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ABSTRACT

LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE CENTRAL
AMERICAN PEACE PROCESSTHE CONTADORA AND ESQUIPULAS II CASES
MAY 1992

MARY KATHRYN MEYER, B.A.
M.A.

,

,

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA

PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by:

Professor Howard J. Wiarda

The purpose of this study

is

to examine the Contadora and

Esquipulas phases of the Central American peace process of the
1980s
as

inter-related case studies that provide important insights into

the interests, capabilities, and limits of contemporary Latin

American diplomacy and foreign policy making.

By reconstructing and

analyzing the diplomacy of the regional peace process, this study
seeks to understand why it persisted for as long as it did despite

tremendous political obstacles and expectations of failure.
study shows that the peace process

is

This

rooted in the diplomatic

traditions of Latin America, but it emerged and persisted because of
the development of the new interests, capabilities, and diplomatic

innovations of several Latin American states.
To understand the lessons of the Central American peace

process, this work opens with the study of the traditions and

historical development of Latin American diplomacy through the 1970s
and up to the emergence of political crisis and war in Central

America.

Then it focuses on reconstructing the significant phases

.

and diplomatic events of the Contadora
and Esquipulas peace

processes and examines their central documents.

Finally, it

analyzes the specific foreign policy interests,
capabilities, and

contributions of four states actively involved
in the peace process,
Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica,
in order to understand
the nature of contemporary Latin American
diplomacy and its import
to both the persistence of the peace process
and the future of inter-

American relations.
This study's primary level of analysis

is

at the inter-regional

level, focusing on Latin American diplomacy, however,
factors at the

systemic and societal levels of analysis also receive considerable

attention.

The data used comes from both primary and secondary

sources and includes interviews by the author with several

Nicaraguan and Costa Rican diplomats actively involved in the peace
process, including former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, who won
the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts.

In the end, this study seeks

a deeper understanding and appreciation of the foreign policy

interests and diplomatic capabilities of our Latin American

neighbors
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

On January 8 and 9, 1983, the foreign
ministers of Mexico,

Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama met on the
Panamanian island of

Contadora to discuss several issues of mutual
concern, but the focus
of their talks centered on the deteriorating
political and military

situation in Central America.

After having developed growing

interests in and ties to the isthmian region during
the 1970s, the
four states meeting at Contadora had become alarmed
at the deepening

civil wars and political violence in El Salvador, Nicaragua,
and

Guatemala in the early 1980s.

Not only were these internal

conflicts becoming increasingly bloody; they also threatened to
spill over national borders.

Increased numbers of refugees,

emerging border conflicts, and the growing militarization of the
region with the help of outside powers meant that the region's civil

conflicts were taking on ominous international dimensions.
renewal of the cold war and

a

reassertive United States

in

The
its

traditional sphere of influence complicated the regional crisis

while the peacekeeping mechanisms of the Organization of American
States (OAS), which was itself in crisis, were incapable of dealing

with Central America's deepening wars.

The four foreign ministers

meeting at Contadora called on the Central Americans to find some
framework for negotiations to resolve their internal and inter-state
conflicts.

Before long, this call for dialogue and peace evolved

.
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into an ongoing peace process that
persisted through the end of the
dec ade

The Central American peace process
that emerged after January
1983 had three major phases.

The first was the Contadora
phase,

lasting from January 1983 to April 1987.

In this phase,

the

Contadora Group countries (Mexico, Venezuela,
Colombia, and Panama)
persisted in their efforts to encourage and
mediate negotiations
aimed at containing and resolving the Central
Americans' conflicts.

Through the Contadora peace process, the Contadora
Group states
sought to provide

a

shelter of diplomacy in the midst of war so that

the Central Americans could find a formula for
regional peace and

demilitarization.

The Contadora Group mediated the negotiation of

— the Contadora Act for
America — aimed at achieving these

three different versions of an agreement

Peace and Cooperation in Central

goals despite insurmountable obstacles, including the hostility of
the United States, the intransigence and stalemate of the Central

Americans, and the serious economic and debt crises the Contadora
Group states faced in the 1980s.
in the face of

The Contadora Group's persistence

these obstacles provides significant lessons about

the foreign policy interests, political will, and diplomatic skills
of these states.

While other studies of the Contadora peace process

have focused on explaining why it failed, we will try to understand

why it persisted for so long and how

it

laid the groundwork for the

subsequent phases of the Central American peace process.
The second phase of the regional peace process, the Esquipulas
phase, overlapped Contadora as it emerged with the inauguration of

3

Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo in
January 1986.

Its highpoint

came in August 1987 at the second
formal summit meeting of the
five

Central American presidents in the small
town of Esquipulas,

Guatemala, a town known historically
as the destination of

Pilgrimages by the faithful seeking miracles
from its Black Christ.
If the second Esquipulas summit
was not exactly miraculous,

it was

successful in finally producing an agreement,
inspired by Costa
Rica's President Oscar Arias, that allowed
the five Central American

presidents to embark on

a

new process of internal national

reconciliations, democratization, and regional peace
and
cooperation.
II agreement

While fulfilling all the commitments of the
Esquipulas

—the Esquipulas

and Lasting Peace in Central

II Procedure for Establishing a Firm

America— would prove difficult, those

commitments (among other factors) facilitated the internal process
of national reconciliation, cease fire talks, and democratization

that eventually led to the end of the contra war in Nicaragua in
1990.

The diplomatic commitments of the Esquipulas II summit and

its five subsequent presidential summits also played a role (along

with other factors) in bringing the Salvadoran government and its

revolutionary opposition to yet

a

third negotiating table under the

auspices of the United Nations secretary general's office,

culminating in

a

cease fire agreement in El Salvador's long civil

war in January 1992.
The third phase of the Central American peace process takes us

outside of the realm of inter-state diplomacy as

it

centers on the

4

internal peace processes of the individual
Central American states,

particularly those of Nicaragua, El Salvador,
and (less
successfully) Guatemala.
await future research.

The analysis of this phase will have
to

Instead, the focus of this study
is on the

emergence, persistence, and meaning of the
Latin American diplomatic

response to the inter-state conflicts in Central
America in the
1980s.

More specifically, the purpose of this study

is

to examine

the Contadora and Esquipulas phases of the
Central American peace

process as inter-related case studies that provide
insights into the
interests, capabilities, and limits of contemporary Latin
American

diplomacy and foreign policy making.
The Contadora and Esquipulas phases of the Central American

peace process are rooted in the traditions of Latin American

diplomacy.

These traditions include the nineteenth century practice

of diplomatic unity in the face of threats from outside powers and

the twentieth century challenges by Latin American states to United

States hegemony and intervent ionism in the

c

ircum-Car ibbean region.

The diplomacy of the Central American peace process also stems from

divergent interests between Latin American states and the United
States over the uses of the Organization of American States (OAS)
and from longstanding weaknesses of OAS mechanisms of conflict

resolution when significant U.S. interests were involved.

Existing

studies of the Central American peace process (the vast majority of

which focus on the Contadora phase alone) fail to take this
diplomatic history into account

— to

their detriment.

.
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Beyond these traditions, the Contadora
and Esquipulas peace

processes also indicate several innovations
in contemporary Latin

American diplomacy and new lessons for
understanding the role of
Latin American states in regional and
world affairs.

The Contadora

peace process developed out of the desire
of the Contadora Group
states to protect their emergent subhegemonic
interests in the

circum-Caribbean region that were based on growing
economic,
political, and cultural ties.

Contadora also represents an

increased willingness and capacity of the Contadora
Group states to
play

a

more active role in regional and international affairs.

If

the multilateralism of the Contadora process was
not entirely new,

the persistent and skillfull diplomacy of the Contadora
states

throughout the complex negotiating process was.

The Contadora Group

states were able to persuade the Central Americans to embark on

regional talks and kept them involved for several years.

Even

though the political stalemate between the Central Americans over

verification procedures and timetables for demilitarization
prevented the finalization of the Contadora Act, the Contadora
states succeeded in keeping open the political space for dialogue
and the peaceful resolution of conflict in a region rent by war and

pressured by outsiders for bigger military build-ups.

That

political space allowed the Esquipulas phase of the peace process to
emerge
It

is

unlikely that the Esquipulas phase of the regional peace

process could have emerged without the previous mediation efforts of
the Contadora Group states and their continued support for regional

—
6

peace talks.

But the Esquipulas phase,
which has yet to be studied

seriously in North America, also
provides new lessons about the
nature of contemporary regional
diplomacy. Guatemala's President
Cerezo initiated a new forum for
discussion by inviting the Central
American presidents to face-to-face
meetings in Esquipulas. Costa
Rica's President Arias later
presented a new and simpler plan for
regional peace (leaving Contadora's
complex demilitarization talks
for the future)

successfully.

that the five presidents themselves
could negotiate

Several more presidential summits followed
the

Esquipulas II meeting.

The summit diplomacy of the Esquipulas
phase

was an unprecedented and innovative means
by which the Central

American presidents could come to know and respect
each other,
understand each other's positions, and find

a

workable formula for

achieving regional peace and cooperation.
To understand these and other lessons of the Central
American

peace process, we will study the traditions and historical

development of Latin American diplomacy through the 1970s and up to
the emergence of the regional peace process.

We will then

reconstruct the significant phases and events of the Contadora and
Esquipulas peace processes and analyze their central documents.
Finally, we will analyze more closely the foreign policy interests,

capabilities, and contributions of four states actively involved in
the peace process

—Mexico,

Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica

in order to understand the nature of contemporary Latin American

diplomacy and its import both to the persistence of the peace
process and to the future of inter-American relations.

7

Our historical analysis will devote
particular attention to the

factors at three levels of analysis that
have influenced events.
Our primary focus is at the inter-regional
level and our primary

interest is Latin American regional
diplomacy.

In other words, we

hope to understand how Latin American
states have related to each

other at the regional level, both historically
and during the

Central American peace process.

Yet factors at two other levels of

analysis are also important for our study and
will receive
attention.

Following James Rosenau's (1976) classification,
these

are the systemic (or international) and the
societal (or domestic)

levels of analysis.

At the systemic

level we will consider the

international political factors that have influenced events and
shaped Latin American diplomacy over the years, including threats

from European powers during the formative nineteenth century,

relations with the United States as

it

emerged as a regional and

international power, and relations within regional and international

organizations such as the OAS and the United Nations.

This level

will also be important for understanding the role of U.S. policies
toward Central America during the 1980s and the Contadora Group's

diplomatic response to them.

At the societal level, we will try to

understand the internal or domestic political factors that have
shaped both the foreign policy making process and ultimately the

diplomacy of the states involved in the peace process.

By devoting

attention to these three levels of analysis, we hope to gain a
fuller understanding of the emergence, persistence, and meaning of
the Central American peace process.

,

8

The data used and analyzed in this
study come from both primary
and secondary sources, but a special
effort has been made to include
and at times favor the writings of
Latin Americans.

recent years there has been

a

Indeed,

in

virtual explosion of works from
Latin

America on the region's foreign policy
and diplomacy (e.g., Munoz
ed., 1988, 1987, 1986; Puig, ed.,
1984; Hirst, 1987; Tomassini,
and others).

1981;

The richness of this material

excellent topic for study, and parts of
provided in Chapters IV and VIII.

a

is

in itself an

preliminary analysis are

These Latin American works are

also good sources for information on regional events
and actors (and

often documents) not readily available in the United States.

Beyond

these works, the primary sources used in this study include
the

writings and speeches of nineteenth and early twentieth century
political figures from both Latin America and the United States as
well as treaties and other historical public documents focusing on

pre-World War II inter-American relations.

Most of these sources

can be found in collections or anthologies published in Latin

America or the United States (see e.g., Alvarez, 1924; Lecuna and
Bierck, 1951; Dozer, 1966; Gantenbein, 1950).

Primary sources relating to more recent events, particularly
the Central American peace process, include numerous documents

(communiques, information bulletins) produced by the Contadora
Group, the three versions of the Contadora Act, and the Esquipulas
II Procedure.

These and other official sources can be found in

various North American and Latin American collections (e.g., Bagley
et al

,

1985; Muffoz

,

ed

.

,

1988;) or in Latin American periodicals

Clones

Internar.iop q 1 PC

,

and

I n tegraci<<n

T.at

inn.^V

^

More

importantly, valuable interviews by this
author with several Central
American diplomats actively involved
in the peace process,
such as

Alejandro Bendana,

Jose* Leo'n

Talavera, and Dennis Torres in Manag,

in June 1990, and Luis Guillermo
Solis and President Oscar Ar:ias

in

San Jose" in January 1991, provide
crucial first-hand insights into
the Contadora and especially the Esquipulas
phases.

sources include newspapers (especially the New
York

Other primary

Tin^

in the

United States and Central America that further
document regional
events and the course of the peace process during the
1980s.

Secondary sources used tend to focus on the more historical
aspects of our topic, but along with trying to favor the Latin

American voice, special attention has been devoted to including
the
"classics" of Latin American or inter-American history, such as
Atkins, (1989) Gil (1971), Inman (1965), Karnes (1976), Langley
(1985), Munro (1964), Perkins (1966), Perez (1983), Ronning (1963),

Schmidt (1971), Schneider (1958), Slater (1970), and Woodward
(1976).

The secondary sources relating to the Contadora process,

such as Bagley and Tokatlian (1987), Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo GarciaPena, eds., (1985) and Drekon ja-Kornat (1985), are cited mainly for
the specific dates or other hard to find data on events and to

provide the reader with citations of alternative studies relating to
the course of the early years of the Contadora peace process.

Finally, other secondary sources on the Contadora phase of the peace
process, particularly by North Americans, such as Bagley (1986),

1

Arnson (1987), Purcell (1985), Farer
(1985), Goodfellow (1987), Karl
(1986), and others, are used as much for
their negative views on the

prospects for Contadora's success as for
the information on the
peace process they contain. For
indeed, as noted above, most
North

American works on the Contadora phase
of the peace process seek to
explain how or why the Contadora mediation
was failing.
interested in explaining how or why
Thus,

in the coming chapters,

following way.

In Chapter II,

it was

Few seemed

persisting.

our study will proceed in the

the formative period of Latin

American diplomacy from the 1820s through the
1880s will be studied.
We will see how and why nineteenth century Latin
American diplomacy

turned repeatedly to the use of multilateral conferences

congresses— aimed

at protecting

great power intervention.

the weak states of the region from

In Chapter III,

and the 1930s will be covered.

—or

Of special

the period between 1889

interest here

is

the

development of Latin American views and diplomatic responses to U.S.
policies in the

c

ircum-Car ibbean region during the transformation of

the Monroe Doctrine from a defensive policy statement to a rationale

for intervention.

Moreover, we will also study the development of

inter-American institutions and conferences during this period and
related Latin American diplomacy to press for the U.S. acceptance of
the non-intervention principle, which finally came with the Good

Neighbor Policy in 1933.

We will also find that earlier in this

century, three Latin American states undertook
(the ABC Mediation) that provides

a

a

mediation effort

little studied but interesting

precedent for the Contadora mediation.

0

1

1

In Chapter IV,

the post-World War II period
of inter-Amer lean

relations will be studied with
special attention devoted
to the rise
and demise of the OAS system.
We will see how divergent
interests
between the United States and
Latin America over the
nature of the
OAS system (i.e., both the
OAS and Rio Pact institutions)
created
early weaknesses that limited
its ability to resolve the
region's
conflicts, especially when U.S.
cold war interests were involved.

Aside from a brief period in the
early 1960s, the OAS system was
never as solid as it seemed, creating

a

degree of dissatisfaction by

Latin Americans that led to several
attempts to reform its
institutions in the each of the post war
decades.

Moreover, by the

mid 1970s this dissatisfaction (along
with other factors) led

several Latin American states to turn to
other international forums
to press

their foreign policy interests (namely, economic

development and reduced dependency).
developed

In the process,

new presence in international affairs,

a

policy activism, and new diplomatic skills.

a

these states

new foreign

The inability of the

OAS system to deal with the emerging political and military
crises
in Central

America in the early 1980s and the increased propensity

of some Latin American governments to coordinate their foreign

policy strategies and work outside the OAS system to secure their
interests are directly relevent to the emergence of the Contadora
peace process in 1983.
In Chapter V, we will look at the emergence of political

violence and civil war
early 1980s.

in Central

America in the late 1970s and the

With deep roots in the past and revolutionary

12

implications, the civil wars in Nicaragua,
El Salvador, and

Guatemala were soon caught up in the
reemergent cold war of the
time.

The purpose of this chapter

is

to identify the regional and

extra-regional players that were involved
and their respective
positions on the deepening political
and military crises in Central
America.

We will also see how international
calls for peace in the

region led to the first meeting of the
Contadora peace process.
In Chapters VI and VII, we will
reconstruct and analyze the

course of the Central American peace
process from the first

Contadora meeting in January 1983 through the
Esquipulas summits.
The Contadora phase can be broken down and
studied in five stages:
(1)

Initial Optimism and the Constitution of the
Contadora Framework

for Peace (January 1983-January 1984);

(2)

The First Draft of the

Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America
(FebruaryOctober 1984); (3) The Second Draft of the Contadora Act (November

1984-December 1985); (4) Stalemate and the Third Draft of the
Contadora Act (January-June 1986 and beyond); and (5) the transition
to the Esquipulas phase.

two stages:
(2)

(1)

The Esquipulas phase will be considered in

The Arias Plan and the Esquipulas II Procedure, and

the Post Esquipulas II summits.
In Chapter VIII our focus shifts to analyzing and comparing the

particular foreign policy interests and diplomatic capabilities of
Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica.

We will look more

closely at the emergence of a greater international activism by
these states since the 1970s and the related development of

diplomatic skills that were significant

in

driving the peace process

1

onward during the 1980s.

We will also compare the
contributions and

limits of these states as they
participated in the Contadora and

Esquipulas phases.

Of special

interest here

is

gaining some

insights into these states' foreign
policy making processes and

evaluating their degree of exercising
what Puig (1975/76) has called
"relative autonomy."

Finally, in Chapter XI, we will
discuss the

lessons of the Central American peace
process for understanding the

nature of Latin American diplomacy in the
1980s as well as the
implications for the inter-American system into
the 1990s.

proceeding in this way, it

is

By

hoped that we can gain a deeper

understanding and appreciation of the foreign policy
interests and
diplomatic capabilities of our Latin American neighbors.

3

CHAPTER II
NINETEENTH CENTURY FOUNDATIONS OF
LATIN AMERICAN
DIPLOMATIC UNITY

shall tell you with what we must
provide ourselves
order to expel the Spanish and to
found a free
government.
It is unioji, obviously; but
such a union
will come about through sensible
planning and welldirected actions rather than by divine
magic."
Sim6n Bojivar, from the "Jamaica Letter,"
September
I

m

6

,

181 5.

The Contadora and Esquipulas peace
processes constitute

important and meaningful examples of Latin
American diplomatic
initiative, expertise, and concerts i^n
(harmonization) in the
face of what the participating states perceived
to be

a

series

foreign threats to their national interests and security.

of

Yet contrary to the assertions of some observers and

participants,

the Contadora and Esquipulas diplomatic

initiatives were not the first such examples.
a

In fact,

there is

long history of active Latin American diplomatic solidarity

and cooperation when confronted with foreign military threats
and

interventionism from outside powers.

This diplomatic

history of Latin American unity in the face of foreign threats
is

tangled up with the seemingly contradictory Bolivarian

aspirations of continental confederation versus the absolute
independence and sovereignty of individual Latin American states
during the nineteenth century.

In this chapter, we shall

attempt to untangle the Bolivarian meaning of Latin American

unity, show its decidedly foreign
affairs orientation, and tell
the story of Latin American
diplomacy during the formative

nineteenth century.

Spanish-American Conf ederative Ideas
at Independence
The idea of unity to win the independence
and defend the

sovereignty of the emerging sister republics
in Spanish America
was integral

to the labor of the independence
movement

itself.

By 1810 arguments stressing the
consanguineous bonds between

Spanish-Americans were well-established

many provincial

in

capitals, where calls for unity and confederation
to create

a

great American "family of brothers" inflected the
incipient

Creole nationalism.

For independence leaders like the Chilean

Juan Egana, the Honduran Jose' Cecilio del Valle, and many
others, ties of blood and identity rooted

in

a

common history of

conquest and colonial tutelage, strengthened by common bonds of
language, religion, law, social custom, and
of the uniqueness of el

puebl o americano

;

a

shared perception

All seemed to bind

the restive Spanish-American provinces into natural political

union (Moreno Pino, 1977: 33, 37;

Davis, 1977a: 69-70).

In addition to such inward-looking arguments based

in

the

presumed consanguinity of the emerging sister republics, Juan
Egana and others also developed the argument that Spanish-

American union was necessary for the mutual defense against
European attacks.

This more outward-looking cons iderat ion was

particularly strong

Santiago de Chile, where one
.ember of

in

the governing junta, Juan
Martinez de Rosas, argued in
his
C

^ismo

Politico Cri

s

fi

r

mn

(1810)

for the confederation of the

Spanish colonies of South America in order
to expel all foreign

domination.

Declaration

Meanwhile, another Chilean document of
1810, the
<je

1 0B

Dererh os
,

flgj

P„

congress of the nations of America

pMo
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caUed

for &

for their organization and

strengthening, and looked forward to the
day when "America's
voice, meeting in congress

..

.and speaking to the rest of the

world, would impose respect" (Moreno Pino,
1977: 33, 36-37).

After 1810 both arguments served to unify
South American

independence forces
against Spain.
in

in

the political and military campaigns

But as the final

independence battles drew near

the early to mid-1820s, centrifugal forces also
appeared to

disprove the assumption that the former colonial provinces
shared unbreakable bonds of natural kinship and community.

After centuries of administrative and commercial centralization
by Spain, the reality was that isolated provincial capitals,

each with distinct identities and interests, had already begun

their separate albeit difficult experiments with self-

government.

Large distances, imposing geographical barriers,

and poor communications systems between the provinces served to

promote provincialisms and parochial jealousies.

Political

differences concerning the best form of government (i.e.,

republicanism vs. monarchism; unitarism vs. federalism) and the
power of local

c

aud il los also contributed to these centrifugal

forces, revealing deep internal
political and class divisions

both within and between provinces
as well as chronic
political
instability.
For Simon Bolivar, such factionalism
and its related civil

disturbances posed serious threats to
completing the project of
independence.

Unity was everything for the Liberator,
as he

stressed in his famous Angostura address
to the Second National

Congress of Venezuela in February of
1819; but the unity he

championed at Angostura was clearly national

in

character.

There he asked the Venezuelan congress
to consider abandoning
its

federal constitution which, he argued, had
resulted from

"the ill-considered pleadings of those men
from the provinces

who were captivated by the apparent brilliance
of the happiness
of the North American people, believing that
the blessings they

enjoy result exclusively from their form of government
rather
than from the character and customs of the citizens"
(in Lecuna
and Bierck, 1951:

180).

constitutional plan for

Instead Bolivar proposed
a

a

unitary republican form of government

that could enhance political equality among citizens and achieve

political stability for Venezuela.
All our moral powers will not suffice to save our
infant republic from this chaos unless we fuse the
mass of the people, the government, the legislation,
and the national spirit into a single united body.
Unity, unity, unity must be our motto in all things.
The blood of our citizens is varied: let it be mixed
for the sake of unity.
Our Constitution has divided
the powers of government: let them be bound together
to secure unity.
Our laws are but a sad relic of
ancient and modern despotism. Let this monstrous
edifice crumble and fall; and, having removed even its

ruins, let us erect a temple to
Justice; and, guided
by its sacred inspiration, let
us write a code of
Venezuelan laws (in Lecuna and Bierck,
1951
191 -92).
:

Here Bolivar the Law-Giver sought to
build

a

viable

sovereign republic whose integrity would
no longer be threatened
by domestic factionalism and civil
unrest; here, as elsewhere in

South America in the next few years, he
sought to eliminate the

institutionalized sources of internal factions
and political
unrest in order to establish fully autonomous
national

governments.

But there was another important
dimension to his

strident pleas for unity both within his native
Venezuela and
elsewhere:

Bolivar the Liberator knew that continuing domestic

political division and anarchy only served the
interests of
Spain and other European powers seeking to restore
imperial

control over Spanish America, thus postponing the day of
real

national independence for the infant sister republics.

Painfully aware of this danger, Bolivar spent several years
campaigning, both politically and militarily, for the domestic
and geopolitical unity of the Spanish American nations.

To

accomplish the latter Bolivar championed several different plans
of "confederation" for the sister republics of Spanish America.

The first and furthest implemented was the decade-long

"union" of Gran Colombia, comprising present-day Colombia,

Venezuela and Ecuador.
address, Bolivar led

a

Just six months after his Angostura

successful military campaign in Colombia,

defeating royalist forces at the decisive Battle of Bocaya.
With Colombian independence thus assured,

a

new constitution for

the "United States of Colombia"
was promulgated in December,

1819,

joining Colombia and Venezuela in

a

"pact of union" that

would also include the province of
Quito after the latter's
liberation.

By the summer of 1822, when
Quito and Guayaquil

formally joined the confederation,
Gran Colombia encompassed

essentially the same territory as that
of the former colonial

Viceroyalty of New Granada circa 1800.

Boli'var seemed to have

held high hopes that this union 4 could
produce

composed of Venezuela and New Granada."

"a new nation

News of its dissolution

after Venezuela's secession in early 1830 was
clearly an
important source of bitterness in the last few months
of his
life.

But as Simon Collier (1985: 408-412) points out,
Bolivar

was acutely aware throughout the decade of its rocky
existence
that the "union" would not last.
for its creation and existence,

Moreover, the primary reason
its raison d'etre

been less an experiment in creating

a

,

seems to have

new national or

supranational identity than a geopolitical answer to weakness
the face of ongoing foreign threats.

wrote that in northern South America
nations

..

.will appear ridiculous.

in

As early as 1813, Bolivar
" v

two different

Even if Venezuela and New

Granada were united, this would only just make

a

nation capable

of inspiring due and decorous consideration in others.'"

This concern with appearances on the world stage and the

weaknesses rooted in the

" v

mult ipl

ic

ity of sovereignties'" in

Spanish America was central to the Liberator's calls for unity.
The "pact of union" was something "^presented [to] the world'"

so that the world

-specifically Europe- would take

"Colombians" seriously.

Gran Colombia was created
out of

military and diplomatic necessity
(Collier, 1985: 408).
Bolivar's second plan of confederation

—or

union, or

league (like others in the early
nineteenth century, Bolivar was
never very clear or consistent in
his terminology for these
Plans except that, in this case, the
term "federation" was not
to be used

in public

discourse)- was

short-lived scheme

a

conceived in 1826 but never implemented.

It was proposed and

discussed by Bolivar 5 in the context of
growing political unrest
in Gran

Colombia and related military threats
from the Holy

Alliance.

To put down such factions and check
the danger of

European-supported monarchism, Bolivar proposed

a

federal union

of Gran Colombia, Peru and newly
independent Bolivia (formerly

Upper Peru), named in honor of the Liberator.

The "Bolivarian

Constitution," drafted by Bolivar himself, would have
been
adopted by each member state to create

composed of

a

a

federal government

president or "Supreme Chief," who would tour the

provinces and visit each state at least once

a year,

a

vice

president, and three chambers (Bolivar to Santander, May
1826,

in

7,

Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 585-593; Collier, 1985, 407).

Each state in the confederation would manage its internal

affairs "in agreement, however, with the other states" (Bolivar
to Sucre, August 18, 1826,

in

Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 634).

The government of each state "will continue to be vested in the

President and Vice President and their Chamber and Senate,

respecting all matters affecting
religion, justice, civil

administration, national economy

- in

short,

evervrh^

K„ f

foreign affairs, war, and the Federal
treasury" (emphasis mine;
Bolivar to Sucre, May 12, 1826 in
Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 590591).

However, political factionalism
in Gran Colombia was too

far advanced, and the idea of
such a supranational union was

soon politically dead (Collier, 1985:
406-407).

Perhaps the

idea also seemed superfluous at the
time given the fact that

Bolivar's third plan of Latin confederation,
the 1826 Congress
of Panama, was already under way.

The Congress of Panama

The Congress of Panama

most famous

is

generally held to be one of the

—and unsuccessful— examples

of the Spanish

American attempts to create an ongoing union or federation of
the newly independent states.

For many it remains the mythic

symbol of a Bolivarian ideal that would present to the world a

Latin American giant state with a supranational identity.
However even Bolivar had rejected the possibility of creating
such a state as grandiose and Utopian.

Indeed, in his famous

"Jamaica Letter" of September 6, 1815, which

is

considered the

primary source of inspiration for his confederal experiments and
for the Congress of Panama eleven years later, Bolivar wrote:

a
i°8 e 8
ernn,en t
infUSe Ufe int0 the New
io^d. to putl into use all
World,
1
the resources for public
1InP^0Ve, 6dUCate
3Dd ^ erfect 'he New
£0"^'"^;
'
World, that government would
have to possess the
authority of a god, much less the
knowledge and
(,,Jamaica Letter n in Lecu

r

.

^

^

s:

'

-

-

Boli'var went on to reject the
popular arguments heard

elsewhere stressing the consangu
inous bonds of origin, language,

custom and religion that could unite
the new states.

Rather, he

argued a Montesquieuesque or
Rousseauan line of thought

stressing the "climactic differences,
geographic diversity,

conflicting interests and dissimilar
characteristics" that
divided the new states one from the
other.

Yet Union -"through

sensible planning and well-directed
actions rather than by

divine logic"— was what was needed "in
order to expell the
Spaniards and found

a

free government" ("Jamaica Letter," in

Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 118; 121).

How beautiful it would be if the Isthmus of Panama
could be for us what the Isthmus of Corinth was for
the Greeks!
Would to God that some day we may have
the good fortune to convene there an august assembly
of representatives of republics, kingdoms, and
empires
to deliberate upon the high interests of peace and war
with the nations of the other three-quarters of the
globe.
This type of organization may come to pass in
some happier period of our regeneration. But any other
plan, such as that of l'Abbe St. Pierre, who in laudable
delerium conceived the idea of assembling a European
congress to decide the fate and interests of those
nations, would be meaningless" ("Jamaica Letter," in
Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 118).

Of course, after the news of the 1815 Congress of Vienna

reached the New World and after three other European

"congresses" were held by 1822, the

century plan for

a

Abbe' St.

Pxerre's eighteenth

"union" of sovereign states to
found

system

a

of "perpetual peace" no longer
appeared quite so "delerious."
In fact,

the Congress of Vienna and
the emerging European

Concert System constituted

Bolivarian project of

a

a

more pertinent model for the

"Congress" at Panama than, as

is

often

assumed, the federal congress of the
North American union.

Moreover, the very nature and outcomes
of the European
congresses between 1815 and 1826 prompted
the Latin American
states to counter with their own Congress
for their mutual

protection.

In order to understand this

important point, we

must briefly expain the nature of l'Abbe St.
Pierre's plan for

"perpetual peace" and its partial realization by European
powers
in the early

nineteenth century.

L'Abbe' St.

was to establish

Pierre's five point plan for "perpetual peace"
a

collective security system among the European

sovereigns to replace the seventeenth century balance of power
system, which he considered merely

a

"system of war."

accomplish this, the Abbe' proposed the creation of

a

To

permanent

"congress" to arbitrate and mediate disputes between
sovereigns.

His plan also called for the disbanding of national

armies in favor of

a

multinational force that would provide for

the mutual defense against outside threats.

such

a

The creation of

European "body politic" would respect and protect the

actual possessions and the sovereignty of each member state.
Such a "general alliance" and "permanent society" based on the

.

,

principle of arbitration would
eliminate the pretexts for war
found in the European balance of
power system. The idea was not
so much to create a supranational
state as it was to constitute
a

collective security system and to
institutionalize the

principle of arbitration in settling
interstate disputes
(St. Pierre, 1974).

L'Abb^ had lobbied hard in the
salons of

the European sovereigns at the time
of the Treaty of Utrecht

(1715) to gain support for his plan, and an
essay by Rousseau

helped to popularize the Abbe"s plan in
the latter part of the

eighteenth century.

One hundred years after the Treaty
of

Utrecht, the sovereigns of Europe created

a

short-lived version

of l'Abb^'s plan with the Concert system
originating in the

Congress of Vienna of 1815.
The European "congresses" of the early nineteenth
century
(e.g., Congress of Vienna, 1815; Congress of Aix-La-Chapel le
1818; Congress of Laibach, 1821; Congress of Verona, 1822) had

originated

in

the collaboration of Great Britain, Austria,

Prussia and Russia against France during the Napoleanic wars.
At the Congress of Vienna, this Quadruple Alliance called for

"meetings at fixed per iods
their common interests."

. . .

f or

the purpose of consulting upon

The "Holy Alliance" was also formed in

1815 within this emerging concert system by the Austrian,

Prussian and Russian monarchs.

France became an active member

of the concert in the 1818 Congress of Aix-La-Chapel le

Differences soon emerged within the system over how to handle
anti-monarchical revolts

in

Spain, Italy, and elsewhere as the

Holy Alliance sought to
use the European congresses
as its antirevolutionary instrutnent (Hartmann,
1973: 177
Claude, 1984:
;

25).

Although the European congresses
never became "fixed"
(Great Britain stopped attending
them after the 1822 Congress
of
Verona and a balance of power
system reemerged in Europe),
they

served as powerful examples to
Latin Americans of the ways in
which sovereign states might
coordinate their common interests
in foreign affairs, construct
a bloc of power, and
arbitrate the

questions of war and peace.

More importantly,

it was

precisely

the existence and power of the
Holy Alliance, its anti-

republican use of the congresses, and
its support of the Spanish

monarchy's attempts to reconquer its
former colonies that posed
the most serious threat to the
independence of the new Latin

American republics

in the

early 1820s.

Thus as Bolivar and other Spanish American
statesmen

developed plans for the Congress of Panama, the
goal was not to
follow the North American example of creating

legislative body to govern

a

a

"national"

tight federal union.

The Congress

was not meant to constitute the "national assembly"
of
state.

a

giant

Rather, the Congress of Panama was meant to follow the

European example of coordinating matters of foreign policy and

mutual defense in order to answer the common threat to
independence posed by one of the products of the European

congresses, the Holy Alliance.

As Bolivar put it in a letter to

Francisco de Paula Santander,
Vice President of Colombia,
in
January 1825,

The great sovereigns of Europe
themselves have been
obliged to gather in congresses
in order to establish
cordial and friendly relations
among their respective
states. As long as they relied
on diplomatic negotiations only, discord kept them
apart.
They formed a
congress and composed their differences;
now they are
invincible.
It would seem that we, being
nothing, as
we are on y
the process of being born!
shoul^not
hesitate for a moment to follow
their example
Cm Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 462).

m

As chief of state of Gran
Colombia, Boli'var began to lay

the groundwork for such

a

Spanish-American congress

in 1822.

He

first sent diplomatic envoys to other
parts of Spanish America

with treaties of alliance in the face of
continuing European

military threats.

His emissary to Mexico, don Miguel Santa

Man'a, found an eager ally

in

the Mexican Minister of Internal

and Foreign Affairs, Luca's Alama'n, who would
later play an

important role in nurturing the goal of Latin American

diplomatic unity.

The two signed a treaty of Union, League and

Perpetual Confederation in October 1823 (essentially

a

treaty of

defensive alliance) which was soon ratified by their respective
governments.

Bolivar's emissary to South American capitals, don

Juaquin Mosquera, was also successful in persuading first Peru
(in 1822), then Chile, and finally Buenos Aires to sign similar

treaties; however,

a

political turn of events in Chile and

rising isolationist sentiment in Buenos Aires at the time

prevented the latter two states from ratifying the alliance
treaties.
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Bolivar's diplomatic emissaries had also extended

,

his

invitation to the signatories of these
treaties to hold an

eventual congress
1977:

(Moreno Pino, 1977: 38-39;
Salcedo-Bastardo

92, 95).

On the eve of the defeat of Spanish
forces at the important

Battle of Ayacucho in early December,
1824, Bolivar issued

a

circular to the "Governments of the Other
Republics of Americareiterating his earlier invitation to hold

plenipotentiaries

in

a

congress of

Panama, "or some other point agreed
upon by

the majority ...that should act as

a

council during periods of

great conflicts, to be appealed to in the event
of common
danger, and to be

a

faithful interpreter of public treaties when

difficulties arise, in brief, to conciliate all our
differences"
(Circular, December 7, 1824, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951:
457).

Continued Spanish American unity was important to prevail
against Spain, but appearances mattered most.

congress in Panama was

a

Meeting in a

condition for survival for the weak.

This Congress must serve us at least for the first
ten or twelve years of our infancy, even though it
should dissolve forever following that period.
It
is my feeling that we will live on for centuries if
we can survive the first dozen years of childhood.
First impressions last forever (Bolivar to Santander,
January 6-7, 1825, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 461-62).

Bolivar not only sought to create an image of unity to ensure
survival; he also wanted the Congress to project an image of

strength to convince the Holy Alliance that any further attempts
at reconquest were futile.

Arms and bilateral diplomacy were

.

important, but so was the spectacle
of

a

Spanish Ameri

Congress

The fact that all Europe is against
us and that
all America is devastated makes
quite an appalling
picture
It seems politic, therefore, for
us to
enter into friendly relations with
the gentlemen
of the Alliance, using dulcet and
persuasive words,
order to discover their latest decisions
and
to gain time.
With this end in view, I believe
that [Gran] Colombia, which has taken
the lead in
foreign affairs, should be able to undertake
some
move through her agents in Europe. While
this is
being done, the rest of America, meeting
at the
Isthmus, can ^present itself in a more
imposing
manner (Bolivar to Santander, March
8, 1825, in
Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 479.

m

Though addressed to the "Governments of the Other
Republics
of America," Bolivar's

formal invitation to the Congress of

Panama was originally limited to the states that had ratified
the earlier bilateral treaties of alliance.

It was the

Colombian Vice President, Francisco de Paula Santander, who
extended the invitation to Chile, Argentina, and the United

Provinces of Central America. 7
the

Bolivar had opposed extending

invitation to Haiti, Brazil and the United States.

He

believed that the Congress should be limited only to the Spanishspeaking nations of America in order to enhance the

"homogeneity, compactness and solidity" of the league.

He

believed further that it should be limited to those nations
having republican forms of government (thus excluding Haiti
Brazil)

in

g

and

order to prevent any influence of the Holy Alliance

(Moreno Pino, 1977: 38-39; Salcedo-Bastardo , 1970: 360; Bolivar
to Santander, June 7, 1825,

in

Lecuna and Bierck, 1955: 507-08).

As for the United States,
Boli'var wished to exclude it
on

the grounds that it lacked
"continental solidarity," given its

neutrality during the war with Spain,
and because
Pursue its "own selfish interests."

it

seemed to

Moreover, Bolivar feared

that admitting the United States
to the Congress might create

trouble with Great Britain, which,
considering the latter's

break with the Holy Alliance, he
expected would be the protector
of the Spanish American league.

Courting Great Britain's

recognition, favor, and protection was crucial
to Bolivar's

strategy of checking the threats of the Holy
Alliance.

Great

Britain was also emerging as Spanish America's
leading trade

partner at the time

(Bolivar to Santander, March

8,

1825,

in

Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 479; Bolivar to Santander,
October 21,
in Lecuna and Bierck,

1825,

1951: 543; Bolivar, "Views on the

Congress of Panama," February 1826, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951:
561-62; Bushnell, 1987: 147).

Nevertheless, the governments of Colombia and Mexico
extended the invitation to the United States, and two months

before the Congress opened, Bolivar expressed his approval that
the U.S.

had decided to send an envoy.

Yet the United States

mission to the Congress of Panama never participated.

One of

the two U.S. delegates died en route and the other, John

Sergeant, failed to arrive until after the Panama sessions had

closed
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(Wilgus and D'Eca, 1963: 385; Moreno Pino, 1977:39;

Bolivar to Revenga, Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, April
8,

1826,

in Lecuna and Bierck,

1951: 585; Bushnell, 1987: 147).

Likewise, Brazil was finally invited
to the Congress of

Panama but its delegate never arrived,
presumably because Brazil
was not interested in helping to
strengthen Spanish America

(Atkins, 1989:177).

Great Britain and the Netherlands
were

invited to send observers, largely
due to Spanish American hopes
for favorable trade relations with
the two, and delegations from

both states were present at the Congress.
invited

Paraguay was never

(Moreno Pino, 1977: 40; Davis, 1977a:
72; Bushnell,

1987: 147; Boersner, 1986: 110).

The long-awaited Congress of Panama finally
opened on June
22,

1826.
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Over the course of the next three weeks of the

early Panamanian summer, the plenipotentiaries held ten
meetings
and worked to produce four interrelated diplomatic
instruments.

The first and most central was the Treaty of Perpetual Union,

League and Confederation, which established

a

defensive alliance

based on the principle of collective security and provided for
other principles of cooperation within the league, such as

conciliation and arbitration.
agreements to create

a

Related to this treaty were two

multinational army and navy of 60,000

men, with each nation providing

with Colombia for leadership
than half of the 60,000.

a

set quota.

Mexico, which vied

in the league, was

to supply more

Finally, given the torrid summer heat

and the uncultivated surroundings they found in Panama, the

delegates agreed to move the site of the Congress to Tacubaya,
outside Mexico City, where they would meet to continue their

diplomatic work every two years.

The Congress then adjourned on

.

July 15, 1826 so that the
plenipotentiaries could escape the
summer heat and seek ratification
of the agreements in
their
respective countries (Moreno Pino,
1977: 40; Salcedo-Bastardo
1970: 360; Wilgus and D'Eca,
1963: 385; Davis, 1977a:
73).
Only Colombia ratified the
accords of Panama, and even
Bolivar opposed this ratification.
In a letter to the
Colombian
delegate to the Congress of Panama,
General Pedro Briceno
Me'ndez, Bolivar expressed his

immediate disapproval of the

treaties based on two problems.

First, he opposed the

relocation of the assembly to Tacubaya
on the grounds that

it

would come to be dominated by the
"already disproportionate-

influence of Mexico, and possibly by the
United States.

Second,

Bolivar considered the terms of the convention
on troop

contingents "futile and ineffective" as well
as dangerous; its
provisions for cavalry strength were "contrary to
all the
principles of the art of warfare."

More importantly, "[t]he

convention does not even regard [a foreign] invasion

as

being

serious unless it involves over 5,000 men, and aid will
be

rendered in such cases only.

inevitable occupation."

This condemns certain countries to

Bolivar noted that there was "unanimity

of opinion" about these matters throughout the other South

American republics and urged that the treaties not be ratified
pending his return to Bogota for more detailed discussions

(Bolivar to Briceno Mendez, September 14, 1826, in Lecuna and
Bierck, 1951: 637).

Other factors were at work
that led to the failure
of

ratification of the Panama accords.

Desp.te Bolivar's concerns

vith the dangers of the military
convention,

it appears

that by
the second half of 1826
and thereafter, few
perceived a credible

European military threat to
Spanish African independence.
Though such

a

threat had seemed important
when the invitations

for the Congress were sent
out in December, 1824, the
defeat of

Spanish forces at Ayacucho that
same week turned out to be
decisive.

While sporadic military skirmishes
had continued, by

mid-1826 independence seemed assured.

Like Great Britain, even

France had long foresaken the imperial
cause of the Holy

Alliance and, through the Polignac Memorandum
of 1923, had
promised the British not to intervene by
force in Spanish

America (Davis, 1977a: 46, 59, 70).
Beyond this changed international situation,
Moreno Pino
(1977: 41) argues that, due to the diplomatic and
political

inexperience of the Congress delegates, the four Panama
accords
failed to win approval because they were legally tied
too

closely together:

widespread misgivings about the military

convention meant that the entire package of agreements had to be
opposed

—or

revised at

a

later date.

The package was too much

too late for the member states to support.

Finally, internal factors in several states prevented even
the revision, much less the ratification, of the Panama

accords.

The government of Mexico tried twice to get its

congress to ratify the treaties, but political insurrections

prevented it.

Gran Colombia, wh.ch soon
came to loggerheads

with Peru, was on the verge
of dissolution, and civil
war in
Central America beginning in 1827
prevented ratification there.

Independence had been won but
internal unrest, so

c 0ffim0 n

to

newly independent states and
fueled by an emerging
caudillismo
and Liberal-versus-Conservative
factionalism in almost every

Spanish American republic in the
late 1820s, left Bolivar and
his dream of a united Spanish
American league in disarray

(Moreno Pino, 1977: 41-42; Lecuna and
Bierck, 1951: xxii;

Atkins, 1989: 178).
Insofar as no permanent league of Spanish
American states
was legally created, the Congress of
Panama was

However, its failure

is

a

qualified one.

a

failure.

Although its

agreements were set aside, the Congress provided
an important

precedent for and useful symbol of Spanish American
diplomatic
unity in the face of foreign military threats during
the rest of
the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth.

The

Congress of Panama at least laid the groundwork that
facilitated
the holding of subsequent Latin American diplomatic
congresses
as

the preferred means of addressing certain common foreign

affairs concerns.

Liberals, diplomats, and experts in

international law tended to continue to embrace the notion of
Spanish or Latin American unity to meet the threat of foreign

interventionism.

As the nineteenth century wore on, these

proponents of Latin American diplomatic unity were also able to

develop a body of international legal principles, if not law,

renouncing the use of force and
stressing arbitration as
a means
to settle international
disputes. A brief overview
of these

developments during the rest of
the nineteenth century

is

important for understanding the
nature of Latin American

diplomacy and inter-American
relations in the twentieth
century.

Latin American Congresses After
Panama

In the late 1820s and 1830s,

the government of Mexico led

the effort to reanimate Bolivar's
project of a Spanish American

league, both to adopt

a

common policy of defense against further

European intervention and to carry out common
negotiations for

diplomatic recognition by Spain.

Tacubaya were sent out in 1831

,

Invitations for congresses at
1834, 1836, 1838, 1839, 1840 and

1842, but these Mexican efforts proved to be in vain.

In spite

of any empathy for Mexico's problems with Texas,
other Latin

governments were suspicious of Mexico's bid for leadership,

especially after
Spain in 1835.

it

independently negotiated its recognition by

Moreover, growing political instability

throughout Spanish America in the 1830s made foreign policy

a

low priority for the region's troubled governments, many of

which came to be dominated by conservative military caudillos
little interested in the largely liberal project of unionism.
The outbreak of the Mexican-American War (1846-1848) brought an
end to Mexico's leadership in promoting the conf ederative idea;

however, the war did contribute
to renewed concern over
foreign
interventionist, elsewhere in Latin
America, particularly in

Peru

(Inman, 1965: 20-21

;

Nuermberger, 1940: 32; Moreno Pino,

1977: 42).

Immediate interest in holding a
second "American Congress-

grew among the Andean republics
in 1847 when they were
presented
with the threat of a military
expedition organized in Europe by
the exiled president of Ecuador,
General Juan

WFlores.

With

2,000 Spanish and British mercenaries, General
Flores sought to
oust the Liberal government and
support the conservative cause
in Ecuador and

elsewhere.

In Colombia,

there also existed the

fear that General Flores would use his
forces in

venture in Panama.
republics,

a

2

a

filibustering

With Flores' threat to the Andean

growing suspicion of imperialist ventures

in

Central and South America, and the Mexican-American War,
the

government of Peru issued the formal invitations for the
"American Congress," which was held in Lima from December 1847
to March 1848

(

Inman

,

1965: 21-22; Moreno Pino, 1977: 45-46;

Davis, 1977a: 100; Nuermberger, 1940: 32, 35).
The governments of Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Chile

responded positively to the Peruvian invitation and participated
in the Congress.

The government of Colombia had issued an

unauthorized invitation to the United States, but this was soon
retracted by the conference organizers because of the Mexican-

African

War.

13

.

Over the course of three months,
the Congress delegates
met informally several times
a week to draft four
separate
treaties.
The first and most central
was the Treaty of

Confederation, whose purpose was to
"sustain the sovereignty and
independence of all and each one, to
maintain the integrity of
their respective territories, to
assure in them their dominance
and soveriegnty, to refuse to
consent that they should be

permitted to suffer outrage or offense"
(in Atkins, 1989: 178).
The Treaty embraced the collective
security principle by

outlining the duty of reciprocal assistance
with land and naval
forces to defend against foreign threats
to the political

independence or territorial integrity of its
members.
provided for regular meetings of

a

It also

congress of pleni-

potentiaries, renounced the right of conquest,
and called for
the peaceful resolution of conflicts according
to specified

procedures.

The other treaties included

a

Treaty of Commerce

and Navigation, aimed at facilitating trade through

preferential customs union,

a

Postal Convention, and

a

a

Consular

Convention, addressing such issues as political asylum,
reciprocal duties
in the

in

cases of civil struggles, and an interest

codification of international law

Moreno Pino, 1977

:

(Atkins, 1989: 178;

46)

Other American states, including the United States, were
invited to subscribe to these treaties; but after British port

authorities in Jamaica broke up Flores' expedition and after the

Mexican-American War had ended, interest

in the

confederation

,

waned.

Only the Consular Convention
was eventually ratified
by
the states that participated
in the Congress of
Lima.
It would
become the only agreement
produced by the Spanish American

congresses ever to enter into force 14

(Atkins, 1989: 178;

Nuermberger, 1940: 35).
If the threat of foreign
adventurism seemed to ease by

1849, it re-emerged by the mid-1850s,
prompting renewed unionist

sentiment and several significant
examples of joint Spanish

American diplomatic activity.

This time, however, concern came

to focus on the expansionist
tendencies of the North Americans.
In

late 1854, the Ecuadoran government
signed

commercial

a

convention with the United States minister
granting generous
concessions for the exploitation of guano on
the Galapagos
Islands.

Allegations of the establishment of

protectorate over the islands stirred concern

a

U.

S.

in Peru and

especially in Chile, where anti-Yankee sentiment had
been
growing.

15

The skilled Chilean Foreign Minister, Antonio Varas

succeeded in persuading Ecuador to renounce the convention
by

offering a new Chilean-Ecuadoran commercial treaty as well as

a

mutual assistance pact against "all piratical and filibustering

expeditions."

The latter was requested by the Liberal Ecuadoran

government after it became alarmed that General Flores had taken
up residence in Lima.

Varas was able to diffuse tensions

between Ecuador and Peru by including the latter
discussions for such
discussions emerged

a

a

in

pact in the Spring of 1856.

the

Out of these

draft of the Continental Treaty (also

known as the Tripartite Treaty)
and

American congress

a

tentative plan for

(Inman, 1965: 25; Nuermberger

a

new

1940: 33-39).
The Continental Treaty
provided for the convening
of a
congress of plenipotentiaries
three months after the
exchange of
ratifications of its members.
The congress was to be a
,

consultative body with the "right
and power to offer its
mediation... in the event of
differences arising among the

contracting states."

It was prohibited from
involving itself

with "the intestine commotions,
internal movements or

agitations" of the member nations,
but the signatories were
pledged to assist whenever any state
was threatened by

"piratical expeditions or aggressions."

The treaty affirmed the

preservation of independence of each state,
the non-recognition
of cession of territory except by
mutual agreement, the

prohibition of amassing troops on frontiers for
invasion, and
the existence of an American international
law.

Like the 1848

conventions, the treaty also sought to promote
commercial

expansion by seeking

a

uniform customs system with reduced

tariffs, uniformity of monetary systems and weights
and

measures, rules of navigation and shipping, and postal reform.
It also

included articles encouraging the diffusion of education

and extending generous privileges to members of the learned

professions.

Peru was charged with the responsibility of

inviting other Spanish American governments to subscribe to the
treaty after it was signed by the representatives of Chile,

.

Ecuador, and Peru on September
16
15, 1856

(

Nuermberger

,

1940:

43-46; Inman, 1965: 25;
Moreno Pino, 1977: 46-47).
By that time, however,
William Walker's infamous

filibustering campaign in Nicaragua
was well under way.
North American adventurer held

a

This

dubious claim to Nicaragua's

presidency after defeating the
conservative government's forces
in 1855.

The other Central American
states, led by Costa Rica,

soon united in a military
campaign against Walker. 17

An

incident involving the reception
of Walker's diplomatic envoy
to
the United States, August x'n
Vigil, by the Pierce Administration
in

May 1856 convinced many Latin
Americans that the U.S.

officially supported Walker.

This unfortunate incident not
only

prompted the signing of the Continental
Treaty;

it

also caused

a

flurry of diplomatic protests by
outraged Latin governments and

produced several other joint Latin American
diplomatic
responses

Immediately after the Vigil incident, an
invitation was
issued by Venezuela, where unionist sentiment
had reemerged, for
an American congress on the isthmus of Panama. 18

later,

in November,

Washington held

a

A short time

1856, the Latin American diplomatic corps in

two-day conference at the Peruvian legation to

discuss the Walker filibuster.

Unaware of the terms of the

Continental Treaty and acting without instructions from home

governments, the ministers of seven Spanish American states 19
signed

a sub

spe rat

is

treaty providing for

a

plan of alliance

and confederation and calling for a new American congress in

1

Li-.

Independently of these efforts,
Costa Rican envoys

seeking aid from Chile and
Peru to

f ight

Walker invited all the
Spanish African republics
to an African
congress at San Jose'.
One of the Costa Rican
envoys had also suggested
to Mexico that
it revive the treaties
drafted at the Congresses
of Panama and
Tacubaya; soon, Mexico
offered itself as the site
for a -great
American congress,- arguing
that its proximity to the
U.S. made
it the first line of
defense against Yankee
expansionist

(Nuermberger, 1940: 41-42, 47-51;
Moreno, 1928: 114-115).
With so many different calls
for an American congress in
response to the Central American
crisis, it became difficult to

coordinate anything except the idea
that some such congress
should be held.

The government of Peru focused
on fulfilling

its responsiblity of inviting
other Latin American states to

subscribe to the Continental Treaty.

Colombia, Argentina and

Brazil all expressed reservations
to some of the terms of the

treaty while Venezuela, Mexico, and Bolivia
focused on one of
the various other calls for an
American congress.

Nevertheless,

by June 1857, Peru's envoy to Central
America, Pedro G^lvez, had

persuaded Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Nicaragua to
sign the Treaty. 20

By that time, however, William Walker
had

been routed (in May) by Costa Rican President
Juan Rafael Mora,
who led

a

Walker.
revived

united Central American military campaign to defeat
The "Great National War" of the Central American states

a

sense of unity as well as the idea of re-establishing

the Central American federation. 2

But with Walker defeated and

an Official U.S.
disapproval of his filibuster,
the stifled

internal struggles between
Liberals and Conservatives
soon
resurfaced in Central Africa
and elsewhere.
With the foreign
threat removed, this third
polycentered movement for a
Spanish
American union fell apart and
the Continental Treaty
was
officially shelved by its
sponsors on September 14, 1857 22

(Nuermberger, 1940: 54-55; Karnes,
1976; Moreno, 1928).
Yet this phase of the congress
movement in Latin America
and

its related diplomatic
activity was not a complete
failure.

Latin American diplomatic and
military aid did help to defeat
Walker, and both the Continental
Treaty and the sub so.
pact drafted in Washington caused
the United States to take

notice of the potential power of
the U.S. minister to Peru, J.

a

Spanish American league.

As

Randolph Clay, warned the Peruvian

government in the summer of 1857, the
ratification of both
treaties would have presented

the singular spectacle of a Union of all
the Nations
of the Western Hemisphere, exclusive of
the United
States.
And the only... cause of such exclusion
would
be that the nations signing the treaties
had formed
themselves in£o a league to control the power of
the
United States
(quoted in Nuermberger, 1940: 53).

Moreover, the Continental Treaty would remain an
important
instrument and point of departure

in

the next movement for a

Spanish American congress in the early 1860s.
In March 1861,

Spain annexed the Dominican Republic in

a

bid to reassert its imperial claims in the Western Hemisphere.

The Peruvian Foreign Minister, Jose Fabio Melgar, protested the

annexation and called on the African
republics to unite in
opposition.

In October of the sa me year,
France, England and

Spain signed the Convention of
London, providing for their joint
intervention in Mexico to force
the collection of debts. 24
Once
again the Peruvian foreign minister
sent a circular to other

Spanish American republics urging
a uniform response to growing

European interventionism.

Peru also tried to gain United
States

support in opposing these threats, but
the U.S. Civil War

prohibited North American participation

(Frazer, 1948: 378-379;

Frazer, 1949: 321; Inman, 1965: 26; Davis,
1977a: 109).

After French military forces began
to Mexico City

in April

United States called

a

a

march from Vera Cruz

1862, the Peruvian minister to the

conference of the Spanish American

diplomatic corps based in Washington.

Like their counterparts

six years earlier, the representatives from Peru, Chile,
Mexico,

Colombia, and the two men representing the five Central American
states wrote a document calling for

convention that would

a

constitute the "international law of the Americas," guarantee
the sovereignty of the Spanish American states, and provide for
the collective security of its members.

Meanwhile, the Peruvian

minister to Mexico, Dr. Manuel Nicola's Corpancho, had no trouble
persuading the anxious Mexican government to accede to the 1856

Continental Treaty, as stipulated in
and alliance signed

in June,

1862.

a

bilateral treaty of amity

This Peruvian attempt to re-

invigorate the Continental Treaty was not as successful

elsewhere in Latin America, where

it

was generally held to be

inadequate. 25

Nevertheless, with strong
domestic support 26 the
Peruvian government continued
to plan for a diplomatic

conference in Lima to aid Mexico
in its war against
France
(Davis, 1977a: 109; Frazer, 1948:
382-384, 386).
Then in early 1863, under the
pretext of a "scientific

expedition," Spanish warships
established themselves in Peruv lan
waters off the Chincha Islands.
The true purpose was to force
Peru into settling old financial
claims with Spain and, failing
that, to seize the guano-rich
islands and exploit its riches
as

payment.

Alarmed at Spain's expanded
imperial ventures, the

Peruvian government sent out invitations
for
congress.

a

new American

Once Spain occupied the Chincha
Islands and began to

mine their guano, Chile and other
neighboring states responded

positively to the invitation, both by aiding

in the war against

Spain and by agreeing to hold the
International Congress of

American States (also known as the Second Lima
Congress), which
opened on November 14, 1864 (Davis, 1977a:
121-2; Inman, 1965:
27; Frazer,

1949: 335).

Distinguished delegates from Chile, Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador attended
the congress.

Unlike past congresses, even Argentina took part through
its
respected participant-observer, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento.
issues were on the conference agenda:

The Spanish aggression in

capturing the Chincha Islands and the formation of

American union.

Two

a

permanent

As for the first issue, the congress drew up

warning to the admiral of the Spanish fleet stating that the

a

aggression against Peru
constituted

^ericas, and that

a

threat to all the

if frie ndl y relations
with Spain were to be

maintained, he would have to
withdraw promptly from the
Chinchas.
But the war continued.
A joint Chilean-Peruvian
fleet inflicted important
losses on the Spanish, but
the war
finally ended due to political
changes back in Spain that

reversed its imperial ambitions.

After

treaty between Spain

a

and Peru was signed in January
of 1865, the Spanish fleet
was

withdrawn and the financial claims
against Peru were declared
paid by the sale of the Peruvian
guano.

Spanish forces withdrew

from the Dominican Republic in
the same year (Inman, 1965:
28;
Frazer, 1949: 335-36, 341; Davis,
1977a: 123).

With the crisis over, the international
congress in Lima
turned to its second agenda item,
the establishment of

permanent American union.

a

Four treaties were negotiated

resembling those of the previous congresses.

The Treaty of

Union and Defensive Alliance sought to
guarantee the

independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the union

members through the principle of collective
security.
provided for

a

It also

congress of plenipotentiaries every three years.

The second treaty, On the Conservation of
Peace, called upon the

signatories to settle all differences by peaceful
negotiation
or,

failing that, by arbitration.

boundary disputes,

a

It specifically cited

nagging (and growing) source of conflict

between Latin American states throughout the ninetennth century,
as a matter for negotiation or arbitration.

The third treaty

was another postal convention
designed to improve communications

between the members, and the last
was another Treaty of Commerce
and Navigation, similar to those
of the past

(Frazer, 1949: 339-

341, 343-344; Moreno Pino, 1977:
47; Inman, 1965: 28).

The congress held its last meeting
on March 13, 1865.
of the treaties were ever ratified.

As

in

None

the past, after the

Chincha crisis had been resolved 27 some
delegates began to lose
interest in the conference.

As

in the past,

reservations

surfaced in some states over the specific
terms of the treaties

while in other states, domestic political
differences reemerged.

In Peru and Bolivia, civil unrest

forced both

governments to table the treaty ratifications.

The President of

Chile argued in his national legislature that pacts
of union

between American states would be ineffective until the
individual nations were more stable and could provide for their
own defense.

The Colombian government voiced the opinion heard

elsewhere that the Spanish American states should not form
alliances that might limit their autonomy or involve them
other states' domestic or foreign conflicts

in

(Frazer, 1949: 344;

Inman, 1965: 28; Moreno Pino, 1977: 47).

The Second Lima Congress ended with a lasting sense of

failure.

After 1865, the Latin American states abandoned

efforts to create

a

Bolivarian union and instead turned their

attention to developing several principles and codes of
international law.

Several Latin American legal conferences

were held in the latter part of the nineteenth century,

including the Congress of
Jurists at

Uma

fr0ffl

18

„

to

^^

Bolivaran Congress at Caracas
on arbitration in
1883, and a„
important congress on private
internationa! lav i„ Montevideo
1888-1889. Latin American
dipjomats also worked hard
to gain
international acceptance of
arbitration as

a

in

remedy for

resolving disputes at the
Hague conferences in the
1890s and
pressed for acceptance of the
Drago Doctrine, formulated
by the
Argentine Luis Drago, which
stated that debt or economic
claims
never give rise to a legal
right to intervene by force
in

another country.

But the idea of creating a
uniquely Spanish

American union of states faded
into the past
180;

(Atkins, 1989: 179-

Inman, 1965: 31; Davis, 1977b:
12).

Cone lusion

Why did the Latin American states fail
to establish

permanent Congress after so many attempts?

a

The answer to this

question partly depends on the standards by
which one judges

nineteenth century Latin American diplomacy.

It

is

true that

the statesmen failed to build the necessary
institutional

machinery that would drive an ongoing union of states,
yet

it

is

clear that calling diplomatic congresses to defend against
real
foreign threats was the preferred, accepted, and repeated
means
of countering such threats.

The idea was "institutionalized."

The exercise of Spanish American diplomatic solidarity in

seeking collective
security
securxty agreements
to block European
or
North American
adventurism was at xeast
least strong
stron enough to

coov.ce uetin statesmen
elective

_

that

^

„ asanatural

d eterre d aggression

». f«t

„

^

Whether
wnecner n,
oc
these
congresses

cau£ed foreign
pouers

« ~.

iDterVeDti0nS

usefuijand

for indiyidually
ueaR states

respond to the threat
tnreat of intervention.
ir,*

«*»U,

,

^
^

^

lass important

that nany Latin
teerican sta£es
apparentlybeHeved

such diplomatic unity

£hen uith

^

means of defense.

Moreover, the ho Iding
„f such high . level

^

congres.es „ a s stil, an
innovation in
nat ional r e lati0 „s.

U

their congresses into
.

^

^

the Europeens failed
t0 institutionaUze

"percent" svste,

century, „e should „ ot
hoId the Lati „

different standard.

in

^

the nineteenth

^

^

The Latin American
congresses
digresses of
or i-h*
the nineteenth century
must be appreciated as more
than just ad hoc meetings.
They

constitute the critical points

in

the development of Latin

American diplomatic history
and diplomatic style.
represent

a

series of steps towards
multilateralism

They
in

international affairs aimed at
preserving the peace and progress
of member states.
They were tools that allowed
individually
weak Latin American states to
develop
unity.

a

degree of strength from

Moreover, these congresses also
had agendas that went

beyond dealing with the immediate
threat of foreign

^
^

rnterven tion .

«-t

The diplomat£ at
tne congresses Ieco
the
for increased
.terstate coo P eratio„ and
„ araonUatlon

aiso t „ prooote co
K inally>

_ ^
rce

deveiopMnt

these congresses

,f

thfi

contribution to the deve
lopm ent o £ geoera!
codes of publ ic

-fn-tW

Uv

an. ioternatioaai
legal re.ed.es

conflicts, es P ecia lly
those of

Nation

is

o

resdve

and arbitration

treaties negotiated at
tne congresses snov
each of these themes.

Nevertheless, it

t

a

_

dear c„« itMt

t0

trn* ^v,,,
true
that once signed by
the diplomats,

the treaties produced
by the congresses
failed to receive

ratification by m0S t of the
participating states. These
failures sometimes resulted
from reservations over
certaindetails of the treaties
often followed by calls
for further
negotiation.
Sometimes interstate rivalries
or disputes over
border questions interfered.
But the failure of treaty

ratification appears to be mostly
due to the chronic internal
instability of nineteenth century
Latin American governments.
Liberals tended to support such
diplomatic activity while

conservatives tended to balk at
the Bolivaran notion of

collective security and foreign
policy cooperation against the
European monarchs. Whatever
temporary cooperation may have
existed between Liberals and
Conservatives to defend national
interests against foreign aggression,
once such threats were

r-oved, Liberals and
Conservatives could

reS ume their lnternal

power struggles, thus
upsetting the ratification
28
process.
Related to but going beyond
the chronic instability
and
weakness of Latin governments
in the nineteenth
century, there
is another explanation
for the seeing
f ai l ure

tionalizing the Latin
congresses into

a true

of

instUu .

international

organization in the four
decades after the Congress
of Panama.
Not only were international
organizations as we Know the,
today
as yet unknown, but

of such a regime.

there existed no clear
and accepted hegemon

The strongest states of
the region, Brazil

and Argentina, had remained
mostly aloof from the congress

movement, thus foregoing the
opportunities to lead it.

Mexico

had tried to play a leadership
role until the mid-1840s, and

later Peru came close to playing
such

a

role after that.

Occasionally other states vied for the
leadership role
furthering the Bolivaran project.

in

The jockeying for leadership

roles by Lima, Mexico, Colombia
and Chile may have also stirred

nationalistic jealousies elsewhere, helping
to stalemate the

ratification process.

The polycentered movement for

a

congress

that was never realized in the mid-1850s
clearly suggests that

a

clear and accepted hegemon was lacking.
In any case, as we know from the work
of Keohane and Nye

(1977) and Keohane (1984) on the study of complex
inter-

dependence and international regimes, without

a

clear and

accepted hegemon to lead and support the institutionalization
of

rnternationa: cooperation

win

,

problably not energe
.

S-tes joined

in and

an ongoing international
organiMtion

Indeed> i(

proffered

Mt
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syste. that the machinery
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organization „ as
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eans.
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To be sure>

"ithin the ran-*»erica
n svste* over it,
leader6hip>
Principles, and

^

untii

^

rian

^

hatin American statesmen
continued to

try to develop the
legal and diplomatic
theoes of

especially the principles
of non-intervention

a nd

^

arbitration

and the desire for
economic development, while
North American

statesmen sought to
institutionalize various
versions of the
Monroe Doctrine.
is thi . phase of Latin

„

relations to which we turn in
the next chapter.
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Rica a President Mora, formed a
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"Great National War"
briefly revived a sense of national
unity among the Central
Americans that had all but died after
the break-up of the
United Provinces of Central America
in the 1830s (see
endnote 7). After the fateful Battle
of Rivas
Walker
surrendered to Mora's multinational army
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May 1857 and was turned over to the
captain of a
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subsequent attempts to return to Nicaragua
and reclaim
his
post as president.
In his last attempt, he was
captured by British forces off Honduras which
turned him
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was promptly tried
and executed.
The U.S. government did not support Walker,
however suspicions were raised in Latin America
over the
adventures of this and other filibusters in the circum,
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By December the three powers
had established their
occupation of the customs house at Vera
Cruz.
England and
Spam later dropped out of the intervention,
leaving French
forces to carry out the plan of
installing a European
monarch to rule Mexico.
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The French intervention
in Mexico remained a
source of
concern, but after the U.S.
Civil War ended, the United
States used its
and military pre sure
t
?
France to help rid Mexico of
the Prenc - lnstalled monarchy
of Maximillian
(Davis, 1977a: 110)

dipWic

1

28.

\

One wonders how the diplomats
and foreign ministers
regarded the status of these
signed but^nrat if ied
treaties.
Was there ever any de facto
implementation? For
example, were the 1865 Postal
Convention or the agreements
to share statistical data
complied with by any state
despite the failure of ratification?
Or were these
conventions totally ignored once
internal politics
prevented ratification? More research
is needed in this
obscure area of Latin American
international relations and
foreign policy.

CHAPTER III

independence we hav P

ined lt * and whose

.

President James Monroe's
Statement to the
United States Congress,
1
December
2,

1823.

The Pan-American Union and
The Monroe Doctrines
The government of the United
States tended to remain aloof
from
the various nineteenth century
Spanish American attempts to form
a

diplomatic and defensive union of
states.

The United States shared

with Latin American liberals the
idea that the New World republics
were uniquely different from the
decaying monarchies of Europe, and
the "Two Spheres" concept developed
early in the North American

national consciousness.

However, the Washingtonian and Jeffersonian

pronouncements against permanent, inveterate,
and entangling
alliances became the cornerstone of early
U.S. foreign policy and
precluded serious participation
to the south.

in

the Bolivaran projects of union
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vas elaborated
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European

^

^ ^
^
.^^^
.

f

^

^

states of the Western
Hemisphere, the United States
wou Id interprete
this as a threat to its
own national £ecurity
.
President
statement to Congress, which
on ly much later would
come to he known
3
as the Monroe Doctrine.
was a unilateral policy
statement seeking
to defend the national
interests and security of
the young North
American republic vis-a-vis
European powers.
It did not pledge any
U.S.

aid or support to other
American states for the mutual
defense

of their independence.

It

also recognized the continued
colonial

status of other European territories
in the circum-Caribhean
region,
such as Cuba, Puerto Rico, and
Jamaica (Atkins, 1989: 112-115;

Moreno Pino, 1977: 72-73; Boersner,
1986; Whitaker, 1954; Langley,
1989).

Preoccupied with its land expansion
westward during the rest of
the nineteenth century, the United
States government tended to deal

with the states of South America on
limited, bilateral, and mainly

commercial terms.

Nineteenth century U.S. -Mexican relations are
an

important exception to this generalization,
with the Mexican-

American War (1846-1848) playing an important
role

in the

.
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AMr
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there v,ere factions in
the United
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.,-„ iMeMtt century

.
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cin dipioMtic
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rilibusterers and private
entrepreneurs, such as Willi»
WaXRer
^ohn L. O'SolHv.n,
Cornelius VanderhiHt ana
others, heca.e
intensely involved in the
affairs
US ot
of LpHt,
a
Latln American
states in the

circum-Caribbean region.
Nevertheless, it was not
until the western frontier
was closin,
in the 1880s that the
United States government
officially began to
turn its attention southward
to expand its commercial
ties and
promote commercial opportunities
with the rest of the
hemisphere.
The need for raw materials
for industrial expansion
and the search
for new markets for its
industrial goods were becoming
all the more
important given intense European
(and especially British)

competition.

In the 1880s both the
United States and many Latin

Americans shared

a

growing concern over increased
European economic

investments in the Western Hemisphere
and over Europe's

imperialistic tendencies there as well
as in Africa and Asia.
the United States, this concern
was manifested

in a

In

growing

sentiment of "Pan-Americanism," which
stressed the presumed

geographic ties and political affinities
of the New World
repub

1

ic s

One of the better known Pan-Americanists
in the 1880s was James
G.

Blaine, who served as the U.S. Secretary of
State in two

different administrations.

In 188],

Secretary Blaine issued

59

invitations t0 el! tne Latin
American states

-taxational

confer

in Wa8hington

.

^

<„„

^^

^

^

oot br eak of the War
of the P acifi o (1
879 . 1882 oetveen
Chile.
Peru, and Bolivia),
Secretarv
>> Secretary Blame mtended
for the conference
to
consider ways to prevent
war as well
well as
ac xmprove
commercial

m

-

•

^

relations

the Americas.

After President

President Chester Arthur
rep lace d Secretary
Blaine and poinded the
conference invitations.
Nevertheless, the U.S.
Congress maintained
an interest in Blaine's
ideas and sent a mission
to Latin America to
study commercial
opportunities in the reg ion.
ln 1888 , the Congress
Passed a resolution authorizing
P res ident Grover
Cleveland to call
another international conference
to address commercial
matters as
veil as to consider a plan
of arbitration to settle
international
disputes in the Americas.
The president acquiesced
and invitations
for the Pan-American
conference were sent out.

It was James Blaine,

reinstated as Secretary of State
under the new administration
of
President Benjamin Harrison, who
presided over the First

International Conference of American
States, which opened in

Washington on October
167;

1,

1889 (Moreno Pino, 1977: 75-76;
Peck, 19 77:

Inman, 1965: 33-34; Atkins, 1989:
116).

All of the Latin American states
except the Dominican Republic
sent delegates to the conference. 6

Over the next six and a half

months, until April 18, 1890, Secretary
Blaine ably ran the seventy
sessions of the conference and nurtured
his pan-American vision of

hemisphere of friendship and cooperation.

The first fifteen

sessions focused on the general organization
of the conference and

a
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daman, 1965: 40; Moreno
Pino,
o. 1977'HI.

expansion

^

of . plan 0£
arbitration
75. Atkins,
75;
•

1989: 116; p eck>

1977: 167-168; Boersner,
1986: 194-195).

The Latin American
delegations .ere most
interested in
^cussing toe plan of arbitration
and related politica!
matters
such as those relating
to extradition, the
juridical rights of
foreigners (i n cl uding the
Calv0 principU)>

^^

the right of congest.

^

The conference approved
a treaty providing

for the voluntary
arbitration of international
disputes vhich eleven
states signed, but no state
ratified the treaty before
its deadline
of Kay 1,

1891.

8

The United States was
most interested in discussing
the
commercial matters on the
conference agenda, especially
measures to
for, an inter-American customs
union.
The conference passed various
resolutions concerning improved
transportation and communications

services, uniform customs and
commercial regulations, monetary
and
exchange controls, patents and
copyright protection, and

international sanitation measures;
yet these agreements received few

ratifications (Peck, 1977: 168; Inman,
1965: 43, 45).
Little came of the U.S. goal of creating

a

hemispheric customs

union except for one lasting agreement
that created the

International Union of American Republics.

This rudimentary

regional organization including both the
United States and Latin
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(Moreno Pino, 1977
76;
Atkins, 1989: 205- reck,
Peck
1Q77.
t
=>,
1977: 168; Inman, 1965:
45-46; Boersner,
1986: 194-195; Inter-American
Institute, 1966: xxi).
:

It

took eleven years for a
second International
conference of

American Republics to be held

in

Mexico City (1901-1902),
but two

-re

conferences followed at four-year
intervals after that (in Rio
de Janeiro, 1906, and Buenos
Aires, 1910).
It thus appeared that
the Pan-American movement
gained ground in the first
decade of the

twentieth century.

However, at each of these three
inter-American

conferences, clear differences
emerged between Latin American
states
and the United States over
the structure and control as
well as the

purpose of the fledgling regional
organization.

Differences over the structure of the
organization focused on
the tight control of the U.S.

State Department over the Commercial

Bureau, which was renamed and reorganized
as the International

Bureau of American Republics at the Mexico
City conference in 1902.
The Bureau was restructured to include
Latin American diplomats

accredited to the United States in its directorship,
however the
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U.S.

secret

of state continued

Governments uithout

u

^

t „ fce

recognUion

^^
^

^^^

^

un£ted
those without dipiomatic
representation to Washington
could not
Participate iu the lnternational

-tic ism

U

vas not

^^^^

at suhse q ue„t
conferences hv Latin American
states because

dear whether

internal!

the International
Bureau was an

diplomatic or 8 an administering

equals or merely

a

a

hemispheric union of

technocratic appendage of
the U.S. State

Department, which sought to
control and define
"Pan-Americanism" on
its own terms.
The United States blocked
Latin American demands to
change
these rules until well into
the 1920s.
However, after the 1906

conference in Rio de Janeiro,
the International Bureau
was given an
expanded secretarial role for
the next inter-American
conference.
At the 1910 conference in
Buenos Aires, the Bureau's
structure was
again a topic of debate, but
all that could be agreed
was to rename
it

the Pan American Union after

a

new building of the same name
was

donated by Andrew Carnegie in
Washington to house this

administrative organ of the Union of
American Republics (Moreno
Pino, 1977: 168-172; Atkins,
1989: 205-207; Inter-American

Institute, 1966: xxii-xxiv).

Renaming the Pan American Union was
the only success of the
1910 conference.

As Peck (1977: 172) summarized it,
»[t]be spirit

of Pan Americanism, which had never
been hardy, almost expired at

this conference."

By that time, not only had differences
over the

structure and control of the Union by the
United States become deep,
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but disagreement
over the Purpose
purpose of thm
the regional,
organization
became clearer.
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As heads ef the
organization's

secretariat. t„e ....
secretaries of

^

agenda ite ms of these
ear!y inter-American
conferences on such
apolitical issues a
commercial reiations,
settlement of financia!

c^ms,

the study of the
codification of Internationa,

Uw.

and the

secretariat's own institutional
and procedural
development. The
latin Americans, however,
were more interested in
political and
security issues.
Io the tradition of
the nineteenth century.
Latin
American states thou ht that
g
the purpose of the
Internationa! union
of American Republics
was to ensure the sovereignty
of its members
and develop peaceful.
juridical means t0 seftU iDter .
state
disputes. Conferee was a
second-order issue compared to
the

protection of sovereignty against
interventionist threats from
outside powers.
But by 1910, it vas the
United States, not European
powers, that increasingly seemed
to pose the principal threat
to the

sovereignty of at least the

c

ircum-Caribbean states.

Between 1895 and 1910, Latin
Americans had grown increasingly

concerned over the considerable
expansion of U.S. interests
power over the

c

ircum-Caribbean region.

In 1895, U.S.

in and

Secretary of

State Richard Olney articulated
the new U.S. attitude toward the
region in his instructions to the U.S.
minister to London, who was
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Three years later, in
1898, the United States
intervened in the
Cuban war for independence
fro, Spain and suddenly
found its
military forces occupying
the former Spanish
colonies of Cuba,
Puerto Pico, and the
Philippines. As Philip
Koner
the era of United States
imperialism was born.

^^

Within five years, the
administration of Theodore
Roosevelt had
implemented the Pl att Amendment,
which made Cuba a virtual
protectorate of the United
States, and had secured
the

"independence" of Panama from
Colombia under similar terms
in order
to begin the construction
of a transisthmian canal.
Then, in
response to political and
financial instability in the
Dominican
Republic in 190A, President
Theodore Roosevelt declared his
famous

corollary to the Monroe Doctrine
to justify U.S. military
and
economic intervention in that
island nation:

Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence
which results in
a general loosening of the
ties of civilized society
may in America, as elsewhere,
ultimately require
intervention by some civilized nation,
and in the
Western Hemisphere the adherence of
the United States
to the Monroe Doctrine may force
the United States
however reluctantly, in flagrant cases
of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise
of an international
police power (in Gantenbein, 1950: 362).
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to

interne

by force

„

^

^ ^^ ^

Internationa! police power
in the hemisphere
.
A£ter
°»itea states increasingly
turned to it£ BariDes
to

Sowing security interest8

and en£orce

circum-Caribbean region.

U6

_

^^

authority

^

Thus Huited states
polio, toward Latin America
by 1910 operated
on two singly
contradictory trajectories.
On toe one hand, the
unxted States tried to
promote its cooception of
fr ie„dl y "Pan
AOeriCaDiSffi

"

^

°»

»-•»

ioter-^ericao institutions to

increase the co^ercial oo
ity and cooperation of
the re g ion.
other hand, the Dnited
States increasingly used
its marines

On the

unilaterally and aggressively
to excercise its new-found
aiiitary
and financial power at
the expense of the
sovereignty of E any circu m Caribbean states, including Cuba,
Pana.a, the Dominican Republic,
Nicaragua and soon several
others.

Not surprisingly, U.S.

intervent ionism through military
force

and financial control had
produced considerable resentment
and

opposition in Latin America.

As early as 1901, at the
Second

International Conference of American
States, the Latin Americans
urged the United States to accept
the principle of non-

intervention. 10

The United States opposed the
resolution and was

able to push the intervention
issue off the agenda of subsequent

conferences.

Moreover, U.S. interventionism inspired
many Latin

American essayists, poets, and statesmen
to articulate

a

growing

anti-Yankee sentiment throughout Central and
South America.

Few
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-te„

could Batch the angry
anti . intetVMtion£<tic

X- r agU a„

^

But

y

P oe t Rub , n Dari o's
P oe m "To Ko 0 s avelt "

other Latin A. erican

„ iter .u

^

_

(Wo

^

e

,

,„„

^

eioquenUy pointed

hypocrisy of "P an
Americanism"
icanism and condemned
Theodore Roosevelt's
twisting of the Monroe
Doctrine
lne lnt0
into »a unilateral
-i
claim of
hegemonial police power
over the hemisphere.
Several essayists even
came to identify

^ctrines.

« ltlpll

Monroe
The Chilean diplomat
Marcial Martinez (1913:
302)

compared the Monroe Doctrine
to

a

medal:

On one side was
President

Monroe's "simple and wise
declaration," and on the
other "the
aspirations and schemes
... 0 f imperialism, or
Napoleonism, of the
United States in this
hemisphere." The Mexican
diplomat and
sociologist Carlos Pereyra
(1914: 47-50; 1959)

found at least three

Monroe Doctrines, "perhaps
there are others," each
progressively
-re aggressive than the former and

each serving only United
States-

interests, not those of Latin
America.

Colombo

Still others,

l

ike the

diplomat Santiago PeVez Triana
(1914: 324) and former

Argentine President Roque

Sa'enz Pena

(1914: 345-352), argued that

the original Monroe Doctrine
be extended to prohibit not
just

European but also North American
intervention ism

in

Latin America.

Only in this way could true
pan-American friendship and trust

prevail in the hemisphere.

Despite mounting Latin American
criticism, U.S. interventionism
in the circum-Caribbean region
became even more aggressive

1910s.

in the

Eager to exercise its growing military
power and convinced

of its moral and political
superiority, the Wxlson administration
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turned increasingly
to the use of
gunboat dim.
diplomacy and initiated
prolongued military occuDat-i^o
Y occupations xn several
other Caribbean
states,
including Mexico
(1914), Haiti U915)
(191«n
l
anda the
»
Dominican Republic
Theodore Koosevelt,
Woodrow Wilson was
impatient with
«" political instability of the weak
states of the region
Wilson also held the
traditional Monrovian
concern about the

<»">

-

»

—

Possibility of European
intervention in the states
of the region
ally after the Panama
Canal opened and war
bro.e out in Europe
in 1914.
Grounded or not,
fears of
nf a. European
c
C tears
military threat to
expanded .... interests

^^^

tfc#

Prompted the Wilson
administration to rely
increasin g l y on the
marines as its principal
policy instrument.

Latin America* hostility
to Wilson's gunboat
diplomacy and
prolongued U.S. military
occupations in Cuba, Panama,
Dominican

Wic.

Nicaragua, Mexico, and Haiti
was strong enough to
prevent
any further inter-American
13
conferences
until veil into the 1920s
and preclude continental
solidarity in the course of
World War
But the Latin American
diplomatic response to U.S.
hegemony and

interventionist, in the

c

I."

ircum-Caribbean also took more
positive

forms in the 1910s, !920s, and
1930s.

During this period, both

within and outside of the
pan-American institutions,

a

new kind of

diplomatic activism by several Latin
American states emerged and
sought to challenge the power
of the United States through
various
diplomatic mechanisms while pressing
the United States to accept the

principle of non-interventionism

in

inter-American affairs.

Latin American diplomatic activism
of this period

is

The

important for
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un d e r6tanding the
Eub6equent development Qf

^

institutions of the
inter.A^
cne inter-American
system.
•

Latin American Diplomatic
Challenges to
H ege»ony and
Intervention ism, 1914-1933
The ARC

MeHi^j^

Between 1914 and 1933,
several Latin American
states jointly
used various legal and
dip lo matic means to
challenge the United

Sites' presumed right

of intervention in the

ircum-Car ibbean
The first of these
diplomatic challenges came in
the wake

region.

of the U.S.

c

intervention in the Mexican
Revolution

in 1914, when
three of the stronger Latin
American states, Argentina,
Brazil, and
Chile, offered their good
offices to mediate the military
conflict
between the United States' and
Mexican forces.

The events of the Mexican
Revolution had deeply interested

President Woodrow Wilson since
his first days in office and
he
personally handled much of U.S.
policy toward Mexico. Wilson
opposed General Victoriano Huerta's
claim to power after the

assassination of Mexican President
Francisco Madero and his vice
president.

Instead, in the country's bitter civil
war, Wilson

supported the constitutionalist forces
led by Venustiano Carranza
against General Huerta's federalist
forces.
In April 1914,

two incidents occured in close succession
that

drew U.S. marines into direct conflict with
General Huerta's
forces.

The first incident involved the arrest of

marines on April

9

a

group of

that had disembarked from its ship in Tar.pico
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^

—

»

- -1

metter w a s

without the permission
o£ the local
authorUies
SOOD cleared up
thfi
uere

^

_

^^
wMch controUed ^

*.«. admiral aemana e a an
officlal apology

"as

by Huerta's forces

,

refused these demands.

^^
^ ^

^
^^

^

Preside u-i
Presxdent
Wxlson responded by
announcing
naval blockade of Mexico's
coasts to° cut off arms
.
shipments to
Huerta's forces and bv
oy askxng
askino Congress for
the authority to
use
military force in nexico
Mexico if it
i* x
became necessary.
Before the Congress coula
act the seco nd incident
occured .
APHI 20 soother U.S. ship at
the port of

German ship

„,

about £0

deUver

^

$

a

0q

^

GeMrai Huerta _ £

^

^

Oo orders from Presiaent
Wilson io the esrl mor „
ing hours of April
y

21. the U.S. ship's ad miral
launched a violent attach
on Veracruz
and landed 1,000 marines
who fought both Mexican
troops and

civilians to capture the
town's customs house.

Later that day,

Henry Oahot Lodge led the
effort in the U.S. Senate to
authorize the
use of force against Huerta
ana urgea an even
fuller U.S.

intervention into Mexico.

Reinforcements of another 3,000
marines

soon followea to pacify the
town ana establish the U.S.
military

occupation of Veracruz (Guerrero
Yoacham, 1966: 56-61; Serrano
Migallo'n, 1981

:

42-45; Peck, 1977: 174-157).

Throughout Latin America, the public
reactea with shock and
angry conaemnations of the U.S.
intervention.

outbreak of war between the two
countries.

Many fearea the

In Washington,

Argentine minister to the Unitea States,
Rdmulo

S.

the

Naon, initiated a

proposal to his Brazilian and Chilean
counterparts that the three
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the rntervention, on A
pril 25, 1914, the
tbree South
-ipl-t. sent a note on hehalf
of the ir
g
n ts

o™

African
to the U.S.

Secretary of State.
WUUaa, Je nning8 Bryan, ana
to General Huerta
-ith the offer o £
Nation "to serve the interests o f
peace ana

elation

in out continent and
with the desire of
avoiding any

further bloodshed...."

A si.iUr note was
sent to Venustiano

Carranza on April 28
(Guerrero Yoacha*.

,

966: 70>

74 _ 74; Gantenbein,

1950: 572).

The offer of mediaton by
the ABC powers, as they
vere called by
the press at the tin*,
von tbe praise of statesmen,
diplomats and
the publics throughout
the Americas and Europe.
A rg entina 5 Bra.il
and Chile were the most
stable and advanced states
in Latin Africa
at the time and were
emerging actors on the
international scene.

Wary of encouraging revolutionary
ideas in their own countries,
none
of them approved of the bloody
revolutionary conflict in Mexico;
but
they were even less favorably
disposed to leaving the U.S.

intervention unanswered.

The primary interest of the ABC
powers in

the mediation effort was to
prevent a larger war through total U.S.

intervention in the Mexican civil war
and to arrange for the

withdrawal of U.S. troops from Veracruz,
but they also had an
interest in promoting negotiations among
Mexico's warring factions
in order to pacify its violent
civil conflict. 15

However, the

intransigence of the Wilson administration and
the complicated

71

internal situation of
Mexico'ss civil
cavil „
„ar prevented
the mediat on
effort from achieving
ail of these goals.
.

The Wilson edministration
vie „ ed

^

^

^

Perfect opportunitv to
arrange the removal
of Ceneral Huerta
Provisions! government
under ,S. influence.
and 8upport
c

derate

as a

set up

„ tai „

reforms that would
circumvent more radical
demands for
change in Mexico.
President Wilson immediately
sent a confidential
-mo outlining this plan to
the ABC diplomats
aIong
official U.S. aC ce t a „ce
of the mediation
P
offer (Ouerrero Voach.m,
1 966:
71-72).

^^

Genera, Huerta initielly
ans „ ered that „ e
the matter of the U.S.

^

^

intervention hefore the
International Court

at the Hague, but
international pressure persuaded
him to agree to
the ABC medietioo.
He also saw the boost
to his claims of

legitimacy that might be
gained by being

a

party to the talks,

despite the official U.S.
position of refusing to recognise
his
government. As for the
constitutionalists. Carranca's
position vas
initially positive, agreeing
"in principle" that the
international
conflict between the United
States and Mexico should be
settled
through mediation. But after
the ABC powers sought a cease
fire
from all three parties. Carranza
ma de it cle a r that he in no
way
considered the internal civil conflict
between Mexicans as a

legitimate subject of the mediation.

It would

instead constitute as

much of a violation of Mexican
sovereignty as the landing of foreign
troops.

Frustrating the careful preparations of
the ABC diplomats

and thwarting Wilson's plan to
negotiate the removal of Huerta in

72
tavcr of a co
KtitotiMalitt

reeved

the

mediation

^^

provisional govenment)

c« timiMlIi[tt

f

_

any

^^^^
^

^

(Guerrero Ycachaa, 1966:
71-72; 76-77).

Thus handicapped, the
ABC mediation opened
in Niagara F.ll.
Canada, on May 20,
and

^^

lM

^

sessions were held iu
which varioua proposals
were drafted and
teieoted by either the
United States or the ABC
powers to remove
Huerta, estahlish S
t y pe c, provisional
or interim government,
and withdraw U.S. troops
from Veracruz. The
main difference in
these proposals had to
do with the nature
of the proviaional
government to he established.
The Wilson administration
insisted
that it he headed by a
member of the constitutionalist
party -hut
not hy Carranza"-while the ABC mediators, in
accordance with the
Mexican Constitution of
1857, proposed that a provisional
junta he
formed with one Huertista,
one constitutionalist, and
two neutrals
who would then call for new
presidential and congressional

*

elections.

Another difference was that the
U.S. insisted that the

withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Veracruz was an issue to be
negotiated by the United States and

a

new provisional government

whereas the main ABC proposal
stipulated that the withdrawal of
troops begin fifteen days after
the formation of
and end within thirty days.

a

provisional junta

In any case, the United States

succeeded in focusing the discussions
on the internal political

matter of establishing

a

new government rather than on the

international conflict between the United
States and Mexico.

M

"
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le
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i.t.n.,1 problems by
outside

«.

d.cussion of

ICO 's

(Guerrero YoMhAB> )966;

142).

The intrasigence of
both

«C

WUson

tb. mediation.

^

CarranM

medietors t0 the point
tha£ they feared

cmpiete

^

^

Ir . final . ttenpt
£o save uhatever
internationai

Prestige they had won by
extending their

mediators drafted

a

^ ^.^ ^ ^

protocol that resolved

represented the most that
could be
oe agreed.
a2 reed

iitae
A „
provision^
•

•

government
would somehow be organized
by the "exic
Mexico*
,
a ns ,,,„
themselves;
the United
States a „d the ABC states
would recognize such a
government

Mediately;

the United States
government would renounce
any claims
to . „ ar indemnity;
the provisional government
would declare a

political amnesty, and

it

would negotiate the creation
of

international commissions to
settle private Cairns of
foreigners for
damages sustained during
the civil war.
The agreement made no

mention of

. U.S.

troop withdrawal from Mexican
soil.

The protocol

«as signed by the U.S.
representatives on duly 1, 19H,
and on duly
3 Huerta's representees sent the
protocol to the Mexican Congress
for ratificotion, which
came on July
ul > 11
lx>
with
""t t-hi.
this meager outcome,
the ABC mediators proclaimed
success and ended the mediation

conference (Guerrero Yoacham,
1966: 144-149).
The final protocol provided
General Huerta with a face-saving

means to give up his claim to
power and leave Mexico by July 16.

It

also pledged the United States to
respect the interim government
that followed.

Within

a

month, an interim government negotiated
the

14

surrender of federalist
forces
orces to rh»
the constitutionalists
and turned
over power to
Carranza by August 20.
But
BUt 11
it W3S not
""til November
101y
23, 1914, that the United
States began
egan to withH
withdraw its forces
from
Veracruz, a decision
which appears to
have had l ittle
lctie lf
if .
fh
anything
to
do with the ABC
18
mediation "torts
efforts
(r
(Guerrero Yoach^m,
1966: 152153; Serrano Mi ga ll<$ n
1981: 52-54.
,

„

•

.

.

.

,

>es P Ue its United
outcone , B0st observerE
of
then have agreed that
fhe
nediation probaMy

^

wider war or deeper int

_

ention by

e

a

^

Sovernment of His HKin
g (Guerrer0

Sreatet significance of
the ABC mediation
diplomatic effort by three
leading

^^^

unued

frustrated President
Wilson's plan
to install
F

^

^

is

^

^

constitutionalist

^^

^

that it was a joint

^

challenge the United States'
presumed ri g ht of intervention
in the
civil war of a circu.-Caribhean
state.
The marine occupation
of
Veracruz and the threat of
another „, between the
United States

and

Mexico had prompted Argentina.
Brazil, and Chile,

in the ahsence of

inter-American peacekeeping
machinery, to act together
to limit and
try to resolve an inter-American
crisis through diplomacy.
The
participation of Argentina and
Brazil in the mediation was
in itself

significant insofar as both states
had traditionally remained
aloof
from earlier Spanish American
multilateral diplomacy. Nov they
led
the joint mediation effort,
which would remain an important

precedent in establishing the
principle of the peaceful resolution
of conflict in inter-American
affairs (Guerrero Yoach^m, 1966:
170).
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The ABC mediating
rat ion

„

also lffiportant
because
!

emergence of an ABC
power bl
hl„°C
'

v
the

ln

^

^

twentieth century 19
which acted to chprk
the expand lng
power of the United
States and
•»». leadership in assertin
g "Latin American"
rxcan in
t
interests
in
hemispheric affairs.
Moreover thm medlatl0D
aeff -t itself
helped
,
to strengthen
the ties nf
«-v,
of thxs power
bloc and made it
a kind of
counterpoise in the
southern cone to North
Am
American
power in the
20
hemisphere.
Even Theodore
Roosevelt
Koosevelt recognized
.

.

•

'

•

•

.

.

in

his 1922

autobiography that

nllWTe AtnP t-:ePerBr:
•o

ViU

C
z

j

r d "—".1th..
adva »«°

^^

far that they no
>
longer s '
tutelage toward'the
°'
ey occu Py toward
us precisely the
,
position t-ll. n
occ
i ^friendship is the ir ienZ
Their
»
P
e,UalS
f
°
r
e<,Uals
(Roosevelt, 1922? 506)

T

Z'"^
^

Finally, the ABC mediation
won for the three
states sufficient
diplomatic prestige to
holster their new position
and underscore
th.i. emerging power
interests in hemispheric
and intentions!
affairs.

The

diploic

leadership and prestige
goals of these

states (but especiany
Argentina) would remain
important once the

inter-African conferences resumed
of U.S.

in the ,920s, as would
the

issue

interventionism in the
circuc-Caribbean region.

Latin American ni r l o maflv Challe
nges
W i thin the P,n
-

*ZlTJ„\X U Z
r

t

„ n q

t„»
Tnt r r,r

MMM »
.

.

The experience of the ABC
mediation did not deter the Wilson
administration from launching other
interventions and new military
occupations in the smaller circu
n -Caribbean states, such as
Haiti

in

.915 and the Dominican

^

^^^^^
^

Sch.idt, 1971; Calder>
1984; Langley> i989j i985;
1983).

„ 0 „ ever

,

it did

cause D

^

s<

Lansing t0 advise wilson
against further intervention
at the very least,

state

^

^^

to avoid using the vord
"intervention."

A»ong
other reasons, Lansing
recognized that "African
intervention in
"exico is extremely distastefu!
to all Latin Africa
and n ig ht have
a very bad effect upon
our Pan-African program"
( in Gantenbein.
1950: 587).

Indeed, the United States'
Pan-American program was stalled

until 1923, when the Fifth
Inter-Amer ican Conference
-postponed
since 1914- was finally held
in Santiago, Chile.
Unlike the

previous inter-American conferences,
the Latin American states

successfully placed several political
and security issues on the
agenda of the Santiago meeting.
There were few substantive results
of the conference, but three of
its achievements were important.

First, the Pan American Union was
again restructured, this time

removing the U.S. secretary of state
as its

officio head and

providing for the election of its president.

The second and most

substantive product of the conference was
the approval of the Treaty
to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts Between
the American States, better

known as the Gondra Treaty (named after its
author,
president of Paraguay, Manuel Gondra).

a

former

This treaty was the first

positive attempt of the Latin American states to
create an

obligatory procedure to settle potential military conflicts.

Any

controversy not settled through diplomatic channels or arbitration
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to be submitted t0
an ad

five

The disputants vere
pUdged to abetain

*ule

the

emission

^^

^^

hoEtiie

investigated the controversy
and for

of six .onths after
the

cession's

conmissiM o£

mission

made it< repor£ _

report had no jurid cal
.

established no effective
s,ea„s tor 8ettUng

pariod

^
^ ^.^

Auhough

^
.

.

con£Uct

actio, had begun, it
nevertheless provided for
a coding off period
to prevent .iHtarv
conflict between states.
It also created two
permanent emissions, one
in Montevideo and one
in Washington, to
receive and trans.it requests
for invoking the
emissions
of

inquiry (Moreno Pino, 1977:
79; Peck, 1977: 185;
Inter-A.erican
institute, 1966: xxv; Garner,
.966: 56; Gondra Treaty
in Gantenhein,
1950: 731-736).
The third important occurrence
of the 1923 Santiago
conference
was an unusually frank
discussion of the Monroe Doctrine.

Sever,]

Latin American delegations, led
by Colombia, asked the United
States
for a definition of the meaning
of the Monroe Doctrine.

Not only

was the presumed right of intervention
claimed by the Roosevelt

Corollary openly being questioned for
the first time

in an

inter-

American conference; also at issue was
the relationship of the young
inter-American organization to the League
of Nations.

By 1923 most

Latin American states 21 actively
participated in the League, which
they saw as another potential counterweight
to U.S. hegemony in the

Western Hemisphere.

However, the U.S. refusal to join the League

and Article XXI of the League's Charter
mentioning the existence of
the Monroe Doctrine created doubts in many
minds as to the

i
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usefulness of the League

-1U.—

protecting

exercise o f U.S.

pwer

.

utin

^
^
„_^

^^^^

Argentina

an amendment at the Lpaon^'o
League s first assembly
that would have
eliminated the Charter's
reference
eterence to t-fc
the m
Monroe Doctrine, but
that
22
Proposal was tabled
(Moreno Pino, 1 977
79;

^^

:

Peck, 1977: 181

m

,

184).

Santiago, the U.S.
delegation

^

^

request by stating si.ply
that the Monroe Doctrine
„as "originally
and essentially"
. national policy not subject
to international
debate or definition"
(Moreno Pino. 1977: 79).
Later that year, in
a speech
the centennial of the
Monroe Doctrine. U.S.
Secretary of State Charles
Evan Hughes reiterated
this position by
stressing that because "the
policy embodied in the Monroe
Doctrine
is distinctively the
policy of the United States,
the government of
the United States reserves to it-col f
S t0 ltself its a rdefinition, interpretation,

co„ating

and application"

(

n

Gantenbein, 1950: 387).

The Latin American states
were dissatisfied with this
response

because

it

failed to renounce the interventionist
claim of the

Roosevelt Corollary or re-establish
the original anti-

interventionist premise of President
Monroe's message to Congress.
In this atmosphere of growing
Latin American impatience with and

hostility toward continuing U.S.
interventionist policies

in the

circum-Caribbean, the issue of intervention
became the central focus
of the next two inter-American
conferences.

At the Sixth Inter-American Conference
held in Havana in 1928,
the debate over the intervention issue
was so rancorous that the

.
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-notes
155).

of the meeting had to be
rewritten (Connell-S.ith, 1966:

Led by Argentina, the Latin

African delegations denuded

that the United States accept
the principle of
non-intervention as

formated during

a

the previous year.

meeting of the

emission

The formula stated simply,

of
-

African Jurists
Ho State

right to interfere in the
internal affairs of another."

Secretary of State Charles

E.

hfl8

in

the

U.S.

Hughes flatly refused this
formula,

countering with what had become

a

familiar U.S. argument stressing

the international legal right
to protect the lives and
property of
its citizens (Moreno Pino,
1977: 80; Williams, 1971: 81-82;
Peck,

1977: 187-188)

:

What are we to do when government
breaks down and
American citizens are in danger of their
lives?...
Of course, the United States cannot
forego its right
to protect its citizens.
International Law cannot be
changed by the resolutions of this conference
(
Williams 1 971
82)

m

,

:

Beyond the rancorous and unresolved showdown
over the non-

intervention principle, the Havana conference did
pass several
important resolutions, including one to study and
codify American

international law and one to hold a special inter-American

conference on arbitration and conciliation.

By December 1928, the

special conference was convened in Washington and produced the

General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation, which extended
the scope of the Gondra Treaty, and the General Treaty of Inter-

American Arbitration and Protocol of Progressive Arbitration.

These

agreements condemned war as an instrument of national policy and
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3uccessfui

^

^
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^^

of the Pan

dropping the old and
controversial requiret eat
that oniy those
diplomats accredited t „
Washington could participate
,

^

But despite its
successes,

the Havana conference
is best

for its boated debate
over tbe intervention
issue.

revered

Yet official

U.S.

attitudes toward intervention
were beginning to change.
I„
December 1928, tbe U.S.
Under-Secretary of State J. Reuben
dark 26
issued bis "Memorandum on
tbe Monroe Doctrine,"
which repudiated the

Roosevelt Corollary as an
invalid interpretation of the
Monro,,
Doctrine and separated the
"right of intervention" fro*
the

underlying security principle of
Monroe's message to Congress.
In
other words, the Clark Memoranda
did not repudiate the "right
of
intervention"
^, but disconnected it from the Monroe Doctrine.

^

The Clark Memorandum was not
made public until 1930, but with
the

diplomatic showdown between Latin
America and the United States in
Havana and the writing of the Clark
Memorandum, tbe year 1928 marks
the beginning of the end of this
era of unilateral U.S. military

interventionism in the circuni-Caribbean region
(Clark,
122;

Perkins, 1966: 83; Connell-Smith, 1966:
157-158).

1
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The Seventh Inter-American
Amencan r„„r
Conference was held
at Montevideo
in 1933 and marks
the beginning o f
a new period o f
inter-erican relation,. The
conference

—a,

—meats,

but its

_

-Prove: 0£ the Convention
on the Rights

^^ ^
^

and Outies o £

State,

X
This

convention not only define *k«
7 defined the existence, personality,
juridical
equality, and recognition
of the statee

Article

'

but
Dut it
,
11 ,1
also included
in

8 a

non-intervention principle
that vent even further
than
^iled 19 28 resolution by
£tating>

nate

^

intervene in the internal
or external «ff„<
affairs of another" (in
Gantenhein, 1950: 759-763
Inter-American Institute,
1966: xxvi
Hcreno Pino, 1977: 82; F

^

;

in8c

,

1977a; 2Q0;

^^^
.

By agreeing to this
convention and accepting
its non28
interventio,,

principle,

Franklin D. Roosevelt
demonstrated his

commitment to implementing
his "Good Neighbor Policy,"
which he had
announced in his inaugural
address in March 1933.
Just two days
after the Seventh Inter-American
Conference closed, President
Roosevelt reiterated this
commitment in a speech to the
Woodrow
Wilson Foundation by stating
"the definitive policy of the
United
States from now on is one
opposed to armed intervention"
(in

Gantenhein, 1950: 166).
a policy he had

that appeared

in

Franklin Roosevelt thus began to
implement

outlined in his 1928 article on
U.S. foreign policy

Foreign Aff n j

r n,

where he stressed the need to

"renounce the practice of arbitrary
intervention in the home affairs
of our neighbors."

"Single-handed intervention by us in the

internal affairs of other nations must
end; with the cooperation of

82

others we shall have more
order in thi*
oraer
this uhemisphere and
(Roosevelt, 1928: 586, 585).

m

,

l

e8s dislike"

Although it was foreshadowed
in the Clark Memorandum
and in the
Hoover administration's
decision to end the U.S.
marine occupatioQ
of Nicaragua, the Good
Neighbor Policy was a
significant break with
Past U.S. policy by eX
p licitly repudiating thfi

^ ^^.^

and occupations of the
previous decades (Curry,
29
1979).
Moreover ,
these interventions had
not only created ill-wUl
among Latin

Americans toward the United
States; with the onset of
the Great
Depression, such military
interventions and occupations had
also
become costly at home, both
economically and politically.

I„ factj

the Good Neighbor Policy
became the foreign policy
complement to

Roosevelt's New Deal policies by
easing the financial drain on
the
United States and facilitating
economic recovery through trade
in
the face of rising economic
nationalism throughout Latin America.

As Secretary of State Cordell Hull
explained in his speech to the

Seventh Inter-American Conference
at Montevideo,

My government is doing its utmost,
with due regard
to the commitments made in the past,
to end with all
possible speed engagements which have been
set up by
previous circumstances. There are some
engagements
which can be removed more speedily than
others.
In
some instances, disentanglement from obligations
of
another era can only be brought about through
the
exercise of some patience. The United States
is
determined that its new policy of the New Deal
—of
enlightened liberalism— shall have full effect and
shall be recognized in its fullest import by its
neighbors. The people of my country strongly feel
that the so-called right of conquest must forever
be
banished from this hemisphere and, most of all, they
shun and reject that right for themselves.
The New
Deal indeed would be an empty boast if it did not mean
that" (in Gantenbein, 1950: 164).
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Thus, between

Caribbean reg io„.

1

933 and 1936 tbe

EooseveU

^
^.^^ ^

The administration
ended the

occupation of H aiti as
Bell as
Haiti ana Dominican
RepubUc;

t„e

u

financiai

^

^.^.^

^

^

^

-it* Cuba and negotiated
. new ean al treaty with
Panama.
of courEe
th. piece of the marines,
long-standing dictators like
Somoza in Nicaragua.
Fulgencio Batiata fa

»

in Dominican Republic

^^^

soon rose to power through
the national guard

organizations previously created
and trained during the
D.S.
occupations. Nevertheless,
the Roosevelt administration
moved to
reorient U.S. policy toward
Latin Africa along .ore
Hultilateraliat
and cooperative lines and
hegan to construct a hemispheric
security
regime based on the principle
of collective security.
As if to prove its break
with the past, in 1936 the
Roosevelt

administration renewed its commitment
to the non-intervention
principle by signing without
reservation the Additional Protocol
on
Non-intervention, a document containing
the most sweeping nonintervention clause yet:

The High Contracting Parties
declare inadmissible the
intervention of any one of them, directly
or indirectly,
and for whatever reason, in the
internal or external
affairs of any other of the Parties (in
Gantenbein,

1950:

The Additional Protocol on Non-intervention
was just one of

several important agreements produced by the
Special Conference on

84
the Maintenance of Ppar« \>^ta
Peace held

„

Buenos Aires in 1936.

The
immediate concern of this
conferencp
onterence v»«
was the devastating
Chaco War
between Bolivia and Paraguay
(1928-29, 1933 -38) 30
however

^

^

;

important part.

The special conference's
erence s oth.
other agreements
included
resolutions on the limitations
of armaments and on
the

"humanization" of1 war f„,f;
treaties on Good Alices
»
Offices anH
and u-a
Mediation and oi
the Prevention of
Controvert
{»«
» r
troversies,
a
Convention for the Maintenance,
Preservation, and Rees tab
•

1

ishment of Peace>

^

^

&

Principles of Inter-American
Solidarity and Cooperation.
These
agreements would come to
constitute the foundations
of a new
security regime for the
hemisphere based on the principle
of
collective security (see
Gantenbein, 1950: 771-780).
This nascent collective
security regime was given a
procedural

basis at the Eighth International
Conference of American States
held
in Lima in 1938.
The "Declaration of Lima"
established a mechanism
of consultation of foreign
ministers to discuss any matter
that
threatened the peace, security,
or territorial integrity
of any
American republic and thus gave
effect to the principles of

continental solidarity and security.

The new hemispheric security

regime received further elaboration
at the three special Meetings
of

Consultation of Foreign Ministers held
during World War II (in
Panama, 1939; Havana,

1

940

;

Rio de Janeiro, 1942) and at the
special

Chapultepec Conference on the Problems of
War and Peace held

Mexico in March,

1

945 (see Chapter IV).

in

These moves toward building

an inter-American security regime
culminated

in the 1947

Conference
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^

the Maintenance of
peace

jMeir °' WhiCh
Assistance,
19?7:

'"-A-ican

,„„
M

Continen£ai £ecurity

" 89;

^^

known as the Rio Treaty

"~"

^ ^^^

^ ^

Treaty of Reciprocal

^

^

Gsntenhein, 1950: ?85 . 8I5)

Cone Imp ion

During the 1930s

Policy went

.

,

KrankUn D

.

Roosevelt , s Good Ne ghbor

long way t0 „ ard

almost died in 1910.

^^
.

^

In „ ords and actionE>

^

administration convinced moat
Latin American, that the
er a of U.S.

intervention^ -or whet Marcial
Martinez
»as over and that

a

had

ca

„ed "Hepoleonisn"-

new er s of hemispheric
cooperetion and

solidarity based on mutual
respect had begun. 31

The change

in

D.B.

policy may have had more to do
with the United States' weakened
condition as a consequence of
the Great Depression and
related
domestic politics than with any
specific diplomatic pressure
exerted
32
by the Latin American states.
T .t the heated discussions of
the

meaning of the Monroe Doctrine
and the principle of non-intervention
at the inter-American conferences
of the 1920s and early 1930s

clearly indicated the necessary
diplomatic path to take if the
United States wanted to improve its
hemispheric relations and

strengthen inter-American institutions.
The effect of Franklin Roosevelt's Good
Neighbor Policy was to
set the stage for widespread hemispheric
cooperation during World
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Dnited states had
learaed

and partners, the
United States emerged
rged as a global
eloh , superpower
and
developed a new vision
of its role
™i„ anda interests
in the post-1945
international system. As
Bryce
Wood
ood U985)
(19851 h
fc
y
has shown,
the United
States then be gan t0
dismantle
•
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^.^
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(1924).
James W. Gantenbein's (1950)
collection of U S
government documents, speeches,
and inter-American treaties
is
another excellent collection of
original document
uL±gj.nai
7
_
ocu
n
TT
uu
U.S.
U.b. -Latin relations
&
^,
relatione mforv„j
referred to^ in this
chapter.
.

12.

President Wilson developed two
controversial types of
responses.
On the one hand, the Wilson
administration
developed a strict policy of
non-recognition of governments
coming to power by force or other
extra-constitutional Zlus.
In this sense, Wilson was
a strict constitutionalist.
However,
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those amenable to U.S.
interests
Wilson responded to instabilirv
i
especially'in the weaR

f

Lo P t

favor ° f

"

° II
ther hand

Resident
"
««-»^«ibb.„
region,
L" «
'

n^i^sr^sr^rjs:^ tJe

Santiago"

14.

0„ Jk
>l

£ °*

Chile^trthe inf

»
<-

Very little in the way of
hemispheric solidarity or
«
cooperation
occured during
iu 6 World
wuna War
„k 0 most Latin
war T1, when
American ct-ot-^o

relations with the Central Powers
were Bolivia, Dominican
E
ri Peru
and D
t
U
i; ;;;1 v ;:;;
the War Were those th ^t either
actively
cha enged U.S. hegemony in
the hemisphere or those that
were
1
Unit6d Stat6S: Argentina, Chile,
Colo K
Colombia,
Mexico, Paraguay, El Salvador, and
Venezuela.
Argentina even went so far as to try
to call an inter-American
conference against the United States
(Peck, 1977: 177-179)'
*

"

-^-

?£? «

^

15
'

U,S
intervention > the Argentines had sounded
ouTthf-T
out
the Brazilians and Chileans about
the possibility of
offering their good offices to the
warring parties in Mexico to
end the civil war.
All three states maintained neutrality
in
the civil war (Guerrero Yoacha'm,
1966: 74-75).
'

16.

Nevertheless, Carranza did send diplomatic
envoys, including
Josd Vasconcelos, to Washington and to
Buffalo, New York to
keep track of the proceedings in Niagara
Falls and to relay
messages.

17.

Wilson did not think Carranza was capable of
governing
(Guerrero Yoacham, 1966: 113, 125).

18.

The withdrawal did not end U.S. -Mexican
conflicts, which
continued throughout the revolutionary period. U.S.
forces
again intervened in 1916 in pursuit of Pancho Villa.
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19.

Norman Bailey (1967: 58)
has referred to this
bloc as

J-JJ- «

a

resuU

of

L2£

^^Hlso^

ins

20.

Guerrero Yoacham (1966: 156-167,
170) cites at length several
assessments by Latin and North
American observers at the time
that praxsed the ABC mediation
as opening a nTv era of
diplomacy and defining a new
meaning for "Pan-Americanism"
while earning for the ABC states
a new prestigfand power in
?
international and hemispheric affairs.

21

B0 V a end6d th6ir artici
P
P^ion in the League in
1921 T/r
after the \League failed to consider
the Tacna-Arica
dispute, but both states returned
to the LeaguJin 1 29 once
the dispute was resolved
(Peck, 1977: 181).

.

^

22.

After this failed attempt, Argentina
stopped actively
1CiPa lng in
LeagUG althou § h ^ officially remained
a
A
member
Argentina
and other Latin American states
(including
Costa Rica) tried again in 1928 to
get the League to clarify
its position toward the Monroe
Doctrine, especially after the
ta
T
US
Latin d6mandS t0
interventionism
at the
tt lSixth
lt%Inter-American Conference r6D0Unce
in Havana (infra).
The
League responded that Article 21 was
not intended to extend the
scope or confirm the validity of the
Monroe Doctrine. This new
position permitted the League to begin
to play a role in
hemispheric conflicts after fighting broke
out between Bolivia
and Paraguay over the Chaco territory
(see note 30 below)
(Peck, 1977: 183; Garner, 1966).

^L

f f

23.

This position of the unilateral nature
of the Monroe Doctrine
as a national policy was shared by many
previous

administrations. President Taft's Secretary of
State, Elihu
Root, once stated that "[sHnce the Monroe
doctrine is a
declaration based upon the nation's right of
self-protection,
it cannot be transmuted into a joint or
common declaration by
American states or any number of them." President Wilson
reiterated this position by stating that "The Monroe
Doctrine
was proclaimed by the United States on her own
authority.
It
always has been maintained and will be maintained upon her
own
responsibility" (quoted in a speech by Charles E. Hughes, in
Gantenbein, 1950: 388).
24.

Hughes also stressed that the Monroe Doctrine "is not a policy
of aggression; it is a policy of self-defense
It still
remains an assertion of the principle of national security" (in
Gantenbein, 1950: 386). This is the earliest official use of
the term "national security" that I have come across in my
research.
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interventions* xn accordance with
"the lav of nations
generally recognized." Nevertheless,
the reservation stressed
U°
t need fear any
'
intervention
on the lilt of
t
the United
States under the Roosevelt
Administration" ^(in
ln
Gantenbein,

—

1950:

9
'

^Tp

763).

11
Pati ° n ° f the ^minican Republic
had ended in
!
1924 due largley
to its unpopularity in the
United States
however the United States maintained
a military presence there
through the training of the Dominican
National Guard.
The US *
ma nt
ed
8 f
ancial receivership over the country *
untii the
until
n
S'
Roosevelt
administration. Moreover, Curry (197910)
argues that during the Hoover
administration, "the threat of
intervention [in the Dominican Republic]
was held out as a
possible if unwanted measure to discourage
developments
regarded as inimical to the interests
of the United States or
certain of its citizens." These threats
of U.S. intervention
in the Dominican Republic during
the Hoover administration led
Curry to insist that "a Good Neighbor
Policy for the western
hemisphere did not emerge before 1933. ...At
no time during his
tenure did Hoover commit his administration
to a policy of nonintervention in Latin America. ... Roosevelt was
prepared to
commit the United States to non-intervention;
Hoover was not.
And therein lay the difference" (Curry,
1979: 1, 9).
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CHAPTER IV
THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM AFTER WORLD WAN
II

The Emergence of the
OAS System
The pa„-A.erica„
system began . new phase
,f

^.^.^

consolidation and development
with the special Chapultepec
Conference on the Prohlems
o f „a r and Peace
in I945 .
0rganized by
the Mexican government,
the conference's
agenda included
considers, ion of the future
of the pan-A.erican
system in light of
the creation of the
United Nations Organization
and discussion of
wavs to strengthen hoth
the regional organization
and the economic
health of the hemisohere
emispnere.

1

Th«>
e
The
conference's
Resolution IX, entitled

"Reorganization, Consolidation,
and Strengthening of
the InterSystem," introduced certain
immediate reforms in the

Scan

structure of the Pan American
Union and initiated

move to
consolidate the various juridical
and institutional mechanisms
of
the pan-American system
into a more formal and permanent
regional
a

organization.

Along with an "Economic Charter
of the Americas" and other

resolutions of an economic nature,
the Chapultepec Conference
also
adopted Resolution VIII, kn0Wn as
the "Act of Chapultepec," which
reaffirmed certain basic inter-American
principles including the
sovereignty, equality, and independence
of states, the peaceful

settlement of disputes, and the principles
of collective security
and regional solidarity in the face
of acts of aggression.

With

94

these principles in
mind, the "Act
Act of cu
,
Chapultepec"
called for the
development of a mutual
defense treaty
reauy for
tor the
th„ American
A
states.
Such a treaty was
signed at the 1947
Conference for the
Maintenance of Peace
onj r~ _
Pearp and
Continental Solidarity
held in Rio de
-neiro. As indicated

^^^_
•

„

Tr-,

of Peciprocal assistance,
or the Pio Pact
(also Pio Treaty,
"Presented the collation
of the decade-long
development of the

collective security principie
alo„ g side the Cood
Neighhor Policy
xnter-Aa.erican affairs.

united States in

'

in

The Pio Pact heca n e
a ready model for
the

formating

its other post-war

„ tMl

such as the North Atlantic Tr-^.*- rs
Treaty Organization (NATO),

defense pacts
s i gned

in

1949 (Moreno Pino, 1977- 87-rq. t„«.
a
87 89, Inter-American
Institute, 1966: xxixxxx; in Gantenbein, 1950:
2
816-81
,

9).

In 1948,

at the Ninth Inter-American
Conference held in Bogota,

the move to restructure
the pan-American syste,
as called for hy

Resolution IX of the Chapultepec
conference culminated

in

the

signing of the Charter of
Bogota, which created the
Organization of
American States out of the older
Pan-American institutions. The

Ninth Inter-American Conference
also adopted the Pact of Bogota',
or
the American Treaty on Pacific
Settlement, which mentioned,

consolidated, and was meant to supercede
all previous inter-American
instruments aimed at the pacific
settlement of disputes 3 (Puig,
1983: 13;

Inter-American Institute, 1966: 77).

Thus, between 1945 and 1948, the
legal and institutional

framework for the post-war regional
organization was rebuilt,
largely with the mortar of pan-American
good-will left by the Cood
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Neighbor Policy.

But after 1948,
divergent
ivergent US
U.S. end* rLatin
American
•

tb. edifice which „
eakened it6

<»e relative interests
of

Ung . tera

ab

.

uty

^

^
^^^^^^
^
—
UHn

African states

and the United

States in thi new 0AS

inStitUti0 " 6)4

they had baan at the
origin

of the pan-American
movement i„

security concerns
War

U

e-ent

in

i„9.

For the United States,

the hemisphere had
become primary during
World

and regained so with
the emergence of the
cold w ar

To the
that the inter-American
system mattered at all to
policyin

Washing

.

given their new preoccupation
with developing

containment policies for Europe
end Asia, the new
inter-American
institutions were taken to
represent an undisputed
anti-communist
regional bloc that supported
U.S. ideological and strategic
leadership in the global cold
war (Williams. 1971:
48; Wilson, !975:
53).

While many La tin American
states shared the anti-communist
focus of U.S. containment
policy, after the signing of the
Rio Pact
in 1947

the most crucial issue for
their post-war foreign policies

and for the reformed regional
organisation was to promote economic

development.

Even at the 1947 Rio Conference,
Mexican Foreign

Minister Jaime Torres Bodet expressed
the view of msny Latin
American delegates that raising the
living standards of the masses
was as

important an obligation as providing for
mutual defense

(Finan, 1977d: 259).

With the security of the hemisphere provided
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*

the Rio Pact

,

m0£t Latin AnericM

govmts

OAS as a mechanism
t0 promote regiona[
l0 ° ked

"

j! ' el0PMl a6Si
».S.

DnUed

S

—

—~

- •««

«

«-hall

^

^

^

P lan for the

5

'°

«- "Sio,

rnsistence on the role
of priva[e loan£

direct investment as the
motor

fM

during the

^

l

95 0s and

priyate

deveiopnent becMe

^

of contention during
a
first decade
8 the fir**
ofc the OAS (Wilson,
1975: 5455; Williams, 1971: 66).
,

The U.S. stance on
aevelopment pol cy
.

aUo cushed

^

Bith
approaches of several Latin
American reformers an d /or
popu li sts
the 1940s and early l 950
s.
Leaders like Rdmulo Betancourt
in
Venezuela, Rafael A„ el
Calderon Guardia and
g

in

W ?im ^

Costa Rica, Jua n Jose Arevalo
and d^cobo Arbenz 6 in
Guatemala, and
several others ha d a d mire d
Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal
policies
an d sought to d evise Latin
variations to promote their
countries'
economic d evelo P n,ent through
public capital an d a significant
state
role.
Their economic, social, and
political reform programs soon
got them into trouble with
comestic elites an d eventually
arouse d

suspicions in the Unite d States.

Once the col d war got unoer way,

Latin American keynesianism (or
state capitalism) an d economic

nationalism, combine d with a tolerance
of left wing political
parties by some of these reformers,
led to growing concerns from
poliy makers in Washington who tended
to interpret such orientations
in

stark cold-war terms.

Beyond the

» tMtl

distinct problem

«- Us

led

the UDited states

.

meaning for hemispheric

or legal e,

PO-

„f

ana

MUty

it s

_

ideoiogicai

^

6uferpower status

^

of the American
states, now codified

new leadersh lp role in
the internationaI

to the re-emergence
of old problems

•ysten.

^

„„ over economic

in the

in

the

^_

inter-American

while some Latin American
states saw the OAS as

a mediatin
s
mechanism between the United
States and Latin America,
others saw it
once again as a tool for

the United States to
control Latin America

according to U.S. hegemonic
interests.
Indicative of Latin American
suspicions of U.S. dominance
over
the reformed regional
organization is the fact that
several Latin
American states delayed their
ratifications of the OAS Charter
for
four or more years after its
signing i„ 1,48. For example,
Cuba and
Peru delayed ratification
until 1952; Chile until 1953;
Guatemala
and Uruguay until 1955; and
Argentina delayed ratification until

1956.

Only three states, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, and

Mexico, ratified the OAS Charter
within one year of its signing.

By

contrast, all signatories to the Rio
Treaty except Guatemala had
ratified the treaty within three years
of its signing in 1947, and
most states -fifteen of

them-

had ratified it within one year.

7

The 1948 companion to the OAS Charter,
the Pact of Bogota, likewise

failed to attract the enthusiasm of the
American states.

Seven

states signed the Pact with reservations, and
by 1966, only ten

98
states had bothered
to ratify
"ry it
it.

8

The ffew ratifications
and

numerous reservations
attached to this
cms form,!
formal system of
pacific
c f disputes tteant
that the pact of Bogot

"*«!—.

—

,

Institute , 1966:
1983:

»

_

387 _ 398

Scheman, 1988: 66;
Martz>

l3i

thus appears that
after J948

b-.in.in. to veaken and
that from

-rains of diver g in interem
g
America.

382

^^.^
^
^^^
^ ^
^^
.

soi d8rity

Us inceptim

^
^

fa

The fine cracks i„ th
. 0AS system

^

^

with the Tenth Inter-American
Conference he!d in Caracas
in Harch
the last such conference
9
ever to be heia
an, .

-

-

itb the ensui„
g

political crisis in Guatemala
in June.

The OAS System and the Cold
War

The Guatemala

rr s
;

j

s

.

United States Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles
personally
attended the Caracas conference
just long enough to ensure
passage
of the famous Resolution XCIII,
the "Declaration of Solidarity
for
the Preservation of the
Political Integrity of the American

States."

This declaration was aimed
against the government of

Ja-cobo Arbenz

in

Guatemala, which was increasingly
seen as communist-

oriented by the U.S. press and
policy-makers in Washington. 10

declaration stated that

The
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^ ^

°£

movement, extendi ;
colonist
h
system of a „
P ° UtlCal
extracontinentalTower
P owe
"ouL
would coostitute
a threat to the sov»™;„„,
f.
8
>° Uti '* 1 independence
of the American
*
States
and would call f«
° f *"" U '.
"
tUsjUMliaiuif appr oprH e^ccion
I"'accordance
lon ln
existing treaties fl„ r I
with
,
^'"-Anerican
Institute, 1966: 131;
emphasis added)

^

IMJSSS.'S -"^^^X

Aware that it was
directed against the
Arbenz government and
vary of unilateral
action by the United
States, the Latin American
delegations insisted on
amending Dulles' resolution
by inserting the

retirement of calling for

"a Meeting of

the adoption of"
appropriate action. 11

ConsuUation

to consider

Under hoth the OAS Charter

and the Rio Treaty,
a Meeting of Consultation
of Foreign Ministers
was the mechanism through
which political and collective
security

issues were to he discussed
and decided.
it

In times of crisis or
when

was otherwise impossible
for the region's foreign
ministers to

assemble, the Council of the OAS
(COAS) could act as the
system's
provisional organ of consultation.

Along with trying to prevent
any unilateral U.S. action
against
Guatemala, several Latin American
delegations also challenged the
cold war orientation of
Secretary Dulles' resolution and
introduced

amendments stressing the need to
address the economic, social, and
political problems within the
hemisphere that gave rise to communist

movements in the first place.

But Secretary Dulles' maneuvers
at

the conference succeeded in
leaving such amendments to be

incorporated into
of Caracas."

a

separate resolution (XCV) entitled "Declaration

According to Richard

H.

Iam.era.an

(1982: 149), Dulles

^

even Bent so far as
of

KesoUUon «!„.
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^

The Latin

went a!on g sith Sec retary
Dulle5 -

in

^

^
^

^

^

inducing him to consider
Latin requests
reauest, for
fo
economic development
13
a^.
However, Secretary
Dulles returned to
Washington once his
resolution was passed,
leaving the remaining
U.S. delegation with
the task of dealing
with those requests
(Ronning, 1963: 73-74, 82-

^

Wilson, 1975: 55-57; Will
iaros> 1971:A9;
Wood, 1985: 171;
Connell-Smith
A short time later,

,

'

1974: 212-214).

in June 1954,

events in Guatemala produced

the first cold war crisis
of the OAS system.

A small insurgent army

of anti-communist Guatemalans,
armed and trained by the CIA
in

Nicaragua and Honduras, launched
an attack on Guatemala
with the
purpose of overthrowing the
Arbenz government by force.
Although
had not yet ratified the OAS
Charter,

it

the Arbenz government called

on its two peacekeeping
mechanisms, the Council of the OAS
(COAS)
and the Inter-American Peace
Committee, to investigate the acts
of

aggression launched from the territory
of Guatemala's neighbors.
Due to deliberate obstructive
efforts by the United States, the OAS

machinery was slow to respond to this
request, leading the Arbenz
government to appeal directly to the United
Nations Security
Council.

There the United States disingenuously
argued for the

"primacy" of the OAS in dealing with the
regional crisis.

In

accordance with Secretary Dulles' Resolution XCIII,
the Rio Treaty
was then invoked by ten member states,
who demanded that the Organ
of Consultation meet

-for

the purpose of considering all aspects of

:

1

the danger to the
peace and security
ecunty of t-h
the continent
resulting from
the penetration of
the Doliti'n.i
political institutions
of Guatemala by
the
-

fc

international communist
movement
ement....

im. a
1

975

56

S

„

lf , Inter .Anerican

-

fu
,
,n„
Wood>
j 9g5
(

^

.

Institute> i%6:

Ronning, 1963: 73-74).

Kather

t „ an

actiDg as

-eat,, the COAS cal l ea

tu

provisioMi 0rgan

^

^

Connell _

ConsuUation

^
^^ ^

for . full Meet£ng
„f

discuss the situetion.^

B<jt

before

_

^

^

Ministers cou.a be assembled,
Arben, resigned, turning
the
government over to his Chief
of the Armed Forces,
Colonel Carlos
Enr iq ue Di az

,

on dune 27.

consider the new situation

Foreign Ministers

^^

A short time later,
the COAS met to
in

Guatemala and postponed the
Meeting of
The lead

„

of

^

insurgency, Coionel Castillo
Armas, soon emerged as the
head of a
new military junta that was
recognised hy the United States
on duly
13, 1954 (Wilson, 1975:

56;

Inter-American Institute, 1966:
89-90,

131-132; Fanning, 1963: 73-74;
taerrcan, 1982: 173-174;
Schlesinger
and Kinzer, 1983: 216xu, Wood
o?
r
1n „
wooa, IQftS- 192;
Connell-Smith,
1974: 2121

.

.

,

217).

Many Latin American governments
saw the U.S. hand in events and
considered the coup to be an intervention
by the United States in
the domestic affairs of Guatemala,
contrary to the principles of the

OAS Charter.

Juan PerOn's Argentina, whose bilateral
relations with

the United States had seemingly
improved with the development of the

cold war by establishing its
anti-communist credentials,

0

1
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«~r.h.l...

insisted that the coup
in GuateMia

b e ginning of renewed

Africa

—
«.

--

c 0ngresse8 of

tl. „.,.

indention

Ecuadoran g over„ n en,

America reacted

^^^

interventions by the
UnUed

and expressed it .
deep conce

»-».n«»).

_

strong

„

„

ArgentiM> Druguay>

Latin

Md chiu

GuataBala as aggreEsion
aa
_

Even pro . D .
a g ainst

^

s

.

the United States>

^

^
^^
d

Yankee demonstrations swept
across Ar g e„ti„a, Brazi,
Chile,
,
Colombia, Cuba, Honduras,
Mexico, Panama, Peru,
Uruguay, and
Venezuela (Ronning, iW>J.
ft?,
g. 1 963-75
75
82; u-nWilUams, 1971: 47; Schlessinger
and Kinzer, 1983: 188-189).
,

In the wa.e of the
1954 coup in Guatemala,
.any Latin

Africans

grew critical of the United
States' use of the OAS as
an instruct
of the cold war and of
its use of the cold war
as a justification
for renewed U.S. interventionist
Not only were the noninterventionist and

multilateral

principles of the Good Neighbor

policy abandoned, but the
credibility of the OAS was seriously
eroded.

As Bryce Wood (1985: 198)

has shown, »[t]he dismantling
of

the Good Neighbor policy and
the enfeeblement of the OAS
began

simultaneously in 1954" (Dx'az-Calle
jas . 1985: 125; Wilson, 1975:
55;
Connell-Smith, 1974: 218-221).
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impl i cations for

In the decade

" rUCtUreS
°

relation,.

f

r\

tLte

a

c

ggat£p

foUowing the Guatemala coup

-

° AS

The Lati n Americans

«»

_

^^

nature of inter-American

cooked

to look for 8upport
for

regional economic development
from the OAS, hut it
was not until the
very eod of the 1950s
that some movement was
made in this

direction.

In 1958

,

BrazlUm

Proposed his "Operation Pan
America." aimed at promoting
regional
economic development and
raising living standards.
In the same
year, after Vice President .

W

.

difficult latin American trip

("hich was punctuated by
several anti-U.S. demonstrations),
the
Eisenhower administration began
to reexamine U.S. economic,
policy
toward the region.
Soon the OAS Council of Foreign
Ministers set up
the Committee of Twenty-One
(formally, the Special Committee
to
Study the Formulation of New
Measures for Economic Cooperation),

which met for the first time in
late 1958 to study Kubitschek's
proposal and discuss the recommendation
from the region's foreign

ministers for the establishment of an
inter-American financial
institution to promote development.

The Cuban Revolution may have

provided further incentive for action on
the economic front.

At the

second meeting of the Committee of Twenty-One
in the spring of 1959,
Fidel Castro proposed that the U.S.
finance

Flan" for Latin America.

a

$30 billion "Marshall

In any case, on December 31, 1959,

Inter-American Development Bank

(

IDB) was established with

the
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significant U.S. support.

-ItiUu™,

Undi ag agency

aimed at pronoting

^

ecMomic

social deveiopment 0f
it s members (Atkins,
1989;
Smith, 1974: 224-225).

Respite this .o

«»

end „ f th e 1950s

K

»

t

t0 improve regional
economic

andicto

^

reuti
:ions

at

the !960s (infra),
the united sutei

continued to view the OAS
as primarily oriented

-sues.

^
^
„

However Latin dissatisfaction
w ith the 0AS syste „_
s
keeping and conflict resn1,iH ft «
resolution mechanxsms
remained chronic through
•

i.

the 1950s and

,e„

into the 1960s

.

The ceatral d

t

^

the peaceful resolution
of conflict, the 1948
Pact of Bogota (or the
American Treaty on Pacific
Settlement) continued to
lack

ratifications, apparently
because of its compulsory
nature. A move
to revise the treaty
to meet the various
objections or reservations
of states began in
195, after the Guatemalan
coup, but this move
petered out by 1957.

There was also

a

suggestion to create an inter-

American Court of Justice in
1954 as

a

mechanism to settle disputes,

but this proposal died in
1964 after only eight states
had bothered
to express their views on
the idea (in Inter-American
Institute,
1966: 80-82).

These failures left the Council
of the OAS and the

Inter-American Peace Committee as the
main peacekeeping of the OAS.
Yet the discomfort with these
mechanisms after 1954 „ as

evident in the repeated revision
of the Inter-American Peace

Committee's statutes in the 1950s and
1960s.

Crested in 1940. the

Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC) had
remained intact as
special agency of the OAS after 1948.

a

It was a vehicle by which

.
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tradition methods

or procedures of

^^^^ MtM

^

^

such aE investi ga tion,
nediation _ conciUation
_
goQd
offices, could be
suggested to
fn parties
^Q
in v-uiiiiicc
conflicf
tk^
ine committee

^

•

.

PUyea

.

use£uI and often
important

porting

on the numerous

the Oominican ,

blic and other circ

tftWM 1M8

ana

In 1956

^

^

r ole

^

Mpc

^

in

confUct8 referrea

^

a semi _ foraai

^

peacefu! settlement,

Among its ne« statutes
„ a s the nev

requirement that both parties to

committee's action.

irujiiio

„ tate

^_

_

^d

aribbean confUcts
becween

1956 went to

institution,,,^ the committee's

but the effort bacKfired.

_

n08t of the inte

a „d

organ of investigation.

investig8Ung

confUct6 invoiving

l**..*!*." m f-.
to the OAS

^

a

conflict consent to the

This apparently made the
IAPC unattractive to

OAS members, as no cases
were submitted to

it

for the next three

years
In 1959 an effort was
made to save the IAPC at

the Fifth

Meeting of Consultation of
Foreign Ministers in Santiago,
Chile.
The TAPC's functions were
expanded to include investigations
into
(1) methods

to prevent

intervention, aggression, or overthrows
of

governments from abroad; (2) the
relationship between human rights
violations and dictatorship to political
tensions affecting
hemispheric peace; and (3) the relationship
between economic

underdevelopment and political instability.

These points reflected

the concerns of the Latin American
ministers meeting in Santiago

with the problems of human rights and
economic underdevelopment that
seemed to be behind the conflicts involving
the Trujillo

1

^

dictatorship i„ the Boninican
RepubUc
Batista dictatorship in
Cuba
to act "at the request
of

.

The IApc

governs

or on its own initiative"
(in

Inter-American Institute,
1966: 84-85).

"PC's functions

^ ^
^^^^^

After
Alter n.(
this expansion of
the

and authority, it
again became active in

investigating various
inter-American conflicts"
until .966, when
its expanded authority
was taken away (infra)
(Inter-American
Institute, 1966: 83-91; Slater,
1969: 502-503; Scheman,
,988: 67-69,
81-84; Pui g> 1983: 14-15).

Despite this activity of the
IAPC, the conflicts

it

investigated between 1948 and 1964
tended to be the chronic
yet
politically safe conflicts involving
the relatively weak states
of
the circum-Caribbean and
usually centered on the issue
of the use of

territory by bands of exile groups
to overthrow another
government.

17

However, as in the 1954 coup in
Guatemala, the IAPC

and related OAS peace-keeping
machinery were powerless to settle

peacefully the more serious political
and military conflicts of the
inter-American system, especially those
in which United Statesinterests were involved.

The more serious political and military

conflicts tended to be addressed through
the mechanisms of the Rio
Pact.

But the Rio Treaty was a collective
security instrument, not

an instrument for the resolution of
political conflicts.

For the

Latin Americans, invoking the Rio Treaty was
considered very serious

business, meaning that

a

clear act of military aggression had been

committed and that some form of collective sanctions
would have to
be imposed (Slater, 1969: 501).

To resolve political conflicts, the

0
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ut 10

Ameri c an 6tates tended
to prefer to invoke

keePi " E MChinery
-

b68i

-^

tb. convocation of
. Meeting Qf

Consultation of Koreign
Ministers

Arucu

^^

Charter.
the United States,
given th . centrality
„f

^^

war in

the Rio Treaty became
the preferred means
for introducing a „ d
addressing its East-West
security concerns in the
hemisphere,

especially through the
treaty's

arduous

Article 6. This article
was an open-ended
provision for action hy the
Organ of Consultation

under the Rio Treaty in
cases where

«

a

state faced "aggression
which

not an armed attack or by
an extra-continental
or intra-

continental conflict, or hy
any other fact or situation
that might
endanger the peace of America"
(in Inter-American Institute,
1966:
378).

This article was flexible
enough to bring virtually
any

matter that could be termed
a "threat" to the peace
and security of
the hemisphere under the
purview of the Rio Treaty, whether
an
actual aggression had occured
or not.

The inadequacy of the OAS

system's peace-keeping machinery
in conflicts involving
United

States' interests and the divergence
of Latin American and United
States' views about the proper
uses of the OAS Charter vs. the Rio

Treaty can be seen in the cases of
the Dominican Republic and Cuba

between 1960 and 1965.
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CahM touecminic,,

„,„ pf ..

In the Kake o £ the
fall of Batista

-an

Nation.

in 1960>

an

^

Zn.tead, m08t Latin
governments

Md wr6ening

^^
^
_
^

n Cuba

the Bnited states

in a cold „ ar
tint> but no(

•» «<•

.

^

begM

^

utin

the excesses of the Trunin,, aTrujxllo drctatorship i„
the Dominican Republic
and its involvement
in a recent
assignation attempt against

Venezuela's President Romulo
Betancourt.

In June 1960, the

Venezuelan government invoked
the Rio Treaty against
TrujilU's
attack, and the Si xth Meeting
of Consultation of Foreign
Ministers
was convoked in San Jose\
Jn^d Costa
rw^ Rica
dto investigate Venezuela's
charges. After condemning
the Dominican Republic
for its
"aggression" and "attack" against
Venezuela, the majority, of the
Latin American foreign ministers
favored the imposition of

collective economic and diplomatic
sanctions,

in

accordance with the

Rio Treaty's provisions,
against the Trujillo regime.

But the

United States opposed collective
sanctions in this case and

advocated instead OAS-supervised
elections in the Dominican
Republic.

The Latin American majority
viev on sanctions prevailed,

resulting in the first example of
collective sanctions being imposed
by the members of the OAS system
against one of its own members

found to have committed an act of
18
aggression
(Slater, 1970:

8;

Ronning, 1963: 77; Wil son> 1975:
60; Scheman, 1988: 76; ConnellSmith, 1974: 229-230).
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At the sa„e «eetin
g of Consultation, the
United States
trx- to introduce an anti .
Castro

^
^

reeoiutiM

failed.

The Latin

ministers

dU

Kio Tr eat y as
appUcable t0 the

«»«

the OAS was the
proper venue

^

COntrOVmiet
foUowin, this m eetin
g

fM

e

discuesing poUticai

'ft..

^^^

and Cuha.
thfi

Imme diate ly

^

the Seventh Meeting
of Consultation of
Foreign

under Article 3, of the
OAS Chatter.

Stin asse-bled

w

in San
the United States tried
to convince the Latin
Americana to pass

resolution

condemn,

the Soviet Union.

^

mMhani>n

case

in AugU8t 1960>

,

^^
^

aUo

a

the Cnban government
for its g ro„in
g ties to

The United States even
held out the carrot of

19 +~
$600 million in economic
economir aid
ain
to win support for its
resolution
(Ronning, 1963: 78).

But the majority of the
Latin American ministers were
not

prepared to go along with the
United States in this case.
a

Instead,

much weaker resolution was
passed, entitled the "Declaration
of

San

JoseV vhich only condemned "extra-continental
intervention"

in

the Americas and rejected
"attempts by the Sino-Soviet powers
to

make use of the political, economic
or social situation of any

American state" (in Wilson, 1975:
61).
mention of Cuba. 20
adding
is

it a

a

In fact,

The resolution made no

the Mexican delegation insisted on

"Statement" to the declaration stressing
-that

condemnation or

a

in no

way

threat against Cuba, whose aspirations for

economic improvement and social justice have
the fullest support of

1

the Government and
the people of Mexico"exico

fln
(

r
,
Connell-Smith,

197A-

230; Ronning, 1963:
78; Wilson, 1975^'-i. 01;
61- S.h
>
Scheman, 1988: 77).

Lacking majority
suppport
ire growing
PPPort for its
antipathy for Castro
states acted Milaterilly
by impl
ting

_

invade Cuha

.

,„„.

of counter . revolutionary

a

cm

^^

^ ^^
^

hope. of sparking .
popuUr uprUing against
bitter failure of the Bav nf d;
Bey of P lgs operation
in April 1961,
the old
oehate ahout interventionist
be t tt een Latin America
end the United
States rested. Although
severe! Latin American
governments did not
like the course the Cuhen
Revolution vas t aking most
Latin
Americans considered the B
ay of Pi gs invasion
to he an iUegal U.S.
intervention only too reminiscent
o, the 1954 CIA
operation in
,

Guatemala (Wilson, 1975:62).
In response to the
course of the Cuban Revolution
and, spurred

by the political fallout
of the Bay of P igs fiasco

the Kennedy

,

Administration vent forward with
a new strategy of
containment in
Latin America. Kennedy deepened
the U.S. commitment to
the region's
economic development that emerged
at the end of the Eisenhower

administration by announcing his
Alliance for Progress.

This

multilateral program was designed
to provide $20 billion

in

development assistance over

a

ten-year period and encourage social

and political reforms in order
to promote economic growth,
liberal

democratic government, and peaceful
change in the hemisphere.

For

the United States, the Alliance's
economic aid, reform, and related

counter-insurgency training programs were
both

a

way to revitalize

inter-American economic and political relations
and

a

strategy to

1

0

1

p~

a„y

£uture radical revoiutione
in

Amencan governments embraced

the

AHiance

utin

^

1

^

^

for Progress

enthusiastically:

Finallv
Finally, after some
sixteen years, their
post-war
requests for a "Marshall
Plan" tor
for Latin America
a
were being answered
by the Doited states.
The charter of the
Alliance for Prog>ress 21
vas signed at the
Uruguayan seaside resort
of P unta d
Est:e on
•

„

United States had made

it

clear that i.
it vould provide no
funds for

Cuba as long as its
revolutionary government
maintained its ties
"ith the Soviet Union. The
government of Peru, backed by
a number
of other delations,
also proposed the inclusion
of an anti-Castro
Political clause in the Alliance's
charter, but this proposal
was
voted down by the rest of
the conference (Connell-Smith,
1974: 233;

Wilgus and d'E^a,

1

963: 411-412).

Before long, however, the Latin
American votes

in

the OAS

system began to shift in favor
of the United States'
position on
Cuba, despite the continued
divergence of a significant bloc
of
Latin American states.

In January 1962,

the Colombian and Peruvian

governments charged Cuba with supporting
subversive activities that
threatened the peace and security of
the Americas.

Colombia invoked

the Rio Treaty and called the
Eighth Meeting of Consultation of

Foreign Ministers to discuss what
collective measures could be taken
against Cuba.

The United States led the hard-line
position, which

urged collective action under Article

6

of the Rio Treaty and

sought to expel the revolutionary Cuban
government from the OAS

system because

it

had "identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist

1

1

~"

— -«

Bolivia,

Clllltled

led the 8o£t . Une

WO™*

Argentinaj BrasU, ChUe,
Ecuador,

^

„

of the Kin Ir eaty
Co the situation>

Oebatea the nature o £
the Cuban governmct.
defended the
of non-intervention
and 8elf eterainat
on>
opfosed
expulsion or exclusion
of any member state
rh. grounds
on the
that
neither the OAS Charter
nor the Rio Treatv
rreaty made any provisions
for
such an action.
.
It was Haiti
e from
8oft _ Hne

^

.

^

fi

_

^

l»e

^_

position that assured the
fourteenth vote 23 for the
two-thirds
majority needed to exclude
the "present government"
of Cuba from

Participation

in

the OAS syste*.

The meeting also decided
to impose

an arms embargo against
Cuba (Atkins, 1989: 224;
Wilson, 1975: 6263;

Connell-Smith, 1974: 236-237;
Scheman, 1988: 77).
Ten months later,

in October 1962,

the Cuban Missile Crisis

prompted ,n emergency meeting
of the Council of the OAS
as the

provisional organ of consultation
under the Rio Treaty.

The United

States called on the COAS to
discuss the crisis and decide on

collective action.

With proof of Soviet nuclear
missiles

in Cuba,

the United States persuaded
the Latin American delegates that
the

missiles represented an extra-continental
intervention in the
Americas.

The Latin Americans overwhelmingly
-but not unanimously-

passed the U.S. -sponsored resolution
calling for the naval blockade
of Cuba; Brazil, Mexico, and Bolivia
abstained.

Near the end of the

naval blockade, Argentine and Venezuelan
naval units joined U.S.
forces in enforcing the blockade (Wilson,
1975: 64-65; Finan, 1977c:
254).

1

2

1

In the case of the
MissiiP Crisis,
Missile

..u

the vast majority of
Latin
American states a ree d
that the situation was
g
not merely . politica]
or ideological conflict
hetween the United States
and Cuba but that

«

resented

dear

a

security threat for the
hemisphere and came

under the purview of
the Rio Treaty's
provisions for collective
action.
There was strong
inter-American agreement on
this use of
the Rio Treaty by the
United States>

^

.^.^

^

^

Cuhan Missile Crisis was
the apparent strengthening
of interAmerica, sol lda rity against
this projection of Soviet
military power
in the hemisphere.
Interestingly, the medium- to
long-term outcome
was the Latin American
move toward making Latin
America a nuclearfree zone, which culminated
in the signing of the
Treaty of

Tlatelolco in February 1967 24
(Atkins, 1989: 337-338).
For the next year and a half
after the Missile Crisis, Latin
American majority support for
the United States' position
against
Cuba continued; it ever, grew
once the March 1964 military
coup in
Brazil added that state's vote
to the anti-Castro column of
the OAS
system.

A short time later the system
took its final step in

isolating the Cuban government through
collective sanctions under
the Rio Pact.

In July 1964, the Venezuelan
government called the

Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign
Ministers after it charged
Cuba with aggression in the form of aiding

revolutionaries.

a

group of Venezuelan

An investigating committee appointed by
the COAS

had corroborated the Venezuelan charges,
thus clearing the way for
the Meeting of Consultation to discuss what
collective action under

the Rio Treaty would be taken.

The foreign ministers meeting in

1

3

1

Washington, 0. c. condemned
Cuha. and

-Posed tou g h ne„ sanctions
again8t

,

by .

_

Cufca

of

^
^

^

^
^

consular and diplomatic
reLtiona and the suspension
of all trade
and sea transport vith
the island nation.
Bolivia. Chile, Mexico
and Uruguay opposed
these sanctions, hut in
the end

all states
except Mexico eventually
severed relations vith
Cuha (Wilson. 1975:
66-67; Scheman, 1988: 77).

Thus, between 1960 and
1964, fairly strong differences
between

Latin American states and
the United States over
the nature of the
Cuban Revolution and the
proper uses of the Rio Treaty
began to
narrow.

By early 1962, the United
States had succeeded in

convincing

a

tvo-thirds majority of Latin
American states that its

conflict with Cuba should be
understood
context rather than

Treaty rathe,
action.

Yet

a

in an

East-West security

North-South pc-Uticrt context and
that the Rio

than the OAS Charter was the
appropriate venue for
a

significant group of Latin American
states continued

to oppose the U.S. campaign to
isolate and punish the Cuban

government for its revolutionary direction
until the Cuban Missile
Crisis later that year.

The Crisis brought near unanimous
Latin

American support for the United States'
position.

But then the

issue was not so much about U.S. power in
the hemisphere as it was

about the indisputable introduction of an
extra-hemispheric power's

nuclear arsenal.

The OAS system appeared to be its strongest in

response to the Missile Crisis and in its immediate
aftermath.

The

collective security provisions of the Rio Treaty and even
the
original precepts of the Monroe Doctr:"ne seemed to be vindicated.

1

4

«t„

f

_

the M iB8ile Crisis.
even more 6tates ..
thougb

"PPort the U.S. position on
Cuba

ar d
,

t „e

use of

against Cuban adventurism
especially once thee
Venezuelan
Venezuelan government
charged Cuba with
aggression in 1964 results
.
resulting xn the
imposition of
final economic and
political
,„,f'
ulcai 8sanctions
H
against
81 CpQt-™'„
6
^astro s government.
Several factors ha a
facilitated this shift
within the OAS
system toward reater if
g
not unanimous Latin
Ericas support for
«>e U.S. position on Cuha
and for the use of
the Rio Treaty against
Cuba.
Vastly proved U.S.-Latin
African economic relations
as a

-science

of the

AlHance

for Progress economic
aid programs had

a

Positive spill-over effect
for politico-security
relations.
Moreover, the political
shift against Cuha involved
other politic.!
and security factors:
The emergence and growth
of guerrilla

~nts

either inspired or supported
by revolutionary Cuba
in
several Latin American states;
the anti-revolutionary
fears of
elites and militaries throughout
Latin America; the stepped-up
security assistance and
counter-insurgency training programs

sponsored by the United States
as part of the Alliance for
Progress;
and the eight military coups
overthrowing constitutionally elected
but unstable goverments in
25
Latin American between 1961 and
1964.

Beyond the Cuban Missile Crisis,
all these factors played

a

role in

bringing East-West security concerns
to bear on hemispheric
political events and in creating
inter-American support for using
the OAS system to implement U.S.
containment policies in the

hemisphere.

But it soon became clear that this
inter-American

solidarity was more fragile than

it

seemed.

1

A

—

poUtica, ana military
crisis

anti-Castro C0n6ensus
could

^

in

tha Dominica „

RepubHc

^
^^^

withstMd

^

Pril , a few Doffiinican
aray u„ lte attenpt6d
a coup againet
unpopular head of the cm .,„oountry s junta, Donald
Reid Cabral.
The

-

power o t former Pre8ident

^

Bo8ch _

Bosch

tu

President in OAS-supervised
eUctions in late
but ua8
overthrown h y the military
in September
1963, just seven month6
after ta ki „ 8 o£fice . As
the

became stronger, anti-Bosch
factions in the military
with the
support of the U.S. embassy
decided to resist the
"revolution"
actively. 26 A brjef blt
violen[ civil

^

^

^

uays the U.S. embassy
asked Washington to
intervene on the side of
the anti-Bosch forces
to help restore law and
order.
The United

States

Mediately responded by

landing 400 marines, but
soon over

20,000 .ore U.S. troops were sent
to the Dominican Republic
with the
purpose of preventing "a second
Cuba" (Slater, 1970; 9-38
Wilson,
;
1975: 67; Williams, 1971: 116;
Pinan, 1977d: 263).

Latin American reactions to the
United States' military

intervention in the Dominican Republic
ranged from amazement to
outrage.

Anti-yankee protests erupted throughout
Latin America

while anti-intervention protests
were lodged by Latin governments
the OAS and the United Nations.

Uruguay, and Venezuela

-then

The governments of Chile, Mexico,

among the most respected and stable

civilian governments in the region- were
most critical of the

in

1

6

1

United States'
intervention.
the COAS convoke

a

The
Hie ChiT.
Chilean government
requested that

Meetinp
eetxng nf
of r
Consultation of Foreign
Ministers

under Article 39 of
the OAS Charter
carter, thn,
thus engaging the
OAS peacekeeping mechanisms
--not the R io Treaty'siy s
to dl
discuss the
intervention (Wilson 1071; co
1975: 68; Atkina,
1989: 222; Schenan>
„„.
•

'

78).

It

is

interesting that C MIe
did not invoRe

asainst the United state.intervention.

blowing

the 196A Panamanian

-ate

fUg

to invoke the Ri0
psct

^^

^

^^ ^

In the previous

riots>27

agaiMt

After the Inter-American
Peace Committee had
failed t0
».S.-Panamanian eonfUct.
which ca.e to focus on the

^

issue of

negotiating

new nana, treaty, Panama's
request to invoke the Pro
Treaty against the United
State, was approved hy the
COAS by sixteen
votes; only Chile opposed
the request, while Panara
and the United
States were not eligible to
vote. Acting as the Pio
Treaty's
provisional organ of consultation,
the COAS set up a special
committee to try to resolve the
28
conflict.
In this case, the
a

Rio

Treaty was used as

a

mechanise for conflict resolution
rather than

collective security (Wilson,
1975: 65).
In

the case of the Dominican
invasion, Chile's preference for

working through the OAS Charter's
mechanisms for conflict resolution
was again manifested, and the
Tenth Meeting of Consultation of

Foreign Ministers, this time under
Article 39 of the OAS Charter,
began its first session in Washington
on May

1,

1965.

The four

states most critical of the U.S.
invasion introduced resolutions

1

7

1

1

«— * «t-

u.s. violation of
the non

state, moved quickly
t0 try

action,

u

^ace Porce

«U ne,

introduced

.

£omuunaterali2e

re8olutiQn

^

W

it8

^

^
be held .

" 80lUtiM

^

•

Bcuador, Meiic0( Peru,
and Uruguay

Veneauela abetaineu.

^^^^

^

crea(e

to occupy the

election. co„

"e

,ntervration

vote of fourteen to
£ive .
sote(J

against

chlle

resoiutiM

^^^

Included in the

^

the neceeeary tvo-tbirde
majority to paa. the resolution
was the
vote of the Dominica,,
representative whose o,e ra,
Mt had been
E

overthrow by the pro-Bosch
supporters.
°f

in

°d

h

« '""—ping

A Br „iHan genera,
became

force, with the U.S.

the Doa, inic a n Republic
becoming his deputy.

American troops

froa,

coaler

By l. te Ma y,

Utin

Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua,
and Paraguay began

to arrive, totaling some

1

,750 troops

in

addition to the 23,000 U.S.

troops in the "Inter-American"
peace-keeping force (Wil.on, 1975:
68; Finan, 1977d: 263; Williams,
1971: 91-92).

With only seven per cent of
the total

American contingent participating

in

forces, the Latin

the occupation of the
Dominican

Republic barely qualified the
peace-keeping forces as "multi-

lateral."

Yet the United States apparently
felt confident enough to

propose the establishment of an
inter-American peace-keeping force
on a more permanent basis,
arguing that the lack of such a force
had

been

a

long-standing weakness

machinery.

in

the OAS system's peace-keeping

But the reputation of the OAS was
alread;

falling

—

~
0^ even

^

ly

vern.Uv

Mrhtr

Wy "
of

after the organi2ation
had faiud

con^

. D. S .

Instead th 0AS
'
ion .

»•«

Almost overnight Latin

^
-a

- -rv

yaDkee

to

o

^
^ _

^^

legitiMte tt .

0£ tne Unite,
State8 - use

inter-American institutions
to »erve
serve its ovn narrow
interests.
1 AneriCM
PP08iti0
°
<°

A-rican peaoe- k eepi„ force
g
miHtarv .overrents

„
»••

°

„ as

-po. al
elming

£or . perMnent
inter-

fcy

^^ ^

of A r g entina, Boiivie,
and Brazil opposed

the idea (Slater,
1969: 500;

91 _ 92;

69).

The stresses produced
by the Dominican

^^^^

Among the... costs [of the
Dominican intervention] w aR
an upsurge of anti-Americanism
in world and Ltin
public opinion.
Furthermore, the Alliance
88
ffe ed a severe ioss
°f
time.
tiL
U.S. m
::
:
moves
to strengthen the OAS's
collective
capabilities were reversed,
leading to its weakening
at Buenos Aires in 1967.
*
The hopef for an InterAmerican peacekeeping force
were obviated for the
tUre
-^r-American system
v
was
111 'iinto question and
called
U.S. self-interest in
i
C0Dtinued viability set back at
least
u ^.
a decade °f
(Williams,
1971:

Wxcm
Ts

*

TIT*

99).

Indeed, the cracks that were
evident in the OAS system in 1954
had only been papered over
with the anti-Castro consensus
between

1962 and 1964.

But they became fissures too
deep to repair after

the 1965 Dominican intervention.

reform the OAS syster, to make

it

1

Isolated moves before 1965 to

stronger gave way to

a

broader

1

9
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—

1965 that succeeded
only in further

ab ility t0 address

those involving the
DDited

—

polUical confUcte>

StBUs .

As Manget

u968)

OAS became lncrea8ingly

-tea

left it t0 deaI with
technicai

^
„

^

^

Mtters yhue £hey

ingly turned to
other ioternationai

fM

Pressing their international
political interests.

^

Redefining Inter-American
Relat ions

The economic, soc
io-cultural

,

political and military

relationships making up the
inter-American system underwent
important transformations
after the Dominican
intervention of 1965.
By inter-American
system we mean the complete
set of relations.,ups
and institutions linking
the states of the
hemisphere in various
"ays and of vhich the OAS
system (defined here b> the
OAS Charter
and the Ric Treaty)

system beginning

i„

is

only a part.

Pressures to reform the OAS

the 1950s and strengthening
in the early 1960s

had indicated that many
were not happy with its
structure; after the

Dominican intervention the movement
to reform the OAS system
indicated that many were not happy
with the structure of power
within the inter-American system
as a whole.
Beginning in the midto late-1960s and continuing
into the 1980s, the Latin American

states pursued

a

variety of new paths

in their foreign relations

order to redefine the structure of
inter-American relations and

in
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-vise

tb. „a ture o £ Latin

^ ericm

part ic ipation

.„

international

politics.

Reforming fh P oar

c

yntr]11

Before 1965, the various
proposals to reform and
strengthen the
OAS system had included
strengthening the initiative
and role of the
Council of the OAS in the
pacific settlement of
disputes so as to
avoid action through the
Rio Treaty, 29 increasing
the

^

and authority of the General
Secretary, and resurrecting
some form
of the Inter-American

Conference as

between the member states.

a

regular, high-level meeting

After the Dominican crisis,
however, the

support for strengthening the
political role of the OAS reversed
itself.

Instead, in three OAS Charter-reform
conferences, held in

30
Rio de Janeiro in the fall of
1965,
Panama in the spring of 1966,
and Buenos Aires

in

early 1967, the Latin American
majority grew

increasingly determined to minimize the
political role of the OAS.
This reform movement culminated in
the Protocol of Amendment to the

1948 Charter of Bogot^, which was signed in
Buenos Aires in February
1967 (Slater, 1969: 502; Dreier, 1968; Manger,
1968).

The Buenos Aires Protocol abolished the
moribund Inter -American

Conference and replaced

it

with

a

General Assembly.

As the new

supreme organ of the OAS, the General Assembly meets
annually to

decide the organization's general policy.
and

it

It may discuss any matter

coordinates the work of the other organs.

It approves the

OAS budget, elects the General Secretary and his or
her Assistant,

122

-

oversees the

Borl[

of the Ge „ eral
Secretariat .

strengthening ltl polUical

-

^^

tb. H-aited. .on- ai
, inittrative

"hose

te™

r6f0raS
-

t.

roU

of

of office vas raduced

"°"

tfce

^
°*

^
^
^^^
^

SKretary>

^

^

orientation o f the re £ora

the na.e 0£ the Pan
teerican Union

formany

change<]

^

the .ore technocratic
"Genera! Secretariat"
(Manger, 1968: 7, 11
:
Dreier, 1968: 483; Atkins,
1989:

210-212).

The Buenos Aires Prntrv> ni
j
Protocol
also redesignated
the Council of the
OAS as the Permanent
Council of the OAS. P reviously
considered
"hub" of the organization,
its authority was reduced
and placed on a
par with three other organs
now raised to council level:
the Meeting
of Consultation of Foreign
Ministers, the Inter-Amer ican
Economic
and Social Council (1AEC0S0C),
and the Inter-Amer ican
Council for

^

Education, Science, and Culture
(IACESC).

No longer the executive

organ of the OAS, the primary
role of the Permanent Council
became
that of peacekeeping, with
the assistance of the Inter-American

Committee on Peaceful Settlement
(formerly the Inter-American Peace
Committee). However, the authority
of both organs over pacific
settlement vas actually curtailed by
the reforms.
(1968: 6)

As William Manger

lamented,

eliminating the verbiage and analyzing the
essentials,
the Council is reduced to a channel of
communication.
It can receive a request for its good
offices from one
party to a dispute and transmit it to the
other.
It
can function, however, only if both
parties agree to
avail themselves of its facilities.
If one refuses the
tender of good offices, the Council shall limit
itself
to submitting a report to the General
Assembly.
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n.

no power to initiate
peacekeeping act;on£ on
council also 6erves
as „ preparatory
cMmittee

General Assembly and
it may
7 still1 «»

Ue

^

"

the Provisional
Organ of
,
Consultation in emergency
situations until the
Meeting o f
Consultation o f Poreigu
Ministers can assemble
Oreier, 1968s 483 .
Manger, 1968: 5-7;
Atkins, 1989: 210-212).
There was no statutory
cbange in tbe Meeting
or Consultation
of
foreign Ministers,
hosev6r itE reUUve
,

^

^

««

^

nearly meeting, of tbe
new Ceneral Assemby
and by tbe elevation
to council level of
tbe 1AEC0S0C an, tbe
IACESC (Manger, 1968- 9°reier, 1968: .83; Atbins.
1989: 210-212). A l ong
with t „.
structural cbanges, tbe
elevated status of £hese
Utt .
r

reflected tbe

overwhelm^

^
^

interest of tbe Latin
American majority

to refocus tbe OAS
system on economic and
development

than political and
security issues.

issues rather

Tbe Charter reforms vent
into

effect in February 1970,
after two-thirds of tbe
member states had
ratified tbe Protocol cf
Buenos Aires (Mart,, 1977:
177; Wilson,
1S75: 70).

These reforms had scarcely
entered into force in 1970
when a
second movement to reform
the OAS system emerged.
The immediate
causes of this second reform
movement stemmed from Latin
American

dissatisfaction with the Nixon
administration's protectionist
foreign economic policies after
32
1971
as well as the continued hardline position of the United
States against Cuba. At the
second and
third OAS General Assembly
sessions in 1972 and 1973, a proposal
to

hold an OAS conference to
reconsider Cuban participation in the
OAS

.
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supported by

.

plurauty

of Latin

ha, already begu „
to re . estabUsh econom

with Cuoa.

^
^
^
^
^

wicm
.

c

o{

.

d

Hoover the uoited States
insi6ted

pioMtic

^

lions

,

vote of the OAS meBb
er.Mp VO uld be neceE8ary
to rever£e botb
1%2 decislou to exclude the

revolution governs

fro* the

organization and the>
qaa decrsxon
the 1964
to impose diplomatic
and ecomonic
1

•

•

sane t ions

Other issues exacerbating
friction between the United
States
and Latin America in the
early 1970s included widespread
Latin
resentment over the U.S. refusal
up to that point to
negotiate . new
Panama Canal treaty that would
transfer "effective sovereignty"
of
the canal to Panama as well
as Latin resentment over
the political
and economic power of U.S.
-based transnational corporations.
At the
1973 OAS General Assembly session,
all of these issues led
several

Latin American states to criticize
strongly what they perceived to
be continued U.S. political
exploitation and domination of the OAS.
Some even went so far as to call
for a strictly Latin American

alternative to the OAS (an idea that
continues to attract
adherents).

Instead, the majority supported

a

resolution to create

the Special Committee to Study the
Inter-American System and to

Propose Measures for Restructuring It (CEESI,
by its Spanish
acronym), which began its work in Lima in
June, 1973 (Wilson, 1975:
76-79; Atkins, 1989: 126-127, 208-209; Lowenthal,
1987: 39; Martz,
1977: 177).

After nearly two years of work, the CEESI submitted
its Final
Report to the OAS General Assembly.

The focus of CEESI's reform
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",y

passed a resoiut.oo
convoking , £peciai
Plenipotentiaries to amend
SeC

»« »

^

" lty »«•

San dose, Costa
Pica in July of
that year
year.
a.end m e„ts t . the
Eio

r ne

^

Treaty

taken by the

conference was

"*

orLnl .*

COlle

«i«

proposed

measures

-Clarifying the definition
of an "act of aggression"
j »

in accordance with th*
in order to Prevent
prevent It

.

10nS
def i^tion
\
the political
uses
of the Rio
Tieatv
treaty, as was possible
under the ori P lnal
in*i
*nd
S
controversial Article
6; and
•

V

^Ek^^
recordations

mailed

(Martz, 1977

The conference made no
o ci.anges
changes

m

lmp ° rtant

177-180)

m,
0 mechanisms
u
the
•

for the pacific

settlement of disputes, such
as they were
were, for
tor tM.
this was considered
an area too sensitive
to
touch.

Coincidental to the San Jose
conference, the Sixteenth Meeting
of Consultation of Foreign
Ministers convened on duly 25
to consider
the question of continued
sanctions against Cuba. After
continuous
day and night sessions, the
-eeting adopted the Freed™
of Action

^solution, which allowed states
party to the Rio Treaty the
freed™
""to normalize or conduct in
accordance with the national
policies
and interests of each their
relations with the Republic of
Cuba."'
Even the United States supported
this resolution (Martz, 1977:
178).
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«te r

its adoption by
the San dose
conference, the 1975

Protocol of Amendment
to rhe
the n;„
R 10 r
Treaty was sent to
the member
»ates for ratification. By
that time, ho.ever.
interest in the OAS
.as at an all time
lo„, and the moves
to reform it faded.
The Protocol never
received enon g h
ratifications to enter
into

—m

force.

-ond

Liaise,

the drafts of other
instruments produced h
y this
refor. movement, s„ ch
fl8 the Draft
Convention on Cooperation

for Development, the
Draft Convention on
Collective Economic
Security for Development,
and other draft
amendments to the OAS
Carter, all languished and
hecame dead issues for
lach of ioterest
in the late 1970s and
33
into the 1980s
(Martr, 1977: 180-183;
Atkins, 1989: 209).

The OAS reform movements
of the late 1960s and
early 1970s
indicated significant Latin
American dissatisfaction
with the
structure and focus of the OAS
system.
The reforms reflected
both a
certain impatience with
continued U.S. domination of
the system and

longstanding Latin American
interest in refocusing the
regional
organization on economic and
development issues rather than
a

political and security issues.

Indeed, by the late 1960s more
and

more Latin American states were
defining their "national security"
in

markedly economic and development-oriented
terms.
Most writers analyzing the reform
period and contemporaneous to

it,

such as Dreier (1968), Manger
(1968), Slater (1969), Wilson

(1975), and Martz (1977), saw Latin American
"nationalism" or

"economic nationalism" as the underlying
cause or impetus for the

reform movements.

In fact,

"nationalism" and/or "economic
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nationalism-

seen,

explanation for

T

to have become th.
the conventional
North American
a hi n ABeriCM
a
ChalUn* 68
»•»• Powe, and t0
the

"

—

I.

analysis).

see. t00 simpli6[ic
(e6peciauy wUhout

"Nationalism" and

•

^

economic nationalism"
seem to be
headings too broad
in which to
t0 ni
Cl3S8lfy the Latin
American diplomacy
of the time, much
of which had come
me to stress
stres, economic
integrationism and multilflt-p-roi
lateral -f~
foreign policy
coordination on many
issues.
Instead it seems more
correct to
«•« explain the
f
reform
movements
P«« of a larger transformation
in Lstin

«
- -

i^^^

teericM

0£ certai „ LaUri

dipwy

^

^^^^

'o define and act
on their own
conceptions of "national
interest „
We .11, consider
this assertion keI „,
and examine it .ore
f„„ y in

«»Ptr

mi.

For „o,

it

is

enough to recog„i ze that
divergent

interests underscored the
Latin American disillusionment
with the
OAS system, which was
dominated by U.S. co.d war
interests and thus
constrained in serving Latin
American development interests.
The
tinkering with the OAS
peacekeeping mechanisms iu
the 1950s and
1960s indicates the discomfort
of Latin American states
with the
institutional "fit" of the
regional organisation, while
the broader
reform movements after 1965
show the degree of
disillusionment with
the system as a whole.
The U.S. rejection of the
second reform
movement's emphasis on "collective
economic security" resulted in
the virtual abandonment of
the OAS system for anything
but the most
technical of issues ir, the
1970s and into the 1980s.
Instead, Latin

feiCM

r

—
~
~

diPl

ioped

forei

-

particuiar

—

<°

—
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—ioMl

forums and

_

that could better

of Latin ABerican
states

-er

-.««.!

since the

m,

Chapultepec

Conferee („

interest „ as aC0D0Bic
development

^

_

^

not before) it

^ u^

1960s, it became increasingly
g^y clear «-W
that national economic
development was limited by
the condition
condit-^ of* dependency
a
y tne
in which
these
34
ates we
U8ht th . Latin taerie .„
foraed the
Economic Co-issio, on
Latin AKerica (ECU)
a

""

"

^

Nat.oos ag e„cy

Ms

in

1951

associates at ECIA

,

the studies

were importan[

trade raletionship
experiellCed by

^

political economy and its
its negBtive

fcy

^

^
^

^
^ ^ .^^.^

„

^

speci£Uzea

on

Utin

development.
ECLA's work led to the
development of dependency theory,
which
was widely accepted in
Latin Americe by the late
1960s end early
1970s (if „ot esrlier) end
which indicated certein
policy

prescriptions

at

both the domestic end intern
a tion al ievels eimed
at

lessening Letin toerica's
economic dependency and
underdevelopment.
At

the international level,
such policy prescriptions included

tariffs to protect infant
industries, multilateral commodity

agrees,
dlVmifi

——

regional economic
integrationism, and

" liM "

(ifnot of thegoods
traded)-

These policies received
con6iderabu attMtion

"««

in th e 1960E

success.

T hus

tu

^

^

andl9?0s> albeit with
varying degrees of

Mt „

ECLA - e studies as
.
a spur
apur, Lar
Latin America
acquired
Its ovn intellectual
framework for analyzing M,
the international
Political economy, Latin
America's place
r
therein
unerem, and various
policy
alternatives available to
Latin American states.
At the same time.
Latin American diplomats
were also acquiring
•

.

•

«=

-Portant practical experience

-y

in

multilaters, dip l0macy
through

different forums outside
of the OAS system.
Partly trough the
existence of ECLA and
partly through the early
dissatisfaction of
Latin American states
with the OAS system after
1948, Latin African

diplomacy turned increasingly
to the United Nations
and its various
agencies as alternative
forums for pursuing economic
development
interests.
Latin American participation
in the United Nations

Conference on Trade and Development
(UNO TAD) was especially
significant by the mid 1960s,
both economically and politically.
Within UNCTAD, certain Latin
American states, notably Mexico,

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and
others sought to play

a

leadership

role among Third World states,
the vast majority of which
had only

recently gained political independence.
UNCTAD
,

More importantly, within

Latin American states rediscovered
the usefulness and

potential bargaining power of speaking
with one voice in international forums by forming the Comisio'n F.n..

latinn».pr

jfrinf

(CECLA).

i

q1

,„

c^;^^

1

~

«*"

-

originally created a6

.

coordinating mechMisn

positions of Latin
America „

1964 UNCTAD

-

0£Lati

I

Conference.

It 800,1
soon b
K

paruc

" a- «

.

_

o^oing caucusing group

———
foreign ministers
aimed at

PoUcies w ith regard to
internatiMal econMic
negMiations
VSri0US

(

^

^

gy transfer, et c,
international forums
(UNCTAD, GATT, the
IMF and „„ ld
Bank, the European
Economic Community,
ana even within
the 0AS)

-

-ions

(Aftali<$n,
QQ\
199).

1

975«
9".

a„d

s^Q. Drekonja
n
539,
Kornat, 1982: 46;
Atkins, ,989: 198i

1

""1.

tne OAS reforms were
being debated, CECLA
became an
increasing!, important
collective instrument for
Latin American

produced the "Consensus of
Vina del Mar
mar, »
to tbe Nu< on
administration voicing Latin

a do,
document

sent by CECLA

Africa, grievances with

».S.

foreign economic policies
and si g nalin
g the need for the United
States to recognize the
-distinctive personality of Latin
America"

CConoell-Smith, 1974: 36).

Similarly, CECLA sent another
document

called the "Manifesto of
Latin America" to the United
States in
September 1971 protesting the
Nixon administration's New
Economic
Policy aa unfair to the
countries of Latin America
(Aftalion, 1975:
543).

Neither of these two documents
had much of an effect on
the
United States. While the Nixon
administration showed some

willingness to improve the "special
relationship" and open

a

"new

dialogue" between the U.S. and
Latin America, little of substance
was ac tually achieved 35 (Atkins,
1989: 198; Lowenthal

,

1987: 38).

3

131

contrast,

««•

CEC^s

u r0P e were more

ef£orts

, ucce8sfu

At its meeting

^

Buenos
1970, CECLA produced
the "Declare,Beclarat 10 „ oft .Buenos
Aires," which
pressed t0 t „e European
Economic Comity
(EEC)
eriCaD intere

J^a

«

,

"

" -

—

withh the EEC.

—

„

S a ..specie!

reUtionship"

Th* vvr
The
EEC responded by
declaring 1971 as the
"Latin
an Vear." More
substantively, a mechanism
for consultation
De80tiati0D
«» *»
-s set up and a series o f
hlgh -level meetings
were held between 1971
snd 1975.
Although the
results were less than
what tha CECLA had
naa honed
ho Ped, this
initiative did
have positive reetilt-e
t_-^,
results.
Initial contacts were
made between the EEC
-d the young Andean Croup (which
had forced a regional
economic
-tegrstion pact parti, inspired
by the success of the
EEC) , and
several new non-preferential
commercial agreements were
signed
between the EEC and
individual Latin states,
namely Argentina,
Braril, Mexico and Uruguay.
European trade and diplomatic
exchanges
with Latin America
intensified atter
offer 1975
ion (r,
(Drekonja „
Kornat, 1982:
,

,

47; Aftalio'n, 1975: 557-558;
Tanner, 1986:

•

95-96).

In spite of some
differences between the
economically more

advanced nations and the rest
of the members of CECLA
over economic
policy positions, and despite
some rivalry between the
larger states
for leadership within it,
CECLA's meetings did produce
a high degree
of Latin unity and coordinated
positions on a number of economic

issues (Atkins.
s, 1989qq)
i*ey. iyy;.
1

tk^ „caucusing
The
group was so successful

that in 1975 it was reconstituted
in a more institutionalized
and

expanded for..

At the initiative of Mexican
President Lui'e

—
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h

'

7

ri a and

venezueun preside

:
^"^"^^^^11^

-

cari

°*

^

-

(SELA) „ as created
create to replace
,
CECLA as the
Latin American regional
caucus.
.

According t0 lt Charter,
.
SELA

is

.

"an organization for

consultation, coordination,
and joint economic and
socio,
Promotion." Like its
predecessor, SEXA is a
political arrangement

^signed

-her,

_

to enhance the
international bargaining

by

f oraulating

regicnai posUions

peer

of its

^

dialogue.

SELA itself is not
an economic integration
scheme hut it
does support integrationism.
U„l ike CECLA, SELA
includes

participate
»ates, but

hy

i,

Principle organ

Cuha as veil as many
English-speaking Carihhear.

continues to exclude the
United States.
is

the Latin

who meet at least once

a

African Council, composed

year.

SELA's
of ministers

The Council's decisions
are not

binding:

Member states are only
obligated to multilateral
consultations. SELA has a
permanent secretariate head,uarte
t ed
in
Caracas, Venezuela and a
secretary general who serves
a four-year
term.

The organization is supported
by budget contributions

assigned to masters based on
their relative ability to
pay (Atkins,
1989: 199-200; Finan, 1977e:
265-266; Drekonja Kornat, 1982:
53-54).
In addition to these
examples of Latin American
multilateral

diplomacy outside of the OAS system,
several other important
examples should be noted.

Beginning in the early 1960s and
inspired

both by the work of EC LA and the
success of the European Common
Market, several regional economic
intergration schemes were

undertaken by Latin American states.

With roots in several

—
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„

the 1950s (and io
tbe

five Centra!

" emaU>

HOnd

—~

—
A^

Common Market (CACM)
in i960.

—

aI1

*>

ou

cMfederai

^

£t8tes (C0SU Rica>

created the Central

^

saivadc

_

"lean

The
ine CACM united
* * its
members in

seeking the gradual
realization of a custom,
customs union and the
promotion
^».tr ia Mti0D . Its first

„

considered succeesful
in contributing

^ ^^^^

^^

for lt . member, and
promoting intra . regional
trade> hovever
re81 °"' S eCOn °" iC
Md P ° liti 1
the 1970s and 1980s
have

"

SemUS

"

hamP6red

CACM

'

6

188).

—

«

eve, eince (Athins,

,„,.

m

_

Also in 1*0. the Lati
„ AKerican Free
Trade A£socistion (Mpw)
»as forced to promote
free trade between its
eleven members. 36
proved to be a disappointment.
Differences in the levels

^TA

of

development between the
members were an important
source of problems
for eliminating tariffs,
and LAFTA became virtually
moribund in
1968.
Hovever, some of its members
were un„ill ing to abandon
integration and signed the
Andean Pact in 1969. The
Andean Pact
created a common market among
its members (Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and, after
1973, Venezuela) that successfully
eliminated tariffs between its
memhers on schedule and
instituted a
common external tariff by
1976.

The Pact also adopted a

comprehensive regional industrialization
policy and
investment code.

a

foreign

In the mid 1970s and
again in the early 1980s, the

Andean Pact ran into economic
and political problems, however
the

1

^Atkins, 1989: 192-194).
1

j;::::;

^

~
*

fl-aillt,

moribund

^

*"t«.»tU»

„

t0

estabU8h

seeks

t.

addrets

goal

Pr—

^^^^^

:

JUridiCSl b86i8

U

the

,

SMe

regio

_

and e£tabH8hed
a

among lt .

Mnbers

ide iatin

of the probUms

c

^

sue, as perBittjrg
greater negotiatiM
than LAFTA and pe

« itting

It6

.

^

us

^

operationai

certain regionai tar
ff
.

preferences based on members'
levels
evels of d»v„,„
development. Throughout
the
1980s, the .embers of A LAD
I continued to
renegotiate the old
agreements of LAFTA and
negotrate new ones, however
the 1980s proved
to be a very diffi c „
lt peri od for Latin
American economic growth
and
regional tr.de. ALADI ' 6
success remains to be seen.
(Atkins, ,„„
196-197).

For our purposes, the
ultimate success of these
various
economic integration schemes
is less important
that the fact that
they vera undertaken at
all and that they provided
Latin American
states with ongoing experiments
in multilateral diplomacy,
from the
highest levels to the more
technocratic levels, outside of
the OAS
system.

Other examples of Latin
American multilateral diplomacy

through the 1970s and 1980s
would have to include the
increasing

number of Latin American states
joining the Non-Aligned Movement
as
wel! as several ad hoc meetings
of Latin American foreign
ministers
and several formal and

informal presidential summits.

In fact,
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.

presidential inaugurations
have
ve recentlv
recently become
h.
important meeting

dKUratiMt Md

^ve

meet ings

"-.over
^ve
e

"

^

the pa6t three decades>

been bora at

^

6 „ch

gained va>uable
experience in miUiiaterai
forM8
SbU,1,ed
ltiPle
ication betveen 8tate£
_
and outside of Lati,
America. With this
situation, the

"

-

—

^^

mstitutiona of the OAS system
became less and Uss
important tc
Latin American international
relations.

Meanwhile, beginning

il(

the 1960s but

fa

-a

^

^

1980s, there has heen an
explosion of new Latin
American
institutes and think tanks
(usually associated vith
national
universities) devoted to the
study of internationa!
relations fro n a
Latin American perspective.
Beginning vith Mexico's
E .tudi.s

Tptfrn arin n i1rf

tutltata Snn-rior
there has been an

df

M CvW >
l

w„di>

i mp ortant

rr nr

n

„, H
,.,

„

^

1

p „

D^^^
^^

in 1959 and

founded in th#

movement within Latin America
to stop

simply importing and translating
North American theories of
internationa, relations without
any Latin adaptation.

Instead,

in Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica. Ecuador,
Mexico,

Peru,

Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela,
Latin American academics

and political analysts have
been elaborating ECLA's intellectual

framework, developing Latin American
perspectives on international
relations, and training personnel who
can then cove into government

— ^;

12

e as part o£
the

"

diplomaUc corps (Drekonja
19 a 5: IonaS6inl>
1980;

^^

MuW>

i98o)

*ven »ore si nifi ca
nt, the various
g
oatioMi institut

<- «->

««*H-

- —etional
important contact£

relations throughout

wUh

nr

'1

The hraiicMTd of

_

^ f ^ u£i

^

reg;oD

other throush

"^^-^^^^^^^
~"

'
•

^

,nri "". k novn by the
acrony* RIAL, i„

_

of Lat;n

foremost

of

intentional relations, Luciano
Tomaesini, RIAL sponsors
-Uinational meeting , Di ,e.

ltm

,

Bt udies, publlcatioDE

,

and

other joint activities
aimed at exchanging
iceas, theories, an,
Perspectives on Latin
American international
relations and f orei n
g
Policy (Tomessini, 1985).
„ ith this developffient
of

^

^

field of international
relation, in Latin America,
combined , lth the
Practical experience gained
by Latin American diplomats
in the past
fev decades, many Letin
American states have developed
their desire
and capacity to identify
and assert their particular
national

interests in international
affaire.

They have found the

institutions of the OAS system
inadequate for pressin and
meeting
g
their poUtical interests in
international and inter-American
affairs.

They have found the inter-Aa,erican
system (mb1b laUa)
too confining to satisfy
their contemporary economic
and political
national interests.
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Conclusion: The Central
American Cri„Cri.i. of th e

,

Inter-A.^XteT'

—^

~i-U.i'

"

of

,tin toerlcan

^^

dipWy

—

Policies ha d turned
iMrea8ingIy

-

" UUilateral

^

-P.. other Ihird
world states, and
among the Latin a
g
American states
themselves
(Tomassini. 1975)
r^^
n
The Unuea States
was no longer the
so!e or even
^inci P al pole t own ra which
L „ ti „

»»

^^^

,

*

P— it-

^foreign

policy goals.

And

t

,_

^

^

ghout
i970s _
those goals focused
on trying
tryine to r*A
r
reduce Latin American
dependency on
the United States
and diversifv
iversify t.«h„
iLatin political
and economic
relations.
•

•

*»e OAS

SyttM

ha d also lost it.

reHabiUty

ana usefulness for
Onitea States after
1970 as the latter's
previous two-th ir a s
-Jorit, was no long e r assurea.
Despite the pronouncements
of the
Nixon administration
ahout the neea to rehuila
the "special
relationship" between the
Doited States ana Latin
Africa, the

reality was that for most
of the 1970s,

0.

g.

policy tovard Latin

America ana the regional
organization was one of benign
38
neglect.
The Carter administration
had gone a long way toward
improving U.S.Latin American relations
(while expending . great deal
of dome8tic
political capital) by signing
ana securing the ratification
of the
Carter-Torrijos Panama Canal Treaties
in 1977 a„a 1978.
However,
the rickety institutions of
the OAS system could no longer
serve (if
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-

really did) as

a

mediating mechMism
betHeen

Lata American political
differences.

IW
*-

dear

in June 19

„

—

when the uaited s

'Pecfaf „eefin of
g
Consultation of Foreign

-

dUCU

became

" VOlUti ° n

"

—

e«ort

-

—

-

^ ^

^^
^

X» a

Ust minute

^^

t0 prescrve the
Nicaraguan „ ational
Guard in
by the revolutionary

Sandinista

Cyrus Vance presented

FrMt

,

Secretafy . £

plan calling
ng for
ror th.
the resignation
of
resident A „astacio Somoaa,
the creation
a

^

of .

~-.ilU.U-.

-«

^

^

^

and the formation
of an 0 AS eace k
P
ee P in g fo r ce te
be
to Managua t0
enforce a ceasefire.
The p la n w a s resoundingly

rejected by

Sola's

a

.„

^

0 f the Lsti „

^

and „ aE widely criticised
a6 . thin l
y veiled intervention

Nicaragua's civil „ ar
(Blachman et al, 1986:
300).
The triumph of the
Sandinista revolution in Jul
y 1979 ~w ith
significant anti-Somoaa
suppor t coming f rom the
govermeIltf „ f
Mexico, Venezuela, Cost a
Rica, Panama and otherswas
followed

October by a mi l itary coup
carried out by
Salvador.

.

.

un or eff cers
,

a

^ n

The coup had held some
promise of needed reforms for

Central America's smallest
and most populous country,
hut increasing
repression fro. the military and
security forces led the c„ Ie
refo™minded .ethers of the new junta
to resign within a few months.
El

Salvador soon found itself engulfed

in a

hitter civil war.

The United States responded
to these revolutionary challenges
in

its

"backyard" with alarm.

In the last months of the
Carter

administration and the first months of
the Peagan administration,

"
0

W
T
PU

" *

P

"

policies of

—*

—
—

earlier e

-

-
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-

put

^

the troubled
The Reagan
administration
^^cration .was especially
p clalI y o~
convinced that
the emerging
political crises in r .
Central, America
were best
understood and addressed
in
C ° nteXt
f
°
g East-West
««««t. The new administration
V0Ked £o dr
6 a S ainst
What it
4* ~
vhat
perceived to be the
spread
off rn
P
C0I
in the isthmus.
°
Its
Policies focused on
increasing
smg Uu. s.
S
*r
economic and security
assistance to an ti
-communist governments
in central
Central America
A,
and on
increasing political,
economic, and milita™
military pressures
,
on the new
government in Nicaragua.

isthmus.

.

m

^

—8in

^^sm
•

^

These policies would
soon bring abou£

opposition or severe! other
lati „

^

»y

«<*"°

and

^

Central America rooted

and dictatorship.

in

.

^

6tate6> which

Venecia,

sovernments of Utin America
tended to see the

»

.

the civilian

revolution

hiE tor y of poverty,
socis,

unr est

i Diquity

,

Alarmed at the consequences
of the vast

militarisation of the region
and fearful of the
threat of a direct
0. S. military intervention in
the early 1980s, these
states

initiated an ongoing process
of negotiations aimed
at rescuing the
Central African crises
fro* the East-West conflict.
Kith the
weakened OAS system in shambles,
particularly after the

Falklands/Malvinas rslands war, the
Latin African diplomatic
response to the civil and
military crises of Centra. America
was to
promote the emergence of an
ongoing

peace process outside of the OAS
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lo the late 1970s,

f

the countries of Central
America entered

into a period of economic,
social, and, for some,
political crisis
that lasted throughout the
1980s and into the 1990s.
Neighboring
states with economic and
political interests in the
troubled isthmus

understood the causes and
remedies of these crises

in different

ways.

After the successful armed
revolution that ousted Nicaraguan
dictator Anastacio Somoza Debayle
in July, 1979, and

growing revolutionary activity
and civil violence

after the

in El

Salvador and

Guatemala in 1980, United States
policy makers increasingly
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region.

however, other states nei
g hborin g

their own

interpreters

of the causes of
the re g ion-s crises and
moved to develop their own
forei g „ policy
tools to assert and protect
their interests.
E mer g i„
g sub-he g emo„s
such as Mexico an d Venezuela
as veil as other states
with g rowi„ g
ties to the region, such
as Colombia an d Panama,
became .ore an d

.ore concerned over the deepenx„
g violence in Central Africa and
the related militarisation
of the region hy outside
powers of both
East and West.

After several isolated attempts
during 1981 and

1982, these four neighboring states
issued a joint call for peace
in
Central America in January,
1983, that developed into an ongoing

diplomatic process aimed at the peaceful
resolution of the region's
conflicts.
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PoHtical situation

spurred Mexico,

dipWic

in

Central Series as
„ell as the international
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,ue.t for peace.

and Panana t0 undertake
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Thus, the a im of this
chapter

is

to

review events of the latP Q7n.o
1970s andj early 1980s to
help situate the
e-rgence of the Contadora
peace process.
It is not aeant to
he a
co mp rehe„sive analysis
or explanation of the
causes of poUtical
violence in Central America.
1

Changing Times

Beginning in the mid 1970s,
the countries of Central
America
(Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua)
faced
emerging economic, social, and
political crises that would deepen
and attract the world's
attention in the 1980s.

The isthmian

economies had experienced dynamic
growth during the 1960's

industrialization process, thanks largely
to the success during that
decade of the Central American Common
Market (CACM) as well as the
related Alliance For Progress programs.

Between 1960 and 1970,

Central America's industrial sector
had grown by 8.4 per cent, to
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diversification of the
g >on-s economy throug h

m

i

.

^

,

'

«->.

~

import-substitution

-Hcies

during the 1960s
,

0arket

t0

*

Central America,
exports to the

— " - -itW

Coffee, bananas, sugar,
cotton, and beef
oeet.
on Primary products

for Centra!

Mrli

agricultural products-

This continued
dependence

Erica's

export earnings resulted
situation
of deteriorating
•
terms of trade in the
mid-to-late
1»70., es P ecia, ly after
the op£c

-

^ ^^^
^

Import prices rose b
y 38 per cent between
1976 and 1982 while
Central America's exports
lost their purchasing
power* (Newfarmer,
1986: 215-216).
To make matters worse,
the 1969 "Soccer War"
between El
Salvador and Honduras brought
about the stagnation of
the CACM i„
the 1970s.
1„ this nationalistic war based in
demographic and

economic frustrations in both
states, the actual fighting
was
relatively brief thanks to OAS
peacekeeping procedures
the

^

significant mediation efforts
of the other three Central
American
states, Nicaragua, Guatemala,
and Costa Rica, whose
diplomats worked
to save the Common Market.
However, Honduras cancelled
its

membership

in

the CACM in 1971 and tense
relations between Honduras

and El Salvador persisted
throughout the 1970s (Martz, 1975).

Thus,

both the exhaustion of
import-substitution industrialization and
the

stagnation of the CACM after the 1969
"Soccer War" contibuted to the
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deteri0r

" i0n

CPs

;T
Tables

*

——

*

and per

-

^^

th. 1970s, „ ith
per

capUa incoMs famng
markediy5

987: 5; Ne- fara
;
2

-

boo.

a

.

Halker , 1989:

and 4).

Beyond its impressive
grouth during

^,. iatiM

pr0 cess alsQ
contributea

domestic social changes.

^

^^^^

These ^eluded
inri a a
increased urbanization
and
the growth of new
urban sectors,
sector* such
*
as industrial
elites and
workers
as well as
ac hv,
n
u
the urban unemployed
and underemployedv,

—

of whose economic
and pol itica l

tradlti ° nal

attests

at

interests

^^

^creased landlessness for
the

^
all

land reform under the
Alliance Per Pro ress
g
(Cepeda and

Pardo, 1987: 5; La Feber,
1984: 145-195).

With the deterioration
of traditional economic
and social
structures came gro„ lng
demands on the political
systems of the
region for the accomodation
of new ln terests.
New social B roups and
new political movements
emerged in Central America
in the 1960s and
•970s, signalling pressures
for change.

However, in Nicaragua, El

Salvador, and Guatemala in
particular, the traditionally
elitist and
exclusionary political systems
resisted demands for change.

Specifically, the Somoza regime
in Nicaragua became more
brutal and
greedy; El Salvador's military
fru^t-raf^ a. ademocratic
rrustrated
election held
in

1972 and turned more brutal and
repressive; and Guatemala's

centrist civil/military regime
of the early 1970s became
much more
brutal later in the decade.
The turn to political repression
by

he

states to

r

;

8rouPS often served
to

8r0 " in8 dl8COntenC

"

divided societies.

—
^ —
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^

*'

*~

already

By the late 197n

guerrilla groups that
had emerged in
the I960
g
1960s and early
1970s had
grown 10t0 foraidable
revoluti
y "roes, both in spite
of and as
COTSeqUen
°f
«» "«« ^criminating counterstrategies carried out

"

"

"

agency
region

hy these states.

In short, as the

economic situating
uuauon a*deteriorated aftPr
aiter t-v^
the c
first OPEC oil
shock and as social
and Political
political adiscontent expanded,
political
violence also grew. As
the 1970s drew to
a ciose,
d
close Nic
Nicaragua, El
Salvador, and Guatemala
all taced
faced serious
B pri«
economic, social, and
political crises (La Feber
.,
or/
„
1984
Hami lton et al,
1988; Booth and
Walker, 1989: 52-53
SA
r
53, 154,
Cepeda and Pardo, 1987:
5-6; Valero, 1985132-133; Diski n and Sharpe,
1,86; GUbert, 1986;
Trndeau and
Schoultz, 1986).
s

1

'

1

.

>

.

By the end of the
1970s, the international
political context
Had also changed for
the Central American
states. As discussed in

Chpater IV, the inter-American
system had undergone
portent
changes in the 1960s and
through the 1970s.
Some of

these changes

were due to the changing
domestic political scene
States and the related search
for

Vietnam; others were the

a

in the United

new U.S. role in the world
after

result of the new diplomatic
assertiveness

and relative foreign policy
autonomy of certain Latin American

states (Puig, 1976).

Both would be significant for
the Central

American states in the late
1970s and early 1980s.

*

-

United states, the

Vietnam

course o£ U.S.-Sovret
detente poUcies>

—

scandaI a11

;r;:T

-

Policy

-

MKMUS

-

S ignificantly

,

us

—

t

^

effects

on co „ tainnent

of concessional
participation

lgn policy .

and

^

begiMing

- PMt
poUcy ^ ^

£he

in

f

-

_

^

-World

a

iation

^

^

Congress passed leeialaH«„
legislation requiring
i
q
^
Lnac II
u.b.
»S that
economic and
•

nghtS SitUatl
°"
Cli ' ena

nd
'

kM

"

"

in

"»

riShtS

—-

"»

•

"untries rather than cold
war

™«-io„,

the g oal ef

support,,

one of the fev foreign
policy goals

"at enjo y ed

so m e measure of biparti
s a „ consensus
and it soon becaee
the centerpiece of the
C art e r for ei n
polic y
g
Vet tMs P oHc
led
.

y

to tensions between
the

states uh ose

h un an

UnUed States

and contain Latin

A.eHcan

right s situations were
P oor.

For the governments
of El Salvador, Nicaragua,
and Guatemala in the
ni d-to-late 1970s,
'

the new U.S. hu.an ri
g hts policy was an important break
with the
ast
P
(Schoultz, 1987; Kirkpatrick,
,979; Crabb and Holt, 1984: 1876
212; Leogrande et al, 1986:
298).

Another important change

in

the inter-American context
for the

Central American states was
the negotiation, signing,
and

ratification of the Panama Canal
Treaties (or the Torr jos-Carter
i
Treaties for the Latin Americans).
U.S.

Senate was

a

Although the ratification by the

difficult and rancorous process 7
reflecting

a

deep

division within the U.S. over this
symbol of U.S. know-how and
power, the new treaties seemed
to indicate

a

new U.S. relationship

—
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with Latin American
countries

™ ::::: ::r

d
1pH
Pled

^
;

*

new respect for
their

™—

treaty

ra

Panamania
"

;

8

~ " - - - —I

—

s

-tes

pleJged

end encourage the
„ egotiation

tatas aad Panana .

.. the

original

Septet

state present

™°" 8

^

process

„ Contadora

the0AS w

a„ d

th6m (CePeda a " d P

» d °.

aU

th

the members of

^

^

significant nanifestation
of

a

.

8

^

Group „ (thMgh

^^^^

Tbe Panes* Canal
Treaties were finany

7, 1977 , at

to

^^
^^ ^
^^

interests and gro„ ing
assertiveness in

Polio, issues.

the

Ihis di£p]ay of
dipiMatic

this n am e at the
tiae)-- wes

feir new

trough

on

Panama's Contadora
Xslend, the

-

Lie

^

^

"87:

^

^

^

6-7; Bel,, ,984:
10; Atkins,

1989; 332-334).

^

This growrng foreign
po l icy asser t iveness „
f

American stetes on regional
issues „ ou l d have inportaDt
consequences
for Centrel America in
the late 1970s a nd
e ar ly 1980s.

Panama's Torrijos seeking
to play

.

l

Not only w a s

ead ership role in regional

affairs and in U.S.-Latin
A.ericen reletions; so too was
Mexico's
Jose Lopez Portillo,
Venezuela's Carlos Andres Pe'rez,
end Colon's

Julio C^ser Turbey.

Mexico's new petroleum findings

in

the 1970s,

combined with the two rounds of
petroleun, price increases which
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—a

^

both Hexlco and
Vene2ueUi encouraged

1970s.

Central America and
the Carihh.
Caribbean kbecame
important new foci
v
of their
foreign policy interests.
a
r
As
7 interest,
Cepeda and Pardo
(1987:6)
explain it, i n the
late 1970s
.

credit, collaborated
in
increased their diolo^ f
tnere were nation
n

T

*>

"el980

subsidized

W,

a
"^ e " tei their
Lelo^
P
banks for
'

l

cvels of

«ne,

lllltTlTl'^ I'V™'

Pact o f San Jose
Vene2ueU and Mexico
,
S

^

ale of petroled to
Central American and
Carrbbean

Thanks to this Program
of Cooperation through
the Pact of San
Venezuela and Mexico joined
the ranks of hemispheric
aid

donors to Central America
(Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 24; La
Feher,
1984: 215-216).

Finally, the Central
Americans also witnessed the
foreign
ministers of the Andean Pact
nations, led h y Venezuela and
Colombia,
taking an interest in the
deepening Nicaraguan civil
conflict in
late 1978 and 1979.
The new diplomatic activism
of the Andean
foreign ministers included
various declarations calling
for Somoza's
resignation as well as opposition
in the OAS to the Carter

administration's failed attempt to
create
keeping force in Nicaragua.

It culminated

recognition of the Fpente Sandinista He

a

multinational peacein the Andean ministers'

T.ih»-,.,; on

n^n.l

(FSLN)

as a belligerent force against
the Somoza dictatorship on June
16,
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-d „

their mediat on
between
.

dlPl0MtlC

"Men

that of the original
"Contadora" countries

ambivalent efforts
of the United
6d St.f
Stat6S *to

P^ent

paralled

the FSLN

f rom

Atkins, 1989: 195-196).

By tb. end of the
197 0s, the Carter
administration's „ uma „
"Shts poHc y provided
evidence th . t the
so-called "hegemonic
PreSUKPti ° n " (L0Went hal
197
-isted, a lb eit in a .ore
.-era! and perhaps attenuated
for. T . t . after
„f

«

hege.ony

^

in

th> circu m -Car lbb ean
region had grea tly and
dan g erous ly
eroded, citing the "eive
give away of the „Panama
B
Canal and the

"abandonment" of Anastacio
Somoza db
as proot.
proof

A ,«
conservative group

known aa the Co^ittee of
Santa Pe was perhapa the
aost articulate
in stating this view.
In its 1,80 report,
A_M£
£
Eg li cy for The Fifhfi r ;
the Conaaittee

^^ ^
m

warned that

,

America

is

everywhere

in

retreat .... Evan the

Caribbean
""""^
a"
P«™1—
refining
J.T"^
° mln8
* Ma "<"t-Leninist lake.
Never
d

center*
tlf.
t°
before \has the
Republic been in such jeopardy
froTits
exposed southern flank. Never
before has Africa"
foreign policy abused, abandoned,
and betrayed its
L3tin AmeriCa (COnmitt
°f
"

slllTft: tllo'V.

"

'

59

What seems to be
more accurate

ClrCU "- C

—

" ibbCM

" rensth " d

" rel

—

«

" i«

is

r eal ly

that
aC U
U,bS

Mmel "

eroded; idtner,
rather the growing
.

,

"

c^. im)

""""

PMama

*" d
-

^ CaPabiUti "

——
C

°f

tb.. the Central
teerican states
As th . isthmus
experienced

Politlc.1 crises,

it

^ ^^

of certain Latin

~<
Wca

i. i- Central

^

Caribbean had become
£ignificant

Eluded

hp
hegemony
over the

states had becone
signincant by

° rei8n P ° UCy

^ce.

'

^

unued stat ^

^^^^

econMiC)

Mexico,
and tha

_^^

^^ ^

also faced a „
international context

the continued presence
of the United St a
tes a s the

traditional hegemon as well
wen as the
tha na
new presence of neighboring
states with active,
subhegemonic xnLerests
interests in the
th. region. 9

m

of these competing
hegemonic

^ited States sought

The test

interests wonlH
would adevelop

m

the 1980s as

to reassert its tr a
dition al hegemony over

Centre! Amerrca while
Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia
end Panama sought
to exercise end maintain
.
their
sub hegen]0nic

In 1980,

interests

_

political polarization end
violence deepened markedly

in Centrel America.

In El

Salvador,

.

coop by ref orm-minded junior

military officers in October
1979 brought widespread hopes
for an
improved poHtie.l situation.

However, after January 1980,
the

military and civilian junta began
to drift to the right.

Growing
death squad violence sponsored
by El Salvador's ultra right

political sectors and military
factions, along with the inability
of
the new junta to do much to stop
the violence, led to the

resignations

in

early 1980 of the more moderate and
leftist civilian
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of th . junta .

Romin Hayorga>

A»e rican „niversity
and
,
Soc ial „e.oc ratlc P
arty

-

—b.

c hristlan

re sign e d

,

Gumermo

Rector

Ungo

^^

^

^ n

_

both resigned

.^^

Denocratic civnians
Hector

^

in january

^

0aly the more
CQnservative chrutian
Democrat
Napouon Duarte atayed on
in a„
.

^

-titute refers

^^

„

Mown cWil

See .!.„ Bal o yra

10
•

^

^

,

^^ ^^^
^

(DisUn

^

1982; » ontgomery> 1982;

1982).
In Nicaragua,

^

1980 brought growing tension
bewteen the leftist

Sandinista Front 11 and the
.ore moderate and conservative
businessoriented members of the
revolutionary coalition that had
ousted
Somoza in July 1979.

In April

1980, the FSLN unilaterally
undertook

reorganization of the governing
revolutionary Council of State by
adding more seats for the
FSLN-related popular organizations.
This
a

move alienated the more conservative
members of the council and
resulted in the resignations of
Violeta Chamorro and Alfonso
Robelo.

s

an d m0 ce rate the
grouing political
violence _

Instead, death squad
activity
vicy, DolinV.i
political repression, and
growing
rev oluti on ary guerril l
a aotivity
EJ Salvador only
coun try £ank int0 full .
59;

or

With the mediation efforts of U.S.
Ambassador Lawrence

Pezzullo, the political crisis was
contained after the FSLN made

conciliatory gestures to the more conservative
private sector
business groups represented by COSEP, the
Superior Council of

Private Enterprise (Cpnseio Superior Hp

1
fl

Emor^a

Pri Yf

l

H^

However, by November 1980, Robelo, COSEP, and
others made up an
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emerging ant i-Sand
in is ta

political
itical EM
,u.
coalition.

Meanwhile, former
Somoza national
guardsmen began
to or,,
8
° rgani2e and
with the help
°
of Argentine military
advisors
visors in r
Guatemala
and Honduras in
the
hopes of removing
the Sandivistas
nistas frn
from power through
an armed
counter-revolution
Thio
Ih
instituted the core of
what would
,

"

Uter

"

CaUed

*

^
"

<*•

aad uould

inside Nicaragua
(Gilbert, 1986- y96-986 98, v
n
u
Kornbluh,
1987: 25; Dickey
1986: 91; P ast0 r, 1987:
367-368).

n

In Guatemala in
1980 a new cycle
cvcIp noff political
irepression and
•

violence under General
Romeo Lucas Garcia
G«™.,'
19
was gaining momentum. 12
the citie.. the
government repression lncluded
arrests

^
^^

•

*

charges, kidnapping,
torture> and

^

^

of Guatemala's centrist
13
parties
Parties,
uk. union leaders,
labor
university
Pressors, and student leaders.
ln rural areas> t „ e
y

_

a

new counter-insurgency
cempaign thet soon

c*

to focus on the

^

indigenous communities in
the highland, of wester
„

revolutionary guerrilla groups
hade successfully increased
their
activities and built up their
support. A brutal civil war

via

ethnic or racial as well
as soc io-economrc lines
once aga.n engulfed
Guatemala (Aguxlera Peralta,
1981; Trudeau and Schoultz, 1986: 3640; Aguilera Peralta, 1988: 156-157;
Booth and Walker, 1989: 86-94).
In very broad terms,

the Carter administration's
policy toward

these regional political crises
in 1980 was to begin
U.

S.

t

o

increase

economic and military aid to the
government of El Salvador, 14

continue to try to moderate the
course of the Kicaraguan revolution

—

oth positive and

maintain

econonic

a

^

^
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cut-off
-j
of II
U.S. aid
°" ot
to Guatemala °
due
Ue to
t0 n,
the severe human
rights abuses there.
But U.S.
U S
f«
foreign policy
setbacks elsewhere,
as the Iranian
hostage ordeal, the
effects off 3
a sSecond
h
.

.

.

c?

.

0p Fr

.

1DC

«-o n ,.

—

cheMariel

<P

~

^

im^Uon

round of

the related
economic

crisis, and

sug .

^ SovietMr ^

Afghanistan all contribute
trrbuted to a grow.ng
sense of "America
under
siege" within the
Unit^H States. ^
Durrng the last
year of the Carter
Ministration, .ore trad ltio
„al cold
.

—derates reeled

^^

war and geostrategic

in ....

-re conserves poHtica,

foreig „

cand.dates succes6fuUy

^^

^

growrng xe nophoh lc
attitude during the 1980
elec[ion
reinjected cold war rhetoric
into the American
pubHc discourse.
Detente d,ed i„ the la3t
year of

^

^

^^

bur.ed with the election
of Ronald Reagan in
November 1980. The
U.S. foreign policy
agenda returned to the
securrty of .ore familiar
strategic concerns as the
cold war was reborn and
the United States
-ught to reassert its .ore
treditional interests in the
circumCaribbean region.

During its first two years

in

office, the Reagan

administrate

sought to redefine the ends
and means of U.S. fore lg
„ policy away
fro. its renderings of the
1970s.
Both ideology and a renewed
global strategic vision
shaped the administration's
interpreta t ,on
of events

in

world politics.

Fro. the new administration's

perspective, after years of setbacks,
the United States was once
again confronted with a global
struggle against aggressive Soviet

8
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communism.

Central AmeriCfl

~

-

of Soviet-sponsored
subversion.

nad

its origins

in Soviet

ventionism.

E1 SalvadQr

^

and D0W Nicaraguan
inter81 case

economic aid t0 that
besieged goveramMt

»

advice t0 strengthe
„ and

U.

against further

^ ^^^^
^

counter-insurgency campaign
against

foraidabie

<»~c..ti. Revolutionary Front Farabun4o M „ ti, pront
Liberation)

current target
•

'

lfi

a

The re
,
regl0n
e ion'<
s revolutionary
ferment

Cuban
Cub3n
'

being

^

m

^

^

NatiQnai
(Bagley and Tokatlian,
1987- 1S
18- r
a
Cepeda
'
and Pardo, 1987and Sharpe, 1986:
50-87; Blacken, at al,
1986: 295-328-'
>

12;

DisUn

Pastor, 1987: 360-365

;

Weinrauh, 1983: 1,4;
Schoulta, 1, 89)

.

The new ad mi „ istrati o„
also sought to support
the Guatemalan

-Htary

in

its efforts to

guerrilla groups.

neutrals

the country's growing

However congress resisted
the administration's

efforts to renew U.S. military
aid to the hrutal military
regimes of
Generals Romeo Luca's Garcia
(1978-1982) and Ife.fi, Rr'os
Montt (198217
1983).
Thus, the Guatemalan
military's counter-insurgency

campaigns generally remained
perrpheral to the Reagan administration's containment policies
during its first term (Trudeau
and

Schoultz, 1986: 37-39, 44-45;
Pastor, 1987: 360-369).

However, Nicaragua became the
primary focus of the Reagan

administration's new policies of
containment and, eventually,
rollback.

1

The administration initially
took the position that the

Sandinista government needed to be
pressured into abandoning its
support for revolution or subversion
against its neighbors,

especially in El
Salvador
alvador.

^ —— —

—ut«t.

-

*

;; 6 ;

or cai
:

n
Durrng
lts first

„ ould develop
the

ding force

;

~
^
—

—°

~

-

*

; ni8tas respooded
in
fUtU

"

°- S

fun

the
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^

o£

^

dipioMtic

*

in

Nlcara ; ua

included a
t

-,o

-~~ - -

j

ile

„ hlch th
the

-*-*.

-

'«

«»
'-I, the blocking Q£
financial credits and
loans from multilateral
aceral b
a w
banks
such as the
World Bank and the
Inter-An>.
merlCa "
Bank during 1982
and

—

-

•

19

mixed signals from
U.S. diplomats
about the

•

P^cts

for normalised

bUatera. relates.

For sample. it t00k
tb. Keagan Admtnistration
seven months to send
a new ambassador

Anthony Quainton, to
Managua after Lawrence

-Augusts,

"eanwhile, at

P,„ ullo

left the post

Pe^llo's

recuest, Assistant
Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs, Thomas
Enders
travelled to Managua to
ho!d discussions on
August 12 and 13, 1,81,
with the Sandinista
government on U.S.-Nicaraguan
relations.

The "Enders Talks"
seemed to open the door
to improved
relations, and some follow-up
correspondence did take place
in
September between the two
governments. However, for
Nicaragua's
ambassador to the United States,
Arturo Cruz, and other

inexperienced Nicaraguan
diplomats, Enders' initial
presentation of
the U.S. position for
improved relations sounded
"like the

conditions of

a

victorious power" rather than
an opening negotiating

position (Gutman, 1984: 4 10).
,

Not only did the United
States

reiterate its demand that Nicaragua
end its material and logistical
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—

support to El
20
Salvador's rrii.w
FMLN
if
lf e
economic aid were
to be ren ewed.
,
It alcn i„
that Nicaragua
limit the size of
between 15,000 end
17,000 soldiers and
eVe UalIy red
""
10,000; the „ s
al
t
•

^

"

OManded

Z~

Ki

"« g ua
>

—s

c,e

Talhs in September.

in the

send back the

******

it. neighbors did
not possess

"ore mixed signals

—
_
-

£oU

_

As Gutman

the administration
sent a draft- „f

^o^.
p
?)

7;

Walker, 1985).

^

^

UDllateral
declaration promising
vigVrou enfor
enforcement o£ U.S.
neutrality laws r»«rJ,-, »
in an example
e was attached
saying that remaining
ec
economi?'
°n°"ic aid to Nicaragua
had been canceled.

of^JI iX'T^t"""'

V

Enders sent another draft «f
of

a.

proposed joint declaration
on non-

intervention shortly thereafter
y thereafter.

^ates not

to use,

against Nicaragua

r.
It uould

have comnitted

^ ^.^

threaten, or acquiesce
in the use of force
i

f

Nicaragua pledged the
same to its

neighs.

However, two days later,
on September 18, the
Reagan administration
announced plans to hold
a joint naval
exercise with Honduras in
October. Nicaraguan
Foreign Minister Miguel
D Escoto Brockman
expressed his government's
concerns about the meaning
of such
exercises.
Soon thereafter, the
Enders" initiative broke
down
without any other draft
documents on security issues,
cultural
exchanges, and economic aid
ever being presented.
The mixed
diplomatic signals produced
growing mutual distrust,
missed

opportunities, and deteriorating
relations between the United
States
and Nicaragua (Gutman,
1984: 3-9; Bagley et al,
1985: 22-32,

documents 1.8-1.13; Bendana,
1990).

166

——

Military tools and
shows of force were
also ddeveloped to
create
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contra. from their
Argentlne advisors
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a.

—
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g cam PS i„ F l orida

Mtril " y

,

^

aUo

^

de8pite

,

„. s .

authorized

^^^^
^

Ho n d Ur .n -ba8ed

September 15
Miami-based Nicaraguan
Democratic Union
union, „„H.
under one anti-Sandinista
banner, the Nicaraguan
Democratic Porce <PDN) 2 '
(Knornbluh> 198? „.
27, Bagley and TokatHan,

^
.

1,87:

„,

P as tor,

I98?;

3^3^

and Pnrdo, 1987:
13; Dickey, 1986; Chamorro,
1987).

^^

By the end of
1981, toe National Security
Council had approved
a 519

million

prograffi of

to interdict arms
trafficking from Nicaragua
to

Salvador

guerrillas, and President
Reagan had sent Congress

a "finding"
stating that such covert
activity was in the national
interest.
Soon thereafter, in March
1982> contra a[tacks fa

increased in the i r frequency
and destructiveness.

Sandinista government aeciared
declared

a

In response,

the

C Q Q ~f
state
of emergency and mobilized
t-

»-

troops along the Nicaraguan-Honduran
border.

The "covert" war was

by then well under way
(Goodfellow, 1987: 146; Kornbluh,
1987: 2425;

Pastor, 1987: 366-367).

Honduras became

containment strategy

a

in

key player in the Reagan
administration's
Central America and the stage for

Washington's new shows of force

in

the region.

Largely ignored by
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Policy to rea sse rt U.S.
oilitary poser

^

^ ^^^^^
h

the north> as

^ civiUM

nmtary

--

in the reglon .

^

o PP c rtunity t0

the region

_

increase

^

o£

^

in

^

tbe region
,e« years ln office>
the Reagan adffiinistratiM
spMsored a
ra P io U.S. Bilitary
build up in „ onduras .
The bund _ up
a

»».-*.«

ln

„e a se

in „.S.

military aid tQ

^

between 1981 and 19fn f-v^
_
1983, the establishment
of numerous new U.S.
military hases and training
centers, the construction
or improvement
of several new airfields,
the building of
-.

•

,

advanced radar stations

operated by the U.S. miliary
and the CIA, the trebbHng
of U.S.
military advisors in Honduras,
the building of roads
and other
infrastructure to support the
new military facilities,
and the

establishment of contra base
camps near the N 1C araguan
border (La
Feber, 1984: 309; Sheperd,
1986: 131-133; Gold, 1987:
43).

But perhaps the most
significant example of the Reagan

administration's early attempts to
reintroduce shows of force in its
regional containment policy was
the holding of numerous ongoing

military exercises with the Honduran
military.
Honduran military exercises took
place

in

Nicaraguan border and the Caribbean
coast.

duration increased substantially

in

The first joint U.S.-

October 1981 near the
Their frequency and

the following years. 22

These
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shows of force sent
different political
me8
messages to different
audiences in the region.
To U * S aUleS
SUCh as the
governments of
E1 ,
,
A
Salvador,
Honduras, and (l ater
)
Costad R
Rica
ica» the exercises
signalled a renewed U 9 m,-i-a.
».8. nulztary preparedness
and wi 1 ngneas
to
resort to force if
necessary to protect
both Uu,bS * inte
interests and
...
allies who might
call for help.
To
io U
P
U.S.
S
,H
adversaries, such as
the

M

'

H

—

"

-*

revolutionary FDR-FMNL
in E1 SaIvador>

«

threatening

a U.S.

miHtary invaslon

^
in

Hnion as vell as

^^^

ordertos£op

^

^

-y advances in the spreading of radrcal
revolution in the region"
(Sheperd, 1986: 133-134;
Gold,. 1987- 50,
50- r
,
Bagley
and Tokatlian, 1987•

18).

^r

other regional actors,
however, the military
exercises,
'beir associated military
bulld

^

^p ^

military aid to the

Salvador

government, the emerging
contra

Policy, and the beHicose
rhetoric of the Reagan
administration all
produced growing concerns.
The governments of
Mexico, Costa Rica,
and Venezuela were already
concerned ahout the civil
confiicts and
political violence in El
Salvador and Guatemala and
about the
effects such violence was
producing in the region, such
as a

growing refugee problem for
neighboring states and

a

further damper

on regional trade during
the deepening global recession.
as

However,

the Reagan administration's
reassertive Central American policy

unfolded during 1981 and 1982,
these states

became increasingly

alarmed at the growing militarization
of the region and what they

perceived to be the growing risk
of

a

region-wide war.
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^

"approve

and in

Calling For Peace

gro „ ing militari2ation
of

camng

^

Qn

^olve their conflicts
peacefuny

PortiHo called

on Honduras

Md

_

^

AmericMs

InearlyMay>1981Upes

Nica

ease their emerging
border tensions.

-i.t-

^

8 3 co dold

discussions to

Upez
pez Portilln
r °rtillo personally

the dis c ussi o„ s hald
on „ ay 13 betueen
Honduran president
Ce„e ral P oli c arpo P a2
Garcfa and

^ie!

0 rtaga in

„

GuasuaU> Nicaragua

_

^
^^

improving relations between
ween the fwn
two governments for
and Tokatlian, 1987:
19; Karl,

a

^

time (Bagley

1986: 275).

Shortly thereafter, Lopez
Portillo and Venezuelan
President
Luis Herrera Campus
issued a joint statement
urging international
mediation to resolve the
Salvadoran civil war.
Ia August
MexiCQ
succeeded in winning French
support for its position on
El Salvador
when French Foreign Minister
Claude Cheysson and Mexican
Foreign
,

Master

Jorge Castaneda issued

a

joint declaration on El
Salvador

and submitted it to the
United Nations Security Council
on August
28.

The Franco-Mexican Declaration
on El Salvador recognized
the

FDR-FMLN as "a representative
political force" that "should
participate in instituting the
mechanisms of rapprochement and
negotiation required for
Salvador.

a

political settlement of the crisis"
in El

This call for a negotiated settlement
between government

and armed opposition also
appealed to the international community
to

;
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"e

W°rk

f

"~* - «*^"

—

°£

C1VUian P0PUlatl0D
ti0nal

During 1982, more

=

- - Evador

;
Franco-Mexican Declaration,

iic
Cfl
3118

1,31
f
f° r

:

1

Natlons t0 protect
the

settlement and
CK 8rl , 1986:

52 - 153

PeaCe

fn . 30-

^^

Goodf el low>

~ed

from act0rs both
withxn and outside
of Central America
erica, with Mexico
M
continuing to
lead the way.
i n a speech
d
Slt to ^nagua
on February 21
Mexican President Lopez
Portillo called
ed tor
for a h
„
a b road

process of

negotiations to bring
peace to El Salvador
aivador, r(
*
reduce
tensions between
Nicaragua and its neighbors
eighbors, and
an H i ffipr0
ve U.S. relations
with
Nicaragua and Cuba.
Mexico could "servee
as a brid
bridge „between the
Polaris forces" in such a
negotiation
Propose:, Lopez PortiUo
stressed

^
^

^

&
.^^^^

affecting Central America
were the result of
the region's own
tyranny
,
and oppressiM; „ they
coQid
shouW

Wry

^

^^

Placed "into the terrible
dichotomy of East against
West or

capitalism against socialism"
(R iding> 1982c:

g

.

Riding

_

^^

Throughout March and April,
the Mexican government
continued to
pursue its peace initiative.
However, a cool reaction
fro,
Washington towards Mexico's
involvement, a still-born attempt
by the
five Central American heads
of state to hold a summit
24
meeting,
the
outbreak of the FalHands/Malvinas
Islands War in late AprU,
and a
chilled diplomatic exchange
between the United States and
Nicaragua
throughout the spring 25 all
contributed to the failure of the

Mexican peace initiative.

On May 9, Lo"pe 2 Portillo
gave up his

mediation attempt, arguing that he
had done all he could ("Central
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Americans...,"

i
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982

]n
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.

.
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Crossette,

1982- 6-

"a Meeting
m
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.

Latin Leaders...,"
T

1

982

•

of Five

"m
Mexico

T
J,
•

Givine U S
ln Pl3n D etails,"
<
198?
o^02: 5;
Riding,
i*ez
1?.
1982ar
*c
a
6.
12, Goodfellow,
1987: 147).
At the sa m e ti me
that Eope 2 PortiUo
»

.

^

^

-tiative, Nicaraguan

--agression
COnmitne,,t

£

°

junta leader>

pacts bet „ ee „
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The
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lgn policy
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and a

,
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f

Declaration, 1,S2

:

I

55)

.

"

In June>

^

^

At the

^

^

.

rCE10Ml

^

^cm^^^

1982, six leaders of
the reg on expressed
the r
.

^

ueiias

for pe aC e in Central
America continued.

^

pUdge

th . terse dlplomatic

r

^

inau g urat IO n of Costa
Rlcan President

a

^

~ ^^

e*c hang e s between
Klcaragua and
1

ga

^.^ ^ ^

PoU.ica, plurals and

SUtStanCe

DMiel

-ersal"

<Me x ican-Ve„e 2 „elan

the

the for matl o„ of
. „or kl n g group of the Centre!
America „ „ ations t0
study the regionel crises
(Cepeda and Pardo, 19 87:
23).
Meanwhile
the Venezuelan overn m ent
g
of Luis Herrera Cabins
baca.e even m cre

interested in seeing

a

negotiated settlement in

elections there in March for

a

El

Salvador after

constituent assembly reeved the

allied Christian Democrats and
brought important gains for the
ultraright-wing ARENA party.
The Falklands/Mslvinas Islands
War also
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C0 " trUbUted

<"

"»

V

™u„

government's aistancin
.
distancin 8 from
the U.S.
Posxtion on Nicaragua
(Chace, 1982- 31. v
,
1G
31; Karl, 1986:
281-284).
»

As the Venezuelan
governmenf i«„

" "e
closely

0n

s

fl

u
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-

trOUMed

d«
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;
Herrera C ampins
sent

n8 y looked
for

the same

Portillo and

President Reagan
^resident
R
expressing their

concern "over the
events which seriously
cnreaten the peace
y threaten
between
v.
.

rS8M

«~- ^

^

H °" d

"- -

the "Me xi c

>"

M -Vene Melan DeclaratiM

out Che "geography
considerations „ as

Politicl rnterests

„

Peace
,,

a£

the two st ates sbared
in

^^

Central A„ erica

„

^
^ ^^^^3 ^

CMtrai

^

^^^^

urged an end to the
"actual
on j vorry^g"
actual and
m ilitary escalation
in the
region as well as the .,,,,,„
support, organxzation,
and emplacement
•

..

ll

^^^
^
of

former Somoc.sta guards"
i„ „ onduras

conclusion of

a gl

.

FinaUy> they

ohal agreement that
may provide true peace
between

Nicaragua and Honduras,
and which

win

bear ,

^

framework of world tensrons
and confrontation,"
(Me.ican-Veneauelan
Declaration, 1 982 153-155;
Goodfellow, 1987: 148).
:

One month later, on October
A, 1982, a special
meeting was held
in San Jose, Costa
Rica, that created a new
coalition of states

seeking to promote peace
and democracy in the
region.

c

ircum-Caribbean

A founding declaration
creating the Forum Pro Peace
and

Democracy was signed by Belize,
Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Honduras, Jamaica, and the
United States; Dominican Republic
and
Panama attended the meeting
as observers only.

The Forum Pro Peace
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and Democracy
fonnally embraced
electoral
sectoral d
P
democracy,
respect for
ri8htS> Dati0nal
development, economic
LUl-egration,
integration
regional
_
OT
arms control and
an H n,„
.
Prlnciple of

mM

,

.

*

^.^^

.

•

-

udedic

successor to the csHii k~
still-born Central
American Democratic
£ ic Community
Con,
,

.

— —

Ura8,Md theu " ited

OP-S.

-

to the revolutionary

(declaration of San

Jose',

SMdinista governmMt

ended up alienating
new ad mi „ lstration
g the n*™
•

Belisario Betancur Cartas.

^

fro _ u

s

_

orientatiM

•

„f

^
^^

Colombia , s President

since his inauguration

1*82. Be t ancu r ha d beg n„
t0 dlstance

POSUi0 " S

^

1982: 155-160).

*he Forum's decidedly
anti . SaDdinista

Pr0 "- S

regional

Maself

^

?

"

POUC, After the foraation of
the Forum Pro Peace
and Democracy> Betancur .
s fQreign minist
-

^

Kodrigo Lloreda Caicedo,
told his Mexican an d
Venezuelan
counterparts that Colombia
would bave endorsed the
September 7
Mexican-Venesnelan Declaration
if on ly Colombia ha d
been consulted.
At the sa.e time, Panama
also backed away even
further from the
Forum (Bagley an d ToKatlian,
1987: 19-20; Hoge. 1982:
6).

The stage

was set for a new regional
coalition to form.
On December 3, 1982,

Present

Betancur underscored the

different vision his government
ha d of the crises
compare, to the Reagan
administration.

In his

in Central

America

toast to President
Reagan, who briefly visite d
the Colombian capital that
day,
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Resident Betancur
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Mexican
Venezuelan
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ministers of the

_

Laan d
raciesi
the region to
discuss the deteriorating
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alternative
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bis de a th in 1981,
Lopez
Pez Portilln
Portlllo spec lflca ll
y ca lled on Colombia

Ven.uela

^te.

to B eet „ ith Mexico
at

Tbe four states chose
January

3"ch a meeting.

They also chose aj

,

^

^

^
^

Panama in its canal
negotiations
a

^

^

Contadora, vbere six
years earHer they

Costs R ica bad Deen

^

^

^

^^

^

^

^^
gathered

^

part of that or
g nai Contadora _ based
.

.

now be considered as
one of the parties t0
the regional
especially considering its
serious border tensions

^

its sctive participation
in the Poru m Pro Peace
and Democracy, 29 and
the pro-U.S. positions
of its President. Lois
Alberto Monge and its

Foreign Minister, Pernando
Volio

WM,

Tbus, b y the end of 1982,

the m e„bers of a
reoonstrtuted "Contadora Group"
prepared to discuss

.
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their growing concerns
over the worsenin
vorsenxng regional
crisis (Bagley
and Tokatlian, 1987- 9n. r»
k °nja-Kcr„at,
°' D
1985: 26; Bell, 19841 0
Karl, 1986: 284).

-

i

.

Political and Diplomat!,.
Preludes
to the Contadora
Call for Peace
In

the late 1970s and
early 1980s,
earlv
19Rn„
r
Central America entered
into
a period of
economic, soctal,
,
social
=„j
and political crisis
that attracted
the attention of many

C

•

political actors

-rounding

^^^ ^
.

states most affected by
the regional crises
active diplomatic responses
to secure their
regional interests.
United States policymakers
came to view the region's
crises as
having significant
reverberations in the renewed
East-West conflict
Of the 1980s.
They acted to reassert
traditional U.S. hegemony
over
the region, thus renewing
the Monroe Doctrine's
prohibition of what
»as perceived to be
extra-hemispheric interference
in the troubled
countries of the isthmus.
The United States developed
a set of

policies designed to contain
the spread of armed
revolution in the
region. Yet the region's
mil iteration and political
violence
deepened

Increasingly alarmed by the
deteriorating regional situation,
other neighboring states urged
negotiations as the best path to
ease
tensions and resolve conflicts in
the region.
Led by Mexico and

Venezuela, emerging regional
subhegemons vying for regional
leadership, and later joined by
Colombia and Panama, which also
sought leadership roles in the

c

ircum-Carr ibean region, these states

1

acted to defend
def^nri #-v.
the lr status and
interests in Central
Aa,e
e
*'
isthmus entered
cuLered i„
t „ crisis.
into
„~
Yot
6t> ffaC1Dg
Sever * economic
crises
,
th
tnemselves
bv
Qft?
«-v
y 1982, these states individually
had limited
capabilities in influencing
ng the isthmian
iatw states to
resolve their
domestic and inter-state
conflicts peacefully
C6fully; nor c ^ld
P
they singly
challenge the containment
policies
Policies of a. resurgent
United States
** -setner, Mexico , Ven
la ,
•

"

•

1

-e

_

..^ ^

^^

^

tne „a y tor tne
«•
di plom atic aiternatrve
„ f ne 8 etiatrons
as
the road to peace
in Central

America.
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n ievenly
to other
regions.
Still others
It
the Ust tW0
of the Carter admin
'
is ration
tl
Vas
a
mark
* d backtracking
on human rights issues
8
as
the right an d certaTco
'°
d
securxty xnterests resurfaced
after the Iranian anH w
^^vo lu t ions and the Soviet
invasion .f «g h

V

arlT^

^

T

T^^

U

'
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^1™"^^
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X^essio'ai^ebat
flOBo. 332-334).
o„ ,,,s
(1989:

8.

19841 75 97
'
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*««

ranama Canal Treaties:
Beatles;

^

«f

see also Atkins

There was also a protocol
to the neutrality treatv (The Tr.„
Concerning the Permanent Neutrality
and Operat on of the Pana

78

,

.
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See Chapter VTTT

P"i«y

"

Met!

.^'.r^S-

°
f
" U «™ °"^
autonomy"
l

of the Contadora
Group scares!

10. As Diskin and
SharDe ( 1
close ties to'the

^

QftA

F^Jl^

6

coalition of center
popular organizations."

^^ 0 ^

and^^T^e
P artl es,

11.

^

^ayorga and Ungo]

-

3 m ° de
te
'
important unions, and

s

The FSLN included
a rather „M
angin s arra °f
left, from anti-vank.:
groups on the
y
; ,;::!;y
catholics; fro* social
'° Uberal and radi "!
d^rats to
To.as Borge).
16 "" 1
6 < Uke
Interesting y
ha FS^dL"'
Nicaragua's traditional
l " ClUde
"*
coiiet party

"

"

and military dicatorshi
etl™ ic vi ° Un
as wail a s ,
fraud.
General Romeo Lucas Ztl<, COrruptlon and electoral
fraudulent elections in 1978 .2
* tC P ° Wer a£ter

«

M^M^AT^^
™

brought General
""'V
P° we r.
A born-again
evangelical and staunchly an H
I
nmun
t
R
' os M °ntt
over a period of even
presided
^
greater
5100
areas, where whole
in rural
1
e
ma ?" Cred ln the
military's
counter-insurgency cj
so m e observed
beg^TuI th 'worT^noc
military's campaign. Others
began to create dark ,
words with Guatemala's
yS ° n
P
namerU
! , "J
E
for "bullet"); and
°
= Spanish
"Guateneor"
= Spanish
for " bad ;" Efifil
- Spanish for "worse")!

^r"

»

™

V
ri
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13.

^

io^o^

"

As Trudeau and Schoultz
(1986: 37) note

f

"rw„

-

i

^^
TZ^^

W6re
crushed following the 1979
I I
former Foreign nfnisterMb
eT^on" anff
Guatemala City Mayor Manuel
Colo'm I gl ta
re
c
v"lv
Th 6
Y
grassroots leadership of the
center-rright
center
io
rl
!
J
Christian
Democrats
was decimated
^
sn

aL«
"u^

^
X'^r^sss ^rr

—

-31
-

1

ser^co si?LTun\u°t

A

pit;

pi;

'

'

recent Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the prolonged Iranian
hostage ordeal, and personnel
changes in the Carter
administration all contributed to the
development of a more
COntainment -°- e *ted approach toward El
Salvador
during 1980
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^

Human Rights:
°f
"One should always
for
r~aiw*
in American attitudes
fund
5"*
change
toward HilM
E1 Sal «dor took
Place in the last
period of the
under the Carter
It was
AdminUtwt on thl
t0 Ni "ragna was
stopped and that
military a.ai! f
started."
"> E1 S *^**or was
actual fait V I
Nicara
until the Reagan
did not end
administration'^ ° l ° n
however it is true
April
1981 •
that the Carter !d"

F ^«al

rf"
""-^""tion.

^

m

-Htary

™T

"

aid to El

^

W^."'^^'^—

^^Zl^^^

-Hefs

of

poucy^ers

Hi
instability i„ Central
v<,1
i
America
e d v^d'b
between the
ideologues and the more
.
praematin La
former saw external
lib
'be
ifTcfn yI S ° Vlet and
subversion and interventi™,!
°uban
?
"
<* the region's
revolutionary in
bn
of the revolutionary
tba caus
movement in
regl0n had indigenous
roots based largely in
Some of this latter
gro
be
ea ttlat tne resulting
instability PDr pcp
rr
e
e
th
interest
tha bI
t ed
s
CubanS " hil * "hers
believed such instab
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PreSent
a securit
*
the United States
y threat to
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17.

V

"J

T

"

CeneraH"^^
U

under General Hejia Stores
'
gu
90
uary"l986,
promised a democratic opening and
held elections
Cieccions for
tor a
!
Constituent Assembly in QfiA
.
and national
elections in the fall
of 1985.
^o->.
The
ine u.b. Congress
n
permitted limited n Q ~1C and
military aid to resume to
ua ^maia in 1984
Guatemala
lTst (T
(Trudeau and
Schoultz, 1986: 45).

^

1

•

/

18.

T

Though championed by some
j
hardliner* -in f^ administration
from
the beginning,
roiib ack
6
in Kg > "rollback"
Nicaragua
7
would
not
officiallv
horn
become a policy goal in President
*
Reagan's first term
Nevertheless, the October 1983
invasion of GrenadJ
demonstrated the administration's
propensity for "rollback" if
strategically feasible. Moreover,
the administration's
ontra
ieDted tOW3rd rOUbaCk deS ite
the
P
posi "ions'tH
C ° DtraS WGre firSt ne
^ssary to stem the
,
alleged flow
off arms from Nicaragua to El
Salvador and then
1
Reagan ' S S6C0Dd term t0 force
Sandinistas
to
rneLt":
negotiate a peace agreement.
fl

m

J

^

^^

19.

'

>

^

It has been estimated that
between 1981 and 1984 the U S
blocked some $200 million in
noncommercial multilateral'
development credits to Nicaragua.
See Gilbert (1986: 105).
'

'
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20.

This demand was
one of the fin*
administration after
the Rea * an
coding to off
continued U.S. aid to
COnditio ° for
Nicaragua
A
Acc
99-100) and Pastor (198 *
? rd »>g to Gilbert (1986:
Jg)
* 1CaraS uan
stop its supply of
government did
arms to the FMLN
Reagan administration
1981
h ° Wever
cu
the
off all V ,Ss" aid
A Pnl 1, 1981
to Nicaragua on
anyway.

" ^

%,

;

.

*

21.

The administration's
moves to t«irtraining of the contras
began
f
a
Reagan sent his first
Preside *t
"finding" to Con r ess
covert operations in
g
authorizing
CIA
Cental a
trafficking to leftist^
Guatemala City on August
f ° Unded in
10
1981
lr
i
dominated primarily by
f 0rmer official
Guar d and was heavily
8 N * tional
dependent on the Cll

L

luS

T'l*

V"

^l*"^
"T"

1

two^er

1982 by

^

e

:r o Theland-'

08

"
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*»

^

^
^
^

po-slb^ri^^tSrSif

iff

Pastora and Alfonso Robe^o
government, Eden
A
n
'I" "
between 1982 and 1984 Eden p \th ° Ugh the CIA *i* aid ARDE
agenda to join AhJ Ttitl
'°
CIA '*
tie EDN^fTe
assassination attempt on
* SUS P lcious
Pastoral t
&t 3
1984 P"ss
conference in La P e ca C
the EDN and
Alfonso Robelo
broke with Eden Pastor* an *
j
f
With
troops.
By
° f ARDE '°
he res" o FtltL
n
0
b «* n lu
away by the CIA to 0
d
U
e FDK
retlr6d from
guerrilla life (Kornbluh 1987
»
P
t0r 1987: 367 Dic
1986; Chamorro, 1987).
'
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22.

Shepherd (1986: 133-134)
identifies three stages in

i?

.3

and

t h.

^S",^,' SPECS'

The second stage began in
Angust 1983 and lasted for
months. Known as "Bier. Pine IT »
longest set of U.S. m!l
•

itary^xer

he

"

i

^

x

^-

""It

OVer flVe
LTove\ x tIe°nrho°" Sandd more on nearby
naval ships and
planes
iE th
Th
thlrd Sta S e be § an in A Pril
1984
with the
?»
»C™-H
Granadero I"
exercises, which were held close
to both the
Salvadoran and Nxcaraguan borders.
These exercises ncluded
the part.cxpatxon of Salvadoran
troops.
Similar joint military
exercises would continue during President
Reagan's secoZ[ term

L

23.

f

In response to objections
by Nicaragua to the first set
of
rC1SeS
regi ° D in ° Ct0ber 1981
k
aovn
as
<
"olll*^
A
Oceanic Adventure
'81"), U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State

T

Thomas 0. Enders denied that the
exercises were in any way

^
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On February 25
Qfi?
to the OAS uaveiling
1

£ '"r^'

Rea8M '

s
his Caribbean
n tlati * e CB »
Program the leader? of
<
\
Costa Rica Ell
s
vador Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Panama
agree to ttlr
to discuss solutions
C ° sta Rica
to^the Central \ll ?™
other natters of common
COn£Ucts
interest
Th? government of Guatemala,
however, refused to
attend tilt'
learain S that
Nicaragua would he
present
he f ° f f*T
day, a Costa
Rican Foreign Ministry
°><"M!
».
0
0" 0 0 th
»as indefinitely
tbe
suspended ( Ce^r ,^"
"A
10;
Meeting of Five

f

-

I T') U

"

"

SS^*^™.
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.K.}"^"
^^^"^t.

25.

N^rt'^ex^h^p^poLls

fo^

St
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a °<

relations.
The Lhange be an
eight-point
Proposal from U.S. Ambassador
3
Coders' proposals
the
Sandmista
government responded with a v-ri+l
itcounterproposal vhich^s fol
"otaer round of written
correspondance between thp f Un
3 r3ther
terse and inflexible ton
cnl rac lll^TlV6 corres
Pondance and
the diplomatic exchan
c
collapsed.
Goodfellow (1987: 147148),
Chace
/, ^iidce
9
Ji)
anc Gutman (19841-1 o~\ aU
,n su est
that the verbal eight-Doint II q I
'
\'
Sg
Proposal was not serious to
beein with *nH
pubUc
purposes
°? y '° ° f
For rT
-change,
see'B Bg y Iet aai uy
42°^documents di > 1
(1 85^32
": 32-42,
1.14 to 1.16).
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27.
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See endnote 25.

The Mexican-Venezuelan
Declaration of September 7 1982 fH-rt
10 S
DeClarati0D ° f San
Costa rJI ^May 8
'
9 82
'
ad V':-;
ina urati
of the Costa Rican"
President L
President,
At^k^
Luis Alberto
Monge,..." in which six leaders
of the
the
ItlTeeTYorrT
re on
arms reductions, peace, and
g^
democracy.
! f
Ilnfn ^
ly ' thG DameS ° r C0^tries of
the six leaders who
«ifnL
signed ?k
the ,document are not identified
by the MexicanVenezuelan Declaration, and I have
not been able to find other
references to it.
This Declaration of San Jose"
should not be
confused with the October 4, 1982
declaration that created the
Forum Pro Peace and Democracy.
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^

^
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29.

Democracy.

create the Forum Pro
Peace and

CHAPTER VI
THE CONTADORA
INITIATIVE FOR PEACE
I* CENTRAL AMERICA

"Among the illusions
of law
e
S ° me that
distinguish themselves
bv Zli
I
occurs with medico"
and this
t
!l
S1IDply '
P8
without boastfulness or
°
6Xhu erant
Performance.
It walks in the
?
shlLl
h
Casti
on anyone.?.an d
^adows
i Ihe shL
°f.
8 ° briety
influences as advice
£t
i<- e an a
not as a mandatP
"
/
T rto y y
1
Jose
Lurs Bustamante

tW

A

"""^
^

^
ta* )^
'

R ivera ,

On January

8

and 9, 1983, the
foreign ministers of

^

Colombia, Venezuela, and
Panama met t0 discuss
var£ous
Policy issues of
tual conce „.
The four £oreigii
ministers
th«, meetings on the Panamanian
isUnd of Contadora, less
than
fifty miles from the
Pacific Bouth of
panama
agenda included discussions
of the deepening trade
and debt crises
that their countries
were facing as well as
the perceived growing
hostility of the United
States toward compliance
with the CarterTorrijos Panama Cana! Treaties.
But the most central issue
of

„

^

concern to the ministers
meeting on the island of
Contadora was, as
they put it, the "complex
panorama existing in Central
America."
The deepening civil wars
in El Salvador and Guatemala,
the expanding

counter-revolutionary violence against
Nicaragua along with border
conflicts between Nicaragua and
its neighbors, the rising
numbers of
Central American refugees produced
by the regional violence, and
the

185
shared and growing
fear of a direct US
U.S. mrHtary
intervene
:ion into
one or more of
these escal„r;„„
escalating regronal
conflict, all
conpeHed the
.
four mmrsters at
Contadora to issue a
call to th r
«ates to e mbark on re
glo „al, peace talks
(Contadora Croup,
1983aa
164-166).
.

.
'

«Uhin
f0n° al

three .onths. these
four foreign
ministers helJ their
C

—

^rican counterparts in
what would become
an ongoing process
of u.,
g
dialogue, mediation,
and
negotiations between the
five Central American

states.
T he fou r
states (Me^co. Colombia,
Venezuela, and Panama)
soon
-opted the name "Contadora
Croup,* Over time,
the y developed a
Political and diplomatic
framework for mediating
and resolving
Central Africa's violent
conflicts that hecame
known as the
Contadora peace process. By
building
.

listing

negotiations with the Central
American states, the
Contadora Croup
sought to rescue the
Central American conflicts
from the reeling
East-West conflict and to
create a political space
in which the
isthmian states could find
an i ndig enous diplomatic
alternative for
resolving their disputes.
Rather than watching the
Central
Americans march down the path
of deepening militarization,
which
seemed to lead only to the
increased military involvement
of extraregional powers and a greater
chance of a region-wide war,
over a

five-year period the Contadora
Group tried to build

a

shelter of

diplomacy that encouraged and
eventually permitted the Central

American states to find their own
for m ula for peace

in the region.
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"
an

various points

,

^
^^^ ^
_ ^^

the Contadora process

along, but especially
a£ter

^ ^

^

(19g6)>

^

^

Contadora peace process
„ as annomced
oyer
observers, such as Bagley

^ ^
Baguy ^ iokatiiM

Arnson (1987), Castro (19R11 r
(1985), Cepeda and Pardo
(1987), D la2 Lacayo
(1988), Purcell (1985)>
Drekonja .Kornat (1985))
G °° dfell0U

^

U987)
-

Nation

(saa,

985, ate.).

^

Seis

Vat Contadora always
seemed to

Phoeni x -like,

-ants.

«

it

Tha Contadora

(i985)

(1985), P as t or „,„>',
ti .

Bipartisan Commission on
Central America

edrtoHals

wrong.

Karl (198
«>

P

U 984)

and

in

ma „ y

rova the naysayars

always seemed to revive
at tha most fatefu!
P rocass

P arsistad

in the face of enormous

ohstaclas hacausa tha Contadora
Croup statas saw thair own
national
security intarasts at stake
in tha violant crisas
shaking Central
Africa. An analysis of the
specific foreign policy intarasts
of
the Contadora statas (and
others)

in

undertaking and maintaining the

Contadora peace process will
follow in Chapter VIII.

I„ this

chapter and the next, we shall
reconstruct the events and analyze
the politics of the Central
American process in its two major

phases, Contadora and Esquipulas.
The Contadora peace process can
he broken down into five

stages.

In

this chapter, we shall focus on the
first two:

(1)

Initial Optimism and the Constitution
of the Contadora Framework for

Peace (January 1983-January 1984), and
(2) The First Draft of the

Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation

in

Central America
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<F6brUary 19 "-°"° ber

-

us

*

subsequent stages and the

(November

^e

^

«-

—

c

hapter , we shall focus

^^^^ ^

E8

^ ipuias ^

984-December 1985)- (4)
, lp
,
Stalemate
^, l«U gt
and the Third Draft
of
Contadora Act (January
1986-January 1 987); and
1

^
(5)

Contadora to Esquipulas
II

(

January 1987 _ January

^

Initial Optimis* and the
Contadora F ramewo rk for Peace, Constitution of th*
January iSTtfJ^ary

1984

At the end of their
January 1983 meeting on
Contadora Island,
vh.ch WaS not reported by
the
Yor , Zimag_, the foreign ministers 2

fa

from Mexico, Colombia,
Venezuela, and Panama issued
an Information
Bulletin summarizing the
content of their talks and the
extent
of

their concerns.

Beyond the deepening trade
and debt crises caused

by the "recessive tendency
of the world economy" and
the "use of

discriminatory legal devices ... found"
in the execution of the Panama
Canal Treaties, the principal
part of the Information Bulletin

focused on Central America.

It stressed

the ministers' growing

concerns over the risk of foreign
military intervention in the
region's worsening conflicts.

The ministers reminded "all states"

(presumably throughout the world) of their
"international

obligations" to abstain from the use or threat
of force and warned
against any kind of foreign interference
or action that "could

worsen the situation and create the danger
of

a

general conflict

CMld

-ion,. Moreover, the „
'
inisters
explicit!, rejected as
"highly undesirable"
the deification
„f
conflicts in Central
toerica as East .Hest
The information
Bulletin

aUo

ca]led

states to embark on
regional peace caiKs.
talks

^

centrai

Whi,
While invoking the
•

,

•

Principles of non-intervention
and self-H»
f
self-determination,
the Contadora
-isters pressed their states'
interests in seeing the
Centra!
American states find a
framework for di alog ue
and negotiations.
The, stressed "the
advantage of involving
the valuable contributions
and necessary snpport
of other Latin American
conntries in those
efforts." The ministers
further evoked traditional
BoHvaran ideals
•

.

of Latin solidarity by
calling for greater Latin
American

consultation and cooperation

in

addressing common problems.

they added a more contemporary
note to these ideals

But

-and further

underlined their rejection of
the reemergent Cold

War- by urging
increased Latin Americau
participation in the Non-Aligoed
Movement

and other international
Third World fora (Contadora
Group, 1983a:

164-166).
Several factors contributed to
converting this initial call for
peace into

a

peace initiative by the states
that would soon be

called the Contadora Group.

The supportive responses of the

international community in the following
months provided inportant

encouragement to the call for peace.

Messages of recognition and

support were increasingly sent to the
Contadora Group from the

governments of Spain (which also offered to
play

a

role in any peace

process), Portugal, Sweden, France, Argentina,
Egypt, Ecuador, Peru,

;

189

»««.

others as

Mll

a8

Socialist Interna Ho
n al (Voli0> 1985;
46 . 4?;

—

Mediate

"

Ce

" ral

response

<>°". Rica, she discussed
the

President

Ui.

^a,. a,„ r

^

tbe Non .Aligned
Movement

Alberto Mo„ 8 e.

_^

^^^^

i983;

^

^

un

m

*•

s an

Joae

^^

^^^^
After visiting

Kirkpatrick recoanended
iMreased

„

^

^^^

Biut

that government
against what she described
as a large Soviet
effort
'here.
Later that
Washington announced
.

^

mth

U.S.-Honduran miHtary exercises
March 10
.

k „o

M

^

as Bi g P in e !.

^

TheD> on

983, President Reagan asked
Coa 8 ress for an emergency
military and economic aid
package of ? 298 million
for Central
1

America, including 5110
„i 1Uon in military

^^

£J

Meanvhiie, stepped-up contra
attacks and armed clashes
in northern
Nicara 8 ua were being
reported and the U.S. role
in the expanding
"covert" war was becoming
increasing!, public. At the
end of March
1983, Mexico's ambassador to the
United Nations once again
called
for peace talks in the
region (Volio, 1985: 49; Meislin,
1983: Al

Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987:
22; Weinraub, 1983a: A7;
1983b: Al; Weinraub, 1983c: Al

;

Weinraub,

Riding, 1983a: A5).

As for the Central Americans,
a week after Ambassador

Kirkpatrick's February visit, the
foreign ministers from the three
closest allies of the United States
in the region, Costa Rica,

Salvador, and Honduras, met in San

Jose' to

El

discuss the status of the

U.S. -sponsored Forum pro Peace
and Democracy.

On March 5,

these

states seemed to respond to the Contadora
call for dialogue by

190

-1—

«~

—

-tin,

„ ould include
Nicaragua

such . meeting

»85: 49; Meislin,

—d,

1

983: A1

,

A12;

Md Guatenau

_

-sued

^

Mteriaii2ed

^

„ Central

^

the dynamic personal
diploMcy of ColonbUn
pre£ident

Belisario Betancur in
early Aoril
.
PrU r.
*
"-««*i«d
for peace.

b

Taking
S up
P the rnl»
role „f
of

»

the Contadora call

peace a^assador,"
Betancur

M e x ico, Veneauela,
and Panama as well
as Cos£a

^^^

regional peace talks he
undertaken as soon as
possihle.

On

April 11 the Contadora
Croup states decided
to send their foreign

listers mediately

^

to Central American
capitals where, as

Sroup, they met with each

^

...^

a

They ended their mission
in Guatemala City
on April ,3 where they
announced that the first,
ground-hreaking joint feting
hetween the
four Contadora foreign
m i„ isters and their

^ Qm

colleagues was scheduled for
April 20-21
Kornet, 1985: 27-28

"7; Bagley

;

i„

Panama city (Brekonja .

Cepeda Ulloa end Perdo
Garcia-Pena, 1985: 166-

and Tokatlian, 1987:
22; "Four Latin Officials...,"

1983: A10).

This First Joint Meeting of
the region's nine foreign
ministers
laid an important foundation
for the building of a
diplomatic

framework for peace in Central
America.

Group's Information Bulletin
after

According to the Contadora

it ended,

the meeting's purpose

was focused on "bringing about
a constructive dialogue and

establishing effective communication
aimed at reducing tensions and
laying the foundations of

a

stable and lasting peace in the region."
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The Contadora
minister*
J
t-ers »ic«
also spoke
poKe nf
ot the 'common
purpose of
bringin£ ab ° Ut
Peacefu!
<Cont.d o raGroup
.
1983b:157 _ 168)i

"

-

tl

-

-ided

«

-

o P p„rtu„it

—

— — - «««—
'he region.

-U.«

i»

Stance"

y for each of

^ CM[rai ^^^^

over the nature
of the

Fron tbe£e di8cus6ionS)

identified the probUms
that

^

probUM

^
^^

ContadMa
thought

most attention; namely,

n,lllt «5' advisor,
other forms of outsit I-,and
* aesista »«. actions
aimed at de.t.bHi.ln.
1"* 1
"der of other
countries,
Jrea s anf
a «res.ion,
warlike
incidents and frontier
»t human
rights and individual
ana JZ?i 8U
a
"ca.,
and
the
grave economic and social
n™M
VhlCh are at tha "cart
of the region's
pre.en crisis
Present
r
(Contadora Group, 1983b:
167).

^

"Vf"

^"

The meeting also
produced agreement in
principle on the
Procedures of consultation
and negotiation to be
followed b y the
Central American states
in the future.
A second joint meting
of
the nine foreign ministers
uas scheduled fM

^

"ay, again i„ P anaM city
.

rf

^
^
^

^

achieved at this first meeting,
it was an important
preparatory

-eting that

laid the groundwork for
more.

U

took place on the

fifteenth floor of the Banco
Central de Panama, which became
the
headquarters of the subsequent
Contadora mediation efforts
(Contadora Croup, 1983b: 166-168;
Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 22-23;
Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo Garcia-Pena,
1985: 167).

.
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Second Joint Meeting
of the nine
foreign ministers
roreign
took
Place on May 28-30,
1983
Tfci.

outco^
outco

„
.

translating the initial
Conta
the r
Contadora peace
initiative. Fi rst
St>

"

cal1

f °r

peace int o

in talks
ln
t ,„

^at the Contad ora
ministers described
as frank
trank, llengthy,
„
and fruitful,
the
agenda items for f„f- 11ro a
future drscusston
were organized and
subdivided
into four categories:
Concent,,,
,
onceptuall framework
i 8SU es,
political and
r
Group

.

M

•

7"

ity

Pr0bUES
"

"

-

- -boring

and machinery

f or

of an y possible
agreements

reached
Second, and even
.ore significant than
this increased
formalization of agenda
items for future
discussion, was the

nation

of tne Technical
Croup.

The purpose of

^

^

"as to coordinate tne
work of the incipient
peace process by
studying various problems
and proposals relating
to regiona! peace
Severing information, providing
technical support for the
ministers
end country negotiating
teams, proposing
procedures for dealing with
identified problems, and
preparing the agendas of
future Contadora
-etings. The Technical Croup
was made up of the vice
ministers for
foreign relations from
.1. nine states and it
began its work on dune
21. 1983.
Bagley and Tokatlian (1987:
24) note that Mexico
came to
Play a leadership role within
the Technical Group from
the

beginning, given its relatively
large and sophisticated
diplomatic
staff as veil as the dynamism
and activism of Mexican
Foreign
Minister Bernardo Sepu'lveda Amor.
Nevertheless, this multilateral
technical support mechanism
developed its own dynamic. It
worked
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-

-

Prevent

government to breakk ro l D *.;
relatl0 »=

^

v"h

^

Significantly the £oraation
of
o f the

^^^^

National Guard

Nicaragua and Cuba.

^
^

Iechnicai Group

inetitutional.ation Q£

VContadora Group. 1983c- 1f,ft-i7n
168 170; Ba ,le
S
y
i>

CMtadora

^

Tokatlian, 1987: 23-24;
Drekonja-Kornat, 1985- 28-2Q- r on a
28 29, Cepeda Ulloa and
Pardo Garci'a-Peffa
1985: 168-169).
'

The third

signified outcome

of the Secona
joint

decision b y the Contadora
Group to Mintain
of Observers, which
vas formed

earHer

^

^^^^
nontt ^

us

^

border incidents between
Costa Rica and Kicaraua
Cost. Rican revest
before the Organisation
of

(

Comi8aion

^

.

States

to for, a multinational
peacekeeping force along

Nicaragua, Bagley and
To.atlian

^

^

border

^

19 8 7! 23 ) report that
there

tacit agreement to b
ypa ss tbe OAS.

I„ fact> the Te

^

a

t

of tbe OAS was never
convoked and tbe matter was
passed directly t0
tbe Contadora GroU
p (Rojas A ra ven a , 1990: 152-153).

Tbe Contadora

Group created

a

civilien bod y of representatives
fro, tbe four

Contadora states to investigate
end diffuse tbe bilateral
border
tensions.
The observer commission
presented its report to the
Contadora ministers at the Second
Joint Meeting with several

recordations

for improving Costa
Rican-Nicaraguan relations.

Contadora Group's decision to
maintain its support and extend the
mandate of its observer commission,
as veil

endorsement of

a

The

as the Group's related

proposal that the two countries form

a

joint
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bilateral commission 3
to resolve their
r conflict
confll ct S> contributed
to the
erOVM8 PtimiSm ab
d
°
°"
of Contadora'.
nediaUon
•
As Bagley and
Tokaman

—
^
*

"

—

^
--

(i987!

" lati0nS

^

*M ^ugh

the efforts
observers conmis8ion>
along uith decreasea
cMtra
based
Costa Rica as the
the. U.S.
n c
t
abandoned
its support for
the
independent contra reader
Hden Pastors,* coined
to "raise hopes
tUt Contadora couid perfo™
a
peacekeeping
deplo yi „ g troops." Thus,
„ith its a g enda „ore
£ „» a
a„d

-

m

^_

KeW

„^

us

^

creation of ne cha„is n s
for technical support
and conflict
resolution, the Contsdora
Group h a d he un to huild
g

a

f_s

for

ongoing peace talks a„ong
the Centra! Africans
(Contadora Croup,
1983c: 168-170; Bagley and
To.atlian, 1987= 23; Castro,
1,85:

U

.

Drehonja-Kornat, 1985: 29; Cepeda
Ulloa and P ardo Garcr'a-PeSa,
1985:
167-168; Rojas Aravena, 1990:
152-153).

Despite the work that had
been accomplished by the
Contadora
Group foreign ministers through
the

end of May 1983, there was
still

something tentative about the
peace initiative.

The Contadora Croup

states had from the beginning
stressed the responsibility of
the
Central American states themselves
to embark upon peace talks.

Meanwhile, the Honduran-based contra
attacks against Nicaragua had
grown in frequency and seriousness
while the civil wars in El
Salvador and Guatemala continued
to grow even more bloody.

The

United States moved to increase its
military and economic aid to its
allied governments in the region while
the regional economic and
debt crises had become more severe,
both for the Central Americans

195
and for Mexico and
Venezuela

7„ thlS
°

"-^Phere,

establishing an ongoing
peace process were

Mny

However, i„ an important
meeting in July
PUdged thCir C °"" it

-"

*'

b-ilil,

the obstacles for

.

^

,

a

framed

for

onsoing negotiations.

ln an unprecedented^
aua.it meeting of
four
Latin American heads
of state,
state ,h*
„
the presidents of
each of the four

Contadora Croup countries
met in Cancu'n, Mexico,
on July 17 , 1983
*'

-d

of their summit,

the four presidents
issued the "Canco.

situation in Central America:
e

ly C
at
d eterior1

IS! :"u at!onr:L

^ "V

tensions, frontier incidents,
and the threat

™
ofVfl

Through the Cancu'n Declaration,
the Contadora presidents
expressly addressed the
"international cOBnnunity" which,
they

stressed, faced the dilemma
"of either resolutely
supporting and
strengthening the path of political
understanding by offering

constructive solutions or passively
accepting the accentuation of
factors which could lead to extremely
dangerous armed

confrontations."

The presidents rejected the use
of force as "an

approach that aggravates the underlying
tensions," and cited "the
basic principles of coexistence among
nations" as the only viable
path towards peace.

They reiterated that the Central
Americans
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the" MlK!
'

W

Sh ° Uld

"

«»

*<™

-POn S iMU ty

..

in resolving

the region's conflicts.

Nave rthel e SS)

-l—i-.
Kl11 t0 C0

„

the nost significant

^

^

the four head8 of
8£ate pUdged their

" inUe

th6ir

£

« P-c

the Central Americans
to ao
do the same.
sam *

^

^
poUticai

«- 1-PU.itl, Oanensea

tk
They

acknowledged that the

broad international
support that had followed
the Contadora Croup's
-itial call for peace had
"inspired" and » impe l led «
the Group to
Persist in its endeavors.
B y sunning and
pledging their political
will to continue their
governments' mediation efforts,
Presidents
Miguel de la Madrid (Mexico),
Belisario Betancur (Colombia),
Lux's
Herrera Campus (Venezuela),
and Ricardo de la
Espriella (Panama)
infused the mortar necessary
to build a solid framework
for ongoing
Peace talks.
The Cancan Declaration
closed by issuing an appeal
to
the international community,
to all American states,
and to those
"states with interests in and
ties to the region" for
support in the
Contadora Croup's search for
peace (Contadora Croup, 1983d: 170174).

The five Central American states
formally endorsed the Cancan

Declaration at the Third Joint Meeting
of the Contadora and Central
American foreign ministers, held shortly
afterwards, from July 28 to
30, 1983.

The Central Americans also manifested
their political

will to pursue

a

peace process by presenting specific
proposals, one

of which was made by Nicaragua and
another of which was made by the

other four states.

The nine ministers meeting in Panama City
agreed

to study the proposals and resume their
talks within a month.

On
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-s-

—

25

and26

,

che TechDical

Groypmet

Kee ting scheduled
£or Septeober

1«3.. 17A-H6; Cepeda Ulloa

^

9

arra ng e tal ks bet „ een
the United

^^

B a tancur

^

tkeFo

(Contsdora

_

an d P ard „ Care .a-PeHa,

MeanwMU, Coleman Preset

opposition,

?

^

^

,

985:

personaUy

^

several m ee ting6 uere
held betueen

J<jly

^

„„. 171)

^^

^
^

September 29 between
een special
sDeri'fll n
q
U.S.
envoy to Central America
Richard Etone> anJ pDR-FMLN
repreaeatat ive
Not hlng of £ubst8nce
.„ ach eved by
QMknj
nouever , the v

„y

Za.ora.

^aMtt

.

1985: 29).

^

^^^^^^

that the momentum for the
6 USe
usp nf
0f ^rsi«
diplomacy rather than force
had
gained important ground by
the summer of 1983.

There were other signs that
the Contadora peace
initiative had
had an impact on the
regional crisis in general and
on United States
policy toward Central America
in particular.
Not only were the
Central American foreign
ministers talking to each other
and the
United States with the FDR-FMLN.

appointment as

a

Ambassador Stone's very

special diplomatic envoy to the
region was evidence

that the Reagan administration
was under some pressure to
manifest
its support for regional peace
talks.

Richard Stone's appointment

was announced on April 28, 1983,
following President Reagan's

address to a joint session of Congress
asking for support for his

military and economic aid package for
Central America (Smith, 1983a:
Al; Weisman, 1983a: Al

,

Senator from Florida and

A12).
a

Stone's credentials as

conservative Democrat could

a

former
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—

enha.ce President
Reagan , biJ
co sres
pol; icy.

beeinni " s
;

*

^^

^
-

Cantral teerican

indeed, with the growing

support

for-

^

of

the Contadora
initiative, as well
initiative
11
as growing domestic

^

,

congressional opposition

-i«*.lti..

t,

^

i. „ inning 6upport
for

1 aecl 0g

Cai

^

its centrai

the late spring and
early summer of 1983
1*83.

anions

ican y -o rl en t ed political
appointees

"*

White House, the

(0-.ru-.,

"»

^

^

and more

°epar tm ent on the one
band and th.

Depart

1983: A3;

^

There were also
important

over policy „ itM .
the ad „ inistratiM
lt8elf)

" rlStS

^

of Defense, and

Snith> 1983b:

<=nders as

M)

_

^
^ ^

the CIA 0D

^

^

Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Aff
airs
the end of May and his
replacement h y the more
tractable hanghorn
Motley at the end of June
gave furtber

^^

administration's Central American
policy was having internal
7
trouble.
Moreover, bipartisan support
had been eroding since

Ambassador KirkpatriCc's trip
to the region and needed
shoring up.
Senators Henry Jackson and
Charles MacMatbias soon
sponsored a
senate reaolution creating

a

bipartisan commission to study D.S.

policy toward the region, and
at the beginning of July,
the Reagan

administration named Henry Kissinger
as its chair.

After its

members were sworn in on August
10, the National Bipartisan

Commission on Central America set out
to study and rationalize U.S.

at
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Policy toward the
troubled region
D
8
and m
T —anH

at the end of
July

^inistratW.

ir,

u-,
M*
Meanw
^le,
after

'

a

bitter debate

an important blow
to the

policy __, the House
voted 228 _ i9s

to the contras
through

^

^

^

first „ BoiMd

(Tolchin 1983: A3;
Halloran, 1983iy«3. A2
A2, v
Weisman, 1983b: Al
Clines,
;
*983: Al;
"Kissinger Panel Meets...,"
^
1983 aj,
^. RRoberts,
o
1983:
Al
Leogrande, 1987: 206).
•

,

.

.

,

»

-itbU

this context of growing
congresE£onal

^

o£her done6tic

"Position t0 the Re a an
g
administration's Central
the momentum
generated by the CoDtadora

- .u-„

pcucy

during

led to . successful
and 6ignificant ffieeting
of

Contadora Group foreign
nini8ter6

colle.g „ ee

^

in

early September.

fourth t«e, fro. September

7

a„d

the£r

•

^^

^.^

Mee ting together i„
Panama for the
to 9, 1983, 9 the nine
foreign

ministers adopted an
important document known
as the "Document of
Objectives." This teXt
oonsolidated the various
proposals and
viewpoints previously drawn
up b y the Peru, pro Peaoe
and Democracy,
by Nicaragua, and by the
Contadora Croup. While not
a formal
treaty, the Document of
Objectives was a kind of
blueprint for the
future of the negotiations
process.
Indeed, it identified and

formalized the objectives of
the Contadora diplomatic
initiative as
veil as the means through
which those objectives could
be met
(Contadora Group, 1983f: 176-180).

Composed in two parts, the Document
of Objectives opened by
invoking the principles of
international law that should guide
the
peaceful resolution of conflicts in
Central America.

The first part

200
of the document
also identifies
entities tthe sources
of tension in
the

u

-sic.

including

»

the preseoce of
foreign mnitary

other forms of foreign
ffiiutary interference/
re8i0DaI

'~

"—

««••

*«

,

^

^^^^
^

^

^

of the territory
of
some states to
destabilize others,
others and
fln H
the region's
"unjust
economic, social and
political structures."
The
ifte first
section ends
by underscoring the
"nepH
r a
«
i
S
need f,
for
poUtic.1 agreement [that
favorsl
^alogue and understanding"
and that can "put
into effect the
mechanisms that „ U1 be
a ble to ensure the
peaceful coexistence
and
security of the Central
American peoples"
(Contadora Group, 1983f
177-178).

^

•

•

The second section of
the Document of Objectives
lists the
specific goals and enumerates
the essential "action
mechanismsneeded to achieve peace
in the region.
In deed, at this point
in the
document, it becomes clear
that the Contadora Croup
was concerned
that the emerging peace
process be not just the
articulation of fine
and noble words but the
realization of meaningful and
viable
actions.
Each of the twenty-one
points in the listing of
objectives
begins with a verb in its
infinitive for-. The list of
objectives
includes the following actions,
among others:
"to promote"

(detente, confidence, national
reconciliations); "to respect"

((human rights); "to take measures"
(guaranteeing representative,

pluralistic, and diverse democratic
systems); "to halt" (the arms
race); "to prohibit" (foreign
military bases and interference); "to

eliminate" (the presence of foreign
military advisors, the arms
traffic); "to work" (for economic
development and cooperation);

20

«c

in order t0
lnplement these

8eIf " COn£Ci ° USly

—
"

-

aCti0n "BeChaDiEmS

"

actiM

«»

d

°f

« ri0«

.

ob ectives

*» *.

_

creation „ f several

Eluding: nechanism8

of

y( , e ., elections);iDternaimechMi8B£to

traff lckiDg bet4(een

,

^

airect communication
to
Prevent and resolve
border incidentsincidents, m
^»,
mechanisms
of economic
i«e8r a tiOT! mechanisms for
technical cooperatiM
•

t-ae

^

projects; and

a«e q uate

s y stems

^

aechmi , m

^

^

of veri fic a tion and
control (Contadora

1983f: 178-179).

Despite the Contadora
Group's concern for
action, finding the
minimum consensus that
permitted toe acceptance
of the Document o£
Objectives by the Centra!
Africans was relative!, e aSy
compel to
the next step of getting
the. to implement the
document's a ction-

objectives.

»onth Uter

The tes, seeded even
.ore difficuU when, less
than a
(on October 3), the United
States sponsored a feting

between General P au l Gorman,
then head of the U.S.
Southern Command
(S0UTHC0K) in Panama, and the
defense ministers of E. Salvador,
Guatemala, Hondures, end Panama
aimed at reviving the defunct

Cental American Defense Council
10
(CONDECA)
("Three Nations
Agree...,"

1

983

:

A7

;

Maira, 1985: 383).

Three weeks later, on

October 25, 1983, the United Stetes
carried out its invasion of
Grenada with the countries fo the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States (OECS).

Nicaragua

11

Both the move to revive CONDECA
without inviting

and the invasion of Grenada seemed
to piece the nascent

Contadora peace process in jeopard .
y

Both events edded to fe a rs

1

2

202

^

u nited

>•»• «; Bagley

and Tokatlian>

^

^^^.^^
^ ^^

states might plan an
invasion of N;caragua
;f
the other Central
African states
28;

31; Maira, 1985: 383;
Asenjo, 1985: 262).

Instead, however, both

—

—dora

Croup, re80lve

building

««e. 1-

-

a

^^

t0 execute

Document

franesork for negotiations

the censuring of
the

the United Nations.

^

^
_

^

^

objectiTCs

^

^

^^^^^
^

^^

The, also stepped up
their dlplomatic

efforts both within and
outside of tne
the OAS r„
to keep the Central
Orleans committed to the
Contadora process. Por
example, Brekonja
Kornat (1985: 31) reports
that Panamanian Vice
President dor E e
Hlueca personally worked hard
to prevent the revival
of CONDECA.
Meanwhile, the Contadora Group
prepared a plan outli„i„
g . schedule
and procedures to begin
talks on Hmiting the
regional
and arms trafficking.
In mid-November, the
Contadora Group
Presented the plan in the for.
of a resolution to the
Thirteenth OAS
General Assembly, where it was
approved unanimously 1
(Cepeda Ulloa
and Pardo Carcia-Pena, 1985:
172-173; Kinzer. 1983: A7; Smith.
1983d: A3;
"Peace Pact Urged...." 1983: A3;
Smith. 1983e: A12;
Karl, 1987: 285-286. Bagley
and Tokatlian. 1987: 28).
I,

^

By this time, however,
changes of direction in Nicaragua,
Costa

Rica, and Cuatemala had also
contributed to Contadora's positive

momentum.

Despite the decision to revive CONDECA
without including

Nicaragua and despite costly contra
activities

in

the fall of 1983,

including the CIA-directed minings of
Puerto Sandino in September
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- °«ober,

the Sandinista gov

"ith tt . Doc „ment
0£ 0bject£ves

—
.

peace proposal to
1

^
^

t

severai poiit

^
^^

^
^
^

CMtadora

Foundations t0 GuarMtee
iDternationai

lance

^

^^

Security of the States
of Central America
Africa" f»
(Nicaragua, 1983: 60-83Cepeda Olloa and Pardo
Garci'a-Pena, 1985: i/i;.
171)

inched

four draft treaties

friendshipj

,

Honduras; the third
proposed
civil var;

-.!».«»..

tU

fourth „ a6

^^ ^ ^ ^^

The firs£ addreased

.

biUtera! relations with
the Dnited
-later,! treaty of peace

Th . proposal
The

.

a

„ ltilateral

soiution

^

^

draft treaty addresaing

Of peace, security,
fri endship, and

all the Central

w

^

African states (Nicaragua,

^

^

1983: 60-61; "Nicaragua

Presents...," 1983: A10;
Gilbert, 1986: 119).
Beyond this, the Nicaragua,
government also hegan to
implement
policies designed to meet
the objections of its
domestic and
international critics.
It eased press censorship
and restrictions
on the politic., opposition;
it announced the moving
up of national
elections to November
4, 1984, as well as an amnesty
for Miskito
Indian prisoners and contra
guerrillas (but not the contra
leadership).

Finally, before the year .as
over, the government

asked some Salvadoran rebel
leaders and over one thousand
Cuban

teachers and military advisers
to leave the country (Gilbert,
1986:
119-120; Drekonja-Kornat, 1985:
31; Yopo, 1985: 237).
In Costa Rica, an important
change of direction in the nation's

foreign policy was announced in
November, forcing the resignation of
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—

ty

in

-

Central

^^

confUct8)

^

after 1980 had £orced

natiQn , E uader8

business leaders
opposed the policy of
neutrality
crailt y and
an d embraced
K
U.S.
Policies against
Nicaragua
agua.
a
A h*.*
heated eternal
debate emerged over
the government's
clospr relations
0 i=*-closer
with Washington, its
strained
relations with Managua,
and its maomty
inability to maintain
.
a consistently
neutral forei n policy
g
stance.
Fo rei g n Minister
Volio was
•

t-

,

•

especiany pro-„ashin too.
g

»MC

Had both

deluded Costa Rica

Peace and Democracy,
where

"0*

He was resentful
of the Contadora

VoHo

and s„p pl anted the
Forum p r0

had played an important
role.

He

a

confrontational stance with
Contadora and a hard
Managua.
Other top officials in
President Luis Alberto

Mvare,' government aided

the contra

Hne

against

Monge

conizations that were based

in northern Costa Rica
„ hile the government
officially did

dose

little to
the contra camps
(Eguisabal, 1990: 204-205;
Rojas Aravena,

1990: Volio Jimenez, 1985

;

Asenjo, .985a: 301,
310; Bell, 1984/10;

Edelman and Kenen, 1989).

Nevertheless, by the late
summer and fall of 1983
g rowin g sense of

,

there was a

insecurity in San Jose" which
the Monge

administration began
to address.
addrPSQ
S

™

t>^
The country's continued
economic

crisis, its growing refugee
problem, its divisive internal
debate
over foreign policy, and its
sense that Costa Rica had lost
its
image as an autonomous international
actor all laid the groundwork
for a change of direction in
foreign policy.

As the Monge

205

Centra!

Wican

—

Rica's problems

"tempt

blen

p
"

^

tj,

,

but Ce „ tral

^

^

government's concern
over Washington's

to revive CONDECA 14
and its

tUn

ter the Grenada
invasion
serve, to reinforce
President Honge's
decision to strength
len
his government's
neutrality in Central
.
Central America's
a
y
conflicts.
In a
solemn ceremon on
y
Movember l7 . 19 83,
President Monge
annonnced
vision to introdnce a
constitution, amendment
proclaiming Costa
K'ca's "perpetual,
active, and unarmed
neutrality." Shortly
hereafter, the confrontational
VoHo dimeoe: resigned
and Car lo8
^se Cutierre: assumed the
post of Poreign Minister.'^
According
several puhlic opinion
polls at the time, the
proclamation o f
neutrality won the support
of the vast majority
of Ticos. 16
Nevertheless, the Monge
administration continued to
stress that
Costa Rica helonged to
the "Western democracies"
and had a
„

,

,

^

"Political and ideological
partiality- to the same.
This suhtle
difference between strict
neutrality in the Central
African
oonflicts and politico-ideological
alignment with the United
States
would often make it difficult
for the Monge administration
to

maintain an

ia,age of

Central America.

independence in foreign policy
vis-a-vis

Yet, at the end of 1983
and into 1984, Costa Rica

seemed to be reversing its slide
into compliance with U.S. policy
in
the region (Rojas Aravena,
1990: 83, 129-133, 141,
156; Asenjo,
1985a: 304, 312; Eguizabal, 1990:
204-207; Carcfa y Gom^riz, 1989:
31).
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si*U„

'uate.au

change o£ direction

as well.

^

foreign

„espite the Rea gan
administration's

^

to intensify
negotiations for CONDECA
after
l
the Grenada
cne
Gren.„
invasion,
the ^Guatemalan
government under Briga.ier
Ce ner al Oscar

"

•

.

Humberto

«e:ra

Stores

".elf fro.

began to lose interest
in the idea and

the Reagan administration's
regional

^

Stance

^
continued concessions:
prohibition on renewing U.S.
.Uitary aid t0
Guatemala one to a poor
human rights sitnetion
there may have haa

seething

to oo with Mejia

(Chavez, 1983:

AH

;

vires'

B agley and

waning support for CONDECA

Tokatlian, 1987: 28).

However,

Guatemala's .ore independent
military wa8 acting
agen da .

M aira

(„„,

Cuetemala backed
it

a „ ay

383) and A6eDjo

,

^^^

from the u-s _ ef£or[ £o
rev ve
.

comEcA

feare d that the Hon d ur a n
.ilitary, vhich had received

military aid from the United
States, woul d come to dominate
the
organization and undermine Guatemala's
claim to regional
leadership.

Moreover, General M.jf. Vi'ctores
was looking to

undertake an important change

in the

country's foreign policy

direction in order to reverse the
country's international isolation.

With Guatemala's guerrilla groups
virtually crushed after
brutal three-year counter-insurgency
campaign an d with

a

a

persistent

economic crisis, the time was ripe
for Mejia vfctores to begin to

discuss moves towards d emocratization
an d to rebuil d the country's
ties with the rest of the world.

By improving relations with

Mexico, by strengthening its ties with
the Contadora Group and the

other Central American states, and by
cultivating new relations
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-

Ue
a

„„ it e d Na£ions
and the 0A£>
Guatemaian foreigo

aec.ea turn auay £rom

•t— «- ««c
0-.-U-.

^

pQUcy

adffiinistration . s

agMda

tion invhich his
government

ne»tra lity

„

the Kicarag

_ Md

Not o nly had the
goveroffient backed avay

^
^
^^^^

SaWadoran contUct6

us

for the cootras;
Foreign Mini££er p>
Andrade

^

trxp to Ma„a „a „ here
g
be assured the Sandinista
gQvernment
Cuate.au „e uId „ ot allou
the in6tallation q£
that the Guatemala,,

niU tar y

sponsored military exercise6
.
towards

i np

d

^

„c uld not participate

The country

y ears

^

„ >g> .

^^^^^

le.e„t ing . >triet policy
of

maintain fo r the next several

„

^

^ ^
^

(Meza et al, 19 87:
49;

Davison, 1989: 19-21.
These moves by the
governments of Nicaragua, Costa
Rica, and
Guatemala in the fall of
1983 contributed to Contadora's
positive

omentum

and permitted the
elaboration of Contadora's plan
for

building

a

diplomatic framework for peace
17
talks.

That plan
reached its fruition at the
Fifth Joint Meeting of the
Contadora
Group and Central American
foreign ministers held on January
7 to

9,

1984, the first anniversary of the
Contadora Group's original call
for peace.
At this meeting, 18 the Central
American foreign

ministers adopted

a

document entitled "Norms for the
Implementation

of the Commitments of the
Document of Objectives," hereinafter

referred to as the Norms for Implementation
(Contadora Group, 1984a:

.
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"0-183,.

Together with the
Document of Objectives,
the Norms for
Mentation ca„ be read a6 the co „
6ti£ution of
Contadora
peace process.
The Norms £or
Implementation derives its
name from the fact
that the document
explicit!, enumerates norms
that would gui de the

The llst of norma
is even more
formalized, precise, and

authoritative than the
twenty-cue points found
in the Document of
Objectives. Xhe norms for
Cementation reorganires the
twenty-one
Points into three interre,ated
but distinct sets of
topic:
Securi ty
^ues, Politics! lEsue8> and
Economic

^

^

^

iseues _
under the heading of
"Security Issues" include
some new
specifications, such as the deeioim, r „
decision to compile an
inventory of all
military forces in the
region, including bases,
troops, and

armaments, in order to reduce
and balance their
numbers within
"reasonable" limits, a census
of all foreign military
advisors and
personnel is also requisitioned
in order to fi x a schedule
for their

reduction and eventual elimination
from the region.

no™

The
under
the security heading also
resolve to identify and eradicate
the
19
"irregular forces"
seeking to destabilize states
in the region as

well as all forms of support,
promotion, or financing of such

groups
Like these security norms

,

the norms under the headings
of

"Political Issues" and "Economic and
Social Issues" go farther than
previous Contadora documents

in

specifying the details of the work

to be accomplished by the Central
American governments on their own

209
and

in subsequent
phases of the
ue neeoti-^
negotiations process
Fiucess.
.

re8Pect f ° r hu " a
6 e

" 0ral

Pr0C6EEeE

"

"d

~

n„ norms for
The

s of tte reg£on . s
r

--

creati0D of .
climate of political
trust between th,
the governments
of the region to
contribute to a reduction
of tensions.
tensions
Tn
The p
Economic
•

and Social
norms focus on
cooperation in aiding
tne reeion'
"6 the
region s refugees
,
and
facilitating their voluntary
repatriation promoting
y repatriation,
economic
integration and intrarpp
j
trare glinn=i
onal trade, encouraging
economic and social
development
witb the support of
in£ernationai c
is6iMs
(such as ECLA)
£o reign aid and joint
ventures, and estabUshing

ms

_

,

"fair economic and socia!
structures" that promote
democracy and
ensure rights to empioyment,
education, health care,
and cultural
expression (Contadora Group,
1984a: 181-182).

The

No™

for Implementation also
addresses the Contadora

Group's continued concern
for action^echaoisms
h y for.ali.ing and
expanding the power of the
Technical Group.
Its new powers included

coordinating the activities of
the peace process, overseeing
the
progress made in the implementation
of the

no™,

and reporting to

the ministerial meetings
on the work being accomplished.

the

No™

Moreover,

for Implementation created
three working commissions, each

of which was commissioned
to address one of the three
main issue

areas delineated by the document
(i.e.,

a

Political Commission,

Security Commission, and an Economic
and Social Commission).

a

These

working commissions were empowered
to study proposals, make

recommendations, draft legal projects for
negotiations, and prepare

—
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verification and control
procedures within
thlD the"
their
e coraissioD ms comp
°
Eed

e-r-

—

-

<°

nine states
participating

^

°

d

m)

f

:r
"

Md

- f- -pon

f

s

for

ls

^e

-

.

"

Each

frM

^^^^

completing their
EtudiesSl le al
8
Projects, and
.

t0 the nine foreign
oiDisterE (Con£adora
g

1984a: 181-183).
T1>e

areas.

0rnS

several masons.

^—f""
It

^

^

a significant
document

representE tb .

diplomatic work by the
Contadora states

^

^ Mssers

^

^

for

their
call for a framework
for negotiations
for the Centra! American
states.
It represents the
f ul] transforation
of the Contadora
e.U
^r peace into an ongoing ana
active negotiating
process hy actually

creating mechanisms geared
toward p roduci n
g
agreement.

.

regional peace

It

also represents a
conscious effort h the
y
Contadora
states to redefine the
regional politico! arena
rather narrowly.
In
setting forth the guidelines
to he followed b
y the working

commissions, the document
explicitly rejects an "foreign
y
advice,
whether from private individuals
or from representatives
of
international organizations"
unless it is "previously
accepted hy
consensus" (Contadora Group,
1984a: 183). This guideline
thus

implicitly defines the five Central
American states and the four
Contadora Group states as the
exclusive set of regional actors
involved in the Contadora peace
process.

It

is

an immanently

political statement in that it
implicitly rejects the occassional

21

-can

7

—
——

{or the U8e of 0AS
Bechaniems todeai
ral A" eriCan
UeS je e tlon of un60lici£ed
•

"

v ce from
;

»

seeBS t0 be directed
at

National Bipartisan
partisan r~~~
Commission on Central
America
rica ^(or
„
,-n
or the
Kissinger
Commission), whose
report on U.S.
U S
nn
n
policy toward Central
America was
scheduled to be sent
spnr to t>
Present Reagan and puMished
•

•

•

.

^^

days of this joint
meeting of Contadora.

AUhou gh

space

notations

pr e Cl „ d e an extensive
ana ly sis of

"naings of the Kissinger
emission's Report,

it

is

useful to

consider some of its
points as they relate
to the Contadora

Central

^ri r„

seeks to define U.S.
national security and

geopolitical interests

in

Central America and make
policy

recommendations for the United
States.
Central America as

a

The report clearly frames

crisis area of vital concern
to U.S. security.

It

Places the region's crises
squarely in an East-West
context by
naming "Sandinista-Cuhan-Soviet
subversion" as a fundamental
and
direct threat to U.S. security
in the region.
The report identifies
the means considered most
appropriate to protect U.S. security

interests, including an economic
aid program of ?8 billion
to
friendly Central American
governments over a five-year period
and an
emergency two-year military
stabilization program of $400 million
in

counter-insurgency and civic action
assistance to El Salvador, along
vitb other tools of military force
intended to promote stability in

the region (National Bipartisan
Commission, 198A: 53; 101-103).

1

*.«W1,.
port devotee oniy
;:

P01Dt

^

^

C

t „e

range of diplonatic
tools

—
—

-

^^^^ ^

t. the TOrk accomplished
up to

. tates .
After
outlining the Commission's
s noi
,™
policy recommendations
concerning
economic and security
issues in the rest
of th.
the report, Chapter
7
addresses "The Search
for ^eace.
Peace » ITnn thls
t-v.
nineteeQ pagg
t^re in only a one page
section on "The Contadora
2
Croup." ° This
^ief section hegins with
two paragraphs that
do not even mention
Croup or its peace
process, but announce
in8tead
•

i-eresf

•

^

of the United States

in

^

encouraging the Central
American

states themselves "tn
aco,,™^ *.v
to assume
the responsibility
for regional
arrangements" and develoD
eveiop %n
a
an independent
system of relations,
backed up by commitments
c
tments of u
„
U.S.
economic resources,
diplomatic
support, and military
assistance." Thus in structural
terms, the
report implicitly defines
the Contadora Croup as
outside of or
foreign to the interests
of the Central American
countries and
peripheral to any eventual
regional agreement that,
"to be
lasting[,]... must be able
t0 count oq u>s> gupport>M
t

^

^

initial paragraphs close with
the paradigmatic statement
that any
arrangement among the Central
Americans themselves must
"provide
both for verification of
compliance and penalties for
violation"

(National Bipartisan Commission,
21
1984: 119).
Once the report finally does
mention the "four neighboring

Contadora countries,"

it

politely acknowledges the "constructive-

role these "key Latin American
nations" have played in "helping to

213

^fine

but then ca6t£

COntad0rS

C

expert" „

°

"*

thi8 regard

^^^^
-en

^

their

Uc k

Moreover;

.

0f

^

^
..

extenBive

^

notes

"terests and attitudes of
these f„ ur c0llntrie8
uLnes are not identical,"
-Piyins the e^tence o f
Croup vi8 .
process.

Mi8

its meBbers

.

^

division6

^^^^^

W hil e it nay have
been t00

^ ^^ ^
.

^

^

^

th. report thus see.s
to discount tb .
poss ibili t y that the
Contadora
states shared a significant
MtioMl security interest

^

»

Pectin,

^^

peace talks and preventing
further militarization

.„

the region that overrode
any other differences
that eight exist
between the* (National
Bipartisan emission, 1984
120).
:

The report then disassociates
U.S. interests

fr«

those of the

Contadora states, whose
interests "Hn
do not always comport
with our
own," and concludes that
"the United States cannot
use the Contadora
i

Process as

a

substitute for its own policies."

Instead, the

Kissinger Commission Report
refers to its own "Framework
for
Regional Security," which is
presented in the chapter section
immediately before that on Contadora.

This "framework" xs

a

very

general ten-point outline that
summarizes the larger set of policy

recommendations presented in the report
as

a

whole and indicates the

Place of negotiations in that larger
framework:

As only one

diplomatic tool among several to
achieve "security" in Central

America (National Bipartisan Commission,
1984: 117-118).
Significantly, the report describes its
ten-point framework as
"fully consistent with the Contadora
Program."

However, the

214
Kissinger Commission
Report tails
fails to foreswear
f«
the use of military
force.
In fact, the
Commission endorses IT
9
U.S.
support to the contra
organizations as "one
«->^
one of the
incentives working in
favor of a
negotiated settlement"
with the "cSandinistas
now in authority
in
Managua." Sphere
the report argues
that
measures are
needed to shield economic
and social programs"
(National Bipart isan
Commission, 1984:
120, 84).
In short, the
Kissinger Commis sion
^port consistently speaks
of military force
as a
•

SUto,

legitimate and
"essential adjunct to
diplomacy"" vMle> a6 „
e have
Contadora Group insists
that miUtar force
y
is a significant
source
of Central America's
worsening climate of
tension that must he
eliminated from the region.

^

^

»ith the virtual simultaneous
appearance of Contadora's
Norms
for Implementation and
the Kissinger Commission's
Report to the
President, the international
community had two clearly
articulated
alternatives for understanding
and dealing with Central
America's
23
crises.
Significantly, in Latin America
only former Costa Rican
Foreign Minister Fernando Volio
Jimenez, Nicaraguan contra
leader
Adolfo Calero, and Salvadoran
Foreign Minister Fidel Chive,
Mena
publicly embraced the Kissinger
Commission Report (Cepeda Ulloa
and
Pardo Garcia-Pena, 1985:
174-175; Kinzer, 1984a: A10).
On the

contrary, the Archbishopric of
San Salvador stated that the

Kissinger Commission "erred completely"

in

calling for more O.S.

military aid to the region, a position
soon echoed by Mexican
President Miguel de la Madrid ("Salvadoran
Leader..., 1984: A19;
Meislin, 1984a: A3).

In

ea rly February, other Latin American
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presidents

DOminiCa

-later

7

f rom

RePUbUc

"

-

of

Spain

PreSident

"-"agua,

——

~all

JaiM
'

P~«

Argentina, 24 Bolivia
oiivia, Colo
Kr
Colombia,
Costa Ri ca

L

ana Panana a6

wen

attending the inauguraUon

(Cepaaa Blloa and Pardo
Garc

1985: 47).

as the prime
.

^

f

- —ration

^^^

o £ Caracas"

At the end of Februarv
February, rho
the r
Contadora Group foreign
ministers met again and
reaffirmed
mrmed their
th^r commitment to
the peace
Process (Contadora Group,
1984c: 186-187).
The
J-ne tontadora
/•
Contado
process
seemed well on its vay
toward challenging
U,bS ' P
8 ng U
do
ol icy toward
Central
America and the further
mi, iteration of the
region.

h

The First Draft of the
Contadora Act for Peace an, r„
Central America. February
1 984—October 1 9^

»

Within weeks of signing
the Noms
created working

emission, began

f

„

Inplemen£ation>

*

^

lw

^

their work of studying,
preparing,

and drafting sections of
a peace agreement. 25

By the end of

February 1984, when the working
emissions submitted their planned
work schedules to the
Contadora Group ministers, there
were over one
hundred technical advisors and
diplomats in Panama participating
in
the Contadora peace process
(Goodfellow, 1987: 149; Cepeda
Dlloa and
Pardo Garci'a-Pena, 1985: 175-176).
For its efforts up to this
point, the Contadora Croup was
reportedly nominated for the Nobel

Peace Prize in March 1984 (Drekon
ja-Kornat , 1985: 36).
As the working commissions began
their work, the broader

political context of the peace process
underwent small but
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By early April,
disclosures of the

renewed the domestic
and 1Dternatl0nal

d

-

-aragu,,

*"«

harbors

over the Reagan

administration's Central
A„„
antral American
policies.

While the
administration sought
to implement
piement the Kissinger
Commission
recommendations and
redoubled its ettorts
efforts to
f „ win
more D.S. aid to
allies in Central
America
"ca, the b;
N 1C araguan
government asked the UN
Security Council to
discus.
85 .->.„
the ">»«.
With the D.S. veto
of any
diSCUSSi0n
•

- "it against the United
States before the
International Court of
JuE tice »„,.
The
-ministration responded hy
announcing that it would
not accept the
court's jurisdiclion
on disputes relating
to Central America
for the
next two years.
WMle the D . s
-

.

^

^ ^ ^.^

26

both the House an, the
Senate balked at approving
any new D,S. aid
especiaUy military aid, to
Central America.
Both houses also
opened new donates concerning
the use of covert
activities
Central America, the CIA's
role in Nicaragua, and
the

in

administration's new position
concerning the ICJ (Ayres
dr., 1984:
A4; Gwertsmau, 1984= Al
Taubman,
;

1984a: Al

.

Smith, 1984: A12;

Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 33-34).
Sensing that its policy was
in trouble at

a

time when

presidential primaries were
getting under way, the Reagan

administration sought to cultivate
a show of support and solidarity
among Central American countries
friendly to the United States
Keislin, 1984b: A3).

New joint military exercises
with Honduras

were moved up three weeks to
April

1

(coinciding with an unexpected
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.-*~P

i-

the teadership of
tl . „ onduran a

^

„ ed

administration EucceEsfully
courted Costa Rica ,
8
b0rde

—

«*»

U8heS

V„

2

b

Rican civll

to increased

tension between those
two

rec« lling it s ambassaaor
to Managua _

"nitea States to reque6t
affiergency securuy
asEistance
that was warmly recaived
by the Reagan adn n
Etrat on
.

»*»~.
-«£.

^^

--^^^^^

"" e "

„ £ state,
1984i Asenjo, I985a;

away from its

also manifested in

poHc,

Us

.

^ ^^^

of neutrality i„ the
spring of

participation in

that Kicaragua expla n

countries and end its arms

^

.

.

co.

a

.

.

buil^p

Union (Drekonja-Kornat,
1985: 33).

niiuary reiation B

t6

^„

mid-April neeting

Salvador and Honduras i.
„b icb the th.ee states
issued

Ending

^

_

through Cuba

„d

^

_

Mi ,M

^

^
ti

Although both Costs Ri ca and

Honduras would vacilate
occassional^, this triangular
alliance
hetweeo Costa Rica, El Salvador,
end Rondures (rooted in
the nov
defunct Eorum pro Peece end
Democracy) agai nst Kicaragua
became the
Reagan administration's trump
in silencing some of its
domestic
critics and in blocking Contadora's
success in later months. 29
The potential effectiveness
of this new triangular
alliance in

blocking Contadora's success became
apparent at the Sixth Joint
Meeting of Foreign Ministers on
April 30 to May 1, 1984.

At this

meeting, the reports and recommendations
of the three working

commissions were due; however, this aapect
of the meeting was
overshadowed by the position taken by Coata
Rica, El Salvador, and
Honduras against Kicaragua.

Echoing their earlier communique, the
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«~

««es

ai!Cl0M

inf

tooK the offenEive by
chalUnEing Nicaragua

°™ ati0 "

°" itS

Inter-^erica. Defense Board

—
<„

oppo8ed to

other

^

Fur tber, they calUd
on Kicaragua

-iHtar, strength

agree to

The, propo6ed chat
the

•

created b y Contedore)
be

«.«!..«..

^

and t0 stop the
exportation

^

^

^

subver£iM

^

^

neighbors (Bagley and
Tokatlian, 1987- 29)
T„
peace agreement could
be concretize
l
concretized at (the
meeting. The Mexican
government later charged
charo^ that *the
L
meetxng was sabotaged by
the three
Central African allies
who had at one point
tried to boycott it 30
("Obstruction of Contadora.
..
1984: A12)
Nevertheles g
Contadora Group was able
to get Costa Rica and
Nicaragua to agree to
set up a new multilateral
border commission to try
to reduce
tensions along their common
border.
Costa Rica's ambassador soon
returned to Managua (Drekon
ja-Kornat 1985: 33; Asenjo,
1985a: 305.

>

^

.

306)

.

After the disappointing Sixth
Joint Meeting, Mexico stepped
up
its efforts to promote a
concerted foreign policy position
of Latin
American states both toward U.S.
policies in Central America and
toward the crisis of debt faced
by Latin America that had now

reached staggering proportions. 31

President de la Madrid personally

took the lead, overshadowing
his capable foreign minister
Sepu'lveda.

In a mid-May trip to Washington,
President de la Madrid

bluntly criticized U.S. policy in
Central America.

He asked

President Reagan to enter into bilateral
talks with Nicaragua and to
support the Contadora process.

In addressing a joint session of

'

-

S ress,

^
^
—-~—

the Mexican
president

p aced into the Ea6t west

^

of
; the effectiveness
of force" (Clines
lneS> 1984*.
A1
1984a: A1
1984b: A14; Bagley
and Tokatlian,
1987: 30).

Significantly, after
attending

^

^

"the illusion

»

A,
A4;
Clines,

^

^

Napoleo'n Duarte in El
Salvador in early
earlv June,
I
Secretary of State
George Shultz flew
on to Managua
a tor
for brief

brief discussions
H
with Daniel

g

Ortega (Kinzer, 1984bA? ? 1
84b. A22).

"-ragua
"exzco.

c
Soon
thereafter, the United
States and

bega n a series of
bilateral meetings in
ManzanHlo,
The Maozanillo TaUs
lasted until January
1,35 after nine

Harry ScMaudeman" and
Kicaraguan Deputy Poreign
Minister Victor
Hugo Tinoco (Goodfellow,
1987150-1151). Although
y°'. 150
iu,
the Manzanillo
Talks .ere ultimately
fruitless," their commencement
in J„.„ e did
contribute to renewed optimism
about the Contadora
process in the
summer and early fall of
*

1984.

Another new source of optimism
for the Contadora Group
was a
certain weakening of U. S.
-Honduran relations by June
and July.
After an unexpected coup
within the leadership of the
Honduran
military at the end of March,
the new armed forces chief.
General
Walter Lopez Reyes, accused
his ousted predecessor,
General Gustavo
Alvarez Martinez, of having
compromised Honduras' "pacifist
and

democratic" principles.

He called for limits on new
military

spending and for renewed dedication
to
region's conflicts.

a

peaceful resolution of the

He also proved to be less
cooperative with the

U.S. contra policy and less
supportive of the U.S. attempt to
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joiDt Salvadoran and
Honduran

Biutary programs

_

seeking to renegotiate
"the terms of xts
,>« k
bargain with the Reagan
team,
the bargain itself
itself" f(Shepherd,
u
8
1986: 150, emphasis
in
original).
Nevertheless
beless, Honduras
Bn^
new stance did force
the Reagan
administration to reassess
;.-«
reasees, its
poUcy toward the Hondursn
military 34
(MeisUn, 1984c: A19; T

^

^e

^

^^^

triangular alliance
between

^

Rica>

^

^

^

deteriorated within six
»eeU, providing Contadors
with . clear road
to new progress.
The Contadors Group
seized the opportunity
for new progress hy
computing . draft ag reeme„t
that it formally presented
to the five
Central American states
on dune 9 and 10, 1984.
The Contadors Group
ministers personally set out
on a tour of Gentra!
American capitals
to discuss the draft
agreement and invite feedback
from the Central
Americans ("Contadora Group's
Envoy...," 198A: A6 Cepeda
and
Pardo Garcla-Peffa, 1985:
177).
In the next fev months,
the Central
Americans conveyed their
observations, objections, and
suggestions
.

35
to Contadora's Technicsl
Group;
in turn,

the Contadora Group

ministers evaluated the Central
American vievs and revised the draft
agreement (Cepeda Olios and Pardo
Garc ia-Pena , 1985: 178). At the
Seventh Joint Meeting of Foreign
Ministers on September

7

to 9,

1984, the Contadora Group ministers
presented a revised peace

agreement to their Central American
counterparts as ready for
signing.

ReVlSed CO

A-ica

was

" ad0 " A« "
f

-

Cooperation in Central

lo»g and detailed
peace as.ee.ee, tha t
sought .
C ° mPrehen6iVe
reS ° 1Uti
'° "»
co^fUct. (Contadora Act
»«)• After invoking „ ariont
principU£
instru
t6
tn atio n al lav. the
Contadora Act articulates
a
a

-

-e

^

_

^

comprehensive
Project that defines peace
ana cooperation in
Central Africa as
-pendent on three interrelated
seta „ f commitments
for each Central
American atate. F ir8t CO
me the Political
Cor-itments (Chapter I)
which include provisions
for national reconciliations
ana political
-eatiaa, the respect for hu.an
rights and judicial
and the promotion of
plnraUstic and ft.ll, participatory
electoral
system as veil as cooperation
between the region's five
national
parliaments.
The Political Cedents
also include a pledge to
promote regional detente and
to ahide by this regional
solution to
conflicts "in the face of foreign
pressures and interests."
The Contadora Act then
presents the Security Commitments

(Chapter II), which provide for
the demilitarisation of the
region.
Specifically, the security provisions
include:
The prohibition of
all

international military maneuvers and
the ending of those in
progress within thirty days of signing
the Act; an end to the
regional arms race by prohibiting any
new weapoas systems and

beginning negotiations on the control
and reduction of current
inventories and troop levels; the
elimination of all foreign

military bases and training schools within
six months of signing the
Act and setting a schedule for the
gradual withdrawal of all

foreign military advisors; an end to intraand extra-regional arms
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^^

trafficking; and the
prohibition of all forms
of Eupport

»i«e8 „ lar

« «n

such as the

other

^

as their disarming
and the dismantling
„ f their base6 .

The Contadora Act
presents these demilitarisation

c™, itMnt .

«

necessary hoth to end
the Uca! armed conflicts
and to fr ee up
the economic resources
for e qui ta bl e development
projects without
wnrch a viable peace
is impossible.
Hence, the commitments
in the
economic and social areas
(Chapter
provide for

^

„»

rf

regional economic integration
and development projects,
the
strengthening of regional
trade and financial
arrangements, the
improvement of employment and
health standards, and the
protection
of the region's refugees
(Contadora Act, 1984).
Reconciliations,
uemil.tarization, and integrated
development then are the requisites
for real peace and security
in the region as posited
by the Revised
Contadora Act for Peace and
Cooperation in Central America.
The Contadora Act also
reflects the Contadora Group's
continued

concern for actions rather than
just fine words.

This concern is

manifested first in the very title
of the document.
peace process produced an "Act,"
not simply

covenant or charter.
for the creation

made.

a

The Contadora

treaty, agreement,

More substantively, the Contadora Act
provides

of new mechanisms to implement the
commitments

It seeks to establish three

independent committees or

commissions corresponding to the three issue
areas addressed by the
Act to evaluate, verify, and follow up
compliance with the Act's

provisions.

The most important

of these is

the Commission for the

Verification and Control of Security Issues, 36 which
would be made

»P of

W_

receded

berE propoaed by

impartiality and

.

Contadora

-Id

g iven

^

^^

genuine interest in
cMtribut;ng

the solution" of
the re
rpoion'o
81 oo e erases.

Co-issioo was

f

The Verification sod
Control

.tensive investigating
responsibilities

report to the Centre!
American

^

listers

and

of forei „ affairs"
g

(Contadora Act, 1984).
»• Centra!

African forei g n D inister
.as quit e prepared

to si g n

the Revised Contadora
Act at the Seventh doint
Meetin g for their
Sovernments, hnt it was clear
that the Contadora Croup
was pressing
for statures in the
sear future.
Soon afterwards, the
government
ot Guatemala announced

its willingness to si
g n the Act while Costa

Rica, El Salvador, and
Honduras all expressed their
conditional
approval.
The Reagan administration
initially voiced favorahle
words of approval for the
Revised Contadora Act, with
Secretary of
State Shultz calling it "an
important step forward." I„
. letter t0
the foreign ministers of
the European Community,
Shultz conveyed his
approval of the Act's conditional
acceptance by Costa Rica, El

Salvador, and Honduras, and argued
that Nicaragua had rejected
"key
elements of the draft, including
those dealing with binding

obligations to internal democratization
and to reductions in arms
and troop levels" (Quoted in
Goodfellow, !987: 149; and Bagley and

Tokatlian, 1987: 30-31; Asenjo,
1985a: 310-311).

The Reagan administration and others
were thus caught off guard
when, just two weeks later, the
Nicaraguan government announced that
it

would sign the Revised Contadora Act
provided that no further

changes be introduced and that the United
States sign the Protocol
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^

argued
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^

Creep (0mang

»

'

US
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SUb8tanti

-

>

"
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"II
u« s

«

,

1984a;

v
Version...,"

th. ad nini s t r atl0 „
er 8 ced

_

the Act's tim e ta „es
for some

" 1Cm80, ' ! faVOr

^

. PProval of the
Revi6ed

Taubman, 1984cAT- Greenberger,
u
y°*c. aj,
1984: 36JD
1984: A24).
;

for the contras 33

K ° St

".B.

orricids roucd

^
p„bleM

with toe Act's ver ificatio
o procedures, and
raised que8tion6 as
bow the proposed
Verification acd Control
Co^ission would

^

be
funded, how its re po r ts
vould be submitted, bow
co Bplaints of
violations would be handled
an A how
candled, and
violations would be punished
(Bagley and Tokatlian, 19871*0/
32)
Thle issue of
51).
This
verification would
remain an important one for
the Reagan administration,
given its
deep skepticism about
Nicaraguan compliance with any
agreement.
v,

,

•

-.

.

;

.

Despite Nicaragua's diplomatic
coup, which favorably

i ffipre ssed
the participants of the
joint Contadora-European
Economic Community

meeting

in

San

W,

Costa Rica, at the end of
39
September,
the

Reagan administration was able
to persuade its Central American
allies to reconsider the terms
of the Revised Contadora Act
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im.».

As „ agley and
Tokatlian (198?!

it,

"

,

^r,

,e
S
Honduras
;S.!
d «P lte the
previous year-and-a-half
"*
f
tl ° ne and their
S
tentative acceptance
««.
?
cLn
the United S^ate
"jested
'were *e d e
a meeting in
J
""^"led
Tegucigalpa SonH
5
f
four days after^onf
19 ' »>*.
ado«-» formal deadline
°I 1
for the
submission of fln.i
Pr ° P ° Sed Cha "
8 "' '°
new amendments
«P their

m'Sbl2ifS^2
o?™

r

^

"V*
?"*"
^™,
,

<1

amance

against Nicaragua and
block the successfu,
culmination of
Contadora's efforts in
this second phase of
the peace process.
The
meeting in Tegucigalpa
produced a counter-proposal
knovn as the
Tegucigalpa Draft
a proposal

-

Perez later duhbed the
"Contadora Anti-Act" ("el

to***.")

(Castro, 1985: 10).

^^
„

A»ong other points, the
counter-

proposal sought to regulate
rather than eliminate
international
military exercises and foreign
military bases; it replaced
Contsdora's formula on reducing
arms and troop levels based
on each

country's defensive requirements
with

a

formula of military parity

among all Central American
states; it excluded the Contadora
Group
from the process of choosing
the neutral countries invited
to form
the Verification and Control
Commission; finally, the Tegucigalpa

Draft proposed the elimination
of consensual decision-making
based
on unanimity and substituted
instead a majority vote among the

Central American countries.

Although the Guatemalan foreign
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minister attended the
meetino
tmg, he AiA
did not sign the
Tegucigalpa
»«'«• I- fact, Caatea.au.
Iike Nicaragua

^^
^

_

vnun.ne.,

»>.

—^

-vadot,

^

to sign the Revi8ed

Point on, the

t

and Ron d ur a s
Bould he

(Bagley and Tokatlian
an> iyB7:
9ft?
-x/
34
1

ri an gular

lMM

aUiance

'

t „.

Tegucigalpa

n

.

19RSiyB5:

,
"

as

Castro, 1985-

5

in-ll
r
10-11;
Cepeda Ulloa

,

and Pardo Garc aa-Pena
na

o f Costa Ri ca

ne
78;

J

t,

Farer, 1985- 71-7?.
a
/A 12
Asenjo,
1985a:
>

311; Goodfellow, 1987^o/.
.

50-1ni;
s
ou
1
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Valero, 1985: 140).

The second phase of
the Cn«f«,*„
Contadora peace process
was thus
brought to an abrupt close
vi th the Tegucigalpa
Draft 0n October 2Q
1984.
S inC e its beginnings
in thfi weeRs
follow ng
.

Norms for

Mentation,

^

^

this second phase of
the peace process

*ad heen mar.ed by
pceitlve 8teps

^

^

^

&

^

agreement with only one
important but temporary
obstacle i D the late
spring of 1984.
During this Phase,
phase
th» Hdeterminati
Dt
the
g
on and technical

competence of the Contadora
Group to finally an
agreement were
dearly evident. However, in
this phase, it also became
clear that
the Contadora Croup faced
three political problems in
its

conceptualization of the peace process.

First, it overestimated the

Tegucigalpa Group states' foreign
policy autonomy and/or their
interest in finding a peaceful
resolution to the region's
conflicts.

Second, as the Kissinger Commission
noted, no viable

peace agreement could be reached
without the participation and
support of the United States.

This became particularly clear in
the

Contadora Act's provisions to end
international military maneuvers,
eliminate foreign military bases and
foreign military advisors from

—

.

"

r68i0n
-
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1984:
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natU e
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d

-"""factor,
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"gaD,ent

(Washing

p„. f
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The Contadora Group
spokepersons may have becone
Bore
the appearance of the
Tegucigalpa Draft , „„, the
Group

deterred in ite

co.i t .,„ t

t0 tbe peace process

_

J(

^^

^

^

to challenge U.S. policy
toward the region and
pronote a Latin

American diplomatic alternative
for the Central Americans
for the
next three years and beyond.
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a
of thousands of
dollars that were used
to briht
San Jose and members
official, in
of Costa RicI""
o
's operations

^

•

" ™

.Ig-iiSLt^St^fi-fc"

^

U
l^TtZl ZJV'l %
•

I T
V

(Brin^y^

UT

and then reemerged

fluctuations) until

i

w

™^°™

.

^e

.«~

,

SS?f J*October 1%L V?"*

Mayme

'

T

e

-1 Salvador, and
Me ting Solved,
'
?

^ifo tnt

JSSfSTc*

,

l^ "

1
served to blick teh final
do'
considered undesireable to U.S.
interests, as we win'see.

!° rge ShUltZ SSked the Mexic *°
1
April; after
* in

nL

Foreign Miniver to
that,^here waJ a "war
Postponed
1.

^Y^

be

President de la Madrid's efforts
and those of other Latin
American leaders with regard to
the growing deb
i
ed to
several important multilateral
meetings on'the Lti debt
culminating in the June 20, 1984,
meeting in Cartagena
f0rmati ° n f
8 °- CalUd ^tag^n
°
'croup.
At
Attended
by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia,
Ecuad0r taico. Peru, Uruguay,
and'
Venezuela, the Cartagena meeting
sought to coordinate Latin
American negotiating strategies toward
industrialized countries
m setting a framework to refinance Third
World debt.
The
'

^
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Cartagena Group stopped
short of f«
its members did
agree to
J

on the debt crisis^
and

3 deb tor's

cartel

but

"T^l ^

41 Africa on
after Stone resigned
March 1, 1984
,
p
then Assistant
between "one
slcr^ary oTsu \l
Langhorn Motley was
Affairs
the reason for St °
De 8 ""-February
resignation according to
reports a * the time
Molotsky,
*
1984vt,£
(c.f.'>
yoH a«,
A8 «r
I
J
Career Envov
»
j. ,
oe/
.
n

X^**"
Z

*

-

i

/

"

the talks were serious;
ln£i8ted th
however cri
talks were used as a
gued
tb
the
ploy to «i Congress
to support the
administration's aid nroer,! f
eDtr
critios of admini^t a t
a " d t0 •»«««
"n
to
i0n
1984 presidential campalg^
dnri, « the
It i 6USt>lc lous"*
«ere unilaterally
the talks
broken off
,
18, 1985 - sh °«ly
after Daniel OrteL was in!,
P"«««t and shortly
before Presiden teaman'
S reina
rein! "S"ration (Taylor,
8
Al).
Jr., 1985:

LsT""""
"

"

"

T f i™""
•

1

f
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?

34.

nilitary
•wi^Jl'.fS't^S"
government.
Cordova, whose

did

power had b«n n
Alvarez Martrnez, retafned
his P ° Sltl0n
the military coup Presidpnt- c poHtion

35.

«

ot afta
President Suazo
°f

In
In'th^"
the morning after

-

The Technical Group, it will h P r-*™^
j
° f the
vice ministers of lore
«"
fa
g
irs^f e
participating in the Contadore
peace process
function was to oversee the
8
details of the work o
b!
w
co» 18 sions and to report back to the
minis Serial meetings as^
well as prepare the agenda
of the ministerial meetings

Vth

36.

"

ItTclT^

"

tb r
Ad " OC C °-ittee for
^?,° n I" 0 " e
Evaluation and
Follow-Up
Regarding Political Commitments
and Refugees and
"
an
0
C
ltt6e f ° r ^^""ion •» Follow-Up
Procedure f
el! !

T
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38.

on this commission.
As Bagley and
Tokatlian (1987- 31) „
to sign the Revised
4t ' b *
Contadora Act
vas agreeing to
make important concJl
government
all Soviet-bloc
0"
military advises "I- 8 ' '"^ 38 expelling
" g aU
reducmg the ei Ze of
-Ports,
its army
0J *
all support for
lnven tory, ending
El Salvador'!
N b
the Nrcaraguan
political opposition
with

^™

^

L

m

inspections by Contadora
Permitting on-site
's Veri J
10n and Con trol
Commission.
I n return
n
^e other Central
UnUed
and
contras; they would
° rt f ° r the
8UPP
f°
also Save 0 e*Tal
1
maneuvers within thirt-v „
Jolnt military
?

^

1

ize

LT" ^

^

,1

a

^

Honduras, El Salvador,
and Co.".

^misters endorsed

the Contadora Act
as
for stability in Central
America and
the regions to an
early si
fl
r

1987) (larcera Confereacia'da"

1

d

^tll

i"

oa! ?

^

Eur ° Pean
opportunity"
coo Peration between
(Cepeda Ulloa ™*

ItVT'

f 1 tL

"

Pardo Carcia-Pena, 1985lis
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CHAPTER VII

FROM COHTADORA TO
ESQDIPDLAS II

The time for Peace
has come.
—Oscar Arias Sanchez
February 15, 1987

Over the next two and
a half
an years
years, th«
the r
Contadora Group states
Persist in their efforts to
provide a

Eheuer

^

^
^
^
^ ^_

»hic h to mediate Central
America's violent
political
acre versions „ f the
Contadora Act
discussed
the Central Americans
for signing during
and

„„

diplomatic supp„ rt
obstacles to

f ron

finding

^

^

other Latin toer can
statesj however>
.

an

acceptaMe Contador£

^^^

Bach positive step forward
in the peace process
met with frustration
or

disappoint.

From the end of 1984 through
the ear ly months of

1987, the Contadora states
struggled to keep the peace
process
alive.
But in August 1987. the
Central Americans unexpectedly

agreed to

a

new formula and answered the
Contadora call for peace

their own voice.

America was found.

in

A new procedure for establishing
peace in Central
The time for peace had come.

In this chapter we shall
continue to follow the course of
the

Contadora peace process through its
difficult years of 1985 and
1986.

We shall then trace its
transformation into the Esquipulas

Phase of the Central American peace
process with the signing of the

Esquipulas II Procedure for Establishing
Central America in August 1987.

a

Firm and Lasting Peace

in

i
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Tie Second Draft
of the Contadora
Act f„. p
Centra! Africa, Hov
er

^ ^^X^er^""

»

*
"

C °" tad0ra

~"

Teg uci galpa Group
uas

-*
-

— —-

p icated the search

;;

——

-

f° r

f

*

;

a

0"

8erious

Te gU c igalpa
Draft

—

•

a report t0
the Uni£ed
general secretary 2
admitting the idea °of
f lncor
Porating some of the
Tegucigalpa Group's
observations into the
Conta,
a
Contadora
Act
insofar
i

as

they contributed to
giving the Act greater n
precision.
However, they
rejected any modification
of the subst.n,
substantive points and
political
•

balance reached by the
Act (Talavera,
1990; Castro.1985.il)
Nevertheless, during this
diff lcult third

,f

^

peace process from November
ovember 1984
QftA through
^ ~
December 1985, the
C0Dtad ° ra Gr ° UP
I"* 'c a =.. PMite
agreemen(
1

«™« -

between the security
provision£ rf

^

^

^^^

-ad

to the Second Revised
Contadora Act was strewn
with important
obstacles that threatened
the lire
life of H.
e peace
the
process all along
the way.

™

On the second anniversary
of its original call for
peace, the

Contadora Group

mt

in P anama t0 reiterate
lt§

uilUngness

^

continue its mediation efforts
end called on the Central
Americans
to fulfill the commitments
of the Document of Objectives.
Hovever,
the difficult stalemate
that bed developed between the
Central

Americans in the fell of 1984 was
complicated further by the

controversial Urbina Lara asylum case.

In

December 1984, the
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SSndiniSta

8 ° Ve

"

-

w

POHtiCaI asylum

*.

»P I-

*CO

froa, the

„

MaMgua

ReUtions

_

betMM

^

^
^ ^^
^^
^^

Councn

e

of

" rOVerEy
0"

-

grant of

Costa Rica announc

Contadora prQcess

on the Peraanent

,

Manuel „ rbina lara>
uho haj

governments deteriorated
rapidly .

withdrawal

"He,

Costa Rican embassy

*>.ta Rica

case was Pending and

(pcoA£)

18. 1985.

^

^

the PCOAS referred

t»e case to the Contadora
Croup , instructing

^

Nicaragua t0 resoIve the
ca£e through Contadora ,
s
(Capeda D11 oa and

("85=

P ardo

Carcia-PeHa, 1985:

As

notes> thi8 deci6ion
reneued Cont8dora , s n
ss oni
also distracted Contadora
from t8
purpose
11)

m^ ^
.

.

Contadora Croup in

tMs

.

.

^

obtrus ve b uterai
confUct _
.

prevented the holding of the
Eight Joint Meeting of
foreign
ministers scheduled for February
14 due to . boycott by
the

Teguci ga , pa Group .

M-ch, but

Xhe confHct

it bed cost

f

,

naUy

reao]ved

,

n

^

the Contadora process
three m onths and b a d

sharpened the differences between
the Tegucig a l pa Group,
Nicaragua,
and the Contadora Group. 3

Another setback for the Contadora
Group as

it

began its third

year was the break-off of the Man
Z anillo talks between
the United
States and Nicaragua as well as
the suspension of talks between
the

Salvadoran government and the FDR-FMLN.

At their second anniversary

meeting, the Contadora Croup ministers
noted the importance of the

Manzanillo talks and urged their continuation
as well as those
recently begun

in El

Salvador by President

Jose"

Napole6n Duarte.
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u.

of tie Contadora
Group , s meet;ng

_

announced it wp
wasc k,-^„i
breaking off the
Manzanillo talks,
talks
asserting that
aPPrOPri e Md
*•
the CoD£aJora
proceS£
•

—

"

I.

«

"

"

Safvador, Pre6ident
Duarte

^ cMfaigDed

the previous sprine
a ~i _r
P
8 nn
° n 3 P la tform that included
seeking
8eekln 8
to the country s
c£vil
in eariy Oc£ober

—on

_

Pre!idMt Duarte
;°
CanPaiS
"

Pr0mi

-

und the

"

.»-.

™- -e,

to

to

^

h

iPolitical

a

^ iw

„ fUI

t;

is

he used bis
October addre£s
t- the united Nations
t0 invite £he FDR-FMLN
te the toun „ f La
for talks on the
search forr peace
peace.
Tho *talks
i,
The
were held one week
later, on October
15, 1984, as thousands
,f
"

^

Pilgrittaga to La Pal„a in
support of the talks.

agree, to set up

a

joint commissioD that

^

^^

^

The two sides

^

.^^

^
w

Process under way and
discuss ways to hu.sni.e
the deadly air
,
The, also a g reed to „eet
again, but the second
.eating at Ayaguals
on November 30 was less
fruitful.
By

tbe end of tbe e a r,
tbe
y

Political space that President
Duarte bad tried to sieze
bad closed
up.
The resurgent opposition
of tbe country's
political end
military ultr a -right vings
agai nst an y accomodation
with the

revolutions

left, the FDR-FMLN 's
unrealistic demands for tbe
time,

and the re-election of
President Reagan all cabined
to pre-empt tbe

incipient political dialogue.

Throughout 1985 and beyond,

.

political solution to EI Salvador's
civil war would not be a viable
altern a tive for the beleaguered
Duarte goverment (Diskin a nd Sharpe,
1986: 70-74, 81-85; Karl, 1988:
184-185; Crahan, 1988: 233).
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In addition to
these setbacks

m a

i„ the
early mon ths of
1985
there were still
others that seemed
to cut the ground
from under the
t-ontadora peace
u;^
process
ocess.
With renewed
self-confidence after
er it
its
stunning re-election
victorv
"tory. the
th a Reagan
n
administration stepped
up
ltS eff °rts to
implement its Central
Cental American
A
policy.
Tn addition
to a renewed rhetnnVoi „
5
alCamPal8D f °"°
on N icaragua during
the
m0nth ° f 1985
°
^inistratic aoved t „ block
COnSiderati
° f a Ki
,

•

"

°"

—
—
— _ ^
-

x*.^..

Push for contra aid .

•

aa mini st ration also
promised an increase

™ic

at the

t

"

DeVelOPMnt

^

iu Biu£ary

a.

^

aid t0 Honduras in
February and Karch

Md began mu oin£
D.S.-Honduran m ilitar exercises
y
fron mid . February through
earJy
On April 30, President
Reagao
a

wcu, d

»« k

.

i rap0 se

fnl]

.

I, K ay ,

trade embargo agains£

the adDinistration

aUo

„„,

^

^

^

^^^^

^.^

and the Reagan administration
pl aying hard .ball>

reaching .

that

^
^ ^ ^ ^^^^

£tepped

ass ista » ce to Ccst a
Rica after yet another

between that cou„t ry and
Kicaragua .

^ ^^^^
^^^^^
d

.

t „.

obstacJes

t<>

p ea ce agreement among the
Central Americans seemed
higher

then ever (Bo yd

,

1985 a: Al

;

Bri„kle y , 1985a: Al

;

Engelberg, ,989:

Ali "North Trial...,- 1989:
3; Gold, 1987: 41, 48; Meislin,
1985:
A9; Brinkley, 1 985h A3
"Vatican Questions...," 1 985 A8;
Cepe da
:

;

:

Ulloe

a„d

Pardo Garci'a-PeSa, 1985:
183; Christian, 1985: Al

;

Valero,

1985: 144).

Nevertheless, both

in

spite of and because of ell these

setbacks, the Contedora Group moved
to get the

peace process back

24

^

o» track. A meeting
of the Contadora
Technicai Group

-oncUe

-

in

to

tne conf

ucting

security

^

Tegucigalpa Draft> the
nine vlc

consensus on the creation
and basic

Mnfkatim

^

f011

—

_

^

inis£ers

^^^^

of

^

dw rNch

^

a

on p.litlc.1,
security, and

economic and social
mat(erE proposed

^

^

Th.s confidence-bunding
effort opened the door
te another meet£ng
of the Technical Group
on May
-17. when discussions
were fi„ a y
opened on tk . security
provi s ion£ that had
deadlocked
process for seven months.
These discussions continued
at the end of
May in a special feting
in Bogota (Cepeda oil.,
end P ar do Garcr'aPene, 1985: 182-183; Valero,
1985: 143-144).

M

^

^

„

Although the peace process
seeded to be getting beck
on track
in the late spring of
1985, tensions between the
united States end
Nicaregue, which bed by this
time become the most public
focus of
conflict in Centrel America, had
reached their nadir in May end
June.

The new U.S.

tr a de emb arg o,

President Ortega's controversial

trip to Moscow, and President
Reagan's hard-hitting push for
renewed

contra aid all moved the D.S. House
of Representatives to reverse
itself from

a

vote in April and approve 527 million
in non-lethal

aid to the contras on June 12.

rejected

a

At the same time, the House also

further extension of the Boland Amendment
(Bagley and

Tokatlian, 1987: 36; Leogrande, 1987:
208-212; Arnson, 1987: 133134).

1
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Yet another meeting
of the Technical
Group
rou P had been
h
scheduled
for June 18 and 19.
But with the UU.S.
S
Cnn
Congress
moving toward a

-ava!

a8eDda 01

^

co„„ , u

of

^

Nicaragua sought

.

" "

"~

repudiation of the U
U.S. contra
<;

bussing

d ' Pl0Mtt

t0 ° k

e.taMi, he d

, ld

"

issue

^

^

60U£ht an officiai

policy by

Uems

outright

P0SitiM «>»

^

•

the other agenda

Croup dipl oma ts
opposed

^

Ro

_

^ ^ ^^.^
_ ^
r_

whne

"as too late

t.

^^

chan g e the

a g enda.

Kicaraguan Vice Minister
victor Hugo Tinoco
valKed oat of the meeting,
rtiel „ as thus
aborted

Nicaragua

_

Wee

^

president traveled to the
capital, of th . Contadora
states soon thereafter to
express Nicaragua's wim„
gne ss to
continue working within the
Contadorad Process,
process rh.
the peace process
again seemed on the veroe nf . n
a= ^ uonapse (Castro, 1985:
12; Meza et al
1987: 54; Valero, 1985: 145-146).
ft

.

Significantly, throughout the
first half of 1985, the
Contadora
Group had hegun to receive
new diplomatic encouragement
and support
for its efforts from some
of the new civilian
governments coming to
power in South America.
This new support had been
foreshadowed

throughout 1984 by Argentine
President Ra*l Alfonsxn, whose
first
major foreign policy initiative
was to declare his support for
the

Contadora process in February 1984,
just two months after his
inauguration (Cepeda Dlloa and Pardo
Care la-PeSa , 1985: 175).

Thirteen months later, President
Alfonsfn spoke out forcefully

in

favor of the non-intervention
principle and in support of dialogue

between the United States and Nicaragua
as he met President Reagan
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at the White House
(Boyd
oy d

1985h- A5).
AO
1985b.

Meanwhile, the March
1985
inaugurations of Uruguayan
President Julio Marx'a
° "aria San
Sanguinetti and
,

h-ill*-

President Jo6a Sarney
provided 8ignincant
Contadora Croup and
Central

African presidMt8
md

ministers to meet
informally to try to r^n
reopen their dialogue
y
and get
-ace process back 0D track
.

opportunity for other
La£in

^
^

^
^

^

rican governBMt6

^

support for the peace
process (Cepeda „lloa
and P ardo GarciaPena, 1985: 181).
But after the aborted
Technical Croup meeting
in mid . June and
the U.S. Congress's
decision to resume nonlethal

contra aid ia

-U-J.1T. the new civilian
governments

in South

Africa decided to
lend their active diplomatic
support to the Contadora
peace

process.

At the presidential

inauguration of Peru's Alan
Garcia on

Ju.y 27, 1985, the new
civilian presidents of Argentina,
Bra.il,
Peru, and Uruguay agreed
to form the Contadora
Support Croup (also
known as the Lima Group) i„
order to help the Contadora
Croup inject
new life into the peace
process.
The formation of the Support
Croup
was formally declared through
the Cartagena Communique,
issued at
the end of a meeting on August
23-25 between the eight foreign

ministers of the new Support Group
and the Contadora Group

in

Cartagena, Colombia (Valero, 1985:
149-150; Comunicado „. EflIta
eaM;
1985).

The Cartagena Communique

is

marked by

a

dour tone and expresses

the deep concern of the eight foreign
ministers over the still

worsening situation

in

Central America.

The eight foreign ministers
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«-« *•

Support Croup had beeB

f

_

ed

WhMi ^

to provide a
of
diplomatic information,
consultation
consultation, and support
to the prompt
conclusion and signine
gni "S ot
nf the
rh* second
draft
nf +the n
arart of
Contadora Act then
be lng Prepared
two groups underlined
.
their vie* that the

-elating

regional con£Uct

national security
and

^
^
^
^^

^^^^^ ^^^^^

forests, both

sources

,

fcy

away from the

^

„f

economic situation and
the debt cri,;.
cri sl s throughout
Latin America and
what the y perceived as
the growing threat
of a generated war
that would have "grave
conae q ue„ces for the
whole hemisphere."
mdeed, the eight foreign
ministers meeting in
Cartagena vanned that
vnhout a peaceful settlement
in Central America,
the regional
conflict "will affect the
poHt

n

^

.

cal M<J

Latin America"

(Comunicad.

He

P

nTrnrrni

6tabiuty

^

^

1985)-

The significance of this
very serious statement
and of the
Support Croup's endorsement
of the Contadora peace
process as "the
only viable path to achieve
peace and reestablish harmony
and

cooperation between the Central
American states" should not be
underestimated. 6 The members of
the Support Group brought
an
important political and moral
force to the peace process.

Despite

their economic crises in the
1980s, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and

Uruguay are among the most developed
and powerful states of Latin
America.

Together vith the Contadora Croup
states, they represent

nearly 85? of the population of Latin
America (Pardo Garcia-Pena,
1987: 214).

Moreover, the four Support Group states
had only
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™i
di

y returned

""°" hip

"

hich

to civillan rule

—

^^

^

- - P0Utici2e

*

ladlviduals or

struggle in Latin
America t0 re-institute .
ltUte d «">«atic
processes and
national reconciliations
in the face of ,„
long-held military
power and
supremacy. The decision
of these nev
civilian governments
to support
*» Contadora process signify

^

.

PWism,

cooperation. and development

^

^

^

^

^

^

"iection of the militated
national security
doctrines proved
through the dictates
of cold war
anti-communism.
As the Support Croup
began its diplomatic
lohhying efforts, the
Reagan administration's
new Assign,nev
Assistant cSecretary of
State for InterAmerican Affairs, Elliott
Abrams,? called a special
meeting of U.S
ambassadors to Central
America and Belize to
discuss the potential
-Pact of the Support Croup.
Abrams lumped the Support
Croup

together with U.S. adversaries
in the region hy
asserting that
»as "necessary that „e
develop an active diplomacy
in order to

it

hinder the attests at Latin
African solidarity that could
he
directed against the U.S. and
its allies, whether these
efforts are
initiated by the Support Group,
Cuba, or Nicaragua" (Babcock,
19 85:
Al, A18; also quoted in
Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987:
37).

Indeed,

administration hard-liners like
Abrams had come to see both the
Support Group and the Contadora
Group as simply anti-U.S. and
therefore pro-Sandinista, thus
precluding any serious accomodation
of the peace process.

—

.
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"

C

°" ad0rS

l
Americans at tne
the
»Sap« erl2

r

(vaur °-

A

— - ~«

"

to the Central

Fi Q v,n, t
tighth
Joint Meeting of th«
8
thenlne
•

1985

)985:

th

iw
-

f

-i»i"«r.

.

-

contadora

Tegucigalpa Group t0
the securi

,

t

focu e

v .emication
rific , t . „
provisions
.

.

.

of the
ti,
Thus,
tb. deferences
between the two drafts
are found mainly i
n Par.
Parr I,
t
ru
Chapter III ("Commitments
on Security
Affairs"), Part TT ("r~
Comments
(
on Execution and
Follow-up"), and
'«* II, ("Final Bispo 6 itio„ 6
"),with only occassional
minor
additions or recordings
in the other
chapters addressing
the
Political and economic
and socia, matters.
Nevertheless, the
September 1985 Act does
include a new article
(IF) in Part I
Chapter I ("General
Committments") which obliges
the Gentral

September 1984 draft
-ft.

American governments to
respect "the
cne ri
rioht
S ht t0 Practice free trade,"
a clear but
diplomatic reference to
the
e D
U,SS trad

"

-

^

e

embargo against

Nicaragua

With regard to the security
provisions, the September 1985
Contadora Act continued to

call for an end to the
regional arms race

and arms trafficking, the
prohibition of support for
irregular
forces and for acts of terrorise,
subversion, or sabotage in the
region, the establishment of
a regional system of
direct

communication to diffuse tensions,
and the removal of foreign
military bases and advisors from
the region.
But unlike the

September 1984 Act, the new draft
established a deadline of six
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also provided for
r a tw °-phased
process of nepoti.f
negotiating regional
.
arms
,
„
control and reductions
to begin after thP
the S1 S Dln of
the Act.
g
The
,
,
v
September
1985 Act did not
oblige
86 the mediate
i™,
cessation of
international military
maneuvers but
Ut 11
it a;
dld attem Pt to
regulate
their si 2e duration,
and location with
a view
view to thai
their eventual
cessation.

„

'

,

-th

—

regard to provisions
on verif ication
acd

^

COntad ° ra ACt

^

out changes in
the structures of
the verification
mechanisms that reflected
renected the
th. consensus
reached on
this issue the
previous Mav
tv,
Hay.
The new Act also
added a new article

addressing the financing
of the
tne verifir-H
verification mechanisms
g
through the
creation of a Fund for P Pa r P
^
i
9
Peace m n~
Central
America.
Several other
Provisions were added to
the document to specify
the functions of
the Verification and
Control Commission on
Security Matters.

The

new Act also specified
with more precision th»
the +l
timing and final
modalities of implementing
the Act in Part III
(.-Final

Dispositions") (Contadora Act,
1985; Contadora Act, 1984).
The Contadora Act presented
to the Central Americans
in
September 1985 was thus a more
precise and in that sense a
stronger
document than the previous
one.
Nevertheless, three substantive
issues continued to divide
the Central Americans.
The open-ended
process and unresolved formulas
for negotiating regional arms
control and arms reductions
divided Nicaragua and the Tegucigalpa
Group,

as did

the continuation of international
military maneuvers

permitted by the Act.

The third issue centered on the
verification,
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execution, and follow-up
provisions of tnc
the Act
Act. Although
AIM.
.
there was
a consensus on
the structure of
the verification
ermcation mechanisms,
„
there
remained some ambiguities
as to just what n,
those mechanisms
were
•

-int. differences also
listed

on the timing
of

„

„f

the Act, with
Nicaragua arguing that
all of the
cne Act
Act'ss provisions
o

should enter into
force simultaneously
with the .1
witn
signing ofc the Act
E
iVad ° r
Honduras .anted a dela
y of si x months after
ni„g.
g
Tbe nine foreign
minister£ neeting

*
-

-

\r

^

try to resolve these
issues

in a

^^

^

special 45-day permanent

negotiating session by the
Technical Croup to hegin
on Octoher 7
order to finalise the
1985 Contadora Act. All
other suhstantive

in

Points of the Act were
considered finaliaed
(Cardenal Cha^orro,
1985a: 846-849; Cardenal
Chamorro, 1985b: 926; Valero,
1985: 150;
Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987:
37).

Uttle was accomplished

by the talks, which
were marked by the

intransigence of Nicaragua, El
Salvador, and Honduras
(Cardenal
Chamorro, 1985a: 847).
On November 11, the
Nicaraguan government
announced that it could not
sign tbe Contadora Act as
it then
stood.

While one hundred of the
Liie Act
Act'ss nrn^e-;,^
provisions were acceptable to
Nicaragua, seventeen relating
to security matters were
not,
including the continuation of
international military maneuvers,

premature cuts in Nicaragua's armed
forces, the lack of

requirement for

a

a

specific

halt to U.S. aid to the contras,
and the absense

of a means to oblige U.S.
compliance with the Act 12 (Bagley and

Tokatlian, 1987: 37; Kinzer, 1985: A8)

.

In a letter to the

;
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Presidents of the Contadora
Croup

CU "^

° rtega

«*-

S upport

—

«-

not exiat

.

..

«»

Such conditions

Group £tates

^J

onus for » icaragua 8 dec is ion on

stetes, arguing that>
given

the minimum ba£ic
conditio " s

«-

a „a

^

escaUtiDg

* Kicaragua

^

uin

^

,

aecuri

^

^

extent that the united
Stetes g ove™„t
undertakes effective
concrete, and real
t „. t

^

cedents

^

level of ttili tary
development that does not
entail

national security" (Orte
ga

,

risk t

„

^
^

its

1985: 878).

The nine forei n
ministers met
g
to 21

a

^

;

f or

.

ninth

as the 45-day ne
E otiatin 8 session dre» to

agreed to create yet another
mechanism

tiffie

a

^

on

close.

They

tectaical and

m

administrative secretariatP
ecanate fnr
c
for the
execution and follow-up of
the
Act.
However, the differences
on the security
provisions Gained.
In essence,

in

trying to meet most of the
security concerns lodged

by the Tegucigalpa Group
and the United States the
previous fall and
thus keep the peace process
alive, the Contadora Group
had presented
a

new Contadora Act that tilted
against Nicaragua's security

concerns.

Despite the efforts of the
vice-ministers and ministers

of foreign affairs

in October and November,

the new diplomatic

stalemate could not be resolved
(Cardenal Chamorro, 1985a: 847
Cardenal Chamorro, 1985b: 926; Bagley
and Tokatlian, 1987: 37).
That stalemate was not the last
setback that the Contadora
peace process experienced in 1985.

In what appeared to be an

attempt to address Nicaragua's concerns
at their November 19-21

meeting, the nine foreign ministers agreed
to

a

proposal by the
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Group t0 introduce

United States as

a

resoiution

a

m

(W

show of support
PPort tor
for Contadora.
a

^^

resolution came to the
floor, the U

WaUers, 8uccessfully

-e

^

•

S

UN as well as those
fro. Col OInh ia

object to parts of the
resolution.

*

,

^

But before the

amha ^dor to
ambas
the UN, Vernon

^

^

Venezuela, and P anaffia
to

The three Contadora

^

a.bassadors removed the
proposed resolution fro.
the General
Assembly without inform
Mexico and introduced
another resolution
elating the points to which the United
States objected (such
as
a Paragraph expressing
concern over continued
joint military
maneuvers and explicit
references to U.S. policy
in Central
America).
Nicaragua then objected to
the passing of any
resolution
that did not contain an
explicit reference to the
United States, and
the whole project failed.

Yet

a

third resolution was
introduced at

special economic commission
of the UN General Assembly
by Mexico,
Peru, Algeria, and Nicaragua.
This resolution focused on
the U.S.
a

trade embargo against Nicaragua
and urged that

it be revoked.

Despite U.S. efforts to amend
and defeat it, this resolution

eventually passed 13 (Cardenal Chamorro,
1985b).
With even the Contadora Group
its

in

disarray,

14

and frustrated by

lack of success in finalizing the
Contadora Act, it seemed that

the peace process was virtually
dead.

This perception was

reinforced in December when Costa Rica
proposed that any further
talks be suspended for five months
to await the upcoming changes of

government in Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa
Rica.

Nicaragua
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seconded the proposal
(Bagley
agley andd mi,

» ^tUan,

^7;

Latin Peace Effort...
A3).

1

987

:

37; c.G.R., 1986

1985Al^
"t
1*85. A13;
"Latin
Peace Meetings
•

»

»«'

.1

Thus closed a very
dlfflCult
y diff
icult

and fruitless
third

,

Phase ofe the Contadora
peace processSy with
Wlth
'
looking excedingly
grim

P ros Pects

for the future

.

Stalemate and the Third
Draft of +u

n

^

On the thira
anniversary of the or
g nai
.

Con.aao.a Is l and

^

,

the eig ht foreig
„

the Support Group

th.« co. itm „ t

.

^

^
^

ffie£

t0 seeking peace in
Centrai

on

^
^^

ihey
that serious negotiations
resume as soon as possible
ana statea in
dear terms the principal bases
the y saw necessary
to establishing

ongoing peace in Central
Africa.

The "Caraballeaa Message"
of

January 12, 1986, stressed
the necessity of
solotion to Central Africa's
conflicts.

a

Latin American

"This means that the

solution of Latin American
problem should arise fro. ana
be ensured
by the region itself so
that the area is not placed
into the EastWest world strategic
conflict." With the added
voices of the
Support Group, this was the
strongest rejection yet of the

imposition of cold war logic in
Central America as well as the
clearest assertion of Latin
America's diplomatic primacy in

resolving the region's conflicts
(Hens.i* H»
613; 611).

r^^.^

1987; 6]0 _
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Carahalleda Message
reiterated tbe principUs
£hat
ded the pea

8

-

p

™

-

^

-

<°

-en articulated in
;; previous
all
Contadora documents
(i
^l.e.,
e
R „i f-,
self-determination, nonintervention, territorial
inteerit-v
integrity, pluralistic
,
democracy
demilitarization, non-support
of irregular
6gUlar f0rces
for,
respect for human
rights, etc.).
The eio)^
f~
f
° rei8n
8
'I- offered their good
" lniEte
"
offices to foster
re6Uffiption of
l,ee ° the governments
of the United
States and Nicaraou.
p
icaragua.... Respectful
negotiation between
with mutual and
editable concessions, is
a condition tor
regional detente,. The
Carahalleda Messa e
stressed that such
g
negotiations were necessary
to prevent "grave
risks to Latin
American peace and stabilii-v" fu»

.

•

«

^

•

,

Tvo days later, on
January 14. 1986, Xarco
Vinicio Cerezo
Arevalo was insulted
as the first elected
civUian president of
Guatemala in „ear,y twenty
15
yea.s.
President Cere20 , s

^

successful diplomatic initiative
was to hold an impromptu
sum.it on
January 15 and persuade
the other four Central
American presidents
assembled for his inauguration
to endorse the Carahalleda
Message.
On January 16, the five
states' foreign ministers
signed the

Guatemala Declaration for their
governments, embracing both the
"principles and propositions
formulated at Carahalleda as
well as
the actions proposed to
restart the peace process"
(C.G.R., 1986:

467, translation mine; Yopo, 1987:
326; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987:

40-41; Goodfellow, 1987: 152).

Once again, at its seemingly

bleakest point, the Contadora
peace process found renewed political
will to sustain its continuation.
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~

d6EPite

«-

"»

h°P

—ore diplonats
Previous yeer.

iBl "" im

"

,

-

-

c £ diplometic
activity by

«

——

S»PPOrt Groups travelUd
to Ha£hington _

-etin 8 with

^

^

Armed wlt „
ei8ht

^

^^ ^

I986 sou]d

^^
^
^^

from the Contadora

Mter

^
^

President ReagM> the
eight mini£terfi

Secretery of State George
shuUz

^

pebruary iQ a

^

^

^

The. also as k ed for
. reopening of
b laterai ta[ks
("Latxn Mi.Uter,..., I986;
.

A7; C . G . R<>

<Wri „

1

989: 34;

GoodfeUov,

1

Ceng,

987: 152 ).

l

^^^^

986a: A9; Ea£ley and
IokatUanj i98?

Nevs report6

uter reveaud

February, the State
DepartBent had proposed tha(
be mede to N icaragua as
. ehov of 6upport
fM

however the „ hite „ ousi

,

idea ((taang, 1986b:

m)

„„
.

tha(

poaiti

a

^

_

^

^

Contadora

^

Befense
In£tead> on February

^

^

i986>

administretion submitted it e request
to congress for 5100
mil Uon
new centre a id for the second
half
of FY

(LeoGr a nde,

1

98 7

:

213; Arnson,

1

1

986 and a

„

of FY 1987

989 ).

The eight foreign ministers of
the Cont a dcr a
met again in Punta del Este, Urugu
ay

,

a nd

Support Groups

on Februery 26-2 8

.

Once agai „

they urged en end to contra a
id and reiter a ted both
the need end

cepecity for Latin America to resolve
its problems without outside
interference (C.G.R.,

1

U

986: 467).

LeoGrende

(1

987: 214-215) notes

that this new willingness of the
eight Contadora foreign ministers
to criticize U.S. a id to the centres
openly

-as

opposed to a

~

254

dipWic

6

tad

r

cr ° up

°"

they could

» -1,

1

^

unued states

—
~ —"on,
———

" """""
ePreSe " atiTCS
-

,

circumspection

ReaSan ' 8

"

»

*

House of

previous arguMnt

ly

„ re

pubUcly acknovledge

SUPPOr£ive of

credibiuty

986 with the nev
aS6ertivene6E of

^

the

,s

.

^

^

icy

eight Contadors

foreign ministers.

Nevertheless
tbeless, th*
c
the Senate
narrowly passed the
administration's request
a week later.
later
TV,
The 18 sue of $100
million in
new contra aid was
not dead.
•

0" April 5- 7>

1986

,

the first

foreign ministers from
the
th. Central

,„ ltl

„

.

.

^^^^

8tates ua6 heJd

on finalizing the
Cortadora

^

^

.

o Dt meet ng

Group

_

t

^

Support

^ paMM ^

^^

au thir£eM

reopen aiscu6sions

^

fc ,

meeting failed to break
the previous diplomatic
stalemate.
only change of positions
since the previous fall
was that the

Contadora Group was wil Ung
to discuss

.

The

Mexican proposal that the

thirteen ministers ask the
united States to halt new
aid to the
contras in order to give
the peace process time to
finalize and
implement the Contadora Act.
However, the Tegucigalpa Group
refused
to discuss the proposal;
Nicaragua refused to discuss
finalizing the

Contadora Act without first
approving the proposal.

The meeting

broke up with only one questionable
agreement having been
reached.

17

In the final communique,
all

the ministers except

Nicaragua's agreed to Venezuela's
proposal to set June 6, 1986, as
the final deadline for the Central
Americans to sign the Contadora
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(Talavera, 1990; Eag
ley and IokatUan
'•

152; Garc la and Gomariz,
1989: 34- c G B

1986. ,LeMoyne,
u
1986,
1986c:

M;

Portly thereafter,

witness

LeMoyne, 1986a: A4).

to sign the
September

—

°f

^
^^ ^
_

the Te g ucigalp a
Croup

-

^

—

Act by th . nes
deadUne> thus pucicg

^

K

,.
986: *, 68 !

'

thfi

^

on

»ica ragua BaiDtained
it£
position that it waq vin;,,
wxllxng to si gn the
Act by June 6 prov
ded fchat
North American aggression
»
has ceased,
ceased
th, c placing
thus
.

i

stalemate on the U.S.
contra aid policy.

^

this time ta k en the
public p 0£itioD that
lt .

•

the onus for

^ ^^
rf

contras was necessary
to force the
Sandinistas to comply
with the
conditions o f any peace
a g reement, inclndin
g national reconciliation
talks between the
Sandinista government and
the contras.
The
Nicara g uan g overnment
refused the legitimacy
of the contras (calling
them "mercenaries" for
the United
States) and rejected any

suggestion of negotiating
with them (Bagley and
ToRatlian, 1987: 42;
C.G.R., 1986: 468; Omang
1986c: A23; Weinraub, 1986:
,
A4).
However, the contras were
no, in much of
in

April and May of 1986.

leadership,

a

a

hargainin g position

The contras suffered from

a

divided

lack of military 6ucc
nr>A charges
y
ess, and
y succps*
of corruption in

the use of the previous
$27 million in non-lethal U.S.
aid.

Moreover, the International Court
of Justice was soon expected
to
decide Nicaragua's case against
the United States in Nicaragua's
favor and declare the contras
illegal (Omang, 1986c: A23).

These

factors, along with the hopeful
diplomatic activity of the Contadora
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some in the state
Bepart
reC0,,8ider

*"

C

°" ad0 "

A

" "

_^

—

*

strategy.

e

—
on

capUo]

^^

ive to the CODtra

While tb. W hit e House
redoubUd its efforts to
posh for its
5100 m iU ion

co„ ra

aid package , £he
admini8tration , s

speciai
envoy to Central Africa,
Ambassador P hi l ip Habib,"
spent . week
trying to 8 et the three
contra factions to for.
a .ore
cooperative, civilian-run
organization.
Success here coal,
hoth
enhance the centres'
credibility on Capitol
Hill and i mprove tbeir
canoes for a place in national
reconciliation taUs i„
Nicaragua
the Contadora Act ware
signed.
However, Ambassador Hahih
soon found

„

*-i

„

h—lf
Kemp

(

the center of controversy.

On Ha y 22, Representative

daC

R-NY) called on President
Rea g an to fire Hahih,
char g in g that

the career diplomat was
selling out hoth the centres
and U.S.
interests (Omang, 1986e; Omang,
1986f).

The controversy stemmed
fro.

confess dated April

letter hy Hahih to

a

member of

that explained U.S. aid to
the centres would

11

cease "on signature" of
Hicaragua.

a

a

verifiable agreement honored hy

Although the letter had cieared
the proper channels

in

the State Department, Kemp and
other contra policy supporters

interpreted it to mean

a

threat to U.S. policy, which had
stressed

the continuation of contra aid
until after Hicaraguan compliance

with any peace treaty could he
verified.

Asserting that Nicaragua

would not honor any agreement, Kemp
went so far aa to charge that

Habib's letter had "potentially set
the stage for

American Yalta."

On the other hand, liberals

in

a

new Central

congress -and

.
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r-

-

„

—
effort

InterScan

«i

and

..

danage CODtrol>
Af £airE

,

,

Ellioct

Abraffi8

ooted

_

ta Bablb but explained
that

lmprecise ,,

^
^
^^^^
^

Ihe vord

,.

used inste ad of -,
ignature „ (Ctaang

_

HaMb . s utter BM

^^

impUnentation „
i9g6fi

^^^^

i986:

and Tokatlian, 1987:
42-43).

^

The controversy gaV
e further evidence
of deep
tb.

Ministration over

P-cess.

i„ fact>

U.S. polioy

.

crucial ti

the cortrover£y

^

^

« „
^
f

^

^
^
^_
peace

fencing between th. State
Department and the Defense
the posaibility ana
iapHcatios of the s ig nin of
the Conta.ora
g
Act.
On K ay 20, the
lUZLMxkJUMUL P ublishe d the d et ails of
.

Defense Department study
that,

as

the

"...Predicts Big w ar If Latins
Sign

fl*

P eaC e

hea dline put it,

Accord" (Gelb. 1986

:

A4)

The Pentagon study questioned
whether Nicarsgua „oul d ever
comply
with the Contador a Act ana
speculated that if the Act were
sig„e d
ana Nicaragua then violated
it for three years, "an
effective

containment program „oul d require
"a protracted con-icent" of
at
least 100,000 O.S.

troops and up to $8.5 billion
a year.

The State

Department, which ha d prepare,! its
19
own stu d y
on the costs of

verifying the Act's provisions throughout
Central America,
immediately challenged the stu d an d
y
state d that

it was

study written under contract" and had
"no standing
Government document."

Fred C.

"an internal

a s a U.S.

Ikle, the conservative Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy and the
sponsor of the Pentagon's
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~J-«

thi , charge as

.,

plaiD „ rong „ (0mang>

0~»g. 1986d: A35; Gwertzmen,
1986:
The elarrusm of
the

Al

,

1986c:A23

A5).

p„

* ana the conservative
backlash over Habib's
role both revealed
and contributed
to a
certain momentum for

the.

.

r,oo,-~

—

""""

,

Contadora Act seem
both possible end

l

the

ike
eiy
l y bv
b y mid-May.
mid M

Why els e
would the conservatives
go to such lengths
Pn
to discredit the
Act'?
l

CO

" ad0ra

aUc

^

S

spo,e of T . lt . and
raised

compliance.

* H,^^
^
^

*

"

^

^

oo May

The Contadoraa Act
acc should
shoulH K
be opposed because

M

^

.

She

••[cJommunists don't comply:"

a

be ne g ot ia ted7

rJ P ::4T iioerA^Jr 118 ""

e

-M

The strong conservative
opposition to the Contadora
Act closed off
the more terete dip,
oma ti c track of the
State Department.
The
Reagan administrate
could not give the Contadora
Act a chance to
work.
However, vhile the debate
in the United States
focused on
prospects for Nicaraguan
compliance, the other Central
American
states faced other realities
that affected the outcome
of the peace
process.

Each of the five states had
indicated its willingness to

sign the Act, yet as the
June

6

deadline approached outside

pressures and domestic politics
led to important obstacles.

In

Honduras, the government may have
begun to feel U.S. pressure not to
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Honduran domestic
opinion uas divided
concerning

POUC, .anar.Uy, most
Hondurans £hared

-

.

-Snea.

Xhe Contad0M Act

centres.

-u tary
Mr

0£ araed contras

In

„

^

Uft
e

^

B

^^^^

on Honduran

^

^

provision

Salvador> pre£ident

^
^^^
contra

faced ^

^

of

intent 0 „ continuing t0
proaecute the cou „ £er .
in8urgency
D- S

In C °"'

««.. • signifies change of
government brought Oscar A
Ari.c
qjC
a6 Sancl,ez
to P°"« on May 8.
President
Arias h ad c^iued hi
Me lf to fn lfilUng his canpaign
pr0ffiiae6 of
-

" "

i

"Storing real Costa Rican
neutrality

Salvador

in

the Nicareguan end

conflict, and working for
peace in the region.

President
Arias' new foreign policy
direction, including his
public opposition
to support for the
contras and his decision to
close the contra
20
camps remaining in Costa Rica,
began the weakening of the

Tegucigalpa Group triangle,
leaving El Salvador end
Honduras alone
in clear alignment with
U.S. policy toward the
region.
Xnstead,

Arias joined Guatemala-.
President Cerezo in the neutral
middle
ground between El Salvador and
Honduras on the one hand end

Nicaragua on the other.

Relations between Washington and San
Jose

cooled (LaMoyne, 1986b: A3;
Hopfensperger, 1986; Arias, 1991; Garc
it
and ComaViz, 1989: 34; Werner,
1986: 73; C.G.R., 1986: 469).

This realignment of Costa Rica may
have contributed to the

alarm of U.S. conservatives over the
Contadora Act's prospects,

especially as

a

special summit meeting approached between
all five

Central American presidents at the end
of May.

But, despite the

260
fears of U.S.
conservatives
ves, Costa
Cost* R
R-ilca

necessarily

ffiean

it would

.

-

s

renewed neutrality
did not

automatically
ly Slde
side with
Wlth Nicaragua
against

Unrted States, as
th . presidential
8unmit would shou .
The Centra! American
presidential «uMit vas
called and
organized by C tffl
President

.

»» inhere!

». "ve
t-

^

,,,

^

^

,

initiatives the previous
danuary.

Centra!

both the Contadora act
and

to create a Centra!

- intention

a

African parHament

e ff ort

among

t

On Ma y 25 and 26

^^

presidente

^

p r opo Eal

by PresideDt Cere2o

that he hoped could
spur a

be five Btate8 .

withou£

^

five presidents were
free to spea k franhly
and 8 et to snow each
other's positions in a
more intimate setting.
I his vas the

„„,

time Presidents Cerezo,
Arias, Ascona, Puarte,
and Orte g a met viti
each other; significantly,
it would not he the
last.
By the end of their
summit, the presidents
had agreed in
Principle to Cerezo's proposal
for a regional parliament
and agreed
to meet again at E 6(!
uipulas within

a

year.

However, the y were not
ahle to resolve their
remaining differences on the
Contadora Act.
ft fact,

the summit meeting included
an apparently rather lively

discussioo of the legitimacy of
Nicaragua's 1984 elections and
the
government's democratic credentials

since the imposition of a state

of emergency in October 1985. 21

The issue of democratization was

new one for the peace process
raised by Arias; national

reconciliation was another raised by
both Arias and Azcona.

Both

issues opened up discussion of the
"Political Commitments" in the

a
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Conors
C0

"

—

Ac t that had been
cons;dered

i,K
'

finauzed

^

^

_

-

o f the June
deadline from the
Contadora GroupP ln
in order t0 carry
out further
negotiations on the stiU
outstandin g issue8 of
arffis

verification, and no.
nation, reconciliation
1986: 10; Weiner, 1986:
73; C.G.R., 1986
«o. ^oy
469
.
.

1987: 44; Garcia and
Goma'riz, 1989
0= the day after the

Contadora's

Technic

:

Croup opened in

to negotiate closure
for the Conta<jora

the deadlock on this
issue."

^

_

.

}

B
Bagley
and Tokatlian,

34).

sumit c]osed>

(on « a y 27), Nicaragua
0ffer6d „

_

^

,

P anama

^

^ ^^

in . last ffiinute
effort

^

^

controi proposai

^

Vet the diplomats „ere
unable to

resolve the disparate
positions of the Central
Americana.

Significant^, there vas further
evidence of the break-up of
the
Tegucigalpa Group as Costa
Pica joined Guatemala and
Nicaragua in
seeking to end international
military maneuvers. Moreover,
El
Salvador joined Guatemala and
Nicaragua in opposing limits
on
national militia forces (Bagley
and Tokatlian, 1987: 44).
The
impasse prevailed, and the
self-imposed June 6 deadline arrived
without a signature.
Yet the Contadora Group persisted.
offered

a

third

-and what

it

On June 6 it unexpectedly

called its final- draft of the

Contadora Act to the Central Americans
and vowed to continue its

mediation efforts.

,

Rather than try to resolve the divisive
arms

control issues before signature, the
new draft called instead for
second process of arms control negotiations
to begin after the Act

a
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entered into force.
fore*

P-esa

should ta k e

^

i^iate

"

the

ti,~ new a
The
Act specified the
stages that second
gre at detail." The

_

„

suspension

„f

.„

region but pennitted
their resumption

to reach any agreement
i„ the

P-ess.

The June

6

verification, induding

„„

^^ ^
^
^

arm6 control negotl
.t

_

Draft
a

u

^^^
^

latin American
secretariate, an

International Corps of
Xnspectors. and an Advisor,
Bod y to help the
Vesication and Control Co.ission
for Security Matters
discharge
its responsibilities
and to facilitate
„
tacilitate communication
between the

mission

and the Centra! American
states.

bodies and of the Verification
and Control
also spelled out in great
detail.

The fnnctions of these

Cession

itself were

The considerable care
taKen in

elaborating the verification
provisions reflected the
Contadora
Group's attempt to address
uress Dasfpast it
U.S. objections to this
aspect of
<?

the Contadora Act and
incorporate the State Department's
recommendations 25 i„ these matters.
Most of the other provisions
of
the Act remained the same
as the previous September
1985 draft,

including an immediate end to
the support of "irregular
forces" and
a dismantling of their
bases (Contadora Act, 1986;
Contadora Act,
1985; Ford, 1986: 9; Bagley and Tokatlian,
1987: 44-45; Goodfellow,

1987: 154).

Within

a

week, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and
Honduras had

rejected the third version of the
Contadora Act.

All three states

cited problems with the verification
provisions of the Act, but the

open-ended arms control issue was also an
important factor.
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~

Guatemala, howpvor
nowever, remained open
to the new version
a
and
stressed
ts continued suppo
f
Guatemalan Fore
;
«« "ario Qui„onea reaffimed
cQuntry , s
isted that
K ° uid
3

- -

—

u

*

- - »« -

-*

7
its part,

_

^

or group

the Nicaraguan
government announced
its

willingness to accept the
new version
n 0t
of the ArtAct on June 20.
th. new Act „ as more
favoraHe to Nicaragua
draft, Nicaragua „ as U n
q uestionah>
the U.S. House of

.

Representees

y

^

^

fcy

^

^^

^

on centre aid.

While

That vote yas

held on dune 26. and
ln . drMatic reyersal

^

^

fro. the previous Kerch,
the House narrowly
approved President

Reagan's^lCO mill ion centre
aid
follow.

26

Within

a

E0nth , s

r e,uest.

The Senete would soon

.

t

mej

paipabu hopes

^

^^

Contadora agreement was within
reach had given wav to a
renewal of
the contra war.
The Contedora process
suffered its n ost severe
a

b low.

From Contadora to Esquipulas:
The Arias Plan and the Esquipulas
II "Agreement
Despite the serious setback to
the peace process presented by
the contra aid vote, the
Contadora Group and the Support Group

characteristically vowed to continue their
work.

Goodfellow (1987:

154-155) notes that immediately following
the House vote, Contadora

n
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negotiators at the UN
commented stoicallv
stoically th
that r
Contadora had
"^reached the end of = ~u
a chapter, „ ot
the
of itswork- „,
the Contadora Group
and the Support
Group,
wmcn had
r> which
nad be
r
begun to
act as
one and were
increasingly referr ed
to as cne
the »Grn
Group of* „•
Eight "
.

P—ted
'

~

in their mediation
efforts.

At his

juration

on A „ g uat

C0l00bian
Baroo Var g as, ur ed
that
6

the Gontadora atates
revive the ataUed
taUa.
Contadora presidents.
.„ in attei da
,

_,

^

The other seven

^

^

At the end of Ootoher.
the senior deputy f
orei g n ministers of
the
Croup of^Eight met in
Hexico CUy to discuss
£taned

P-cess.
Passed

7

^

^

In it . NoveKber

^

^^

declaration reco g ni 2 i ng the
Gontadora Group's efforts
and
offered the support of the
OAS in the search for
peace.
In
a

December, border incidents
between Nicaragua and
Honduras as a
result of the stepped-up
contra war led to the
formation of a
mission of diplomats fro. the
Group of Eight, the UN, and
the OAS to
tour the five Central
American capitals and try to
reanimate the
peace process.
This effort, combined with
the political fall-out
fro. the first revelations
of the Iran-Contra scandal
in November,
led to a series of meetings
between December 1986 and April
1987 in

which the Contadora Act was again
discussed.
difficulties in reaching

a

However, the same

final agreement remained:

Arms control,

verification, and now internal
democratization and national

reconciliations all stood in the way of
finalizing the Contadora
Act, especially in light of the
escalating contra war ("Meeting of
the Contadora Group," 1986: A6

;

Garc/a and ComaViz, 1989: 34-35).
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of 1986 and int0 I987
uere leading to

process.

-

a

<.ra„ ing

to a close.

The

a ericai
As,
,

^

^

transformatio]i

The Contadora phase
of me
the Central
Cental

•

escaU ti ng contra

Mr

peace proce£s

addcd

.

„„

ur g enc y to resolvin
g the regional conflicts,
and
scandal .as he inni„
g
g to undermine „ >g-

^^^^

However, w hi le these
reaHties presented certain
oppertnniti,es to
Gr ° UP f Ei8ht
the C
1
°
found the Contadora
Process hopelessly stalemated.
Guat e„ala-s President
Cereso and
Costa Rica's President
Arias had be
oe g
P un to look for
f„
alternative paths
to peace since their
respective inaugurations.
I ndee d
this
"

—

i

,

urging

new phase of the regional
peace process can be traced
to
Cerezo's impromptu su^it
with has colleagues at his
January 1986
inauguration.
Working separately at first,
Cerezo and Arias looked
for a truly
initiative to resolve their

C^l A*^,

violent conflicte (Solis,
1991).
holding

a

m

ear]y 1987

,

second Central African
presidential summit

agreed at Esquipulas in May

1

986,

^

Cerezo

to accelerate the

.

as had been

rotation

of a

Central American parliament that
could revive regional

integrationism and cooperation.
preparing
agreement.

a

At the same time, Arias was

text that he hoped could be the
basis of

The so-called "Arias Plan" was made
pub

1

a

ic

new regional
on Feburary

15, 1987.

The formal document was entitled "A Time
for Peace: Procedure
for Establishing a Firm and Lasting
Peace in Central America."

was presented to the presidents of Guatemala,
Honduras, and El

It
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""""
—View,
alone

m

~"

<°

- '«< «« «.

President Arias expuined
that he

Managua
udgua.

n,-f«„
Ortega was not

orieinallv
iginally

though he later aired
some opposition
S1Clon

originally had many
reservations
ervat.ons.

^

~

occassio,

-

^>

ln .
a 1991

a

•

a
a
S ai nst

«

,
E1 ,
,
Salvador

the plan

and Honduras

tk
The
presidents agreed to
study

" «il

the second
presidential

at Esq ui P ulas
tentatively scheduled
for late May 19S
7 (Arias
1991; Kinaer, 1987: A16).

w

President Arias' "Procedure"
ocedure vss kbased on
the philosophy that

democratization and national
reconciHations h y the Central
Americans themselves.
Arias viewed the Contadora
Act as being
flawed because it was
too "ambitious" and
"complex" in its oal of
g
reducing and balancing
the region's armed
forces. Moreover, the

Contadora project .as "exotic,"
comiag not fro, the Central
Americans but from otner
other Latin
Lafin American
countries, some of vhose
•

democratic credentials vera
weak.

"How could countries like
Mexico

and Panama teach us about
democracy, liberty, and
peace in Centra.

America?"

After waiting to see what
might become of the Contadora

process i„ the wake of the
5100 million contra aid vote.
Arias
decided at the end of 1986
that the time was ripe for
preparing
Cestrfll

twxium

credientials.

peace plan from

a

country that

m

have democratic

Rather than the question of
regional arms control,

the Arias Plan emphasized
democracy as a condition for peace and

peace as

a

a

condition for development (Arias, 1991).

,

267

~

-

— ""™ —
—
r ecoKil

, tira!bl(ea

-

betUee

"

"~— -

^

onpoUticai amestiee
o PP ositions

*

eroups

*»PPcsed to create

.

these objectives and
oversee
ersee their „compliance
within each country
^e second point called for
Mediate cease fires between
beUiserant g roops io ts .
COUDtries

^estic

^^

political

dealt with

dialog

degradation

he ga „.

The third

^

^^

thron g h the liftia
g of censorship and

other controls on free
political dehate as well
as the
free elections acoordi„
g t0 the constitutiona]
country.

The plan

"ide Sections to

a

,

6

o

a re gi

_^

incited

a

grantee

^

^

of

provision for eventual re
g ion-

onal parliament as
proposed by Pre£ident

Cerezo.
Point five called on the
Central Africa* states to
ask outside
states to suspend their
respective .Hitary aid

program to the

region.

Thxs petition, along with
another askxng the region's

irregular forces to abstain fro,
receiving such aid, was to occur
simultaneously with the signing of
the Procedure.
The sixth point
obliged each Central American
country to prohibit the use of
its
territory by groups seeking to
destabilize neighboring states.

Point seven called for negotiations
on regional arms control

in

the

spirit of Contadora to begin sixty
days after the signing of the

Procedure.

Points eight and nine focused on the
issues of

verification and evaluation of compliance
with the agreement.

Point

„,
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—a

•**

- «~P

Foll

_

*»-

-

'

.

p COTmittee

«.

conpMed

as Bell as the
foreign minister£

of Eight countries
to ov

_

National Commissions
for Reconcileonciliation

cane,

for a

feting

of signing the

imPlene

of

agreeMnt £o
•

oevelop m ent
"for,

a

a „a

Md

agents

stressea tbat

^^^^

"» "«1

t „.

Dialo gue).

Point

Point nine

e

„.,.„

s

ix

m

tor future

aimed at prMoting
regiOTa]

^

point>

harmonious ana invisible
whole"

1987a: 423-426).

The unexpectea
appearance of thi .
reactions.

^
^^^^ ^
^^^

^

coffipliMce

thfi

" iD8

economic ana cuUura!

^

_

Presiaent Arias 6aid
that his

(

^

"P Ia££diai£at£ .

.
.

.

^^^^
^.^

a

great ae al of support fro,
throughout Latin Africa.
Including th .
Contadora countries (Aries,
1991).
Indeed> at tbeir AprH
19e7
meeting, the Group of Ei
g ht .roisters aeciaea to tabU
further
consideration of the thira
Contadora Act until the, knew
the results
of the second su^it of
Central American presidents
at Escuipulas
which was now scheduled for
June 25-26, 1987 (Garcia
ana Gor.ariz,
1989: 36).

Arias founa the reaction

fron, inos t

of Western Europe to

be n,ore skeptical, given the
EC's previous support of
Contaaora,
"ana of course Mrs. Thatcher
was totally again8t if (Ari
a s, 1991).

Reaction

in

the United States was also mised.

On the one hana

Congress responded favorably with
the Senate's vote of 97-1 to

enaorse the peace plan in -id-March.
in

Or the other hana, officials

the Reagan Administration either
ninimiaed the significance of

269

«•

or

«.«K«

critici^

for not

it

(Sciolino, 1987:

President Arias 8tated

t

AU)

„. t he

^
^

maMng sufficient

^

Is

on

^ ^ ^ ^^^^
.

Choosing

reaction to be "support
through exhortation
that
aL was not .
sincere.
...-ic.il, the, kept trying to
unaermine my effort8 „
(ArU ,
1991).
Ib. Keasao saministration's
pressures on Arias . ft
-luaed a slowdown in the
disbursement of economic
aia
approved by Congress," .
aelay in appointing
.

„

March I98?

.he,,

_

San Jose, ana the

-ports.

position

Moreover, in

a

^

of restrictions on
some of Costa Rica's

June visit to Washington,
Presiaent Arias

ana a close advisor were
given "a severe 65-minute
lecture on his
-stakes" by top White House ana

aaministration officials

1987: 5).

(Vol™,

The aaministration also
pressurea the other Central

American presidents to oppose
an y plan that aia not
meet U.S. views
ana security interests
in the region.
Ambassador Habib personally
delivered this message in

a

tour of Central American
capitals in mid-

dune, soon before the second
Esquipulas summit.

In the wake of this
tour, President Duarte asked
the other Central American
presidents

for a last minute postponement
of the summit.

objections from Nicaragua and Costa
Rica,

Despite initial

it was

postpone the summit until August 6-7
and to hold

finally agreed to
a

meeting of

foreign ministers at the end of July
or early August to prepare for
it.

There were also reports that contra
leaaers wantea to attena

the summit ana that the Reagan
aaministration supportea the iaea.

However, top officials from both Costa
Rica ana Guatemala rejected

270

^5 iAriM>1991;Honey
Pear, .988:

Al.AU;

"Costa Rica I. Different,"

1

988)

.

^^

despite Duarte's folding
under pressure> BMci
co£t

P-tige

Wrican

in the re gion>

Washington's pressures
00 the other

^_

presidents prove, to he
counterproductive.

notes that hoth Ar ias
and Cere2c

-dependent positions fro. Has
hington.
moving aBay fr

„

it8

pro .

^

andAvirgan> 1987: 220 .
22i;Rin2ei

_

^
^

Vol™ („„.„

^

Even

Kashington stance

^
^^

^

^^^

the Re agan administration's
position had veasened
considerah ly in
the vake of the Iran-Contra
congressional hearings and
the fai.ure
of the contras to
achieve a„ y serious m
iHtar y successes with their
5100
1U doners. In . la£t ninute
to

„

„

^

outcome of the Centra!
American su™it, President
Reagan and House
Speaker Jim Wright ottered
offerprf t-h*i~
their „own peace plan for
g
the region
on

August 4 (Lemoyne, 1987a:
A7)
so long,

.

After such

the Reagan-Wright plan
was

a

a hard

line position for

mixed signal that surprised

and confounded the Central
American leaders; but it did
not deter
them. (Arias, 1991; Solis,
1991; Bendana, 1990; Torres,
1990).

The Esquipulas II summit meeting
was tense (Arias, 1991).

Diplomatic aides at the meeting and
other observers said

it

opened

with the presidents arguing and
trading insults, but then they
got
down to work (Bendana, 1990; Solis,
1991; Sarti, 1990).

ministers presented the presidents
with
their meetings on August 3-4.

a

The foreign

report of their work at

The report identified the approved

points, the disapproved points, and the
points for further

d

—

- «-
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v ery

tm

points

other two categ0ries

.

_

already

^^^^

aimogt

^ ^
f

Arias said thia
trouMed

becauge
he saw that an
agreement vould be
difficult
1CUlt to
t0 reach Nevertheless,
the presidents were
Kl 0 to resolve
able
many of their
differences
began to build a
consensus. Aries
"forced"
CM "em
the., t
to continue the
-tin, until the, f0 u„d agreement
on the remaini„
g issues,
the
-st troubling issues had to
do with the timing
of certain
Provisions and the question
of "simultaneity"
as veil as

^

fl

verification.

Arias said he

revered

a tactic

FrankHn Koosevelt

reportedly used and tried
to use it at Fsquipulas:

He tried to

to consult with their
home governments, thus
undermining the

consensus reached thus far.

-eting after

Nevertheless, there was

break in the
2:0 0 a.m., but it soon
resumed and a final
agreement
a

was reached by 4:00 a.m.
on August 7, 1987 (Arias,
1991).

The Esquipulas II Procedure
for Establishing a Firm
and Lasting
Peace in Central America
differed somewhat from Arias'
original
Plan, reflecting the bargaining
that had taken place between
the

presidents; however, its basic
outline remained the same.

After
invoking various documents
produced by the Contadora process

(including the June 1986 Act) as
its guides, the Esquipulas II

Procedure contains eleven points
plus a brief section entitled
"Final Dispositions."

As

in the original

plan, the first point

addresses "National Reconcilation,"
however

it

deals with the

sections on "Dialogue" and "Amnesty" in
reverse order and adds

a
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third and expanded
section spelling
ng out thp
the composition and
internal

verifxcation responsibilities
of tne
the "Na
t
*
National
Reconciliation
Commissions." The spm^
_
second point is
re titled "Exhortation
for
Cessation of Hostilities"
and urges those
thos. governments
facing armed
insurgencies to takp aU
*n necessary
actions" to reach a
cease fire
within a constitutional
framework."
n

!

•

.

thira ana fourth
points of the Es uip
ul as
q

continue to aaaress
^ocratiaation" ana

-actively,

but

see

of the woraing

now "commit themselves
eives to n.,cK
push
Pl

"ali" iC

-

Md

'""^"^

c or
f

U

"

„

Precede

Fre e Elections"

changed

.

The

an authentic democratic,

P-ess"

that

inches

for television, raaio ana
the press as well
as full freea on of
speech, assess. a n d
campaigning for political
parties.
A new
Paragraph aaas that .„
states of exception shou,a
he en d ea an d full

contitutional guarantees shoula
be reestahl ishea
There are only a
few minor changes with reparH f-^ t-u
regard to the paragraphs
S
on free elections,
however there is a new
paragraph
pr snecifv^,,
,
specifying the need, for
g
the
.

^

American governments to ratify
<-±±y

a
d

Central

treatv
treaty on the
,u formation
t
of the

regional parliament before
elections for

it can

be held.

Points five and seven differ
markedly in their wording from
the
Arias Plan while point six
("Non-Use of Territory to Attack
Other
States) remains virtually the same.
Point five ("Cessation of Aid
to Irregular Forces or
Insurrectional Movements") calls on
the five

Central American governments to
seek an end to all outside military,
logistical, financial and propagandist
ic aid to the region's

irregular forces and insurgent groups.

An important exception is to
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i- *»

—
-

^

o Utside aid

f o rces

„.

for £he peaceful

or groups

.

pcint sevec

resem

^

_

t

cQmpUteiy

..e 8OEiatl0ns on
Security> Verification>

^
^

^

^

^

^d

Arms Control"
specifically calls
tor th.
y i-ans for
the continuation
of
negotiations on the
1986 Contadora Act's
security provisions
securitv
as well
as the means for
disarming the reeion'c
region s irregular
8
forces willing to
lay down their arms.
The last four points
of the Esquipulas II
P rocedure are
significantly different fro
m the Arias
as rian
Plan
Tn
I
° an entirely new
provision, point eight
addresses the
une protection andA
eventual
rep atriati oo of R e fug
ees a„ d Displa ce d
Persons." The provision
focusin 8 oo regional
economic developnent
'

..

^ cooperatiM

^^

ninth point of the Procedure
("Cooperation
cooperation, n
n
Democracy,
and Liberty
for Peace and Development")
while the tenth now contains
the
provisions on "International
Verification and Follow-up."
The
fl

Presidents agreed to create an
International Verification and
Followu P Commission made up
of the secretaries
general of the UN and OAS,
the foreign ministers of
the Group of Eight plus
the foreign

ministers from the five Central
American states.

There was

apparently some discussion about
allowing the Central Americans
alone to be responsible for
verifying compliance with the
Procedure,
but Nicaragua insisted on including
the participation of the eight

Contadora states (Bendana, 1990).
The eleventh point was entirely new
and spelled out the

"Calendar of Implementation of Commitments."

It named

the Central

American foreign ministers as constituting
an Executive Commission

«

.
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«

ld

begin to develop the
procedures

^

^

lmPUmenting

-Ubi. fifteen
*isnin 8 of the ag ree n en,

November

7,

Ninety

d a ys

a f te rsi gnat ure

1987
t-^ key
987), the
)

i

previous

on amnesties,
cease fi.
ires

force.

Verification and F ollo„-up

7)

(i.e.. on

1

democratization, cut-nff
-j
n e aid
off of
t0 lrreguUr
(orces
territory would a ll
i„i-„ t
enter into

-lysis

days of the

of co Eplia n=e a t

Cession
1

M

_

,

^ bw^ m ^

The Intern a tion a l

„ as scheduled

days after 6ignature

^

^
t„

begin

and present its report
Port to a n,4«i
third summit meeting
of the Central

American presidents at
the 150 day
y mark

(i -e.,
m
u

t
January

7,

1988).

In

its "Final Dispositions,"
the Procedure again
stressed the

indivisibility of its provisions

(

£ra££!iiBifia£a,

. .

1987b)

.

The success of the Es
q uip„l as I! su^it seeded
to surprise
everybody. After four end
a half years of
diplomatic hopes,

frustrations, and stalemates
aiemates, t-ho
a
the r^r,*Central Americans
finally found
their own diplomatic voice
and political will to
answer the
i

Contadora Croup's original call
for peace.

The Esquipulas II

agreement was both literally
and figuratively

a

procedure the war-

veary Central Americans could
follow to rebuild mutual trust
and to
establish internal peace processes
based on the goals of national
reconciliations and democratization.
remained

a

Nevertheless, there still

great deal to be worked out at the
national levels, and

carrying out the various steps of
the Esquipulas Procedure

in each

country would prove to be difficult
and sometimes impossible.

Although the agreement was supposed to
apply to all five
Central American countries, its application
to Nicaragua and to

a
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PUtUC att6ntiM
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—a

governs

initiany

.... support>

M80tiati0DS uitb Hanagua
but refQsed

"eir

^

uy

ar.s unti] democratic
conditions existed in
Nlcaragua
<«ann 10 n, 1987a; 2A;

^^ ^

f«.t ninety

days Khen

t „.

key provision£

^

^

agreement vera supposed
to take effect
(November

-versed Us position

^^^^

^

^
^^^^
^^^^^
?)

_

and agreed to begin

contras through th .
intermediary of

^^^^

Obnndo y Brevo.

^

Two rounds of talks
too, pl ace in December
198?
before breaking down, but M
a „ ag u a S recoaaitttent
to tbe talks
followed in Jenuary (Robter,
1987: A19; Bennett, 1988:
1, ,4).
Tbus
began tbe c 0npl e x process
of interna,
in Nicaragua.

peeking

In El

Salvador, tbe FDR-FMLN agreed
to President Duarte's

invitation to begin talks soon
after the signing

however

it

0f

Escuipulas II,

refused to accept the Esquipulas
II agreement

(Mannion, 1987c: 6A

•

Manm'rm 1987b:
Q«7K
wanmon,
1

.

n»\
2A)

.

^„

Two meetings were held in

October but at the beginning of
November the FDR-FMLN broke off
the
talks to protest the killing
of a human rights official
(LASA, 1988:
11;

LeMoyne, 1987b: A6)

prove to be
years.

a

.

Ending the Salvadoran civil war
would

long and arduous process stretching
over the next four

In Honduras,

the most difficult parts of the
Procedure to

implement would be those provisions
relating to the continued use of

Honduran territory by the contras as

a

base of operations and the
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continued supply of
aid to the contras
aS

CUlationC
"nse

of political
vieus and

reCOnCiUati0n

-We.

*~

°—

In

P

™

T n Guat
r
,
In
^ala,
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Msta

—
£or

^

faiHng

«*»

the National

^ ^
by political

^^

Rica> . Nati0Ml
ReconciUation Conmission
ana unexpectedly
discovered

-ests,

_

lengthy detentions
without triai

_

indxvidual right,.

^

other vioiati

ms

^^

The commission soon
began
oegan to act as an
ombudsman
to address these
problems ("The
me Central
c t «tr.l American
«
Accord...," i 987
A6; LASA, 1988:
8, 14, 19-20).
«.

.

On danuary 15,

I9M>

the

^

^

their third formal sum.it
as agreed in the Es
q uipulas II Procedure
to receive the report
of the international
Commission on

Verification and Follow-up
on compliance.

The report was mixed.

The presidents agreed
to contrnue their
efforts to implement the
Esquipulas
Procedure, but they disbanded
the verification

H

co-ission and charged the foreign
ministers' Executive Commission
"ith its tasks.

Nevertheless, Nicaragua asked
the Group of Eight

and the secretaries
general to constitute a
special verifrcation

team to re-evaluate the new
measures Managua agreed to make
to
comply with the Esquipulas
treaty (LASA, 1988: 22). That
team would
continue to play an important role
in Nicaragua's subsequent

domestic peace process.
An examination of next phase
of the Central American peace

process as it came to focus on the
internal dynamics of conflict

resolution within the individual countries
(especially Nicaragua and

"

is,

o nfortunately

Such an axamination

—

-~-t.it

l«t...

Wic

is

Bin

^

to

untn

i»Po rtant t0 aote that

£uMit

_

te e rican presidents
„ ould become

of the Esquipulas

„

that helped

Process o„„ ard in Nlcaragua
and

(<)

#

ings

occur

^

^

_ ^
es

^
^ ^^
^

prccedure

prasidantial 8umi£ry a£ter

-te rnati o nal commitments

S P ec

^
^ ^^

beyond the scope
of th£s

,

fact

_

i98g

^

^^

^^^^

^ ^

ifi c ally> fi ve TOre
suamit8 Det «een Pe bruary
I989 and

deserve brief mention as
part of t-h*
the p
Esquipulas phase of the
Central
American peace process.
•

,

Central American Summitry
after January 1988:
Fulfilling the Spirit of
Esquipulas

After the January 1988 summit
(the third
the first Esquipulas meeting
in May 1986),

f orma l

summit since

informal meetings at the

inaugurations of other civilian
presidents in Ecuador, Mexico, and
Venezuela during 1988 and into 1989
allowed the Central American

presidents and their foreign ministers
to maintain their regional

dialogue in the face of uncertainty
and remaining obstacles (i.e.,
lack of consensus on future
verification procedures and continued
U.S.

1991;

pressures to undermine the viability of
Esquipulas II) (Arias,
Solis, 1991; Bendafia, 1990).

With the continued help of the

Contadora Group states, especially the new
presidents of Mexico and
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Venezuela (Carlos
Salinas de Gortari
ortari an.
and r
Carlos Andres
respectively), the
groundwork
i

^

of Central

Sol, El Salvador
0 t 83

.

PUMlC

8

~
^—

Erica's
" S

m
„

p resid ^nts
P

Thi

on February 13-14
14

>

Pe'rez

1989 at, rCosta
del

•

"

democratization and move
ud th~
'

"""^

-

*

-

aragua , procesfi
of

*

c

-r

President

«" it-tWl,

undated

f
1990 national
elections from November
to February
ruar y- thus
tb
scheduling
the elections to
take place within
the year.
year
Mo
Moreover, the five
Presidents reiterated
their call for
f„
an end to all
outside aid to
the region's irregular
forces and urged
gea that all
all such
„
groups in the
region participate
in their country's
national reconciliation
Presses. Si gnif icantly, they
also agreed to haye
their foreign
Hesters undertake meetings
with the UN secretary
general to find
acceptable yerification
mechanisms f or the region's
demil itari.t ion
CArias, 1991 , SoliSi
1Mlj Benda5a _ i990; Ofa2o
BerMies
Fernandez V., 1990: 282-283).
.

t,

,

^

This last

cogent

soon bore fruit at the
fifth regional

sum.it in August 1989 in
Tela, Honduras.

It was the first

Presidential sum.it attended
by El Salyador's new
President, Alfredo
Cristiani (ARENA) who had
,
succeeded Duarte earlier
that su

».

But Presidents Ortega
and Azcona took center
stage in Tela as the
two worked out agreements
to bring about contra
demobilUation and
an end to the contra war. 29
mdeed, the Tela meeting was one
of the

-est significant of all the
post-Esquipulas

H

of the entire Central
American peace process.

summits and perhaps

After years of

negotiations within the Contadora
and Esquipulas phases, the fiye
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Central American
leaders finally
y agreed to neutral
ne
verificatiion and
Peace keeping
mechanisms focusing
ocusmg on
nn the A
demobili 2ation and
repatriation of the
contras.
,

.

a

Specifically,

t „o

mechanisms under the «,„„
au spices of the
UN and

"

the OAS were created
at Tela.

8en

" al

^

°

f

the

™

and 0AS

» i8sion

Support Co

detaiU reUti " S

tl>e

t0

The offices
lces of
ot th
th.e secretaries

«~« * ^„ ati0Ml

(CIAV) and charged

"» i"Pl-«t.ti«

contra demobilization
and repatriation
patriation.

«AV

^

were Spaniards Francese
Tofcfl ,

^

Verification

administering

au

and oversight of
the

tv
,
The
top diplomats of
the

Hugo

^

^ ^^

was a ided by a UN
peace ke.„:„„
keeping tforce named
ONUCA (United Nations
Organization in Centra,
America), which was
in8talUd in
and Nicara gua

in

^

Deceffiber

^

technical advisors and
troops fro, Canada,
West Cermany, Spain,
Brazil, Ireland, Venezuela
„j rColombia
i
v
,
enezuela, and
(Solis, 1991; Bendana,
1990;

su-it

Opazo Bernales and
Fernandez V., ,990: 337-341). 30
had set into motion

a

^

The Iela

sig„if icant process „ £
international

verification and peace keeping
that facilitated the end
of the
contra war.
"ore presidential snmmits
folloved.

A sixth regional summit
in

Coronado, Costa Rica, was
hastily called in December
1989 to discuss
the deteriorating situation
in El Salvador.
In November, the FMLN
had launched a new offensive
in the capital city and
government
forces responded with aerial
bombardments of civilian

neighborhoods.

News of the shocking murders of
six Jesuit priests,

their housekeeper, and her daughter
added to the urgency for

280
action.

The presidents
urged the Salvadoran
ao
government and the
FMLN
to arrant 3

" Wtl

that thn

c

-

° nS

^

C

--

the peace process
inside ei

-ve,
;

it

i8

Slgniflcant

what was becoming

—

-pen

fchat

<.isc„ssions
;

—^

the,y also0 ssu
8gested

t0 oversee

°-

^^^^

a connnon

^

be slow t0 emerge

;

^

occurance -face-to
taCe t0 "face
f
meetings- to
address another diffie,,!*
rtlcult aspect of
the regional
regional no*
peace process.
In early AprilI, 1 99n
*-u
1990, the
seventh formal summit
„ as held .„
Montelimar, Nicaragua.
It »as
„=, the
n,. last
suma.it for Presidents
Ortega
Arias and the first
for Honduras' „e„
Preset, Hafael
Callej
^e, the presidents recogn.ed
and
applauded the clean
February elections in
Nicara.ua
Nicaragua andH positive
arrangements for the peacpfnl
peaceful transition of
power f r0m the
Sandinista government
to the win«,*„
winning opposition.
They also asked
the United Nations
to take the necessarv
necessary steps to
complete the final
demobilization of the contras
in the coming
weeks. While several
inportant issues remained
unresolved, especially
especiallv the
t-h
continued war
in El Salvador and
renewed political violence
viol*
„
Guatemala, the
Montelimar summit represents
a culmination of
the Fs,uipulas phase
of the Central American
peace process. Future
regional summits,
soch as the eighth
meeting in mid June 1990
in Antigua, Guatemala,
would focus on regional
economic issues and hegin
yet a new phase of
diplomacy for the Central
Africans (Medina, 1990: 2A).
,

-

-

*

^ «- ~

•

•

•

•

.

^

1

m
•

These five summits after
January 1988, along with their
preparatory meetings by the
region's foreign ministers,
kept alive

.

28
the c.MitMnt
t0 peace undertak

.

presidents and top

^^^^

^

otner

on a more ner^n^i
P er sonal u
basis, to speak
v dK franklv
rrankly, and to
come to

—«~
^las,

•

each other,
positions

1991; BendaSa,

-1— -l-

«e

N

Ks, uipulas phase>
£he pre£idents

™ W

Public dipl omacy and

POSltiV6)

_^^^^
constraiots

ffiutual

;

^^^^

support uibeit

*

a

^

oj

^er-st.te r el a£ions
laid the groundwork
for future
tor
fntnr. regional
cooperation in the
PoHtlcal and economic
spheres.
and

-

portent

role in keeping
Nicarauga , s

^

^

ssi

^^

^^

The regional sumit$

Peace processes on track,
even if th,,
thosea processes followed
their own
dynamic s
»

Of cou.se, beyond
these

s umnit s,

there were other important

factors at both the
domestic ano international
levels that
facilitated the region's
internal pence processes,
hut man y of these
factors had a lso heeo
present at the Es,uipul a
s II sue.it.
The
weakened Centr a l American
policies of the Re agan
administration in
the w ak e of the Ir a
„-Co„tr a scandal, the waning
of the cold war a nd

proved

U.S.-Soviet reletions after
1987,

a nd

the persistent

efforts of the Contadora
countries in promoting the
continustion of
the regionel peece process
ell allowed the war-weary
Central

Americans to find their own

f ormulas

for peace.

Moreover, the more

1

"

"
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^tive role

of the UN and
OAS after 19899
,
ln facil itating
the end of
thp
the contra warr
n,
and the
new role of UN
e cretary r
Secretarv
•

^

General Javier PeVez
de Cuell,
Cellar ln mediating
El Salvador's
internal
eternal Dp eaC e process
after
1990
90 we
S ^-ficant
in building
8 the co
confid.
°fidence needed
for peace to
e-rge ln Nicaragua and
Salvador.
In
D a svmb
symbol
olic ceremony i
n
K
Nicaragua on June
9, iyyu,
1990
ro
„
representatives
V6S of
0f th
thea contras
,
formally
•

^

•

•

„

.

- " ~" - —a,

.

°*

V-etta
1

de Chamorro, and
ONUCA f orces 31

990:1)

^

*

„
(

new President,

Entrega

.

Salvador, peace process

eventually shifted to
the UN secretary
f
general'ss of
y generai
office, culminating
,.
Anally in a cease fire
agreement between
een the government
Po
and the
FMLN guerrillas in
January 1992.
WMl
while -u
y 19 92
the emergence of
peace in
Central America would
not have
h 3vo k
been possible without
these and other

Actors,

it was

the political
determination and commitment
of the

Central American
presidents themselves that
reclaimed the time for
peac e

Conclusion

The diplomatic stalemate
that developed with the
Tegucigalpa
Croup's counterproposal
to the 1984 Contadora
Act continued through
1985 and into 1986.

The Contadora Group,
joined later by the

Support Group, persisted in
its attempts to mediate
discussions
between the Central American
states and resolve differences
arising
from the region's violent
conflicts. Two new versions of
the

'

.
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Contadora Act were
prepared and discussed
scussed, how
however the complex
security and verified™,
location P rovi sions
never fn,,^
e " ent
aS
million contra aid
•

.

"

Da k 886 aPPr ° Ved
in th *
'

~"

Nevertheless, the
theCCoot
d

d

lplomacy

'

" ated

^

o, 19 86 was
Pr °" SS

-

"entries vowed to
continue their

hanging political
reamies
C

«

-

^

regiMai

- - -tes

^

^

involved i„ the
»e„ presidents in
Cuatemala, Honduras,
and
e S Pecia lly Costa
Kica durmg 1,88
contributed to a new
re gl o„ al
dynamic.
President Aria*'
m
~
Arias moves not
only
ixy led
iea to t-h*
the ubreak up of the

Peace process.

m

of the remaining
contra camps on Costa
Kican soil.
be g innin g of 1987,
Presided
A,,resident Arias
presented a

Then at the

simpler ten-point

alternative to the stalemated
Contadora Act.

Plan became

agreement.

a

viable step toward reachi„
g

.

With the help of

regional peace

The added troubles of
the Reagan administration's

Central American policies
by the summer of 1987
created the
additional politics, space
needed to allow the Central
Americans to
find agreement at the
Esquipulas II presidential
summit.
The
Central American presidents
recommitted themselves to the
Esquipulas
II Procedure over and
over after 1988, thus
facilitating the

continuation of the internal peace
processes in Nicaragua and El
Salvador and building the
foundation for greater regional
cooperation

in

the future.
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The Contadora
phase of the Central
entral Ame
American peace process
c-ated and supported
a diploic
shelter
lcer that npermitted
peace
Central America for
over four years
B t 111 the Es
1"iPulas
:
Phase
Phase, Present
Pr
arias found the way
to set the
Central A*
°"
"eir own paths to
peace
i>
Lik

"Us „

•

PreSide " C

--

secnr ity interests
in
Pursuing an active
diplomacy aimed at find,
flndln § a Peaceful
way out of
the region's violent
conflict.
These in*
TheSe
lnterests are the
_
focus of the
following chapter.
.
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in yxnnzng the contra aid
package in the spring ("Vote on
Military Aid...," 1986).

:
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•

Bagley and Tokatlian
(1987- 45) . ,
Department study,
entitled
Verification," "estimated
thalT W ° Uld
annually and require
1

of the camp

;rr;

the State
"Lentil " ^
** ° f Eff ^tive
^ ° St $4 ° "^ion
.

1
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.

C

^^^-^^c

interview with President
Arias on January 14
1991
h„
C0U,,t < 3
Reagan administration's
<*<»" the
?
iii??„i"
Arias had stated
t0
»~ ««ctio„.
in a BubHc
that "If I were
Mci -S"i„)
President Reagan 1'T
African economic develops 8
Ce
ral
nd
t for'T^
hls existing
policies in the reeion
A,;.
!
that the U.S. was
becLe clear
bothered' \fc
"It bothered the
U.S so Irl'
f**>").
Imy inauguration] I
feW days before
saw "hat no
n ° onT
0
VaS C0min fr
Washington.

^^

^J"""?

J

V

Onlv ,n m !

«te nd?

u

Aria°rL:rt:;f
:

—
-- ™^hL

Xr
hJi;
-"h

0:n

"The tli^ders^i" 8 ^'

-tween
21.

°™

g

embassy

^.^jrs-i: s

0 a

ref

worf-deL

- ai

b

>

aircraft

UuncherL..^!

'X

w

,

'

"

"4

5

;r

Th"'"

*

^^.^^r^s'^ss:!.-

23.
0
th':

<-

«- -iss. &Ta°; r.s.r?s..

As Bagley and Tokatlian
(1987: 44)
»•
"offered a list of possible nfrlZ explain it Nlcara S"a
red ««ions,
including

as the

led

the

<»

22

"

^if^*^^

.

fiftrrlti^tion"

Sr.Vl"

^

^

^
lo ° 8

°£

fifteen days, each state must
submit its inventories of
weapons, bases, and troops to
the Verification and Control
8
(3) WithiD Sixt
VCC must c mplete
*,.
^ da ^>
its technical °
itTtec
studies and recommend maximum
force limits for

^

^

^

}
n6Xt tMrty
'he "." ie'r
h
the
maximum limits of arms, bases, and
troops
^on
along with timetables
for their reductions.
If the parties
tai] to reach such an agreement,
the recommendation of the VCC

6St
es^Mlsh
Ush

^
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^

would provisionally
take effect
negotiations would be
* ***
limit for these
set
(I) n i
° therwise a §reed,
Parties would have a
the
total of 180
on maximum arms
COm P le te an agreement
limits.
(6) If
h
the parties may
8reen, nt is reached,
suspend imp ementation !
?
0
international military
COmjDlt ^nts on
maneuvers
for^
foreign military
1
b
and
advisors.
(7)
"J*° T
force limits are
8ettin
maximum
sensitive to each Ji
*
are not based on
SGCUrit y weds and
absolute paritv
f«? V-eludes a new provision
the 1986
a
h
the transit,
"ction prohibiting
stationing mobili^'
f
[etCj ° f forei n «™ed
forces" that could
S
threaten "tL
territorial integrity
and
Central American ' state"
Act, 1986: 229-233,
(Contadora
253).

V°

™

""* ^s,

LilJ?

?"

^d

^

tn^'

™^y>

"«y ^tr^T*

stl^^^rthT^I^^ 98 ^ 45) - G - df ellow (1987: 154)
joint military ex^
Le^
requiring the suspension Vo^rlhrL
qUlte clear in
of
f

intl^M

for the first ninety
d vs
while the arms

^
?
0

f !

S

con/J^oll

i

?

8
15

°f

^

m ^tary maneuvers
,

£ ^J™^*'

f

maneuvers may continue
'
"""Pension of
beyond that un
C0Dtr01
agreement is reached.
Moreover
e ° ver
LrT ,
international
military
maneuvers with no n r» "°^
Stat6S W ° Uld be P-hibited
once the a™ c
r
" dement
I"
J""
«as reached (Contadora
1986: 226-229)!
Act,

T"

!

L

25.

0n e

the

e^\\^L°^:tVa n d ^alities
mod:?-t

provisions!
26.

'

^ e P artment s study on the
of verifying the Contadora
Act's

The vote was a slim 221 tn ?no
contra aid proposal
Th!%
\
6

r

c

,

X °
the Ministration's
\hadT°already
approved a
f

Senat e
RH.kn !•«
l f
en Version of the aid
packag'e and formally
5
approvedI Jthe
h f final version on
August 13, 1986 by a vote of
53
° f thiS and 0th
-ntra i
iatLn Icln
L6 ° Grande
° 987: 218 " 219) and
Arnson Til 87).

«

^

U

27.

MeXi
Inno
a

r T eting

reverb

of U S

-

'

° f the Gr ° Up ° f Ei § ht

?

^"'J"™

^

t00k Place as the U

S

-

(1986) not
that the offer was
the firSt t0 Produce

?into
advanced filLl
i
fighter planes
Central America.
28.

Writing in September 1987 from San
Jose" (where they live),
Martha Honey and Tony Avirgan (1987:
220), state "No U S appropriated funds have been disbursed
to Costa Rica during the
1X
GmbaSSy
official
Puts
the amount withheld
-??°
at $85 million,
while Costa Rican and U.S. Congressional
officials say the total is $140 million."
The slowdown in U.S.

«r^
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aid continued
after th„ o-

Resident A rias stated
thaftht
Pressure

^

H"*

agreement.
adl »»>i"r a tion-s
through the aid ,1„ J
neV
«es always a bit
Tei » dir ect
it
subtle
k™
IngtM ke I" attaching
conditions for .«
more
about a cut off of
Ulkin «
aid" (Ar a
""Iber"sources in the
U.S., including
a segment on fin li
in Noveinb er 1988
reported financial
also
and other
the „ake of
aS
nSt C ° 8ta Rica ia
President Aria"
lV ' " C ° Sta Ei
ortferent," 1988; Kinzer
ia
Jnd Pe«?

"

;

i*

o^^f"^ "
mS"'

29.

d

«

«

f
S
flU
n
e
(and :tn:rs) i:- u ; k
an
ires
£e «ch.
likely that the more
It i.
pragmatic Bush
1
diplomacy to encourage
US6d 1 uiat
.
P rocess
al oeg at this point,
even if the administration^
„?J,
P
to the
continuation of contra aid r
1
Central
°f

^

Tre;

^

£ST
L

*U

"
"

'"T"' "

«

^
^t^-^^l^ *
"^^^
Wie^TSf'Si IXV £T
.

^

1

Pos^s uipulL

2^%^"^
^A^c™

appears from thrall J.
had widened and the
Central

'

"

1

^

.

Coo^dvXTof T.'

30

at,,'„M
Xrbe
ItlTV^
Nicaragua
reassuring presencT

"pressive.

f

Anyone travelling

. 0 i5cl"L5*ci5"*'^,

r

notef that

:ctr^^^

United States
noo.
peace
process can be found.
31

m

in

,,y

Z

support of the regional
reeionsl

Despite the formal ceremony,
there were reports that the
contras did not in fact turn in
all their arms (Entrega
8
Ca *-;
199 °
1}
SiDCe June 1990 -«»e ormer
contras
; rS
'
C ° Untry S difficult
economic
i ua° "L h
situation
have tried to reorganize.
The so-called "re-contras"
have carried out some attacks in
the country, where peace
P
remains precarious.
j

:

*

"r^f ^

>

CHAPTER VIII

COMPARING

SS^S"^!™

61 P ° LICIES

'

^

W 1C
1S S6t in -otion
one of
o f its
ts parts receives
a shock
We must be ready
to come to our
neighbors' aid especially,
^sorders in those nations as any7
will
doubtless spread to
ours."
Simon Bolivar to
Francisco de. Paula
t>antander, January
6-7, 1825. 1

Fro. the

Cental

Sisnin 8 of the Esqulpulas

Usting Peace

o»ers

s«

pr0cedure

In

of the states

tMs

EstaMisMng

.

a

^^

th e Central American
peace P rocess

les$ons for

and forergn polioy
.

»hy

„

in Central America,

im P orta„t

^^^^^

Croup's initial

of

chapter>

^

utin

^

co

involved in the peace
process came to

Participate in it i„ the way
that they did.

Space limitations and

reliable information preclude
us from examining all
of the states
involved in the peace process.
Thus we „ iU analyze and
conpare

^

particular foreign policy
perspectives, interests,
capacities, and
contributions (both positive and
negative) of the most significant
actors in the peace process:
Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia
from
the Contadora Group states
and Costa Rica from Central
America.

Through this comparative analysis,
we also hope to acqmre

a

general
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COEParatlVe

°l

-

actors,

Restates. AUhous.

- -etgn
mstitottons ^

80me of our conclusioii3

impressionistic than
others, cms
this study
studv
.

pollcy naking
Bitfcin

_

be

1S

intended to serve
as
P°in t o £ departure
tor identi ty i ng
gaps in informa£ion

*****

tU

!

a

^

dtrection o f

f „ture

research and analysts

of

-Parative

hatin Vatican
diplomacy and fo rei n
policy making.
8
few
*
8 e„era. remarks ahont
the stnd y „ f Latin
toerican

^

nature of the literature
regains lifted and, as
underdeveloped.
In fact,
fartlt was

it were,

not until the 1970s
that studies

focustng on foreign
poHcies of Latin Aa.er.can
states he g an to
appear.
Prtor to that appearance
-and even afterwards-, the

literature on Lattn
in the

Area's

internat tonal

for, of diplomatic
histories.

relates

usually came

Some diplomatic hrstories
were

(and are) so sweeping that
little could he learned
ahout the fore ig „

policy making process in
any one particular state
(e.g., Moreno,
1°28; Rippy, , 938; Zea
I960; Davis, Finan and
Peek, 1977
Boersner,
1986; Karnes, 1976).
Other diplomatic htstories
took the case study
approach, focusing on one
particular country. This rendered
some
insights into the foreign policy
making behavior of some states,
such as Mexico, Argentina,
and Brazil (which have tended
to be
,

;

overstudied), but

it

ignored other states, focused on
outcomes

rather than processes, and
precluded much comparative analysis or
theoretical development.

Diplomatic histories of the inter-American

system have been more numerous, bnt
they have tended to focus on

U.S.

interests and
predominance ln
in the
th.

.

.

—
»*«-

r

rr

Laun - Latin

°r

Connell-Smith

S y stem

«d/or

on U.S. -Latin

attention

<.....-.

1967;Mecham , 196
lQfifi. r
1n
1966
C °nnell-Smith,
1974; Gil
v-li, 1971. t
Inman, 19651977; Kryzanek
yzanek, 198s1985; m
Martz and Schoultz,
1980)

,

'

5

'

»

Moreno Pi no

»

,

«-

and 197 „
s>latinAjnericabecane

nev studies rtth
nore theoretica[

international relations
•t—.. To--

Uta

lntere

"

" ith re8

"d

<»

^

-PHcations

i„ Latin

_^

^

Amerrca became one of
several regions

"">^

Anerica

^

f

*

^^
^

th. integration
experience

<*-. !*>, Haas, 1975; scatter,
1972)
-tegrationism

^

^

„,

_^_
.

H

f or

-

^

international relations
theory-building and less in
the rmplications for
buildlng theories abou£

^

Policy orientations and
decision-making.

More importantly, the
appearance of both the field
of
cooperative foreign policy
and dependency theory
in the United

S-tes

has had an important
yet somewhat contradictory
impact on the
study of Latin American
foreign policy per se.
Following their

increased participation

in

the international system,
some Latin

American states were finally
studied as international
actors with
their own interests,
capabilities, and behaviors (e.g.,
Bailey,
1967; Atkins, 1977; Davis and Wilson,
et al, 1975; Astiz, 1969;

Fontaine and Theberge

,

eds., 1976; Cochrane, 1978;
Bellman and

Rosenbaum, 1975; Ferris and Lincoln,
1984).

Yet the dependent

status of Latin American states
in the international system
meant
that,

in the end,

their foreign policy choices were
circumscribed.
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Indeed, some
proponents of the
t-h« a
dependency school would
g0 so far as
"Sue that most , if not
all>of
utin American
are so

-

^

^

ir

dependency on the United
States that there
the foreign policy
making process in t-h
g
those

is n
18
no°

.

m

Process is located in
Washington
nmgton. 2

dependency theory

Point to studying

states because that

9

Suchk an understanding
of

is

useless in explaining h
how and why the
dependent
Contadora states actiyely
persistentiy

^

Central America £or
such

and

.

^
^ ^^^^ ^
^^
chaiunged

prolo „ gued

_

throu g h~their

^

^

»»y the highly dependent
minis£ates

ca„ ied

^

^

_

The most dynamic and
insightful students of
Lat n Amer can
foreign policy have
been the Lati „
.

.

^

^

"70.

and 1980s, 8ignificant
theoreticai

forei g n policies of
Latin

America and have contributed

^

conparative 8tudias

^^^^^

states

^

understanding

role" that Latin America
has be en playing in

^.^^

in the past

1..

a

great deal

few dec a des (Drekon
ja-Kornat end Tokatlian, 1983

1985; Munoz, 1980; Munos, ed.

»85; Tomassini,

,

1988; Pui g

1975; and many others).

Chapter IV, there has been

a

^

,

ed.

,

1984;

;

Maira,

Parma,

Jndeed, as we have seen in

significant growth in the number
of

Latin African research
institutes and "think tanks" devoted
to the
study of Latin America's
international relations parallelling
the
increased foreign policy activism
of a number of Latin American
states.

'

The studies produced by Latin
American researchers have

focused on the nature of dependency 3
and its implications for both

295
domestic and foreign
policy.

However
owever, they
th p
K
have also developed
the
,
heterodoxica,
autonomy" (Puig>

study of such
concepts
e?'s a*
as

,

"w

Perxpheral autonomy"
(Jaguaribe, 1979)
'

'Btoji stw a%)
i

(Aftalion

„„,

and

"b
bargaining
•

power"

1975) „•„,..
UlthlD a
'

»* dependency.
Such studies suggest
that there are
degrees
agrees of dependency
den H
and hence
reciprocal degrees of
autonomy that
u
y tnac a state might
exercise. The
.

„

—

ions

„„

depend on the nature
and degree or its
dependency in
the international
system The more active
states in the
international system give
evidence of enjoying
relatively more

Gonzalez

G.

(1984U3OT AAA
-

and bargaining power

1

„
notes
that to as<?PQ
assessC the room for
maneuver
».

-or

relative autonomy- of

a medium power,
It
best to study the
patterns of action in its
foreign policy rather
than to try to evaluate
the bases of power
that sustain it.

^

Latin American students
of international
relations have also
shown a marked interest
in the concept of
"complex interdependence"
developed by Kechane and
Nye (1977), Keohane
(1984), and -any others
<aee e.g., Tokatlian,
1,83). Although it is often
acre illicit
than explicit, this interest
seems related to two issues
relevant to
Latin America's foreign
relations.
On the one hand, understanding

interdependence a.ong first world
states means understanding
better
the nature of the contemporary
international system, which is

necessary for any state
realistically.

in

formulating its foreign policy

On the other hand,

if even first world states

experience sensitivities and vulnerabilities
towards each other and
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exercise varying
agrees of power
5 degrees
Srent

™

^

interdependent

»"
«

f ir

world

.

depending on the
issue area

* " PablUtieS

and the

*«.

—

k-

(

—

—
in

~nt.

^ U

interdependence and

tat6S beCOmes
attenuated and relative,
t

.

•««

.

—

variahUa)

has important
iffipUcations

8SPire

differenf
ice "e
erent lss
areas at

-^

The distance to

^

„f

those states

^ L ^ in

dependent £[ates

-

appears

W

«. ran.

^^^^

o£

^

states can already
Mercian reUtive autonomy
approaching
o£
£itsC Borld 6tates
Moreover, if dependent
.
Utin ^erinan
states cooperate with
each other and poo!
their resonrces in a
Particular issue area,
they aight he able
to exercise a still
greater degree of power
or relate autonomy
vis-a-vis first world
^ates. These hypotheses
see, to underlie the
research of Latin
American writers who have
Stained both . theoretica[
Practical interest in Latin
American regional cooperation

^

-e

^

("asmauto

and econo.ic

integration schemes (e.g.,
BUar, 1985-

Maldonado, 1987; Puig,
1987).

They are also shared hy
those

interested in the diversif
icatxon of Latin Africa's
ties to Europe
and other regrons (e.g.,
Tanner, 1986; Van Klaveren,
1988) as

strategies for lessening the
effects of dependency on the
United
States and widening the range
of foreign policy choices
available to
Latin American states.
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Gerhard Drekon
ja-Kornat (1983: 16-17)
•„
U) ha*
has identified
a group
up of
8
states that, in
the earl
S> Sh ° Wed 3 hl
"
* h international
profile
and hence a marked
degree
of aUt0n
a „*
8
° ffiy
the
relations:
3Zl1, Ar 8«t«a.
Mexico, and Venezuela
a!
8 Wlth
Special
of Cuba
Cuh
„
and
the new cases of
Nicaragua and Grenada.
For Drekonja .
Kornat, these states,
and especially
e fi
y the
flrst
rst fou
f
r, represent the
outcome 0£ an lmportant
Uarning proc£ss
„
apprenticeship|i
•

"

»

w

"

—-

toteriC '''

decades and siem'fv
signify m„
the emergence of

P0Uc y

,

this new £oreign

a

^

- P»v

^

i0U8 three

andahalf

"new
new Latin American
A
foreign

poUcy behavior

of

utin American

marked by the following
characteristics:

^

eaUr degree of a «°non,y
marked by a redefinif
I'f relations
of
rede£lnlt i°n
with the United Stir**
" vhlcht the Lati "
American state

'w

"
;

aceeots
with Washington!

states"^

3.

a

m»

Political disagreement

^

ac'cive'part llll't

—

Lati " A

high degree of geographical
diversification of

^

a high 1
61 ° f
tn,i
,
u
including
the

P artici Pation in Third World
fora '
Non-Aligned Movement;

a stronger negotiating
position based on better
training of diplomatic and
technical cadres;

5.

develop'mentT
7.

m

8.
a

^

°' technol

°^

^vance.ent and economic

a high degree of
predominance of the Foreign Ministry
mistry
the formulation of foreign
policy;

increased openness to international
trade, but with it
high degree of foreign debt
(Drekon ja-Kornat 1983: 17-19).
,

^

,

^—-— — —

The high foreign
debt of these

Utln

L*t-4
Utin

-

Pr V10USly aCqUired
ba
;

YetDrek0nj

states

P^r

is

a

"vulnerability- of
hes some of

*-----^

American foreign poliev"
P°^cy
8

„

a

Orekon.a-Kornat, 1983

.

the,
19 _
:in

fact Qf international

and

represents the slow but
clear l-r
a„ «
trans
format ion of the
international
economic and political
31
rder
1Dt ° ° ne in which
°
Latin America will
Play a more dynamic,
creative
creative, and powerful
role (Drekon ja-Kornat
1983: 22-23).
•

Juan G. Tokatlian (19fm
U983)

is

more pessimistic and
highly

critical of the assertion
that there

America's foreign relations.
income country" and

-

..

mediuffi

supposed to apply are po

is

anything "new" about Latin

^^

Hec notes that th.
the adesignations "middle

pouer „

„ ly

^

uMch

_

conceptual 2ed not ons

over a country's dependent
statu$

.

.

^

^^

gioss

^^

Peculiarities of its depended
role in the rnternational
political
economy (..,.. tne nature
and de g ree of extroversion
of its economy,
the extent of control of
foreign capital over the
dynamic sectors of
the economy, the role of
the state in capital
accumulation, the
domestic distention of wealth
and resources, etc.).
Moreover,
Tokatlian sees no clear pattern
emerging in the foreign policies
of
such states or even within any
particular such state. Finally,
he
questions whether dependent states,
no .natter how advanced, can
ever
really exercise true autonomy
and independence and he warns
of

confusing "relative autonomy" with the
real thing (Tokatlian, 1983:
175,182-183).

By contrast, Juan Carlos Puig
(1975/76: 10) reminds

i
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us that

"

f#-

•

18

possible that there exist
,•
in reality
absolute sit„„
f
s«uat lons of dependency
Qr auton;)ny _„

— *« —
-

"

-

—

-

-serine,

——

"""^
a

cal discussions,
the rest o£ the
recent

;

dependency taken as

a

given.
given

ChrOn0l ° 8iCal

Ually

^*-"

"n

;

™

—

"

Occassional ly ,

hOWV

"

-Holes

president or presrdential

""'

.

with

_

This

_^

el „ f

carried oat by

admiration.

«-

- "<•" - - P-e

case study

tive

<

Th„= case
These
stadias tend to
fooa s on

<*

P-icular

on

^^

a
.

Thus most
moi
o£

hrstory genre and
y

^

^

.king

ME_.

that have influenced
some aspect of a
state's f orei n poHcy
g
StUdieE
f L
in
°
^reisn poHc y making at the

"

bureaucratic politics
level are sorely lackine
' lackl "igstudy, Ca r] os J. Moneta

T
In
a ver y general

(1987) found that, i„
o0 st cases, the

foreign

P o,

lcy making subsystem
in La ti„

African states saffers
fro. contradictions
and inadecuacies that
seriously harm those
states' interests in the
rnternational system He
urges that the
foreign policy makrng
process be nodernized)
prof essio nal 2e d and
opened up however, he
fails to provide concrete
examples fro,
specific countries.
By contrast, Ester
Lozano de Key and Pilar
Manrlanda de Galofre
published an exceptional 1982
study of the
,

;

Colombian foreign policy ma ki„g
process that gives an interesting
look into the structure
and functioning of the
Colombian foreign

ministry as well as other
institutions and actors that
influence the
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ADOther

" P ° rta "

™

ln

*•

the recruitment
process of
°f

—3

-im,

"

«,

"

—
COU

u terature

" ry

8

"Plonatic corps.

mention the role of
academic institut;ons

^^

and training

has to d0 Bith

^

^^
^

Few case
iding

Process, so it is
virtually impossible
to assess the
„•
sophistication
professionalise of a country's
diplomats beyond Mre
•

and Maurlanda de
Calcfre's are needed.

With this hrief loop at
the literature,
comparative analysis of the
foreign

p olicy

„

can nov turn to our

per8pec t ives

_

capahilities, and contributions
of the four most
active states
the Central American
peace process from 1983
to 1986.
While
recog„i 2 i„ g the gap8 ;n
the case £tudy
uterature
_

to Piece together an
understanding of
of these states

in

f oreign

M

policy

in

^

^

^^^

their diplomatic search for
peace.

The Contadora Group States
General

RffflflrfT

By undertaking and persisting
in their efforts to build
a

diplomatic framework for peace talks
among the Central Americans,
the most active states making
up the Contadora Group -Mexico,

Venezuela, and Colombia
Gerhard Drekon ja-Kornat

~
's

manifested many of the characteristics
of

definition of the "new Latin American
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foreign policy"

(

Dre kon ja-Kornat

1983)

Th
These states also
gave
ev.dence of exercising
heterodoxical orr relative
rei ative autonomy
,
in
international and
regional polities .lb...
albeit 111
r yi»s Agrees
(Purg, 1975/76;
Tokatlian, 1983: 177).
,

'

(„•,„,
-ese

states share a
diplomatic history

-Pendent states vulnerable

B~a ln

™

•

'

„£

^^^

to the regional
hegemon

in the

centuries.

—MUty

nineteenth and toe
United States in the
twentieth
Moreover, their own
preoccupations with internal
in

toe nineteenth and

"eant that their
reactive.

f ore ign

relates

However, i„ the past

mch

of £he

^^

were usually pass.ve
or, at most,

^

^

_

^

country, these states
hsve become .creasingly
active in regional
-d international politics.
This new international
active is the

-suit

o f both the

increased internationalization
o f their economl es
as their development
processes have progressed
and the related need
to do a hotter joh
of representing their
state's interests in the
international system. Hence
their continued but altered
dependency
has required a more
active and effective foreign
policy

orientation.

Today these states are
classified as Newly Industrializing

Countries (NIC).

Quite different from the image
of poverty-

stricken "banana republics,"
these states are middle income
states
whose economies are being
transformed by the industrialization
process.

Although the peasantry, the rural
economy, and traditional

exports are still important, the
development strategies pursued by
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significant growth nf „^k
'long

«Uh

.an„ £acturi

S
'

also Er0

™^

-

eSPUe
of

„;
lesser

^

-tors

y

developed country"

^

"""-traditional experts have

of the economy.

-

(UC ,

— —on

from the status

to

that of NIC, Mexico,
Venezuela, and Colombia
are still
.rill structurally
dependent and thua
VUln able t0
ln deed. the
- conditions.
"80s were particularly rough
economically and facially

'"^

"

"~"

«—

for these
states. Th. global
recessions of 1979 and
1982 led to severely
depressed re g ional trade,
high unemployment,
high inflation> and
o£
course the crisis of
debt that pla ued Latin
g
America after 1982
Sol

Line

(1,88/89) and others have
noted that as a result
of the
oebt crisis and rts
associated austerity policies,
Latin America as
a whole has loat
a full decade of
development. More recent

observers

au gg est that livin
g standards

fallen to those of thirty
years ago.

It is

in many

countries have

therefore very

significant that these Contadora
Group states undertook
their
diplomatic mediation efforts
in Central America
the debt

^

crisis was well under way
and maintained their efforts
througout the
difficult decade of the
1980s.

These Contadora Group states
share several

s

imilar it ies and

differences with regard to their
general foreign policy orientations
and their interests

countries share

a

in

the Central American conflicts.

All three

foreign policy tradition that emphasized
legalism,

the principles of international
law, and the Bolivaran ideal as
the
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—

•

*°r protecting
national sovereignty
_

««

stiu 8aiiMt

-tl—

sovereignty .

^

AUhough

Participation" in Drekonja .
Kornat . s notion of

aMlitie.

^^

in dealing with each
other,

^_

the United States, and
other

Moreover, each has manifested
aspirations for

leadership ro le in the reg.on
as well as

The president renins

international

tv,~
u
They
have shown greater
political will

self-conf.dence, and the
ability t0 experiffient

international actors.

^

Latin

to take an acti v ist
role in regional and

politics in recent years.
vpsrc

a

^

traditi o n has cone t0
focus on natiMai
economic

present

in

in

third world for..

foreign policy decision ma
kl n g

each state, but, with the
exception of Col 0mbia, there
seems to
have been a growing prof
ess ionalization and
sophistication of the
in

foreign ministries in the

policy as

a

formation

and implementat ion of foreign

result of this new international
activism (or

"apprenticeship," to borrow Drekon
ja-Kornat 's term).
With regard to their foreign
policy interests in Central

America, it is significant to note
that each of these Contadora
states had initiated recent apertures
to Central America (and the

Caribbean), creating growing economic
as well as political and

cultural interests in the region.

Hence all had economic and

political tools available to coax the
Central Americans along in the
peace

process, at least in the beginning.

With regard to the

Central American conflicts, these three
Contadora states shared the

— ««

underdevelopment and soclaI

^_

^_

p„l ltical instabilUy
and vioUnce>

*«.

that the old

«-

^

^

pass

ideas about exactly

should look

l

ike .

Nevertheless,
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^_^

^
au

^
^ ^

a ll

^
on

ejected the imposition
rejected
of the
East-West conflict on t
the region's troubles
end the related
growing
-Uit-i-tU. of the isthmus from
whatever q uarter. Ml
manifested
strong
concern that the region's
*
conflicts could escalate
to the
Point of regionally war
and further endanger
their own national
security interests
—namely,
cne rear
fear of h»i
1, the
being adrawn into such
a
conflict and having to
choose sides the stress
of receiving even
-re refugees from the region,
the continued stagnation
of regional
trade hindering economic
recovery;
•

™ u

;

and so on.

Thus, at a general level,
there were many similar
foreign
policy reasons for these
Contadora states to undertake
the building
of a framework for
peace talks in Central America.
We can now study
each country's specific
foreign policy motivations,
interests, and

contributions to the Central
American peace process.

Mexico
Mexico

is

one of the states identified by
Drekon ja-Kornat as

participating in the "new Latin American
foreign policy" during the
early 1980s and can even be said
to be a model.
However, the

country did not become such
whether

it

a

remains such today.

model easily, and it

is

doubtful

Despite an early bid for

a

leadership role in the Latin congress
movement (see Chapter II),

—
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-

.««-

int0 . rather defensive

Md

isoutioni8tic

world for most of
the nineteenth

« «n—
^*

country preoccupied
.,

u

wth

auo

chronic

^end Us

"" UrieS

ty year

,

inte

Indeed> MexicQ . s
struggie

^

sovereign^ during the
defin6S

poUticai

suffered the hunillatlon
of

United States and an
inperial

—--

^^^^

*

«

I*-

_

^

a

^
cosUy

Mr

tion witiin

^

estabush

^

^

^

-reign reUtions during

period and beyond.

that

After the Mexican
Revolution, the country's
foreign poUcy
continue, to taxe second
plaC e to the government's
internal
Political projects, and the
geopolitical real lty of
neighboring an
emergent power like the
United States meant that
this bilateral
relationship wou.d dominate
Mexico's lim.ted diplomatic
agenda.

interest in regional and
world politics and broaden
its foreign
policy agenda. At the beginning
of I960, President Adolfo
Lopez
Mateos embarked upon a tour
of South America.
Soon thereafter,
Mexico was invited to join the
Latin American Free Trade
Association
(LAFTA) as a founding member
and joined in signing the
Montevideo
Treaty in February (Rico, 1987:
122).

Mexico's new interest in regional
economic integration was the
first step in the development of
policy.

a

more active and assertive foreign

As noted in Chapter IV, during
the 1960s Mexico challenged

and resisted United States'
efforts to isolate Cuba from the OAS

system and, in the wake of the Cuban
Missile Crisis, Mexico took the
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lead in negotiating
a regional treaty
oeciaring Lata
y declaring
Latin America
to be
a nuclear free
zone, culminating
the 1968 Treaty
T
,
6 in tne
ofc Tlatelolco
'

—
kU "'

IM "

337 -" 8

!

-ions

=^

Mexico also

its activisn in
th . United Na£ions

efforts t0 „ ard estabUshing

^^^

6coMnic

Cent ral teerica at
thi8 time _

<*stav Dla2 o r dax
administrations, several
U,,dertaken

urease

»"

trade

African Bank

r el ations>

of Economic

^
^

yentures sere

^rica,

^

such as efforts to

promote Mexican

fa

^

Integration (Rico, 1987=
123).

Nevertheless, Mexico's
international role in the
1960s regained
cautious, lifted, and
generaUy accep£ing o£
regiMai

^

international status quo
(Gonzalez

G.

,

1984:

447).

This role began to change
significantly in the 1970s. The

stagnation of Mexico's
import-substitution development Model,
the
crisis of legitimacy of the
political system after 1968, and
the
apparent lach of interest on
the part of the United States
to give
Mexican exports preferential
access to the protected U.S.
market all

Played

a

role in spurring a change
in Mexico's foreign policy

orientation.

President

new foreign policy both

Lux's

in

EcheverriVs administration developed

style and substance.

Punctuated by

a

strident nationalistic rhetoric,
its main features included

strengthened political and ideological
support for national
liberation movements and leftist governments
in Latin America, an
explicit identification of Mexico's
interests with those of the

a
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^

to play a leadership

Int

" nati0nal

f

T7

D0lO8y
-

"

D "'

"«

- «- »

-

u"

^ tuciu

growing trade deficit
,,j
and

New

a

_

Assembly, and an

-

- -» this

^

-

sources o £ capital and

assertivene8s , hovever>
.

f„
f
oreig
•

underscored the fact nf m
of Mexico

s

of it. objective
bases of power

n indebtedness

in the

early 1970s 5

cootinned dependency
and the limits

«Wl„

G.

,

1984:

450

^ 52)

After 1976, tbe Lope,
Portillo administration
pursued a .ore
Pragmatic and measured
forergn policy without
abandonning tbe desire
to Play a leadership
role in regions!
and tbird world fora.

Tbis

administration was able to st«h,li.„
stabilize the economy in
the short term
signing an agreement
with the IMF. but it
also benefitted in tbe
longer term from the new
discoveries and paction
of petroleum at
a time when oil
prices were high.
Thus by 1978-1979, Mexico's
economic power bad increased,
its status as a medium
power was
strengthened, and its room for
autonomous action in regional
and
international politics was
opening up as well, with
Mexico's top
diplomat, Jorge Castaneda,
taxing over as Foreign
Minister, Mexico
sought to develop petroleum
as a tool of a new foreign
policy "based
on traditional principles,
but adjusted to present
realities"

^

(Gonzalez G.

,

,

1984-

w

456;.

M»
Mexico
joined ™
Venezuela in creating
•

,

the Program of Energy
Cooperation for Central America
and the

Caribbean through the Pact of San

Jose"

in

August 1980.

Thus, as the decade of the
1980s opened, Mexico had become

significant regional and international
actor.
policy goals and interests were
clear:

a

Its general foreign

Promoting national economic

—
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f

i8

—

g ;;; •
a

—

poli
;

-

^ * country,

bargaining

medium power , Mexico
could

«el«ed goals included
Baintaiaiag

»U h

a

^

^

ensure its

^

system,
^

uadership

^ ^ tin

ana the third world
„ ithout jeopardizing
cordiai

^

:ions

the United States,
diversi£ying the country ,
g ecoMmic

relation, with other
regions of the uorld

Ut„

^

t0 this

^

Md

dependen

t0 act with relative
autonony

^erica

^
_

~»

*

,

promQting

AMritan cooperation,
and continuing t0
defend

of international

law

_

^

tbfi

~especial ly those concerned
with national

sovereignty, such as
non-intervention and
self-determination.
The new centralit of
foreign policy and Mexico's
y
new
international activist has
meant that the nature of
the foresign
policy making process has
become
ioportaat
president al
leadership and initiative
have reined significant
in Mexico s
forexgn policy process;
however, since Castaneda, the
Mexican
foreign minister has come
to exercise a significant
degree of
leadership on his own account.
Indeed, many observers have
credited
Bernardo Sepulveda Anor, Foreign
Minister under President de la
.

_

Madrid, with

a

process going.

significant role in keeping the
Contadora peace
As an institution, the Mexican
foreign ministry has

also been generally credited
with developing

a

high level of

diplomatic sophistication and experience
over the years which was
crucial to the institutionalization
and functioning of the Contadora
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Process (Gonza'lez
G.

,

1984- ^66,
466- Bagley
Ra i
and Tokatlian, 198724-

Valero, 1985:
131; VanKlaveren,
1985b: 42).

A * of 1983, Mexico
had at least ei.hf
eight research
institutes
devoted to the study

of some aspect
P Ct of
inr emational
° f lnt
relations 6

(Drekonja-Kornat and
Tokatlian, 1983- 557)
557). aim.
Althoughu there has
been
°°
3 £udy
this question
it u reasonaMe
,
to hypothesize
the creation of
these in£titutes
a posUive infiuen
on Mexico's recent
foreign poUcy ac[ivism

«

^^
^

^
^

capable diplomats to
the foreign

Gonzalez G. (1987>B7. 2'5S-9Sft
255 258) uhas noted that
the increased
sophistication and expertise
of the6 Mexico
Mexica n fforeign ministry
have
come about primarily
uith regard to
>

>

while accuiring the
technical skiUs necessary

^

^
^

^

aggressive foreign economic
policy continues to be a
problem
Moreover, curing the 19
80s, tbere bas been a
tendency toward tbe

"feudali.ation" of foreign
policy decision making, with
politicodiplomatic matters regaining
within the foreign ministry
but foreign
economic policy matters being
increasingly controlled by
governmental agencies charged
with internal economic and
development
7
policies.
Bureaucratic rivalries and turf
battles have emerged.
Nevertheless, in the context of
the Central American peace
process,
it is clear that by the
early 1980s and after, the Mexican
foreign
ministry had developed significant
diplomatic skills to both

undertake and maintain its diplomatic
effort.
As for its role in the Central
American peace process,

participants and observers alike have
agreed that Mexico's

Uade " hiP

^

dedi

——

"

Persistance of ^uucaaora
Contadnro (.Talavera
Ct
i

qqn
iy90
l

1

.

'

1991; Arias Sanchez

lqqi
i
99I> u
Valer0
.

'

"

.

-ation
j
r
B
endana,

and

«m

1985

1990; Solis,

"85; Karl, ,986).

'

„
L k
Like
the
other Contadora
Group states, Mexico
had

-rests
10

at stake

"*""™*> »

„
"0'

Central te„ica.

^fore, Mexico

had

since

^

^

deHherate ly

sought to increase
its economic and
poHtical role in Centra!
-«ica and had consequently
developed subhegemonic
interests
"Sioo. W ith its e,„ 8io8 .,
phere of influence „
£uraon>

-Id

not ig nore the
regiMal crises

^
^ ^

^

in

the

Mexico

^

Moreover>
e
between 25,000 and
35,000 re fug ees from
Guatemala and another
6,000
to 12,000 from E,
Salvador had fled to Mexico
(Meislin, 1983a:
A10).
He ig htened horder
tensions with Guatemala 8
were an unweicome
_

effect of the re ional
g
violence and threatened the
stability of
Mexico's troubled southern
n stat
state.
m.. economic
es.
The
burden of caring
for these and .ore
refugees at a txme when
Mexico was feelin the
g
first effects of the debt
crisis was also a problem
Disrupted
trade with Central America
further contributed to a
difficult
economic situation and
jeopardized the prospects for
economic

recovery (Van Klaveren,
1985b: 40-43, 48; Karl, 1986:
274, 277).
But a peaceful border and
economic ties with Central America

were not the only interests
at stake for Mexico.

The government

also found itself confronted by
a resurgent United States
seeking to
reassert its hegemony over its
traditional sphere of influence.

Wishing to avoid a direct confrontation
with the United States wluch
it

knew it could not win, the Mexican
government was nevertheless

alarmed by the
possibility that
U.S. „„i
7 cnat US
policies toward the
region
t. . r egionali ,ed
Bar forcing Hexico
at the
,
ieast>
to choose siaes.
Moreover, and unlike
the United
•

-«

•

1-

««ic M

government did not
perceive revoiuUon

as a threat.

^ ^^
se

^

0 n the contrary, Mexico turned
to its own

reVOlUtiODary hl

" 0ry

«"

defense o f the principle

of self-deter.ination
as guides to its
Centra! African policy.
By late 1982, the
Mexican government's
objectives in Centra!

America became clear:

Io work t0 impede th .

^^.^ ^ _

that could lead to the
"Lebanonization" of Centra,
America; to
oefend the principles of
self-deter.inat.cn and
non-i„terventionism;
to support the emergence
of nationalist governments
committed to
reforms ar^ed at eliminating
the causes of the region's
political
and economic crises; and
to develop an alternative
to D. S. policies
in

Central America through

a

collective effort involving ether
Latin

American states (Van Klaveren,
1985b: 41-42).

The formation of the

Contadora Group and the development
of the Contadora peace process
served these ends well.
Along with the energy of Foreign
Minister Sepulveda and other

Mexican diplomats to keeping Contadora
going, Mexico played an
important role in the peace process
with regard to Nicaragua.

Its

largely sympathetic attitude towards
the Sandinista government

encouraged Managua that its interests would
not be ignored, thus
keeping Managua involved in the peace
process.

Indeed, the

Sandinista government considered Mexico to be
its most helpful and
trusted advocate in the peace process (Bendana,
1990; Talavera,
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1990).

Mexico's cautious
and proper
Proper relaM
relations with Guatemala
Played a role in
encouraging
ng the l.
tf . - . continued
latter
8
participation
and neutrality i
n the peace
process
MP
S

—

t*

other Central

^
ta

P ° Utlfi " 1

riCan St3teS
•

~

1-

clear.
The meffibers
of the Tegucigalpa
Group at different
6nt ti™.
tlmes ex Pressed
some concern

-/or

resentment towards
what they perceived
to he Mexico's
'-hegemonic interference
in their affairs
(Purcell, 1 985: 88
VOUO, 19 S5: 46 ). -t
maintaining g00d relatl0ns
wUh Mexic had
its benefits.
.

;

"exico had some
potential economic in£luence
A" mCanS

US

ventures, and petroleum
subsidies „ ith
San

W

(Maira, 1985: 381)

.

Hovever> Adol£o

centrai

^
^^
^^^

PKSM ce,

'

vM

joint economic

f

109) argues ttat neither
Mexico nor Venecuela used
their economic
tools to force
. successful conclusion
to the Contsdora
process,

"exreo appar ent ly bad
guaranteed Nicaragua's foreign
debt and became
a major aid donor in
an
£o

greater rad ical izat ion (Karl,
1986: 275).

^^

But by late 1984 and

1985, it became clear that Mexico's
own economic ana debt
crises
Preclude, greater use of its
economic tools to influence
tbe Central

Americans.

In fact. Mexico temporarily
suspended petroleum supplies

to Nicaragua and Costa Rica
in 1984 and 1985 because
they were

behind in their payments.

But rather than being a
"punitive"

measure again st them, the suspension
v a s the result of Mexico's own
economic difficulties and the
short term considerations of
officials
in PEMEX and

the Ministry of Finance, not the
Foreign Ministry.
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Nevertheless, the
suspensions aid
did cost Mexico
Mp
some influence with
these countries and
contributed
routed to an
„„ erosion
of Mexico's prestige
the region (Gonzalez
G.•» 1987- 258-259;
2SR ?sq v
Karl, 1986: 275)

m

,

ton

"" b

on Mexico.

gr °" in S debt

, eclining

on

prices

^

shrioking

^

wakened Mexico's internatiooa,
international position
•

^cea

a more cautious

foreign policy .

Dn lt ea States
deteriorated markedly duri
„ g 1986 10
further to a lower
international p r o fil e (Meyer,
1987: 70-71
Meyer, 1988; Minor Maerr,
1,8 6; Eoazilez G

^

and

^^
74-

.

the Be La Madrid
administration remaineJ
for the Contadora
process.

Position, concerts i o
n

,

or

^

In deed, given Mexico's
weakened

„l tiUt .,.l

policy coordination with

other Latin African
states, became more important
than ever, hoth
»ith regard to Central
America and the debt crisis.
The Mexican

governor's interests

and objectives in Central
Amer lC a had not

changed; peace in Central
America regained crucial to
Mexico's long
tern, economic recovery
and its short term national
security
interests.

Mexico regained committed to
supporting a peaceful

resolution to the regional conflicts
even if

it

could not find

to reinvigorate Contadora
during the second half of 1986.

a

way

Though

cautious at first, Mexico came to
embrace the Arias Plan as the best
way out of Contadora's stalemate
and it participated

in

the

International Verification and Follow-up
Commission set up by the
Esquipulas Procedure.

Mexico's role in the Central American
peace

process was thus vindicated and its diplomatic
prestige salvaged.
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VenP7. U g]

a

Venezuela

„

^
^ ^^
^
^

also one o£ the states
nreKoo ja-Kornat
identified
as participating
in the „ nev Latin

^

1980s.

But like Mexico>

^

_

Passivity in its £oreign
reUtions _

P-occupiea its ea rly governments

Donestic ins

^

iiity

economic opportunities
br ou gh t Httle interest
from outsiae powers
Th. country was able
to avoia the concentration
of its traae with
any one ootsiae power
ana also escapea incurri„
g much foreig „ debt
until late in the nineteenth
centnry.
Occassional horaer conflicts
with its nei ghb ors ana the
promotion of migration
represent the
extent of Venezuela's forergn
relations in the nineteenth
century.
In the early twentieth
century, the centralising
dictator General
auan Vincente Gomez finally
hrou g ht a measure of
political stability
to the country a„a promoted
the aevelpment of the
petroleum industry
through concessions to foreign
investors.
By 1926, petroleum

accounted for half of the country's
export earning while North

American capital had acquired
industry.

a

preponderant position

in

the oil

Nevertheless, Venezuela's foreign
relations remained

limited, ana it

is

really not until the post Worla War
II perioa

—and especially since

the post 1958 democratic

Venezuela can be saia to have

a

perioa- that

clear foreign policy orientation

(Biez Cabrera, 1984: 542-545; Boersner,
1983: 400-401).

The foreign policy principles ana
orientations that aevelopea

after 1958 were foreshaaowea in the brief
revolutionary junta that
first brought R<Smulo Betancourt to power from
1945 to 1947.

In
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1958, ten years after
the Marcos PeVez
rerez Jimenez - military
tatorship had

~™ -

;r

BetanC0U
"

" "d

Pove, and .. t Venezuela
on

PrODOte de "° CratiC

economic development.

~.«.

^^xi^

~
the

jy,

.

GallegoOS

UD) party returned

foreign policy course

"

^
^^

* -isp^e

and spur

to

^

national

Both themes led
VenezueU out of its

traditional foreign poli
c y passivity and
into . more activist
regionally and globally
.
Support
denQcracy n

^

.

was both a

„ ttar

of principle

m

Md securUy

and reformist Betancourt
administration.

The "Betancourt Doctrine"

refused recognition of
governments coming to power
h y force after
1959 and sought to create a
hemispheric front that would
oppose the
surviving military dictatorships
in the region, such
as the
Trujillo, Somoza, and
DuvaHer dictatorships among
others.
The
doctrine was not initially
applied to revolutionar Cuha,
y
but as the

Castro regime moved further
to the left and as

it

came to support

armed struggle in Venezuela,
relations between the two
governments
deteriorated. The Betancourt
administration broke off diplomatic

relations with Cuba in 1961 and
supported the 1962 vote to suspend
Cuban participation in the OAS.
Despite this coincidence with 0.
S.

policy, the Betancourt Doctrine
rejected unilateralism and U.S.

interventionism.

Betancourt protested the U.S. role
in the Bay of

Pigs invasion and his successor,
Rail Leoni, led the rest of Latin

America

in

Republic.

condemning the 1965 U.S. intervention
in the Dominican

Although it was the centerpiece of Venezuela's
foreign

policy throughout the 1960s, the Betancourt
Doctrine lost some of
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I970E and gave uay
to the principu
of support

233; Boersner, 1983:
404-408u
Utt
B4ez rCabrera,
1984: 549-552).
The joint goal of
promoting8 the nation',
atl0D S ^onomic
independence
and ln dustri al
developBMt
other importMt

^

»

^

the means to achievp if
it.

Aa measure of
economic

W

^

nationals

and a

concerted effort by
Venezuela's progressive
kleadership
to "sow the
Petroleum" i„ order t0
fiDMce the country . s
industriaii2ation
Process le d the state t0
seek t0 regain

^^

controlled petroleum industry.

new effort included

Venezuela

The international
i nitiative

t0

c

„ ate

0r 8a „ i2ation of Petroleum
Export ng Countr es (QpEc)

^

^

.

.

^^

^

^^

drew the country far
outside the western hemisphere
and into contact
with the oil rich states
of the Middle East.
This new

multilateral^ expanded

into other arenas as well.

During the
1960s, Venezuela played an
active role in the formation
and

strengthening of the Group of
Seventy-Seven

a „d,

in 1964, became one
of the first Latin American
states to become an observer
-member of
the Non-Aligned Movement.
Venezuela also took an active
interest in
the creation of the Andean
Pact, however it delayed joining
the

organization until February 1973 U
(Baez Cabrera, 1984: 550;
Boersner, 1983: 406-407; Atkins,
1989: 194).
Under both the Christian Democratic
(COPED administration of
Rafael Caldera and the A££££ administration
of Carlos Andre's Perez
in

the 1970s, Venezuela's foreign policy
continued along the path of

greater international
activism.

The
ne Lalder
„
Calder*a administration
based
•

its foreign policy
on the notion of
"international
international social justice"

International Economic Order.

No rt„-Sout h politicE
beca „ e

^

more

important than East-West
west nolin*..
politics, given the period
of detente
between the superpowers
and a certain disillusionment
with

Washington's apparent
indifference towards Venezuela's
development
goals. Although it did
not participate in the OPEC
embarg0 against
states supporting I srae l
in the 1973 Yoffi Kippur

^

welcome the 400% increase
in petroleum prices
at

a time

^

when

Venezuela's import-substitution
industrialization policies had
reached their limits and new
capital wag needed

^

^

accelerate its economic development
(Boersner, 1983: 407-409; Baez
Cabrera, 1984:551-553; Karl,
1986: 278-279).
Venezuela's new oil wealth in
the mid 1970s gave the country's
leadership both the means and the
self-confidence to exercise

greater bargaining power vis-a-vis
industrialized countries and more
autonomy in its foreign policy. The
Pe'rez administration continued
to play an active role in the
third world demand for a New

International Economic Order and moved
to increase Venezuela's
presence in the

c

ircum-Car ibbean region.

Venezuela was beginning to play

a

Indeed, by the mid 1970s,

subhegemonic role in the region.

Not only were public and private
Venezuelan investments in the

Caribbean and Central America increasing (Maira,
1985: 381), but
Caracas moved to extend its economic aid to
the region.
1974, Venezuela began

a

As early as

program of supplying subsidized petroleum to

~W
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states ot the circu

^"

of sa„

^

aribbean> foreshadouing

with Mexico (Kan,

Venezuela implemented
an

"

a in
d

1

986: 279).

i9eo

Also in 1974,

«
Pr ° gra

" t0 Ce ""l Africa and Panama
designed to withhold
coffee exports in order
to stabilise
coffee
prices (Aftalion,
•

1975: 549).

Venezuela's new presence
in ,h.
the circum-Caribbean
region was
fe.t in other wa ys
as well.
The Perez administration
relations with Cuba and
developed a positive
relationship witb
Havana.
It maintained
. cordU1

^

^

Torrijos and ,ed hemispheric
support for Panama's
position in the
canal negotiations with
the United States.
I t played . role
Preventing . ,978 military
coup in the Dominican
Repuhlio end it
supported Belize in its
claims against Guatemala.
It collaborated
dose ly with Mexico -the other
aspiring regiona! subhegemoni„

„

encouraging multilateral
cooperation in Latin America
and the
Caribbean aimed at increasing
the region's economic
and political
autonomy (Boersner, 1983:
409; Karl, 1986: 279).
In short, Caracas
developed an active economic
and political presence in
the circumCaribbean region in the mid to
late 1970s that tied the
region's
fortunes (and misfortunes) to
those of Venezuela.
Caracas also played a significant
role in aiding the Nicaraguan

opposition to overthrow Anastacio
Somoza.

Ties between the AD and

Nicaraguan opposition leaders (such
as Arturo Cruz,

Ede'n

Pastora and

others) as well as the old animosity
for Somoza since the days of

Betancourt were important reasons for
Venezuela's involvement, but
the extent of its support for the
Nicaraguan opposition was

319
unprecedented.

SUPPly

S0Ur

Pp'
ThP Perez

°P««ion

""

A
adm^stration
coordinated
.

with Panama and Costa
Rica to So
Klca
Somoza

*~ *

(«.

W
—
-

tial elections in

0CratiC (C °

Venecia

brought

m)

"

- -«»

-i*

t „e

hin . significant
(and

Partisan change of foreign
poHc y too, shape.

ChrisMan Bemocratic
counterparts

s

!»., 280 ).
o PP osin g

—a

.

.

mass ve

a

opposition.

H0V6ver

Crista

Campios, to power

^
Concerned about his

in a post-Somoza N
lcaragua

,

Herrera Campins cooled
Venezuela's support £or the
Sandinistas and
conditioned Venetian
economic aid to the
Sand.nista government's
commitment to democrecy.
Betueen 19
and
Caracas cMtinued
Provide some ? 150 minion
in

„

-

^

credUs

the federation of the
Ssndinista government, hut
in 1981, Caracas
ended its economic aid
and cut Nicaragua off
from its subsidized

petroleum ostensibly

„ ti

,

Managua paid

281).

u§

^^

Caraces also increased its
involvement with Christisn
Democratic end other opposttion
forces ins.de Nic arag ua.
Liaise.
Herrera Cempins ceme to the
personal friend)

W

a id

of fellow Christian
Democrat (and

Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador,
who w a s the

sole remaining civilian in the
governing junta after January 1980.
The coincidence of Herrera

Cains'

position towards Nicaragua

and El Salvador with that of
the United States should not
be taken
as evidence of a lack of
autonomy on Venezuela's part, as
Tokatlian

(1983: 180) suggests.

Indeed, Herrera Cempins reversed his
position

toward El Salvador after Duarte lost
the March 1982 elections to the

right wing ARENA's
ea i nq
& gains.

v
Moreover,
1

most outspoken
critics of the U
islands war.

«sume

fading

a

S

^

™
P ° SltlOD
«
•

-

Thp course
m.,T-e.„ of
r
events i„

-Ui.-I-.i-

-

*

of Central

'
Hprr P r=a rCampms
Herrer
was one of the

1

^
^
^^^

Falkland/Malvinas

982 and the grouing

ud

^^^^

closer coordination o£
it< regional

t0 the «e x ican-Venezuelan
oeclaration of September
1,82

"Sins President Keagan
end U.S. support
t0

..

t0 undertake
negotiations w ith Kicaragua
and

former SoaocUta

^

1986: 283-284).

^

Herrera Campins' policy
reversals do su est,
gg
however, a lack
of institutional
strength on cne
the part of t-fc
f
the foreign
ministry in the

formation

of

Venecia's

forei g n policv.

appears that presidential
leadership and the
Person

Stated differently, it
id

iosyucrac ies of the

office continue to he
more important in formulating
Venezuela's forei n policy
g
than is the foreign m i„
is try.
Baez
Cahrera (1984: 553) has
noted, without elahoration,
that despite
havi„ g developed skilled
ne g otiators and diplomats,
especially in
the field of oil politics,
Venezuela has not been able
to "multiply
its administrative
capacities in a form corresponding
to the
in

accelerated multiplication of
its financial resources,"
especially
in the case of foreign
policy.

Moreover, Karl (1986: 280) notes

that the Venezuelan foreign
ministry, "a traditionally weak

bureaucracy," had "suffered from
the concentration of power

in the

presidency that had occurred during
the Perez years" (see also
Wilhelmy and Vio, 1986: 111).

Herrera Campins continued to

C1

^

~"

-

-

in carrying out
his

w ilhelmy and vio
(19g6!

foreign poUcies

llMij>

juridical basis for
presidential
d6ntlal

PUC

1,

^^-^

C0 PE1 party

_

^^

*

f o-i gn policy
in the
Venezuelan system,
but they add that th.
the constitution
y
has also
created a significant
role for former
f«
presidents in continuing
to
shape the country's
foreign policy.
P ncy.
After leaving office,
former
PreSide S beC °" e
i

"

"»

leader

-

-*

bought

statU8 .

tt or not

^
^
„

~

Prolong^

their

The president
.

in the per

on by the ex . Presidents

"Snificant

«

£

dispute

,.

^

fM natiMai

this dispute

in the field 0£
foreign affairs

_

Thus>

appears that Venezuela
has not yet developed

forergn ministry „ ith

.

.

^

unuke

_

^

^^^^^

measure of institutiona]
influence Qver

formulation end implementation
of foreign policy.

However, like
Mexico, the Venezuelan for
e lgn ministry does
suffer
problem of competition
Bith other ministries
the
Qf
Energy and Mines> the
Ministry q{

^^^

^^

the Institute of Foreign
Trade, and others) for
authority over the

various spheres of Venezuela's
foreign relations
It

is

.

also important to note that,
at the societal level of

analysis (Rosenau, 1976), puhlic
opinion
appears to have played
the president.

a

in

the Venezuelan democracy

role in the foreign policy
orientation of

At the very least, beyond
party politics, public

opinion appears to set limits to
the range of variation in the

country's foreign policy.

Herrera Campi'ns' early Central American
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Policies dra „ heavy
publlc criticisn

^

to Was hi „ 8ton and
too interventiQnistic

Pontics.

Repr e S e n tin

»-«.*.. He„e ra

8

.

even fr0E

s»xp has been the ruIe
in
Thus
to

aortic poutic.

derate

^

^^^^ ^

tM
Sai

more conservatiye
£action of

Ca mpi'ns faced a rare

-tUtive., eventual

debate

^

^ orM

christiM

^ ^ _ ^ ..^^

,„„„.,.„

o£ consensus

M

for ei gn policy si.ce
1958 .

aiso Play ea . rol e in
£orc in g He rrera C aopina

his Central American
po.icies in 1982 and int0
19g3>

when campaigns for
national elections got
ont under
a
way (Karl, 1986: 282283; Medina, 1985: 72
75)
By returning t0
regional
with Mexico and the
non-intervention principle, the
Herrera Caupx'ns
administration found the Contadora
initiative t0 be the begt
to follow in protecting
Venezuelan interests in Central
America.
After February 1984, the
new president, Jaime Lusinchi
(AD),
,

continued to follow

a

.

more bipartisan and pragmatic
Central American

policy and played an important
moderating role within Contadora
(Medina, 1985: 76; Wilhelxny and
Vio, 1986: 113).
Given this confluence of factors
influencing Venezuela's

foreign policy in the early to mid
1980s, the country's interests in

Contadora were as extensive as Mexico's,
but they were also somewhat
more moderately stated.

Like Mexico, Venezuelan economic ties
to

Central America had become significant;
thus the region's peace and

stability were considered important for
Venezuela's economic
security, particularly in the context of
deteriorating regional
trade and falling oil prices in the wake of the
global recession and
the Iran-Iraq War.

13

Venezuela also was concerned about the
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elation

could lead t0

"-«..-. rejection

-ever,

«

wen

.

regi

_ _
ide

of the East . Hest

confUct

^

unlixe Mexlc0>

^

vene2ueu

^

^

Mderiying

_

as

^

those o f the United
States as exacerbating
th . East .Hest
dimension of the regional
conflicts
unnicts. Caracas
Car*,
was critical of the
Sandinistas' de.oc.atic
credential, and more cool
than Mexico to
Hague's concerns in the peace
process.
lndeed , Nicaraguan

d.plomats involved in the
peace process viewed

Venecia

as far less

helpful or sympathetic
than Mexico (BendaSa,
1990; Torres, 1990;
Talavera, 1990). Nevertheless,
Venecia did oppose the O.S. trade

embargo against Nicaragua.

After

Jose'

Napoleon Duarte's return as

president of El Salvador after
May 1984, Caracas tended
to balance
Mexico's support of Nicaragua's
positions with its own support
of

Duarte's positions (but not
necessarily those of the Onited
States)
within the Contadora process.
Caracas also encouraged Guatemala's
active neutrality in Contadora
(Wilhelmy and Vio, 1986: 134, 1 39 140).

Thus, Venezuela had clear economic
and political interests that
it sought to secure through
its

involvement in Contadora.

Moreover,

Venezuela's Contadora policy was guided
by the consensus principles
of regional solidarity, the peaceful

-and regional- solution

of
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"sputee. non-interventronis..
self . deteraination

—

cr«„

»*-">.

Us capacities

and contributions
t0

»ere lmportant and
complemeDted those

Master

_

representative

human rights and
ideologicai piurausm

of Poreign Affairs

_

career

^

^^^^

t „.

^^

^

^^

»a» recogni Z ed by
international observers as
playi „ 6 . very actiye
role in Contadora's
Technical Croup „ hile other

»Uh

experience at multilateral
consensus building have
been
described as "invaluable"
in Central Africa
(Medina. 1,85- 82Karl, 1986: 278). Moreover.
Venezuela brou g bt its
Internationa!
Prestige as a stable de.ocratic
repubHc and credible regions!
and
international actor to the
peace process. The country's
election to
the UN Security Council
in 1985 for a ter B fro.
19 86 to 1988 was an
indication of its continued
international prestige and an lm
portant
boost to its role in the
peace process (Wilhelmy and
Vio. 1986: 116;
Bras, 1988: 72).

Unfortunately, the economic
difficulties Caracas began to face
after 1983 meant that its
economic tools, especially petroleum,

became less useful than they might
have been otherwise.
could no longer use its petroleum
as

a

Venezuela

bargaining tool with the

United States, and, like Mexico,
it lost important leverage over
the

Central Americans when it was forced
to cut back its subsidized oil
sales in 1986.

Yet by that time, Venezuela's economic
and domestic

political situation was still better than
Mexico's or Colombia's,
and

it was

Caracas that rose to inject new life into
the stalled

peace process by sponsoring the successful
Caraballeda meeting of

thfi

C

°" ad0ra

<Wllhelmy

iMlly

^

Gr ° up

Vl °- 1986

VeneZUeU ' 6
'

;

ad0

^

«<

" P "lUeled

131;

=

p

in January of
1986

.U^,

-

"™ —

1987:95-97,
Colombra witMn

-

such as £he debt
crisis as veil as
petroleum Policy
policy with Mexico
M.
and border conflicts

»« Cl-u.

Iu d ee d

.

Presets

Lusinchi

Md

^^^^

<Coionbia)

<evelope d a personal
friendship that
relations and downplaye.
more traditiona,

between the two countries
ntnes (wiiui
(Wilhelmy andJ „.
Vxo, 1986: 137; Hazleton
1984)).

bnUnce. Venezuela was

On

»

the

fetation

by 1986

face d

a„ d contrnuation of
the

it was clear that
Caracas was

P-gress
it

a central p layer and
moderating

as well as the
.

Centura

process.

£orce

However

frustrate. witi the lack ot

averse economic

an d political situation

Caracas thus welcomed the
signing of the Esquipulas II

Procedure and participated
in the International
Verification and
Follow-up Co ission, which
was based in Caracas.
With this new
phase of the peace process
under way, Caracas marntai„e
d its

M

cogent

to regional multilateralism
and policy coordination by

agreeing with the other Contadora
Group and Support Group states
in
late 1986 to continue to
meet periodically to discuss other
issues
of common concern, such
as the debt crisis (Bras,
1988:73).

Yet the

economic crisis and related domestic
political fall-out force d

Caracas to make the .domestic
political scene the focus of its
attention.

Like Mexico, Venezuela ha d found
both the scope and the

limits of its relative autonomy in the
1980s.
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n

i.

«)

-

in

lw

iatin

(Drekonja-Kornat, 1984- 340)
340).

BeXisario Betancur

-if«t
0rle "' ati0
"

u„
However,
(

1

S6emed

^

£oreign

^^

during the administration
o£

982- 1986 )

many important changes

^

foreign

he concluded that
Coionbia reoains

of the Latin
Anerican mainstream

Present

^^

not one 0£ the
states identi£ied by
Drekonja _Rornat

as Participating
in the

«-*.

«•«-.

u

>

Colombian £oreign poUcy

frM Us

"^

traditionai iou _ profiie
a

new regional activism

similar to Mexico's and
Venezuela's.
Like Venezuela, Colombia',
early aspirations of
diplomatic
leadership at the time of
the 0on g res s of Panama
and its role iu

subsequent Latin congresses
easily gave way to

a preoccupation with
domestic political problems
in the course of the
nineteenth
century. Yet an awareness
of the geopolitical
importance of its
Panamanian province to any
future transisthmian canal
and a jealous

concern for protecting its
sovereignty led Colombia to
develop
skillful ways of playing off
the European powers against
one
another.

As the United States' growing
power in the circum-

Caribbean region displaced the
European presence there at the
end of
the nineteenth century,
Colombian governments found themselves
increasingly unable to withstand
Washington's bid to undertake

unilateral construction of a canal. 15

The Colombian senate's angry

rejection of the Hay-Herran Treaty
(1903) as being too one-sided led

Theodore Roosevelt to support a plan
for

a

Panamanian independence (Roosevelt, 1922).

revolt that led to
The traumatic

,
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d^er^t
Sive up

Us

of Panama from

Colonbu

^

^

NovMber

Caribbean idantity and
withdrau

^

caribb

<*»U1.

1959: 249; Drekonja .
Kornat> 1984; 3i7 _ 3i9;
1985a: 158).

^^

^n

Vm

Washington's role in
Panama , s indepeDdence
brougbt about
strong Colomhian
resentment towflrd
regionai
<»e »° it ea States

t0 repair relations

^

for lt< loss during
the wilson adminiEtration

t-rrutia-Thompson Treaty
(1921/22).

confensate

^^^^

.

_

culBinat ng

,

n

^ ^^

By this time

President (and former
Foreign Hinister)

^eloping

^

^

,

Colombia's

Fidei

a new attitude towards
Washington that set bilateral

relations on

a

much more friendly course.

President Snare*

summarized his new foreign
policy orientation towards
the United
States in the brief phrase
respite P0 ,„ m , or , look t0 the North
St.r." indicting Colombia
willingness to be pulled into
the U.S.
orbit

16

and

follow U.S. leadership

in

the hemisphere.

Soared dictum became the guiding
principle
policy for the next fifty years.

of Colombia's

After World War

dependable supporter of the United
States

President

H,

forergn

Colombia was

a

in the OAS (whose first

secretary general was Colombian
Alberto LLeras Camargo) and in the
UN (Colombia was the only Latin
American country to send troops to
fight in Korea).

However,

a

decade of civil war beginning in 1948,

the conservative bipartisanship
of the National Front after 1958,

and a guerrilla insurgency beginning
in the 1960s contributed to the
low international profile of Colombian
governments (Drekon ja-Kornat

1984: 320-323; Atkins, 1989: 61).

» >-*
And " n
member.

^

^hrs new trade

C0UDtry

-t*«i- Plan as . foundlDg
opened trade
" de d00rs
d
'« E "ope and Asia

The government
also

'

8

^ ^^^^^ ^

*. loo k Co its Andean
neighbQrs

P

~-

oHo y

trade P

proved successful in

^

-ports

1

diversity

the

'

and created an
advantageous accumulation
of international
international reserves to
finance
development (Drekon
ja-Kornat 1984- J/b
326-330JJ0 v an ri
Klaveren, 1985a,
1

*

>«>•

I-

19", President Alfonso

;

^^

Lope, Miehelsen „ as
reporteJly

able to turn down
bilateral f inancial aid
£ro „

^

With this enhanced
bargaining position during
the .id 1970a
President Lope 2 Michelsen
began to implement a new
foreign policy
orientation that, while not
as daring as that of
Mexico or
Venezuela, nevertheless
shared some of the same
characteristics.
His administration
(1974-1978) sought to distance
itself fro.
Washington and expand
diplomatic relations with more
states around
the world, including
reopening relations with Cuba
in 1975.
It als

Participated

in

the discussions for a New
International Economic

Order and joined Venezuela,
Costa Pica, and Panama in the
"first"
Contadora Group's support for
a new U.S.-Panamanian
canal treaty.

LoW

Michelsen's successor, President
Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala

(1978-1982), continued this new
direction in foreign policy through
the first half of his administration.

President Turbay personally

visited Yugoslavia in July 1979 to
strengthen new bilateral
relations and two months later sent an
observer delegation to the

Non-Aligned Movement's meeting in Havana.

Moreover, the Turbay
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supported the

—

U,t„

„

pollticization „ of the

reco g ni 2ad the
SaDdlnista oppo£ition

p

^

^

anti-Somoza opposition,
the Turbav
Turbay administration
was taken aback
vhen the Sandinista
government registered
egistered its claim
to the San

^

•

1

«ut i0M

gre „ tense (Drekonja .
Kornat> 1984; 326 _
33Q;

1985: 127).
By 1981, severe!
factors led the Turfcay

s»e

si g „ifi cant changes

Tensions vitt Kicaragua)

in
.

.

ts

foreign

t „e

poUcy oriMtation

deteriorating

g ro„i„ g challenge of Colombia .
s

adverse effects of

^

^

_

^^^
^ ^

guerriiu

global recession on th
.

county

exports .„
contributed to Turbav's
r&ay s shift
shift- k„„i,
back towards closer
cooperation with
Washington.
Relations with Cuba were
suspended in March 1981,
Colombia backed off a bit
from the Non-Aligned
Movement, and Turbay
publicly criticized the
Franco-Mexican Declaration on
Central
America. Moreover, with
trade falling by 12% in 1981
from the
previous year, Colombia seemed
to have reached

export-led growth strategy.

the limits of its

The Turbay government was
hardpressed

to find new markets for
Colombia's exports.

It was as this point

that Colombia "rediscovered"
its Caribbean identity and
turned to
the circum-Caribbean region
as the locus of its new
economic and

political aspirations (Drekon ja-Kornat
1985a: 158).

,

1984: 330-333; Van Klaveren,
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Respite Turbay's

realigns
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lth U S
*
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exclusira
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,
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P° llc

the region,

inistrati0D - s Caribbean

Bas ln Initiative
developnent prograa
coropiicat

another regional oowpr i« #-»,
Power xn the

™
•

y

^

^

c

ircum-Caribbean.
Bogot^ moved to
develop new instruments
to increase its
it. influence
,1
with the
governments of the region,
rpci^n suchv as
technical and scientific
cooperation, economic
and financial aid,
.in
joint ventures, and
provisions of Colombian
coal.
In early 1982,
1982
ri
Colombia negotiated
~» into the Nassau Group, a
of regional po
of Canada, Mexico,
Venezuela, and the United
States, aimed at better
coordination of the doers'
foreign aid program in
the circusCaribbean (Pardo Garcfa-Pena,
1988: 100).
Thus accepted as the
"fifth" regional power,
Colon's new Caribbean policy was
paying
off.
Yet its interests in
regional stability and its
reading of the
deteriorating situation in Central
America (as well as its
position

w

^

in

_

the FalUands/Malvinas
Islands conflict) continued
to coincide

with those of the United
States (Drekonja-Kornat, 1984:
336-337;
Hoge, 1982: 6; Cepeda Ulloa,
1985: 130).

Such was not the case with
Turbay's successor, Belisario

Betancur Cuartas, who set Colombia's
foreign policy orientation in
yet a new direction.

Betancur was elected on

a

strong platform of

peace amid the public's fears of
growing political violence related
to Colombia's guerrilla groups,
the government's counter-insurgency

campaign, and emergent narco-terrorism.

Betancur's domestic peace

plan consisted of an amnesty for
all guerrillas willing to lay down

their arms and reinin
rejoin

a
a

more open
noHn^.i
P
P° Ut ^al process as well
as an
effort to negotiate
cease fires with m, *
the four major
guerrilla
uP£
This do
.
ucial lnternational
:
tn order to
gain the confidence

—
r

—

—

,

-

„

of the

to pre-empt any
internationai supfort

—P™
-b a

-

„r

Nicaragua __ BetMcur

^^^^ m

ve that sought t0
project Coiombia

"

^

,

s

ioternationai

peace in Central
America.

with W ashington and
,
moved
<b

^^

"""^ '~ ~«»-*«

t(>

f„„

improvfi

fuU membership

_

^

ai£o

a

^

^

diplomatic reIatiM£

the public opposition
of the Colombian
miutary)

ror th e nation's

^

reUtions

in the Non .AUgned

Movenent> making
Colombia the one hundredth
taun membpr
member «f
of m,
the organization (Hoge,
1982:
6; Van Klaveren. ^wa.
71
1985a» 158,
Sft
c
1 73-1 75;
Cepeda Ulloa, 1985: 131-132)
Moreover, Betancur sought
t0 play an active
1

l

,

-,

>

Africa, both by hosting

^^^

the first Latin conference
on debt

Cartagena (June 1984) and
by participating actiwly .„
Indeed, Betancur became
P erha P s the most significant
force

transform

the Contadora Group's

ongoing peace process.

in

in

initial call for peace into
an

Bis domestic peace process
depended on it.

Not only did Betancur notify
Mexico and Venezuela that be

supported the 1982 Mexican-Venezuelan
Declaration but he politely
admonished the two for not having
included Colombia in their

consultations.

After January 1983, Betancur's
personal diplomacy

within Contadora won hxm strong
support both at home and abroad.
April 1983 and again in July, Betancur
played

a

central role in

I„

mediating among the
Central Americans
mericans to get. them
u
to consider
ent

" inE

iDt0

~"

«»

AmbaSSad ° r RiCh

"d

S " 1Vad0r ' 8 FDR "
FMLN

^

*'

S

«•«<». the

— —

U.S. special envoy

— —-

"

efforts did not end

-tb

a

representative of

B

^^

Played a signrficant
encouraging the La
palma talks between
presidmt
the FDR-FMLN i n the
fall of 1984,
198A and he
tried, l ess successfully,
to mediate differences
between
ecween the Sandmista
government and
opposition candidate
Arf-i,^ Cruz
r
"ate Arturc
ln preparing for
the November 1984
ejections.
Unlike Mexico's
readers, He did not shy
may from
Publicly criticize the
united states as wen

»»•

I"

W

^

Soviet Union for their
roles in

^

international^

and esoal ati n
g
the re g ion's conflict,,
and he insisted that
the Contadora Act
contain an additional
protocol to he si „ed hy all
g
three powers
spelling out their le al
obligations to support the
g
implementation
of the Act.
Betancur's firm commitment
to the peace process
and his
even-handed mediation efforts
contributed to the widely held

perception that he was an
"honest broker" in the search
for peace.
Domestically, Betancur's peace
strate g y paid off with the
signing of
cease fire agreements with
Colombia's four guerrrlla groups
in March
and August 1984 (Van Klaveren,
1985a: 160-161; Cepeda Ulloa, 1985
:

139-141, 144; Chernick, 1988:
80).
In addition to his personal
prestige, Betancur had other tools

to use to encourage the Central
Americans to continue along in the

peace process, thanks to the new
regional aid programs developed by
the previous administration.

But Betancur went further.

He
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committed Colombian
economic aid t0
to Central
Cenr
a
Ame
^ca through CADESCA
•

,

.

.Econ6ini r n
y

Process

Sflgjfl]

,,],

^ ^^

which was created
within
icnin bbLA
SELA th
u
through, the
Contadora

U Member

lMJ

.

^

^

ax«ce economic

aid to the region
in March

Preferences ,„ Central

expo

lm

that

^^

„ ^
s

1985a: 159).

Unfortunately, by the end
cf

^

economy wa8 in serious
trouMe .
was losing lt . economic

t oo ls

t0

encomge

grMted

^
^
progress

.„

^

Process.

Moreover, Betancur was
losing domestic support
as his
domestic politics. and
economic policies began t0

mmU ^ ^

serious poUtical setback
was the take-over of the
Palace of Justice
in November 1985 h
y the M-19 guerrillas and the

dislodge the. by the military.

^^

^

With the domestic peace
process

discredited and the Contadora
process stalemated, Betancur
was
forced to moderate Colombia's
aspirations for regional leadership.
The Central American peace
process remained important, both
to
salvaging some prestige for
Colombia's foreign policy and to

deterring more guerrilla violence,
but Betancur had clearly lost
the
political initiative to a deteriorating
domestic situation
(Chernick, 1988: 92; Cepeda Ulloa,
1986).
His successor, President Virgilio
Barco (1986-1990), faced

continued domestic troubles, including
an increasingly bloody drug
war.

However, foreign policy was not abandonned
even if it took

more pragmatic line.

Barco remained committed to Contadora and

a
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l"er

to the Esquipulas

'«««,
the

in helping

Salvador

„

agreenent _

^^

governiDent in

the u nit ed states

,

,

especially uith regard

^

Washington, 6uch as the
reestabUshment of

Colon's
German

participation

in

bargarnrng power.

^^^^^^^

^

internationai

Barco also continued

the Group of Eight and
other Latin

efforts at forei n policy
g
coordination

areas (e.g., debt ) a£

^
^

_

^

Vet there „ e re areas
o£

agree.ent a„a the extradition
issue.

PDR-FMLN and

Barco maintaiMd

antl - drug strategies,
and the 0iS> ve£o

Development Ban,.

^
^

t0 sponsor a diaiQgue

Contrary t0 expectations

«~

Coioobia

. „ ea „ s

to

in

specific issue

^

As a further .eats to
that goal. Barco set out
to

refer, the country's foreign
ministry (Pardo Garc ia-Pena

,

1987 and

1988; Tokatlian and Pardo,
1988).

The wobbling of Colombia's
foreign policy since the mid
1970s
between its traditional lov-profile
alignment with Washington and
its more recent ambition
for autonomy and regional

leadership

result of several factors, both
foreign and domestic.

is

the

However, the

nature of Colombia's foreign policy
making subsystem, particularly
the weak institutionalization
of its foreign ministry, seems
to be

one of the more important factors
of this variation.

Colombia's

foreign policy suffers from »f rac t
ional izat ion" even more than
true in Mexico or Venezuela.

For decades, Colombia's foreign

ministry has been removed from negotiating
the country's
international coffee agreements, ceding to the
powerful Fondo

is
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an responsibly
COUntry

'

S

eXP °"

* «"

ln

representing

Md 8elUng

^.ti^

Mrket . In the ute
1960s, Colombia's new
trade policy vis-a-vis
.
a Vls the
th « Andean
„
Pact and
other regions vas
supported by the creation
of several state-owned
enterprises and agencies
that regained outside
of the foreign
ministry. Colons
does not suffer fro,
a lac k of
or
Professionals with e X perience
in
ltilateral c0
rcia]
out these people are
generally „ ot found in the
foreign ministry
(Drekonja-Kornat, 1984: 337-34n- T no
j
t,
Lozano de
7 340,
Rey and Marulanda de
Galofre, 1982: 91-99).
Within the foreign ministry,
archival material,

a

„

_

a

paltry budget, insufficient

lack of systematic policy
analysis, and

ineffectual advisory bod.es
are serious structural
problems.
Efforts to fix these problems,
including a program to improve
the
training of diplomatic cadres
with the help of France since
the
1970s, have so far had limited
success due to the persistence
of
clientelism. These problems have
further limited the participation
of the ministry in the
decision-making process (Lozano de Rey
and

Marulanda de Galofre, 1982: 60-71,
76-77; Drekonja-Kornat, 1984:
339).

These institutional weaknesses have
contributed to the

predominance of presidential initiative
in Colombia's foreign
policy.
at

Yet in addition to idiosyncratic
variables, various factors

the societal level of analysis appear
to shape the president's

foreign policy agenda.

Aside from the participation of the powerful

coffee and COImercial
interests> Coionbia ,
s
" llitary

'~ "

C

'

'

— —

7CHMS —

—
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r, S f0r6i8n
POli
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Conserves,
*eo logy
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P«« » tU
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^

P-nciples, giving the
presideDt

tend not to divide

^^^
orientation of the

C^U-.

«-«..

Refined

a

, d eology

foreign

„

^

^^^

^

tend to adapt their
different

^

or rnternational
circumstances,

pro _ traae

relaUve roies

r

or opposition, and
the „ inds of
.

gnerrilla -embers of Colombia's
FARC

ltaaau

,-,,, 1

_

^

gove

^

ent

^

be seen whether the P
atrioti c Union,

ttYolucinnnnn- dn c-1

Mtiook

^

.

thfi

^^
^

foreign policy (nor in
donestic pQUcy

but instead share
. generaUy pro .
West

of

^

new part y created by
former

h) and tbe older comnunist party>
w

.

n

have an impact on defining
the non-commercial
p ri „ c i ples and goals
of Colombia's foreign
polio y more cle a rl . 19 Yet
y
this party's

interests would likely be checke
d b y the still subst
a „ cia l in£lue „ ce
of pro-U.S. sectors in the
country's political spectrum.
Finally,

public opinion h a s tr ad ition a ll
y pl ayed a very limited role in

influencing the country's foreign
policy due to

a

general lack of

popular interest (Lozano de Rey and
Marulanda de Galofre, 1982: 7483; Drekonja-Kornat, 1984: 339-340).

Of the three Contadora Group
states studied, Colombia clearly
has the least advanced foreign policy
making process.

However,

Colombia has shown at various times since
the late 1960s that

it

has

-

*««ee t

^

ta k in g a mC re
active

^^

^
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^

Pursue its foreign
policyV interests
nterests. Unfortunately,
U f
.
its domestic
economic and Fpolitical
r ;*
ulcal rcrises
the late 1980s,
QftOo
especially the more
Dt e n erg ence of
narco-terrori 8n

m

-e

^

Cart6lS
'

C

" ated

bS
°

foreign policy potential.

—

1

^^

-

«-

^

^

^^

"evelop.eot of the country .
6

Dependency and KeUtive
Autoncay in Central
Carina:
The Costa Rican Case

^e

five states of Central

Africa are highly dependent,
with

extroverted economies that
are vulnerable to
international economic
conditions. Their h.story
is mark ed by
g reat power dominance and
intervention in their internal
affairs, with Great Britain
playin g
the role of he e n on in
g
.uch of the nineteenth century
and the United
States playing that role in
the twentieth.
Central America's

history

is

also marked by
uy repeated tailed
f=n^ attempts to reconstitute

the ill-fated political
union (the United Provinces
of Central

America) that existed from
1924 to 1838 (Moreno, 1928;
Lopez Mora,
1984; Karnes, 1976).

The most recent attempt at
regional

integration occurred through the
Central American Common Market, but
this experiment resulted in
increased economic dependence on
the

United States and fell apart in the
wake of the 1969 "Soccer War"

between El Salvador and Honduras (Nye,
1967;
Martz, 1975).

20

L<fpez Mora,

1984;

;

.

—

^-— —
^^».
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With the (qualified)
except.cn of Nicaragua,
Nicaragua rCentral
*
America's
endence on the
st

; itical

-

and

;°

•

iiit

ai American

dePende

in at

n„
0 C*

°

" a " ePtan«
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^

can pursue those
interests .
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the Central

anythin,

Ut in
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th.

teilM
relate

Ane tlca „ states.

°f

Wfc.
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^

Evea the

have heen abIe to

abnity

^

autonomy exerclsed

Indeed>

Policies.

«- * PoHtic,
u uouU ^ gQing

states h

of the

has not alvays
meant an

°f

£

,

lin „,

m.

°-

"

idMtify th6ir

»

^
~ —

automatic subord

£ot ltseconomic

-

as we have seen
in ch

;

,

fcy

^

space in Bhich

^

tM

exercise

^^
^^^

Part lac, the critical
(vi Z ., anti-status
,„„, perspective of
emergent regional powers
l ike Mexico or
Venecia, much

less the

relative economic power
and technical skills
of snch states, to
exercise a large degree of
freedom of Denver in their
domestic and
foreign poHcies. As Lopez
Mora (1984: 300-301) notes,
the Central
American states have traditionally
followed a conservative
foreign
policy oriented toward
supporting the international
status- q uo and
O.S.

leadership.

Moreover, their foreign ministries
suffer from

a

low degree of professionalism,
a high degree of
clientelism, and a

high degree of subordination
to the president (or other
chief

executive)
This conservative foreign
policy orientation and supremacy
of
the chief executive in foreign
policy decision making often make
it

difficult to identity the room for
maneuver

a

particular Central
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does nol mean that
the dependent

°' that

Us
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uctil

.
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sute

of political space
and/or

Guatemala gave evidence
of

. f air

^

dictated

dependMt state gives

'he he 8 e ra on that one
can begin to

^sree

regions.

A

^^

a dependent . tate
and

forei g n policy
positions

-

g„

Wentify

^

^
^

^^^^

^

autonMy avaiUMe
degree of fofeign

its

of a

^

assaes

^

^
to

independence fro„ W as hi„
gt0 „ throu g h General Mej
r a victores'
-eutralit, polic y after toe
fall of 1983.

Cuace mala did not have
the political spece

a v ailable

to exercise
such independence before
the overthrow of Gener al
Rio s Montt, or
only that Rios Montt
chose cot to exerc.se euch
.dependence fro m

«ashi„ gto „ ?

El

Sslvador end Honduras conld

e a sil y

he classified as
the two most dependpnt
a
ependent rpntr,i
Central American
states on Washington during
the 1980s, but as ve saw
in Chapters VI and VII,
they occass ional
ly
showed some divergence from
Washington's preferences in the
peace
process, especially when they
signed the Esquipulas II
Procedure.
This suggests that they
possess some (albeit a limited)
degree of

xndependence in their foreign
policies, even if they usually
agreed
with Washington's policies.
Revolutionary Nicaragua found and
sought to create more political
space in which to exercise its

international (and domestic) autonomy,
but

it

"went too far" for the

Reagan administration's interests
and was forced to pay

a

price.

In the case of Costa Rica, 21
we find a country that seemingly

re(dis)covered

a

degree of autonomy that was eroding in the
early
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1980s.
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Although Costa Rica

is

rathpr atypical
a,
rather
of its Central
.

,

neighbors in terns of
its econoDic> sociai>
poUticai
characteristics, it provides
in£eresting ussono
policy potential of
A™.
Central American
states.
The Costa Eican cas e
-SSests that even a dependent
country facing a serious
economic
crisis can define and
im pl ement its own
definitions o f national
interest and national
secnr^,, adespite
security,
some of Washington's
pressures to the contrary.

^
^ ^

•

Unlike its troohled
neighbors, Costa Rica
possesses a stable
aemocracv and relatively
accent living standards
for its people.
The lack of a powerful
landed oligarchy and two
liberal reforms
Periods in the 1880s and
1920s helped to promote the
early emergence
of democratic institutions.
A brief civil war in
1948 brought yet
another reformer to power,
socia! democrat Josi Figueres.
Before
turning power back over to
the winner of the 1948
elections (over
which the civil war was fought),
Figueres nationalised the banks
and
abolished the country's military.
Without a military to feed, Costa
Xican governments after 1949
were able to invest in the
country's
economic development and social
welfare.

By the 1970s, Costa Rica

boasted of one of the highest
literacy rates in the western
hemisphere, along with excellent
health care and adequate housing.

Costa Rica also had

a

large array of autonomous state
enterprises

and institutions that comprised the
country's welfare state and that

employed managers and professionals in
the growing middle class
(Edelman and Kenen, 1989).

Costa Rlca - S foreign
pQlicy orientation

—bet

a loof

C0U,Ury

»

Pa

*

fromits less

" iCiPate

Common Market <CAC„>

of det ente betueen
the u

M

In 1972>

u ms

s

C °" ar °

_

Soviet

^^^^ ^
^^

mrtiated consular relations
with Cuba.

"Pana Us relations with Europe

^
^^^

universalizing its £oreign

fir£t

establish diplomatic

«.

er

of the CACH after
1969 _ conbined
Bith

contributed to Costa r,v,%
8 KOVeS

reUtW.

^_ ^^

neighbcrsi ho

* "» """I

T„e

«- -rgence

^

^

Costa Rica also began
to

and Japan

relations with the rest
of Lafin

Venezuela, and ColomMa.

international^ was

The main reason for this
new

to promote trade aad
g aia access to new markets

for Costa Rica's exports,
coffee and bananas.

Costa Rica did not

identify Bi£h nor participate
in the th rd uorid
.

a

^

International Economic Order and
it remained outside the
Non-Ali gD ed
Movement, although it did
attend the 1979 and 1981 Non-Ali
g aed

meetings as an observer.

It

is

important t0 note

^^

new internationalism w as
guided by Foreign Minister Aldo F
a cio, who
served two president!.!
administrations for an unprecedented
eight
years (Lopez Mora, 1984: 299-300;
Rojas Aravena, ed., 1990: 15;
Rojas Aravena, 1990: 54; Solis,
1991).

Despite Costa Rica's diplomatic a nd
commercial opening to the
socialist bloc and des ite its articul
P
ar version of state
P
ca P italism and social welfare programs,
Costa Rica identified itself
as a member of the western
capitalist world.

The an ti -communist and
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Str ° nSly den ° CratiC

-

if

leaders (including Jose
Fisue.es, who remained
. pouerful
poaticai
politics until his death
in 1990)
j r
90) 1l6d
C0Sta Rica to maintain
a clear
alignment with the wp^ 0
i
-u
western Hberal democracies.
Nevertheless, Ccsta
»«. played an important
roU
supporting

^

^^

m

^^^^

^

overthrow of Anastarin
c~
nastacio Somoza.

As noted elsewhere,
the Carazo

administration (1978-1 Qfm „ 1982) participated in
supplying arms to the
FSLN, allowed the FSLN
to find refuge on
Costa Rican soil, and
joined the rest of Latin
America in opposing the
United States'
•

•

-ove. in the OAS to remove
Somoza without

a Sandinista victory.
By 1982, the honeymoon
between the Ticos and the
new Sandinista

government in Nicaragua ended.

Growing public disenchantment
with

the course of Nicaragua's
revolution was reinforced when
Eden

Pastors,

a

previously popular figure in
Costa Rica, announced his

break with the FSLN and his
decision to fight Managua in
April,
1982.

In May,

the newly inaugurated
President Lui's Alberto Monge

faced the presence of growing
unmoors of anti-Sandinista
combatants
on Costa Rican territory.
Pastora's fighters, combined with
those
of another former Nicaraguan
junta member, Alfonso Robelo, began

offensive military operations against
Nicaragua from their bases in
Costa Rica in April, 1983, leading
to serious border conflicts and
an increased sense of Costa Rican
vulnerability (Edelman and Kenen,

1989: 270-271).

President Monge faced a difficult domestic
and international
situation.

Domestic opinion was largely against support
for the

Sandinistas but it was also turning against
support for the contras

343
based on Costa Rican
soil (Solis, 1991)
Ye
Yetr an increasingly
vocal
right wing did favor
support
PPort for the
m, 0 contras
and the United States'
contra aid policy.
Moreover
oreover, lit.
Uke -v
the rest of Latin
America after
1982, Costa Rica found
itself u,
in th*
-a
the Bld8t
of a difficuU

—

.

econoffi c

ion.

The global recession
gevereiy

country ^

led growth strategy
and the nation soon
faced the largest per
capita
debt burden in all
of Latin America.

Costa Rica's welfare
state was

- crisis.
Walton

Credit from private
international
was will lng to belp.

Total bllateral

States to Costa Rica
increased from

million dollars in 1982.
year,
1;

increasing to

b an ks was

$ 15.26

f

_^

million in 1981 to

It more than quadrupled

$ 218.72

flid

^

tight, out

$ 53.83

^

million in 1983 (Solis,
1990: 39, table

Rojas Aravena, 1987a:
56).

More aid came from the IMF.

But the
flood of US and IMF aid
to Costa R 1C a did not
come without strings.
It was conditioned on
government austerity measures,
including the

privatization of the numerous
autonomous state enterprises.

The aid

"including security assistancewas also used to pressure the
Monge administration to
support Washington's policies
in Central
America.
However, the costs of completely
deteriorated relations

with Nicaragua were too high.

It was

in this context that President

Monge proclaimed Costa Rica's
"active, perpetual, and unarmed

neutrality" in Central America's military
conflicts and "ideological
alignment" with Washington in the region's
political conflicts (see

Chapter VI).
The neutrality policy was difficult to
maintain, especially

given Monge's otherwise close political and
economic relations with

344

BMhi " 8tM

—

—^

thr °- h

ver - Monse vas
not

r™
«-

'

"s

term (Solie
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support of the
Contadora Group

Europeans, thanks to
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Hoe Cr ° Sta Rl
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* ~.
CaPlt3lS

^
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ac tl ve ly joined

Moreover>

^

4

^

gton

^lous

on debt , thus

of Lat i„ Anerica
.

,

o£

5)

; e could

.

^

administrations

^ utin

^^^

JUD€ 1984

an

o£

tseiw

^

P"-i«. of economic and polltical
'
support from them as
well a,
as the Economic
Community.
I„ September,
hosteo the unpreceaentea
conference of fore ig
„ ministers from the
«C. the Contaaora
Group, and the five
Central American states
In San
Jos^ (Asenjo, 1985a:
310-3111
ti
311).
This
conference has been callea
"the
-st important manifestation
of extrarenal
support receivea h
y
the Contaaora Group"
(Asenjo, 1985a: 311).
It „ as also very
important support for Monge's
neutrality policy. But as
the

^

Contaaora process developed
its stalemate
harder to maintain Costa
Rican neutrality.

participation

in

in 1985,

Monge founa it

Conversely, Monge's

the Tegucigalpa Group
helped to prolong Contadora's

diplomatic stalemate.

Despite the difficult balancing
act between Washington and
Contadora, the neutrality policy
had the support of the vast

majority of Ticos (Solxs, 1991).

In

Fe5ruary 1986j the Costg Ricans

ratified their support of neutrality
by voting for another member of
Monge's National Liberation Party,
Oscar Arias, to succeed him.

Arias had campaigned on

a

platform of "peace and neutrality", and

his significant electoral victory 22
gave him the support to carry it
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out (Rojas Aravena,
1986: 311-312- K n ;
a
Rojas Aravena,
1987b: 283-285)
months of hi8
gurationj

w

1

C ° Dtra

J
border

CamPS

with Nicaragua.

_
^

—

Soon after that

_^

tociose

on C OSta Rlca 's
northern

^

k
as
have seen in Chapter
>
VII, President
Arias began to
develop
eiop his
nis plan ffor peace
in Central
America.

-

be

achallengetotheUnUedstates(Arias
_

»t-f

of

the Koreign „ inistry

-PUi. tUt
U.S. options
xt did

,

Ws

i99i

GuiUerao SoUs

the peace plan's
conceptual design

-nor

Contadora per se.

vent on co

^
^
^^
_

_^^

for that matter
Nicaragua , s ._

ended up doing so.

^

^ ^

The plan was also not
. .ejection of

Th e Arias P lan » vas
a specific

fcy

to propose a
negotiated way out and
guaran[ee democratic

stability in an international
context of great diplomatic
stalemate"
(Solis, !,„,.
Arias and his advisors
.
c<;sta Rica

security at staRe.

s

^ MtioMi

Vulnerable to the region's
vroleot conflicts,

but unwilling to give
up Dearly four decades
of denocratic

without

military, diplomacy was Costa
Rrca's only means to secure
the country's interests.
Moreover, peace in Central America
was
a

necessary not only to protect the
country's territorial integrity
and political stability; it
was also necessary for the
country's

long term economic recovery.

The economic and political
pressures that the Reagan

administration placed on Costa Rica, both
after Arias presented his
peace plan and after the signing of the
Esquipulas II agreement,
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were diffiml*
irricult, especially

-•"-»

-is

- -*« «-s.

—

in

light
Aight of n,
the country's
continued

But those

After the signing
of

tera

-

Arias

^^^^

^

a

-

end

c PP „ £ed further
>
„. S.
aid to the
contras in order for ,„
the P ea
process in
Nicaragua to proceed
«ed. t„
In response>
the Reagan adm n
nstrat on couid
-t appear to be too hostile
toward Arias considering
the
international presti^P n,o r u
„.
•«„. that hrs drplomatic success
had hrought him
e 1987
»ri..).
Beyond thrs. the
reasons

;

-Hitary

«

.

.

.

•

"

explaining why Arias
was
»as able t-„
to move beyond
Monge's neutrality
Policy and accomplish
what the Contadora
process could not are

Pursue what he saw as
being in Costa R.ca's
nations, interests

Whether

that conflicted with
Washington's interests or
not.
On
the other hand, the
wearing of the U.S. position
as a result of
the Iran-contra scandal
and President Reagan's
iame-duck perrod may
have reopened the
political space Arias needed
to assert his

country's interests.

It

is

likely that both idiosyncratic

differences and this changed
international context 23 played
important roles in Arias' ability
to move beyond Honge's
cautious
and sometimes contradictory
neutrality
policy.

Costa Rica's foreign policy
experience

in the early to mid

1980s suggests that other factors
are also important in defining
the
country's foreign policy orientation
and implementing its policies.
The president and his top advisors
continue to be predominant in
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^ - eow
P0UCy

Und

" 1,,1Stry

C

foreign policy _

AccordingtoW£Gunierao

—"on.

"
°" inUeS

»^

*

—

Structurally> the £oreign

—ancracy

vith liBlted

professional exDPrf,^.
P
lSe andj

"

^

cUenteli.*. Yet the
emergence of international
' relatl o»* Programs
at Costa Rioa's

-varsities

in tbe

Relations at the
5

8reat

- «»

"

I9,s, including

^O,^,^,
-

PreParati °"

fut-r..

Lai's

-

CuiHermo Solis

the SchooJ

^

in Beredia>

^

^

-fessiona! diplomatic cadres

sample of the country's
growing ability to
connect the ac.d»™,v
academic analysis of
international
relations to government
24
service.
is

an

,

The country's two
major political parties
seemed to have
developed clear and distinct
fcrign policy orientations
daring the
l«0s. The positive side
of this difference is
that voters had a
dear choice in the 1986
national elections, the
negative side is
that bipartisanship in
foreign policy was not
possible, at least
"ith regard to Centra,
America. The center-right
SgCja1

Cn>fi n n i (PUSC)

—

^

to block Monge's
constitutional

amendment on neutrality in the
congress from early 1984 to the
end
of his term.

create

a

It has

also blocked ratification of
the agreement to

Central African parliament
as envisioned by Guatemala's

President Cerezo.
Beyond the party structures,
public opinion plays an important
role in Costa Rica's foreign
policy.

It provided one of the brakes

on President Mongers slide
towards Washington when an increasingly
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-Uc

supported Monge'sS 8subse
„he 0 quent
„
8
neutrality policv
POiicy.
u
,
bSalthy d

-

,

•

candidate

-P-

«

t

—

a.

-a

reelected

.

M

opinion then
n
Costa

tn
I

Rica's

the ,, eace and

m6

adBinistration

ec0D0Bic 8ituation>
aithQugh

uter

^

administration
An »c came under
"on, Arias
some public
1C critic
F
criticism *for paying
DUCh atteDtiM
£
•«.'«"
not enough t0 the
economic crisis.
U nIik e M e
-

"

—

—

-

^
^^

xicoandColonbia>inCos£aRica)the

of the

pubHc's interest

U -ativeXy

flnd

high, y et there
persisu a

isolationist* 8entIment
to„ ard

-ir

participatiM

^^^

problems, the Ticos

^

poUcy

aioofness

^^

reason

the,,

stable and peaceful
democracy when cropared
violence cf their neighbors.

e„

^

^

tragic

Su nmary

By analyzing the
£oreign poUcies of four
q£

^

involved in the Centra! American
peace process, we have found
that
each of them acted not out
of some altruistic or
idealistic

commitment to peace.

All had real national security
interests at

stake in the region.

All were concerned about the
effects of the

region's wars on their own political
and economic stability.

All
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———

had

Process goi „ g
their DO
P ° Wer

"

.

C°

A11 £ace<j 4

««•

t

,y

„

could use to keep
thepeace
.

C

their interests

_
'

yec

excep tlon Gf
President Monge

Cri88S that
"*a-th the

possible

3
those crises did
not
.
t
deter
them
from persist.
Persisting xn their
diplomatic
r
LXC effort,
ertorts. n
Despite the
frustations and the
obstacles the f0rei
f
.

•

•

.

D

^
P ol -y -king system8
of
these states found
the Political
politic space and kept
it open for the
diplomacy of peace.
'

350

ENDNOTES

1.
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being sufficiently
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"

8U

1

3ttaCk agaiD8t a G -temalan
refugee camp
M6X1C0 ' S b ° rder With Guatemala
rented
i
six d e ltl?
^° Vernment s
a formal note of
protect to III r
Gua temalan government whose
army was apparently
involvL
involved
some way in the attack.
The Guatemalan government
denied any connection between
its army and the raid.
The two
governments tried to resolve the
conflict and Mexico decidel to
roove the estimated 46,000
refugees to new camps in the Yucatan
(Van Klaveren, 1985: 48; Karl,
1986: 274).

'Ltr/

'

D rl

m

9.

r

'

a

\ri

T""

^

In 1986, Mexico's foreign
debt had reached $100 billion while
income from its petroleum exports
had fallen to $8 billion,
3
lt
be6D jU8t f ° Ur
ars earli
'
(Me^r,
1987- 70
,? "m
* 0reover > between 1982 and
1987,
Mexico payed
,
K-??
$7?
?73 billion dollars
interest on its foreign debt without
being able to lower the amount of the
principle (Meyer, 1988:

^

^

"

m

10.

The deteriorating bilateral relationship
between Mexico and the
United States included increasingly vocal
criticism by the
Reagan administration of Mexico's political
system and U.S.
Ambassador John Gavin's close relations with
Mexico's
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Pact entered

h
of the
12
'

e

Pact'vHh g «Irin?e r:,t?°

Vernment

, ° ll8

"d

D laratio. (1982) „ as .
Utter from
"exican President Lopez Portillo
and Venezuelan President
Herrera Camp ins to President
Reagan expressing concern a
the
Sr °Ving "iii^rization and tension
between
lit
NlCara 8" a 11
^ted September 7, 1982
See
Chapter '/J
V for more on the context
of the letter.

teiS'S^r'S" f
^

^
13.

^TrVrnTl™ 'T^

intolorce™

—

Venezuela's economic crisis began
to emerge in 1983, vith
f,Uing petroluem exports and prices
as well as declining nonU
tS
debt (Wilh *lmy and Vio?i986:
120
120-121;
121
Wilhelmy, 1987: 87-94).

YT, "LiMMM ^

14.

It was Venezuela that persuaded
the other Contadora states to
impose the deadline of June 6, 1986,
for the signing
S of the
third

Contadora Act.

15.

be6n Started iD the 18808 h s Fr *nch
company
y
Ferdinand de Lesseps, but bankruptcy and
other
Problems brought construction to an end in
1889 with only one
third of the canal completed.

I**/??
headed by

16.

Between 1913 and 1929, U.S. investment
in Colombia increased by
almost thirteen thousand percent while U. S.
-Colomb ian trade
quintupled (Drekon ja-Kornat
984: 320-321).
,

]

17.

By 1976-1978, the European Common
Market bought 32.8% of
Colombia's exports, thus surpassing the United
States (32.7%)
as the principle destination of the
country's exports. Exports
to Latin America more than doubled between
1961-63 (6.5%) and
1976-78 (13.2%).
In 1974, coffee accounted for only 44%
of
Colombians exports, although by 1980 it was back up to 59.5%.
Colombia's other exports included hydrocarbons,
agricultural
products, flowers, textiles, fungicides, cement, paper,
and
other products. Drekon ja-Kornat (1984: 326, 333)
cites the
Banco de la fieptifr) k-fl and the Inter-American Development Bank,
as the source of the trade statistics.

18.

Colombia had been able to avoid incurring much debt since the
late 1960s due to its successful trade strategy and its healthy
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international reserves; despite
Colombia's good credit ratin*
the Latin American debt crisis
made new credit hard to
r

I

e

C o«Lo,!!

ind

U r enCy d Valuati
A
devaluation
e : had
h ad brought
b
h!
serious
economic
and political
v- f
g ° Vernmen 1 ° f Carl ° S LLeras ^str^po

°-

^

09 6^970)% ^, t0 aVOld The government
successfully
resisted tL
, instead
the lMr
IMF and
sought to combine regional
in tegration (i.e.
the Andean Pact) with export
promotion to
eCOn ° miC Pr ° blem8
This successful challenge to the
IMF was
1 " POrt8
P- Cede °t symbolizing Colombian autonomy
:!
which Bet"
wMch
Betancur could
not ignore (Drekon ja-Kornat
1984: 325Van Klaveren, 1985a: 163).
Betancur began to implement his own
"austerity measures "
by slashing the government budget,
restricting imports from
its Andean and Central American
neighbors, devaluing its
currency gradually, and opening the country
up to foreign
direct investment.
These policies vere costly at both the
domestic and international levels (Van
Klaveren, 1985a: 163165).
Then, in October 1984, it was discovered
that a
Colombian delegation in Washington had been
secretly meeting
with the IMF to discuss the terms of a
possible loan
agreement. The ensuing domestic criticism
signaled the end of
Betancur's political honeymoon. As one observer
put it, "it
was the end of autonomy in the economic field
Foreign policy
was left without any economic support"
(Cepeda Ulloa, 1986:
210).
For more on Colombia's 1966 disagreement with
the IMF,
see the essay by Richard L. Maulin in Ferguson
(1972).
'

.

,

19.

'

In 1 986 and again in 1990, the Union Patriot V
f (UP)
participated in national elections and won several seats
either
alone or in alliance with the Liberal party. According
to
Chernick (1988: 86) the FARC used the existing political
machinery of the Colombian communist party to form the UP.
Unlike the M-19 guerrillas, the FARC continued to honor its
cease fire agreement achieved during Betancur's peace process.
?

20.

Despite a history of parochial elite jealousies and the more
recent emergence of popular nationalisms that have prevented
effective political and/or economic integration, a Central
American identity persists in the region. An example of the
persistence of this somewhat supranational identity is that the
automobile license plates and many other official stamps in the
region state the country name as well as " Centroam^rica " (e.g.,
"Costa Rica, Centroame'r ica")
.

—

Central American countries'
foreign
i0DS
6trUCt
Unfortunate^, for
C ° 8ta
ica > which
latere l°t?°8 lessons about the *
foreign policy
potential nf\! C? !

oolicv ma wnov
Tn]

LvTtoT
present^

T

^

'
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6
° f this
*
however
« Uestion >
Zolllll o f Co JaY*
103 18 m0re direct after
having
spent a total „f
f
Weeks there ( in June 1990 «d
January 1991 do"

^

•

^

.

•

™ a 8 forei 8 n Policy in the 1980s
are richer lilt
than I
my sources for Guatemala.
Arias won the election bv 52 V/
Rafael Angel Calderon,

Se^^i
^^JLELffi'
°^
IWbVSlf
tr,

a'/

-

•

i_

•

^

™>

(PUSC) (R
°
S A
fron
and the PUSC were perceived
as being anti-Contadora and
antie PDSC ^d blocked Mongers
effort to pass a
!
constitutional
amendment making permanent neutrality
the law of
the land since the end of
1983.
In its formal 1986 campaign
Platform, the PUSC P rpgrmfl de Go^. n

nd^ PUS^

.

^

critiqued Monge's
TT]
neutrality policy by arguing that
-permanent neutrality is not
synonymous with peace but in reality
is a synonym for
defenselessness, which provokes abuse and
leads to violence
It critiqued Contadora as
weakening the inter-American system,
a
in8
he fUtUre
° f ° Ur nation '" (Rojas Aravena,
1986™%nQ
?nr Elsewhere Rojas
iyot). JUy-310).
Aravena (1987b: 284) notes
that this victory for the National
Liberation Party (PLN) broke
the tradition of alternation in
power of these two principal
political parties.

^

should also be noted that by 1987, other
important changes
included the emergence of
political and economic reforms in the Soviet
Union after
Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985.
The new orientation
of the USSR may have encouraged Arias and
the other Central
American leaders to believe that Moscow was not or
was no
longer the regional threat that was once believed.
It

in the international context

Luis Guillermo Solis is both an academic and
served as one of
Arias' top advisors in the position of Chief of Staff
( Jefe dp
Cabinet? ) of the Foreign Ministry, which has both
administrative and political functions (Solis, 1991). After
leaving the foreign ministry in 1990, Solis returned to
academia and teaches at both the National University in Heredia
and the University of Costa Rica outside of San Jose
The
School of International Relations at Costa Rica's National
University publishes a fine trimestral journal, Relaciones
InternacionalPE.
7

.

Arias was also said to have gotten
Nobel Peace Prize.

a

"big head" once he won the

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION

The Central American Peace
Process, 1983-1988
The Central American peace
process from 1983 to 1988 was the

result of a variety of historical
and contextual political factors:
The Bolivaran tradition of
Latin solidarity in the face of
perceived
threats to security; the historical
weakness of the inter-American

system's formal mechanisms of conflict
resolution and the breakdown
of the OAS;

the deepening of civil and

interstate violence in

Central America; the increased
diplomatic activism and relative

autonomy of emerging Latin American
regional powers; the reemergence
of the cold war and the resurgence
of U.S. claims to hegemony in the

circum-Caribbean region.
early 1980s in such

All these factors came together in the

way that the four Contadora Group states,

a

moved by concerns for their own interests
and stability as well as
their desire to play

a

larger international role, undertook an

active experiment in multilateral diplomacy that
unfolded and

persisted for well over four years.
This Latin American diplomatic response to civil and
interstate

conflicts in Central America evolved into an ongoing peace
process
that sought to promote peace and cooperation in Central America.

The Contadora phase of this peace process provided an informal but

persistent mechanism of mediation for the Central American states
that allowed them to undertake and maintain joint discussions on
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their most difficult
political, soc io-economic

conflicts.

.

and security

The Contadora peace
process ultimately came to
focus on

the negotiation of an
ambitious demilitarization of
the region

through

a

complex arms reduction and
arms control regime.

Unable to

find an acceptable formula
for achieving and verifying
such

demilitarization while still
guaranteeing the security of the
Central American states,
particularly in light of continued
military
assistance programs and pressures
from states outside of the
isthmian region, the Contadora
process gave way to

a

new peace

initiative originating from within
Central America itself that

ultimately answered the Contadora
Group's original call for peace
between the Central American states.

The Esquipulas II agreement

was a less ambitious but still
highly significant step towards

achieving peace and cooperation in Central
America.
The Central American peace process
we have analyzed should be

understood as one ongoing process with two
phases, the Contadora
phase and the Esquipulas phase.

The Contadora phase created the

diplomatic space from which the Esquipulas phase
emerged.
it

is

Indeed,

unlikely that the Esquipulas summits of May 1986
and August

1987 could have occurred at all had it not been for
the previous

diplomatic work of the Contadora states.

The Contadora Group and

later the Support Group were able to place and keep
the possibility
of regional peace and detente on the agenda of the
Central American

states.

Moreover, the ongoing meetings and informal contacts

established between the Central American diplomats during the

Contadora phase proved to be important opportunities for coming to
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understand each others'
political realities and
positions (Talavera,
1990).
Unfortunately, the Central
American diplomats were
limited
in what they could
accomplish during the
Contadora phase given the
difficult positions of their
presidents and the complex
economic,
Political, and military
contexts these dependent
states faced at

the
At the very least,
Contadora's persistent
mediation efforts
helped to diffuse the more
serious border incidents
that threatened

ti*e.

to trigger a wider
regional war;

at most, Contadora
facilitated

the

emergence of proposals from
Guatemala's President Cere Z0 and
Costa
Rica's President Arias to
gather all five Central American
presidents together at Esquipulas,
Guatemala, to find their own way
out of the political conflicts
that divided them.
In this study, we have
sought to examine the emergence
and

development of the Contadora and
Esquipulas phases of the Central

American peace process as case
studies that shed light on the
interests, capabilities, and limits
of contemporary Latin American

diplomacy and foreign policy.

It

is

only by understanding those

interests, capabilities, and limits that
one can explain the

persistence of the Contadora Group's efforts
to mediate peace talks
and demilitarization among the Central
American states.

We have

sought to investigate the emergence,
persistence, and meaning of the

Contadora process as both a Latin American
political response to

disfavored U.S. policies in Central America as
well as

a

manifestation of the new diplomatic activism,
multilateralism, and
relative autonomy increasingly found in the foreign
policy
strategies of leading Latin American states.

Finally, we have also
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tried to understand
the effectsS of
i
0t thi*
thls adiplomacy
on the Central
American states themselves
as tney
they passed
Dasspd ,-v,
through one of the most
violent decades of their
troubled history.

The Contadora Group
states (Mexico,

Venecia,

Colombia, and
Panama) persisted in their
diplomatic efforts because
it was in
their interests to do so.
These states needed peace
and cooperation
in Central America in
order to protect their
economic interests in
the face of the global
recession and the debt crisis
that plagued
Latin American economies
during the 1980s.
These economic interests

-eluded the need

to re-inv lg orate

inter-regional trade and protect

the recent investments
of the Contadora Group
states in Central

America as well as the requirement
for debt relief while
billions
were spent for war. More
importantly, the Contadora Group
states
had significant political

interests at stake.

roles and sub-hegemonic interests
in the

c

Their new leadership

ircum-Car ibbean region

were challenged by the active
reassertion of U.S. hegemony in the
region.

The unilateral and militaristic
policies developed by

Washington in its traditional sphere
of influence along with its

reintroduction of cold war logic conflicted
with the Contadora
Group's prescriptions for promoting
regional stability and claims to
regional leadership.

Indeed, the United States' hegemonic

resurgence and its policies toward Central
America during the 1980s
upset the distribution of power and authority
that had evolved there
in the previous decades as

the Contadora Group states developed

their own sub-hegemonic presence, interests,
and diplomatic activism
in the region.

While these economic
and political
Political interests
irn-o
»
gave the Contadora
Group states the
political will to persist «„«..•
,
their mediation
efforts, their diploic
skiUs and foreign poUcy
activ
rKMt
8aVe
the "Hbiliti^ to
sustain tbeir regional
diplomacy, despite the
serious stalemates among
th e Centra!
Americans that developed
along the way. The
diplomatic
"apprenticeship" the Contadora
states undertook since
the 1950s and
1960s as their economies
hecame increasingly
internationalized
provided them with a cadre
of diplomats experienced
in complex
multilateral neget ia t ions
The complexity of the
.
Contadora Act for
Peace and Cooperation in
Central America, particularly
the security
and verification provisions,
attests to the sophistication
and

m

•

^^

seriousness the Contadora diplomats
brought to their work.
Moreover, their growing economic
and political contacts with
Central
America in the 1960s and 1970s
as their foreign policy
strategies
became increasingly active gave
the Contadora Group states

significant influence and useful tools
to help keep the Central

American states involved

in the

peace process.

By 1985 the difficult economic
and debt crises had placed clear

limits on the economic tools available
to the Contadora states while
U.S. military and economic aid
packages to the region continued to

increase.

built

a

Nevertheless, by that time the Contadora
diplomats had

solid framework for regional negotiations
and the mediation

of bilateral conflicts that even
the OAS deferred to.

But

throughout the Contadora phase of the peace
process, it was clear
that by pooling their diplomatic resources
and complementary

360

Politic*! lnfluence among
the Central

Roup's mul ti l ateralism

in and

^^

WlfiM

of ifcself

a significant
Political tool t0 offset
the unilateral power
of the United States
the xsthmus.
In this sensej the
stalemate
deveioped
the Central Americans
during the Contadora
phase of the peace
Process was in many ways a
stalemate hetween the United
States and
the Contadora Group
states over the relative
capabilities of each to
shape the outcome of the
regional crises. The Contadora
Croup
became a counterpoise to the
United States and the Contadora
framework created the diplomatic
space for the Central
Africans to

-

consider finding their own way
out of their conflicts.

The

condor,

Phnpp

iQ8W 987-

s„„.~

-

or Fai 1llTO?

The Contadora phase of the
Central American peace process
has

been judged

a

observers.

This assessment is based on the
fact that no version of

"failure of diplomacy" by Bagley
(1986) and most other

the Contadora Act was ever
signed by the five Central American

states.

But seeing through the finalization
of

treaty among the Central Americans
became

a

a

Contadora peace

goal of the Contadora

Group only after the Central Americans
agreed to the Norms for

Implementation of the Document of Objectives
in January 1984.

One

year earlier, in its original call for
peace in Central America, the

Contadora Group simply called on the Central
Americans to find some
way of resolving their domestic and international
conflicts
peacefully.

There

is

no clear evidence that the Contadora Group

states set out from the very beginning to set up
an ongoing peace

.
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process and oversee the
negotiation

agreement

^

^

^

^

^.^

^

The Contadora peace
process developed slowly.

mM

It was not
the Cancan Summit in
July 1983, six months
after the original call
for peace, that the
Contadora Group presidents
committed themselves
to offering their good
offices and to playing the
role of mediator

to facilitate talks among
the Central Americans.

This commitment

came about only after the
Central Americans had indicated
their
interest in holding such talks.
The Document of Objectives
of

September 1983, which the Central
Americans helped to draft,
formally identified the fundamental
problems that would have to be
addressed while the Norms for
Implementation created the blueprint
for future negotiations aimed
at developing a regional treaty.

Given its modest beginnings, the
fact that the Contadora process

developed and persisted as

it

did

for over four years is an

important diplomatic success for the
Contadora Group states,

especially considering the obstacles and
frustrations they faced at
nearly every turn as the peace process
developed.

Indeed, these

obstacles and frustrations propelled the Contadora
process onward.
Not only did the diplomacy of the Contadora
Group succeed in

getting the Central Americans to talk to each other;
a

it also played

significant and successful role in mediating border tensions
in

the region.

These mediation efforts helped to prevent border

incidents related to the U.

S.

-supported contra war from escalating

into full-scale war between Nicaragua and its neighbors.

should not be underestimated.

This fact

The border incidents were widely

1
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le8arded
trigger

"
a

fUSh POi

fuU

"

6

««"

a

larg er re.iona! „ ar and

^

U.S. military int
ervention.

The
and
Support Group's statements
fro m the Cartagena C
ommuni qu e to the
CsrahaUena Message clear ly
expressed this concern.
„ ig h-ranKin
g
diplomats fro. Ni cara „a,
such as dose ledn Talavera
g
and Alejandro
Bendaffa, and fro D Costa
Rica, snch as
Guin«r» Soils, have
stated in interviews that
i-ney belipv*
thev
fho mam
Delieve the
contribution and
success of the Contadora
process was to
tn deter and prevent
the United
States fro, launching a
full-scale military intervention
in Central
America (Talavera, 1990;
Bendana, 1990; Solis, 1991).
Whether
Contadora actually did help
deter any possible intervention
or not

Ws

^

is

less

important than the fact that this
was an apparently widely

held belief among those involved
in the peace process.

Another supposed failure of the
Contadora process

is

that it

did not directly involve the
United States, wh.ch was after
all one
of the major players

in the region's conflicts.

Echoing the

Kissinger Commission's view, by failing
to involve the United
States, it is argued that the
Contadora process was doomed to

failure.

One variation of this argument is
that the Contadora Group

(and later the Support Group) neglected
to lobby the U.S. congress

sufficiently and thus could not temper U.S.
policy toward Central

America (Aguilar Zinser, 1988: 108).

These points seem to have

validity until one looks closely at the
principles and underlying
logic of the Contadora process and the foreign
policy orientation of
the Contadora Group states.

At least four inter-related principles

guiding the Contadora process both explain and
necessitated (from
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Centra's

perspective, tb. exclusion
of the United States

peace talks:

tad ° ra
In

t h°°

°f

'!

^^

East-West Conflict-

^r^^l^*^"

-

the Reagan
American crises originated from
Soviet-Cuban-karaeuan
C
aguan
adventurism.
The Group of Eight worked harH
East-West politics and Rhetoric

™

tl e

L^

^

1c

V c-Ts'o

8031 ° f S6eking pLce and c"
e
on
i d° e :;f7etl\
detente)i amon S th * Central
Americans.
Given
the U
Cy
ation > if the United States
had been
invited
nvite Itto ii
play a direct role in the
negotiations
the
Contadora Group would logically
have had to inviue
te
Cuba
UDa
and
the Soviet Union 3Q « 0 n
c UCh
I
3 peace Process would
have
1!
bPPn
ac
been as unwieldy as it was
improbable. The Contadora Group
?
t0
the * l ° hal East-West conflict
o
h?"only to get the Cental Am.
xt^sought
ri
talking to each
•

if

r

>^

Regional Solution to Regional
Problems: This idea was
the most important underlying
principle of the Contadora
process, and it appears over and
over in the Contadora
documents.
It flows logically from
Contadora's
2.

rejection of
E a st-West Conflict and defines
the Central American"
with the help of the Contadora Group
states, as the exclusive
set of
regional" actors able to
t

e

resolve the isthmian crises
leaving the United States on the outside.
It asserts that by
working together, Latin American states
-including the weak
states of Central America- can resolve
their own problems
without the interference of non-regional
states.
This idea
is also the contemporary
reiteration of the old Bolivaran
themes of Latin solidarity and mutual
support in the face of
foreign interference.

Relative Foreign Policy Autonomy: Although
3.
this
notion was not explicitly stated in any of
the Contadora
documents, it clearly guided the work of the
Contadora
Group and is related to the previous idea.
It asserts
that even dependent states lying within the
traditional
sphere of influence of a world power have some
degree of
autonomy in their foreign policy decisions.
Such states
have only to look for it and use it.
In other words,
sovereign states, even dependent ones, are capable of
resolving their problems and do not have to ask the
permission of the hegemon to follow a particular foreign
policy or undertake a particular diplomatic initiative.
Dependent states still have a range of foreign policy
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e

ofT,

V

Vailable t0 them P^entially
even a rejection
'° reign P ° UCy agend "'
"
>

Uo clX:I"

^PUci

rejeC lon ° f the unilateral
and
?
bSlligerent U
r aSSertlOD of
exclusive claim over
f
its traditio!ll
traditional sphere of influence.
S

The Non-intervention Principle:
This principle is
stated in virtually every
document produced by the
ra
eSS
DOt ° Dly 3 C6ntral
*
of the
he°cContadora
o
process; it is also a guiding
principle
of the Contadora Group
states' foreign policies as
we l
as a principle that Latin
America fought hard o n
.
'
lnte American
earlier
in
this
^T
centurv
J
r 38
Pri ° ci P le was "ed by Contadora
to
try to del^^26
8
3CtUal ° r P° tenti
intervention
by
b7the
ir
the United
Un > i States
Central America (or by the Central
Americans in each other's internal
affairs), It also
required the Contadora Group
states not to interfere in
ltlCS
?
bUt the m0St diplomatic of
ways.
Thl\U.S.
l
The
congress knew of the Contadora
process, which
did have some influence on
congressional debates on contra
aid.
The Contadora process was also
known at least
to the attentive public in
the U.S. and its existence had
some effect on public opinion.
Moreover, the Contadora
presidents and diplomats did seek to
persuade the Reagan
administration to give the peace process
a chance to work
but were rebuffed by administration
hard-liners more than'
once.
Of course, the Contadora Group
was sometimes
perceived as interfering in the domestic
affairs of the
Central American states, particularly
through its attempt to
seek an end to civil wars and promote
respect for political
pluralism and human rights in El Salvador and
Nicarauga, but
the Contadora Group states apparently
did not see those
efforts as interference, only mediation.
4.

U ^

ntT

V£lpU

W.

^m

^

^

^

The first three of these principles
guiding the Contadora peace

process explain why the Contadora Group did
not seek to involve the
U.S. directly in the peace process;

the fourth principle explains

why the Contadora Group (and Support Group) did
not become heavily
involved in lobbying Capitol Hill.

The logic of the Cont-pdora

Process wag to fogUS On the Central Amerira n s themselves and tn

epcpurage them tP find their own wav of
.

.

The Contadora process sought to open

a

r esolvin r

their cnnflirr.

.

political space in which the
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Centra! Anericans
erecting

couU choose

^

.

d

piomacy

^

a

fra.ewort £or negotiations,
the Contadora Group
ensured
that the Centra! Americans
had other f orei gn po l icy
„ ptions £rom
which to choose.
As for the Central
Africans, the fact that they
could not
agree on any of the three
versions of the Contadora Act
is due to

number of reasons.

a

Susan Purcell (1985) has
argued that some of the

Central Americans resented
pressure from the Contadora Group
to hold
negotiations and sign a peace
agreement.
While it is clear that
former Costa Rican Foreign
Minister Volio resented Contadora,
the

evidence among the other Central
Americans

Occasionally all

is

inconclusive.

of the Central American
states expressed some

dissatisfaction with the Contadora
process; but all remained
involved in it and no one forced
them to participate.

Moreover, the

Central American states were able
to use the peace process to
further their foreign policy interests
and objectives.
For example, Nicaragua was able to
neutralize some of the

Reagan administration's ant i-Sand inis
t a rhetoric and gain some

international support through its participation
in Contadora.

It

was also able to ensure some of its
interests within the peace

process by threatening to withdraw from it.

Honduras was able to

extract more aid from the United States by
manipulating its

commitment to the peace process, as

it

did after General Alvarez

Martinez was ousted in the spring of 1984.

It also faced

the

difficult question of what would become of the thousands
of contras
based in the country if

a

regional peace agreement were reached.

.
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Costa ElC a could not
afford to withdraw fro,
the Contadora process
given its own internationa!
reputation as a peace-loving
nation and
President Kongo's difficulty
in maintaining the
neutrality policy.
Guatemala's participation
in the peace process
facilitated first the
military government's and
then President Cerezo's
attempts to
reverse Guatemala's
international isolation and
improve its

international reputation.

Finally, the peace process
offered

President Duarte some room
to maneuver against the
Salvadoran
military's goal of total victory
in the civil war and against
U.S.
pressures for the same.
Put simply,

there were important reasons for
each of the

Central American states to
participate in the Contadora peace
process.

All had interests to protect and
none wanted to be blamed

for its failure.

Yet (with the possible exception of
Guatemala) all

of the Central American states
were being pressured

in opposing

directions by the Contadora Group and
Support Group on the one hand
and by U.S.

policies on the other.

Instead, led by Presidents

Cerezo and Arias, the five states found the
diplomatic space opened
by the Contadora process and a changing
international context to

fashion their own procedure for peace and
cooperation in Central

Amer ic a

The EsQuipulfls Phase. 1986 -1988 and Bpyon

rl

Emerging from within the Contadora process, the beginning of
the Esquipulas phase of the Central American peace process can
be

traced to the inauguration of Guatemala's President Vinicio Cerezo
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in January

1

986

.

Indeed

,

President

^

^^^

he has received publicly
for his role in sponsoring
first the

impromptu summit of Central
African presidents at his
inauguration
then the two formal
summits at EiquipuU§

^

1987.

^^^

^

At his inauguration he
persuaded the other presidents
to

reaffirm their

comment

to the Contadora peace
process by

endorsing the Caraballeda
Message and agreeing to hold

a

sum.it at which they could
discuss Cerezo's proposal for

parliament.

more formal
a

regional

Despite their continued lack of
agreement on the

Contadora Act, it

is

significant that the new m ix of
presidents at

the first Esquipulas summit
could commit themselves to study
further
this proposal for an isthmian
parliament aimed at reviving regional

integrationism.

Such

a

project could not become

peace in the region and without

cooperation.

a

a

reality without

commitment to regional

After February 1987, President Arias'
peace plan

upstaged Cerezo's initiative, but the
two leaders ended up working
together to achieve success at the second
Esquipulas summit.
The signing of the Esquipulas II
Procedure to Establish

a

Firm

and Lasting Peace in Central America
was a major accomplishment for
the five Central American presidents.

By focusing on mutual support

for democratization, national reconciliations,
and an end to outside
aid to irregular forces,

the Esquipulas Procedure was a less complex

document than the Contadora Act and therefore easier to
accept.

Implementation would prove more difficult.

The Esquipulas II

Procedure incorporated both Cerezo's proposal for

a

regional

parliament and Contadora's project of continued negotiations for
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re g io„ al d e mi

^Uowins

th e

U tari2ation
EsquipuUs

and

„

^

SUBmUi neUher

^

of these

^
^

provisions
i.pie.enteo as envisionea
by the agreeaent .
By Ute
Costa Rica remained the
sole central
Central American
Am^country that had not
ratified the treaty creating
the isthmian parliament.
The goal of
continuing arms control
tal ks under the auspices
of Contadora had
Petered out in 1 988 as other
aspects , f

vouH

be

^

awaited implementation and

a

new president was elected
in the United

States.

After January 1988, the
implementation of the Esquipulas
Procedure limped along with
uneven compliance records and
serious
political obstacles.
Prolonged civil war in El Salvador,
continued
U.S.

aid to the contras still
based

in Honduras,

and the shrinking

of the already restricted
political space in Guatemala all
raised

serious questions about the
real effectiveness and success
of the

Esquipulas II agreement in and of
itself.

Despite these and other serious
problems in implementing the
Esquipulas II Procedure, the Esquipulas
phase of the Central

American peace process should not be
judged

a

failure.

Its most

significant and innovative achievement
was calling the five Central

American presidents together in face-to-face
meetings to discuss
their conflicts and to work out

a

formula for achieving regional

peace and cooperation they thought they
could live with.

This

achievement led to at least five more formal
summits over the next
three years in which

a

real personal dynamic of mutual respect and

commitment to cooperation developed between the five
Esquipulas
presidents and eventually their successors (Solis,
1991).

From the
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San

W

summit of January 198gj
when

^^^^

pregidents
their commitment to the
Esquipulas Procedure; through
the Tela
(Honduras) sum.it of August
1989, when Honduras and
Nicaragua found
acceptable international
verification and support m
echani SffiS to
oversee the demobilization
of the contras; to the
Antigua
(Guatemala) sum.it in June
1990, when the region's five
presidents
turned their attention away
fro m war and towards
regional economic
cooperation:
The pos t-Esou ipulas summits
-and the preparatory and
support meetings of the foreign
ministers- marked a new develops
in Central American diplomacy
that

increases the prospects for

deeper regional cooperation in
the future.
Of course,

there were significant external
reasons for the

successes of the Esquipulas phase
of the peace process.

Not only

had the Contadora process created
the space in which Esquipulas

could emerge.

Important changes in the United States
and in U.S.-

Soviet relations further opened the
political space for the Central

Americans to find their own way.
scandal in the fall of 1986 marked

American peace process.

The revelations of the Iran-Contra
a

turning point for the Central

The scandal weakened the Reagan

administration's position and facilitated the
Central Americansserious consideration of President Arias'
peace plan in the spring
and summer of 1987.

The failure of the contras to achieve any

significant military gains with their $100 million
in U.S. aid
further opened the political space for success at the
Esquipulas II
summit.

These setbacks in U.S. policy created a certain ambiguity

in the Reagan administration's position towards

the Arias Plan that
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encouraged the five Central
American presidents to forge
their owa
formula for peace (Solis,
1991).

The Central Americans
interviewed for this study noted
that
this ambiguity in the U.S.
position continued to grow
through the
end of the Reagan
administration and into the Bush
administration.
On the surface at least,
many of the old policies continued
through
1988 and into 1990:
Prolongued U.S. aid and rhetorical
support for
the contras, a continued
hard-line rhetoric against the Sandinista

government along with the maintenance
of the U.S. trade embargo, and
continued military and economic aid
to the Salvadoran government.
However, with the election of George
Bush,
in U.S.

policy along with

a

a

new pragmatism emerged

willingness to repair U.S. -Latin

American relations and inter-American
institutions.
time,

At the same

the winding down of the cold war and
a new understanding

between the superpowers on regional conflicts
after 1987 vastly
reduced the East-West dimensions of Central
America's crises.

These

international changes presented clear opportunities
for the Central

American presidents to maintain their commitment
to the spirit
not the letter of Esquipulas;

if

they also permitted the post-

Esquipulas summits to forge ahead and new peace initiatives
to
emerge.

With continued international support —from the Group
of

Eight, the United States, the OAS and the

UN—

the Central Americans

eventually succeeded in resolving their most violent civil and interstate conflicts.

The signing of the UN-sponsored cease fire

agreement in El Salvador in January 1992 represents the culmination

.
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of the Central

African peace process begun nine
years earlier.

The

Contadora Group's original
call for peace has been
answered.

Contadora, Esquipulas, and the
Future of the Inter-American
System

The Central American peace
process represents both continuity
and change for the
inter-American system.

It was rooted

in the

Bolivaran traditions and historical
development of Latin American
diplomacy.
The Contadora phase of the
peace process was especially
reminiscent of Latin America's
nineteenth century practice of
regional consultation and defensive
solidarity in the face of

perceived foreign military threats.

The Contadora process also

echoed the experience of the ABC powers'
mediation efforts between
the United States and factions in
Mexico's civil war earlier in this

century
More importantly, the Central American
peace process of the
1980s recalled the history of divergent interests
between the United

States and the leading Latin American states
in the inter-American

system for most of the past century.
II period,

In much of the post World War

this divergence —indeed, the identity crisis
of the OAS

over whether it was an organization to promote hemispheric
security
in the cold war or regional economic cooperation
and
led

to the structural dysfunction of the OAS.

development-

After the 1982 South

Atlantic War, the breakdown of the OAS seemed complete.

The

unilateralism of the Reagan administration and the renewal of the

372

cold war during the
1980s meant that the OAS system
could not

guarantee hemispheric security
nor promote economic development
to
relieve the hemisphere's
economic and debt crises. For
the
deepening crises in Central
America, the OAS surely could
not
Provide real conflict resolution,
for which OAS mechanisms had
always been weak.
With divergent perspectives
and interests in the
Central American crises from
those of Washington, the Contadora
Group undertook its mediation
efforts.
Beyond its roots in the past, the
Central American peace
process represented the outgrowth
of

a

new Latin American diplomacy

for both the Contadora and the
Central American states.

More

active, more capable, more autonomous,
the Contadora Group states

sought to secure their new regional
interests by coordinating their

positions, pooling their resources, and
developing an ongoing
process of multilateral mediation.

The focus of this multilateral

diplomacy soon spread beyond Central America
and led to new
multilateral initiatives addressing regional debt
and economic
recovery that involved still more Latin American
states.

diplomacy brought

a

This new

proliferation of diplomatic contacts, both

formal and informal, between the Group of Eight, the
Central

Americans, and other Latin American states.

Most significantly, it

brought the civilian presidents of Latin America together on
numerous occassions during the 1980s.

At both formal working

summits and through informal meetings at their colleagues'

inaugurations, presidential summitry played an important role

in
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both the Contadora and
Es quipulas phases of
thg peace

-rked

a

^

significant innovation in
Latin American diplomacy.

The Central African
peace process provides
i.portant lessons
for the nature of
contemporary inter-American
relations but also
raises new questions for
future research.
The peace process
illustrates the increased
Latin American ability to
identify and act
on national interests,
even if they conflict with
those of the
United States.
It also suggests that
the Central Americans

underwent their own diplomatic
apprenticeship during the 1980s.
It
remains to be seen what long term
effect the peace process will
have
on the diplomatic capabilities
of the Central
is

African states.

It

clear that much more systematic
research needs to be undertaken

on the foreign policy
subsystems of the Central American
states to

understand the extent of change the
peace process may have brought
to the region's diplomatic
capabilities, but this promises to be
a

fascinating topic for future research.
The Central American peace process
also shows us that Latin

American solidarity and multilateral
action can lead to finding room
for maneuver to protect certain foreign
policy interests, despite
the continued dependency of these
states.

This dependency still

subjects Latin America's foreign policies to
real constraints in the

international system.

No study of Latin American foreign policy
or

diplomacy can ignore the international context
Americans act.

in

which the Latin

But even within those constraints, it is clear
that

Latin American states can coordinate their foreign
policies, pool
their diplomatic resources, and share the political risks
to ensure
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their relative foreign
policy autonomy within the
international and
inter-American system.
Research into the Latin
on the

debt crisis during the
1980s which grew out of the Contado:
)ra
diplomacy would provide more
useful insights into this
area of
contemporary Latin American
diplomacy.

Finally, the Central American
peace process demonstrates the
need for the United States
to take Latin American states
and their
foreign policy interests more
seriously. Divergent interests

between the United States and Latin
America can no longer be ignored
for very long because the Latin
Americans will act to ensure their
interests.

The Bush administration has been
able to repair much of

the damage to the inter-American
system during the 1980s by working

with Latin America, not against it.
something of

a

The OAS has even undergone

revival since 1989 with Bush's more
pragmatic and

multilateral style.

In Central America,

particularly in the contra

demobilization and later in the Salvadoran peace
process, the OAS
and UN played significant roles

—with both

that deserve more detailed study.

U.S.

and Latin

support-

In Panama and Haiti, OAS

delegations have sought to use diplomacy first to
mediate political
solutions to anti-democratic coups.
These positive developments in the inter-American
system should
not obscure the fact that divergence between U.S. and
Latin American

interests can reemerge.

After all, Latin American states and the

United States still have very different levels of economic

development and very different roles

in the

international system.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the cold war now finally

375

over, the possibility
of new North-South

i ssues

coming to dominate

the agenda of inter-American
relations is greater.

Moreover, Latin

policies that conflict with
the United States can no
longer be
interpreted as "anti-U. S.
" and therefore "pro-Moscow."
This

development may allow the Latin
American states more room for
maneuver in their foreign and
domestic policies. And despite
improved U.S.-Latin relations,
it is unlikely that Latin
American
states will confine their foreign
policies to the western
hemisphere.

Even the Central Americans will
continue to cultivate

relations with the European Community
while the leading Latin states
will continue to play an active
role in the United Nations.
As

in the pre-cold war era of

U.S.-Latin relations, we can

expect that Latin American states will
most likely be willing to
work with the United States and cooperate
on regional issues,

particularly those relating to economic
development,
possible.

if at all

But Latin American states will continue
to resist

unilateralism by the United States and will expect
to be treated
good neighbors.

as

The leading Latin American states have the

diplomatic capacity to assert their own interests and
defend them.
This is what the Central American peace process
was all about.
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